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Helen Xanthaki 
Secondary Establishment of European Union Public Limited 
Companies in France, Greece and Italy: 
Breaches of European Community Law and Redress 
Abstract 
The thesis analyses the secondary establishment of foreign European Union public 
companies limited by shares in France, Greece and Italy. 
The conditions for the establishment of branches, agencies and subsidiaries in 
the three countries are presented. Their compliance with European Community law is 
evaluated. Although the formal conditions for the recognition and secondary establish-
ment of foreign companies comply with European Community law, national legislative 
and administrative practices limit the activities allowed to foreign persons and violate 
their free establishment, as confirmed by the European Court of Justice. This proves the 
first hypothesis: the companies' freedom of establishment is still violated. The second 
hypothesis is that the persistence of France, Greece and Italy to continue these viola-
tions is mainly due to the lack of effective judicial protection for foreign companies suf-
fering damages as a result. Judicial protection at the national level, in national judicial 
proceedings, even where the European Union principle of state liability is raised, is inef-
fective due to the privileges of the state in actions against it. In view of the currently 
minimal role that individuals may play in proceedings before the European Court of 
Justice, the only manner in which protection at the European Union level can be sought 
is through the Francovich scenario, which combines state liability and preliminary rul-
ings from the European Court of Justice. The inefficiencies of national proceedings and 
the inherent problems of indirect actions before the European Court of Justice render the 
Francovich scenario inadequate for the protection of companies. This proves the second 
hypothesis. 
In the future a possible, yet untested, new interpretation of concurrent liability 
may allow companies to seek redress before the Euro.pean Courts on the basis of con-
current liability between the breaching Member State and the Community for failure of 
the Commission to perform its supervisory duty. 
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CHAPTER! 
Introduction 
The thesis tackles the issue of breaches of EC law committed by French, Italian and 
Greek national authorities in the field of secondary establishment of foreign public 
companies limited by shares. The examination of this topic revolves around two main 
hypotheses. First, breaches of EC law in the selected field still take place in the three 
chosen countries. Second, this is mainly due to the lack of effective judicial protection 
offered to companies suffering damages as a result of these violations. 
In order to prove these hypotheses, the thesis refers to six topics examined in six 
separate chapters. Chapter 2 places the topic into its legal framework from an EC law 
perspective. It presents the primary and secondary EC legislation on the freedom of es-
tablishment of foreign companies with particular emphasis to the secondary establish-
ment of public limited companies. The information provided in the description of EC 
law on Arts.39-45 in Chapter 2 is used as a comparative basis for the examination of the 
compliance of French, Greek and Italian law with EC legislation in Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
These Chapters present different areas of national provisions relating to the sec-
ondary establishment of foreign public limited companies in order to evaluate the com-
pliance of the relevant national legislation with EC law. Chapter 3 begins with the pres-
entation of the theories of recognition within the three selected countries. The topic of 
Chapter 3 is of fundamental significance for the development of this analysis. In order 
to establish within the selected Member States, foreign companies need to be recognised 
as subjects of rights and obligations by the national legislation of France, Italy and 
Greece. Lack of recognition signifies lack of legal existence which leads to a practical 
abolition of the possibility to establish at all. The evaluation of the compliance of the 
relevant national provisions with EC law on recognition and on the determination of the 
criterion under which this recognition is made constitutes the aim of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 presents the formal requirements for the establishment of secondary 
units by foreign public limited companies in France, Italy and Greece. Recognised for-
eign companies need to follow a formal procedure in order to acquire the right to func-
10 
tion within the selected Member States. The fulfilment of these formal requirements al-
lows foreign secondary units to exercise their right to establishment presented in Chap-
ter 2. Chapter 4 compares these formal requirements with EC legislation and assesses 
their compliance under the prism of their possible use as obstacles to the functioning of 
foreign secondary units within the three selected countries. 
Recognised and legally established foreign secondary units exercise their right to 
free establishment through the national legislative and administrative regulations which 
delimit the nature of the activities allowed to foreign legal units, the type of products 
tradable by foreign units and the corollary activities of the right to establishment. 
Chapter 4 brings into light discriminatory restrictions in the right of foreign companies 
to establishment. The Chapter focuses on persistent violations of EC law which have 
been declared as such by the ECl. This choice reflects the need for a judicially declared 
violation of EC law in order to allow the evolution of the second hypothesis of the the-
sis concerning the protection offered to foreign companies suffering damages due to 
such violations at the national and the EU levels. The discovery of breaches of EC law 
in the field of company establishment proves the first hypothesis of the thesis, namely 
that breaches ofEC law in this field ofEC legislation still occur. 
Chapter 6 presents the procedural rules for the submission of a claim for state 
liability due to violations of EC law within the three selected countries. These rules are 
evaluated in order to establish whether protection for foreign companies at the national 
level is adequate. Emphasis is given to the privileges of the state in civil and adminis-
trative procedures in France, Italy and Greece as these are the main hurdles to the route 
of companies to compensation. 
Chapter 7 follows on the theme of Chapter 6, but looks at the effectiveness of 
judicial protection from the point of view of the EU. The feeble position of the individ-
ual in EC law is presented and the effectiveness of the Francovich scenario, as the cur-
rent remedy for the achievement of compensation for damages suffered due to viola-
tions of EC law by Member States, is assessed. The effectiveness of state liability as a 
doctrine applied before the national courts is largely affected by the often unsurpassable 
procedural hurdles of Chapter 6 in cases against the state in all three selected countries 
at the national level. Chapter 7 analyses the effectiveness of state liability as a means of 
offering judicial protection at the EU level, namely" when combined with a preliminary 
reference before the ECl. Particular emphasis is given to the inherent problems of any 
EU indirect remedy, which mainly derive from the reluctance of French, Greek and 
Italian judges to recognise the judicial role that ECl judges may play in the national 
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system of judicial process. In concluding that the judicial protection currently offered to 
foreign companies both at national and at the EU levels is ineffective, the thesis looks 
into a new, possibly futuristic remedy, whose future adoption by the ECl may offer ef-
fective judicial protection to EU companies. The proposed remedy utilises the mecha-
nism of the already existing principle of concurrent liability between Member States and 
EU institutions, and revives it under the prism of the state liability related case-law of 
the Eel. The end result is the proposition that foreign EU companies suffering damages 
as a result of the breaches of EC law by Member States presented in Chapter 5 may 
manage to achieve compensation on the basis of concurrent liability between the 
breaching Member State a~d the Community for the failure of the Commission to per-
form its supervisory duties adequately. However, with reference to the current situation, 
the ineffectiveness of the state liability doctrine proves the second hypothesis of the the-
sis, that foreign companies suffer from lack of judicial protection, a factor which may be 
seen to explain the reasons for the existence of so many persistent breaches of EC law 
within the three selected countries after almost forty years of legal integration. 
The research for a topic involving the presentation and comparative analysis of 
four different legal systems, the EU and the three selected jurisdictions, would be in-
complete without regular visits to the countries involved and the European Commission. 
Annual visits to the libraries of the Universities of Sapienza in Rome and the University 
of Naples, more frequent visits to the Cujas library at the Sorbonne in Paris, and regular 
study at the library of the Athens Bar Association made access to the relevant national 
legal materials easier. Further research in the library of the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies in London, the library of the European Commission in Brussels, the library of 
the ECl and the Internet ensured access to further national materials. Requests for in-
formation from the Athens Supreme Court and Council of the State, which even allowed 
me access to their private libraries, the Italian Corte Supremo and Consiglio dello stato, 
and the French Conseil d'Etat completed the necessary research for case-law in the 
three selected jurisdictions where traditionally few cases are published in legal journals. 
The result of this work is reflected in my use of unreported national cases, easily identi-
fied in the list of cases at the national level annexed to this thesis. With reference to Ee 
law, the research to aspects of the freedom of establishment and initial reactions to the 
proposed remedy of Chapter 7 was possible through "close collaboration with Mr. Costas 
Popotas, the Automation Officer of the library of the ECl, and frequent communication 
with Ms Virginie Guennelon and other officials in DG IV of the European Commission. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the chosen topic it is worth noting that 
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the main reason for the choice of the three selected countries lies with their records in 
the transposition of EC legislation into national law. According to the latest statistics of 
the ECJ, the number of open infringement proceedings by Member States (situation on 
29 November 1999) indicate that France has the worst record of infringements of EC 
law with 274 breaches, Italy is the second worst with 202 and Greece is the third worst 
with 175 breaches [see Graph 1]. In the previous available figures (situation on 25 
August 1999) France had again the worst record of infringements with 254 violations, 
Italy came second with 193 violations and Greece was third with 169 infringements [see 
Graph 2]. Moreover, the highest number of infringement proceedings initiated between 
1953 and 1998 was brought against Italy with 355 actions. The second highest number 
was against Belgium with 225 actions, whereas France and Greece came third and 
fourth with 185 and 160 actions accordingly [see Table 1]. Furthermore, the transposi-
tion rate for Directives in the three chosen countries are amongst the lowest in the EU 
with Italy at the lowest position with 1377 Directives transposed so far followed by 
Greece with 1366, Luxembourg with 1372 and France with 1377 Directives transposed 
[see Table 2]. It is also worth noting that according to the latest statistics of the ECJ on 
31 December 1998 France had the highest number of cases brought against it with 42 
cases, followed by Belgium with 34, Italy with 31 and Greece with 28 cases [see Graph 
3]. Thus, the three countries selected for analysis in this theses are, at least currently, the 
worst violators of EC law. Moreover, the three selected countries are civil law jurisdic-
tions, thus presenting a commonality in the structure of their legal systems, in their mer-
cantilist philosophy and in their specific legal provisions. This facilitates comparative 
work. Furthermore, all three countries are situated in the Mediterranean and have com-
mon interests in specific areas of commercial activity, such as maritime transport and 
tourism. This poses a very interesting question concerning the reasons for the existence 
of common EC violations, namely whether these occur due to commercial interests 
shared by the three states chosen here or whether these occur due to the lack of effective 
protective mechanisms for foreign individuals suffering damages as their result. 
The choice of the field of EC law analysed here was again a mixture of scientific 
interest and record of infringements. According to the latest statistics of the ECJ the 
number of open infringement proceedings by sector (situation on 29 November 1999) 
demonstrate that there are 413 cases related to Internal Market, 370 concerning the envi-
ronment and 343 concerning agriculture [see Graph 4]. The previous figures (situation 
on 25 August 1999) brought once again Internal Market first with 397 cases, then agri-
culture with 336 violations, then the environment with 332 breaches and transport with 
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208 [see Graph 5]. The selection of the companies' freedom of establishment as a spe-
cific area of the Internal Market sector derived from the discovery of many such 
breaches ofEC law in my M.1ur. thesis, also submitted at Durham University. 
The thesis refers to the establishment of one type of company, namely public 
companies limited by shares. The examination of the establishment of all possible types 
of companies within the three selected countries would be impossible for the purposes 
of a thesis of this length, as each company type within each of the three chosen jurisdic-
tions is regulated by a special set of provisions. The choice of public companies limited 
by shares was made on the basis of the consideration that public limited companies, 
usually the most financially robust type of company, would be the most probable form 
to both desire and be able to expand abroad. l This form of company, namely the British 
public company limited by shares, is considered to correspond to the Greek Anonimos 
Eteria, the French Societe Anonyme and the Italian Societa per Azioni. 2 This is now 
widely accepted amongst legal commentators and is demonstrated beyond doubt by the 
secondary EC legislative texts on Company Law.3 Despite some problems in the past, 
the matter is now considered to be resolved.4 Without further reference to this issue, 
therefore, this thesis will proceed with the analysis of the secondary establishment of 
foreign EU companies of this type in Greece, France and Italy. 
In view of the recent guidelines of the Eel for the correct manner of citation of 
Articles of the EC Treaty and the Treaty of the European Union, it is exclusively the 
new numbering which is used in the thesis. For the facilitation of readers with experi-
ence in the old numbering, a conversion table is included at the end of the thesis. 
Developments after the end of February 2000 have not been taken into account. 
1 The concept of the public limited company is often introduced "to facilitate the creation of self-
supporting and viable businesses that would accumulate large sums for the development and modernisa-
tion of the country's commercial and industrial infrastructure". See B. Sheppard, How to Set up a Com-
pany in the EC (1992, Mercury Books, London), p.95. 
2 See Brebner and Co, Setting up a Company in the European Community, A Country by Country Guide 
(1990, Kogan Page Ltd in association with the London Chamber of Commerce, London), pp.106, 66 and 
142 respectively. Also see Karavas, Commercial Law, (1952, Sakkoulas, Athens), p. 84: "The public lim-
ited by shares company of the Anglo-Saxon legal system correspond to the Greek Anonimos Eteria, 
whereas private companies limited by shares correspond to the Greek Eteria Periorismenis Efthinis." 
3 The Proposal of the Fifth Directive on the structure of public limited companies stipulates that it ap-
plies to "public limited companies" in the UK, Societe Anonyme in France and Aktiengesellschaft in Ger-
many. Therefore, it can be stated the Directive treats these three national company forms as analogous. 
Similar reference is made by Directive 77/911EC. Analogous company forms in other EU member states 
are Societe Aninyme-naamloze vennootschap in Belgium, aktieselkebet in Denmark, societe anonyme in 
Luxembourg, societa per azioni in Italy, naamloze venootschap in the Netherlands, public company lim-
ited by shares in Ireland, sociedad anonima in Spain and sociedade anonima de responsibi/idade Iimitada 
in portugal. 
4 See Brebner and Co, op. cit., p.l 06, where it is noted that "Due to differences in legal tradition, private 
and public companies in the UK are not completely equivalent or analogous to private and public compa-
nies on continental jurisdictions". 
• 
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Table 1 
Actions for failure to fulfil obligations 
Brought against 1998 from 1953 to 1998 
Belgium 22 225 
Denmark 1 21 
Germany 5 122 
Greece 17 160 
Spain 6 60 
France 22 185 
Ireland 10 84 
Italy 12 355 
Luxembourg 8 86 
Netherlands 3 59 
Austria 4 5 
Portugal 5 41 
Finland 1 1 
Sweden 1 1 
United Kingdom 1 41 
Total 118 1446 
Source: Statistical Information on the Court of Justice (1998) in http://europa.eu.int. 
15 
Table 2 
Transposition of Directives per Member State 
Directives Appli- Directives for which Percentage noti- Percentage notiflca-
Member States cable on 31-12- implementing meas- flcation rate on tion rate on 31-12-
1998 ures have been noti- 31-12-1998 1997 
fled 
Denmark 1453 1427 98.21% 97.00% 
Spain 1458 1420 97.39% 95.10% 
Finland 1453 1411 97.11% 96.30% 
Sweden 1454 1411 97.04% 97.30% 
Germany 1459 1411 96.71% 93.60% 
Netherlands 1459 1410 96.64% 96.40% 
United Kingdom 1455 1402 96.36% 94.70% 
Ireland 1452 1387 95.52% 94.10% 
Austria 1461 1388 95.00% 94.30% 
Portugal 1462 1386 94.80% 93.50% 
Belgium 1459 1382 94.72% 91.80% 
France 1458 1377 94.44% 93.60% 
Luxembourg 1457 1372 94.17% 94.20% 
Greece 1456 1366 93.82% 92.80% 
Italy 1457 1364 93.62% 92.50% 
EC average 1457 1394 95.70% 94% 
Source: European Commission, Update of the Single Market 1998, 
http:/ /europa.eu.intlcommlsg/ sgb/infringements/pdf/text_rap98 _en/pdf. 
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Graph 1 
Breakdown by MmJer State of the 2029 open Infringement proceedings 
(situation on 29 N:>venrer 1999) 
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Graph 2 
Number of open infringement proceedings by Member State 
Situation on 25 August 1999 
Source: http://europa.eu.intlcommlsg/sgb/infringements/pdf/ms_en.pdf 
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Graph 3 
45 
42 Cases before the Court of Justice on 31-12-1998 
Source: European Commission, Update of the Single Market 1998, 
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/sg/ sgb/infringements/pdf/text_rap98 _en/pdf. 
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Graph 4 
Breakdown by sector of the 2029 open infringement proceedings 
Situation on 29 November 1999 
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Source http://europa.eu.intlcommlsg/sgb/infringements/pdf/ms_en.pdf 
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Graph 5 
Number of open infringement proceedings by sector 
Situation on 25 August 1999 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Companies' Freedom of Establishment 
Under EC Lawl 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first hypothesis of this thesis is that violations of EC law in the field of company 
establishment still occur within the three selected countries. In order to prove this hy-
pothesis, the thesis will describe and analyse the rights granted to companies which, 
being considered under EC law to have the nationality of one of the EU Member States, 
wish to plant a secondary establishment within other Member States under Arts.43-48. 
Chapter 2 will define and describe the content of the freedom of establishment as it is 
introduced by Arts.43-48 and interpreted by secondary EC legislation and ECl judge-
ments. Particular emphasis will be given to the nature of company activities liberalised 
by the relevant EC legislation. It is intended that, through the clarification of the rele-
vant EC legislation and the consequent provision of a clear measure of comparison, this 
chapter will constitute the theoretical background for the assessment of the legality of 
the Greek, French and Italian national laws on the establishment of foreign EU compa-
nies within their boundaries. 
Under Art.43 restrictions to the freedom of establishment of nationals of a 
Member State in the territory of another Member State or restrictions in the setting up of 
agencies, branches, or subsidiaries of foreign legal persons established in the territory of 
any Member State shall be abolished. It is widely accepted that the legal basis of the 
freedom of establishment, which according to Art.43 includes the right to pursue activi-
ties as a self-employed person, as well as the right to set up and manage undertakings 
under the same conditions as the nationals of the host Member State, lies in Art.12 
1 Past versions of this chapter has been published in H. Xanthaki, "The right of legal persons to estab-
lish within the EU: An overview" [1996] Rivista di Diri1to Europeo, pp.641-675; H. Xanthaki, "Secon-
dary Establishment of Companies within the EU: A Real Challenge or Another Missed Opportunity?" 
[1999] European Business Law Review, pp.120-139. 
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which prohibits any discrimination due to nationality. Insofar as companies are con-
cerned, the scope of the freedom of establishment is to allow the setting up and func-
tioning of the foreign undertakings described in Art.48 under the conditions introduced 
by national law for the natural and legal persons nationals of the receiving state.2 It must 
be accepted therefore that equality in treatment between foreign and domestic compa-
nies within the EU should include not only liberalisation of the conditions for the setting 
up of the company, but also for the recognition of foreign legal entities as legal persons. 
The reason behind this is self-explanatory: the company's freedom to establish within 
another Member State would lack practical value if the company is not recognised as a 
legal entity by the domestic law of the host country. Indeed, a company not recognised 
as a legal entity by the national law of the receiving country lacks legal personality. It 
would therefore simply not exist as far as the receiving country's national law is con-
cerned, thus making the renting or purchase of premises, the employment of workers, 
the participation in any kind of contract or even its procedurally admissible presence 
before the administrative or judicial authorities of the host state legally impossible. 
Even if the host state is prepared to recognise the legal personality of foreign legal enti-
ties, however, another -possibly more important- issue arises. Under which nationality 
will the legal entity in question be recognised?3 In other words, which is the legal sys-
tem applicable to the company's internal structure and external relationships (lex/ori). 
Since recognition is a prerequisite of the freedom of establishment of foreign 
companies, without which the right to establishment lacks practical value, the analysis 
of the freedom of establishment must begin with the exploration of the regime for the 
recognition of foreign legal entities within the EU. 
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Bl. Basic Principles on Recognition 
The basic issue of company recognition, namely whether EU Member States do in prin-
ciple recognise the legal personality of foreign legal entities, is easily resolved. For the 
past two decades (at least) all EU Member States follow the liberal theory or theory of 
ipso jure recognition, according to which foreign companies are recognised as legal en-
2 See P. Craig and G. de Burca, EC Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (1995, Clarendon Press, Oxford), 
p.744. . . . 
3 The identification of the two aspects of the problem of recognition should be attributed to G. StreIt 
and P. Vallindas, Private International Law (1937, Athens, Greece), p.90. 
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tities without the need for further administrative or legal, substantial or formal require-
ments, provided that they were legally formed according to their lex fori. 4 As Cath 
notes, the only requirement for "a company to exist and function is a document of in-
corporation"s. 
However, the issue of the determination of the national legal system under 
which recognition is to be made is still in debate. The matter is of significant theoretical 
and practical interest, because the company's lex fori also regulates the company's va-
lidity, legal formation, function and dissolution, internal administration (attorneyship, 
valid decisions etc.), external relations (representation, entering into legal transactions, 
liability, etc.) and its nationality.6 Several criteria have been suggested for the determi-
nation of the companies' lex fori. Amongst those are the following: 7 
a. the nationality of the company's shareholders; 
b. the state where the company's aim is to be achieved (theory of aim); 
. c. the country where all necessary legal actions for the company's formation 
took place (theory of formation); 
d. the state where the company's main commercial activity takes place; 
e. the nationality of the persons controlling the company (theory of control); 
f. the state where the company's main activity occurs (siege d'exp[oitation); 
g. the state whose legal system applied for the creation of the legal person (state 
of residence), or, as Goldman puts it, "where the formalities for the creation of the com-
pany where completed".8 Due to the fact that the creation of the company is achieved by 
its incorporation, this theory is widely known as the "theory of incorporation"; and 
4 See I. Krispis, Legal persons and public limited companies in specific in private international law 
(1950, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.7, who adds that the main relevant theories are the following: 
a. theory ofterritory (the corporate body exists only within the boundaries of the state where it was cre-
ated); 
b. theory of reciprocity, or best known as comitas (due to international comitas legal systems implicitly 
recognise all foreign corporate bodies); 
c. theory of action by agents (the legal entity may not emigrate to another legal system; however, it 
may send its agents around the world and act exclusively through them); 
d. liberal or international theory which assimilates legal persons with natural ones: as all natural per-
sons are recognised by all legal systems without any further requirements, legal entities must be recog-
nised ipso jure all around the world. 
S See I. Cath, "Freedom of establishment of companies: A new step towards completion of the internal 
market" in Yearbook of European Law (1986, Clarendon Press, Oxford), p.248. 
6 See S. Megglidou, "On the establishment of foreign companies in Greece" [1971] Armenopoulos 200, 
p.201. 
7 See F. Wooldridge, Company law in the United Kingdom and the European Community, its Harmoni-
sation and Unification (1991, The Athlone Press, London), p.137; also see 1. Boukouras, Recogn~tion of 
companies and the right of establishment in the EC (1984, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.29-40; E. Perakls, The 
Law on Public Limited Companies (1992, H. Karatzas Legal Library, Athens), p.435; B. Goldman, EC 
Law (1973, Stevens and Sons, London), pp.187-190. 
8 See B. Goldman, op.cit., p.69. 
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h. the state where the company's seat is located (theory of the seat, which in-
cludes two doctrines: the theory of the statutory seat and the siege reel doctrine~. 
Within EU Member States and in intemationallegal theory the last two doctrines 
prevail, the theory of the siege reel and the theory of incorporation. 10 In order to assess 
which of these prevails in EC law, it is necessary to examine both briefly. 
B2. The Theory of the Siege Reel as Applied in the EU 
The theory of the siege reel, which prevails in most Continental jurisdictions,ll defines 
the company's lex fori as the law of the country where the company's seat or main of-
fice is located. For the determination of the company's seat several criteria have been 
used placing the siege reel in the location where: 
a. the main decisions on the company's operation and functioning are reached; 
b. the basic guidelines and orders for operation are produced; 12 or 
c. the management of the company is situated, namely where the meetings of the 
Board of Directors or of the shareholders take place, or where the single controlling 
shareholder resides. 13 
Legal experts have attempted to produce one single criterion for the determina-
tion of the siege reel. Commenting on the futility of such efforts, Krispis notes that the 
9 See R. Houin, "La regime juridique des societes dans la Communaute economique europeene [1965] 
Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen 20, p.20. The doctrine of the statutory seat uses as its criterion for 
the determination of the company's lexfori the place named in the company's Articles, whereas the the-
ory of the siege reel uses as a criterion the true seat of the company. It must be noted that the distinction is 
not unanimously accepted. I. Krispis, op. cit. , p.72 notes that the only acceptable distinction should be one 
between a true and a fictitious seat, since the company has the legal obligation to declare its true seat as 
its statutory one. 
10 See I. Krispis, op. cit. , p.3I; also see F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.I37; J. Boukouras, op. cit. , pp.29-40; I. 
Cath, op.cit., pp.249-252; Jadaud and Plaisant, Droit de Commerce International (1991, Dalloz, Paris), 
pp.39-41; S. F. Goldmann, The European Community (1990, Macmillan, London), pp.187-190. Also see 
H. Xanthaki, The establishment offoreign companies in Greece with particular reference to the compli-
ance of Greece with the law of the European Union (I 996a, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.15, who notes that 
underneath the controversy between the theory of the seat and the theory of incorporation lies the issue of 
the extent of commercial liberalism of the state in question. The theory of incorporation is an expression 
of liberalism, since it allows the company in question to chose its lexfori freely, whereas the theory of the 
seat aims to preserve this power for the respective state. 
11 The theory of the siege reel is widely supported in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Cyprus. See respectively, Jadaud at Plaisant, op.cit., p.35; also Supreme Court, S. 1870.1.373; S. 
1901.1.70; German Supreme Court 1882, RGZ 7 68; 1927 RGZ 117215; Italian Supreme Court, in 
Rivista Commerciale 1938,225; Belgian Commercial Code, Title IX, Art.197; Luxembourgeois Law on 
Commercial Companies of lOth August 1915, art.159; A. Irakleous, Companies and real insurance 
(1988, Nicosia), p.96; G. Broggini, "Sulle societa nel diritto internazionale privato" [1992] Rivista di 
diritto internazionale, pp.30-40. 
12 These two criteria are introduced by Jadaud et Plaisant, op.cit., p.35. 
13 See 1904 RG DJZ 9555; BFH NJW 1957 1896; RG JW 190421; BFH HFR 1965 170; the same 
criteria are also used by Pennington, Companies in the Common Market (1970, Oxez Publications, Lon-
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determination of a company's seat is a matter of fact and not law. Thus, one single crite-
rion applicable in every possible case is impossible to find and each case must be 
judged according to its particular factual circumstances. 14 It must be noted, however, 
that recently a new advanced version of the theory of the siege reel has emerged in 
France. The theory of the siege social places the company's seat in the location which 
fulfils a combination of two criteria: the basic criterion of the real seat and the correc-
tive criterion of control. Consequently, the siege social of a company is the place where 
the company's administrative organs meet and all necessary decisions for the achieve-
ment of the company's aim are taken:s Mayer points to an additional criterion: the 
company must also have a "financial bond" with the relevant national community. 16 The 
criterion of the financial bond (the but lucratif) is also mentioned in ArtA8. 
The doctrine of the true seat, either as siege reel or as siege social, distinguishes 
between the company's formal and its real seat, namely between the location where the 
company is registered and the place where legal, financial or other control is exercised. 
The theory of the seat may lead to total chaos, as it is impossible to predict its applica-
tion in judicial practice and its interpretation under each national law. Since no precise 
criterion for the determination of the true seat can -or at least has as yet- been produced, 
each national law may locate the company's seat in a place different from the one se-
lected by other national laws. Consequently, the company may end up having several 
different seats depending on the requirements of each national legislation. Even worse, a 
company incorporated in one state and truly established in another may end up with no 
seat at all, if it fails to comply with the interpretation of the true seat both in the state of 
incorporation and the state of true establishment. 17 This could easily occur if the state of 
the true seat follows the theory of incorporation, while the state of incorporation follows 
the siege reel doctrine. In this case the company would be refused the nationality of 
both states and would end up being considered non-existent in both countries. The main 
advantage of this theory lies with its effectiveness in preventing companies from ex-
ploiting the beneficial registration regulations of one country by formally registering 
there and then functioning in another country with favourable establishment conditions. 
Essentially, it prevents a situation where a company would enjoy the privileges of each 
don), pp.98-99; J. Boukouras, op.cit., pp.32-33; and P.M. North and J.1. Fawcett, Cheshire and North's 
Private International Law (1992, Butterworths, London), p.175. 
14 •• 't 64 See I. Knspls, Op.Cl ., p. . 
15 See Jadaud et Plaisant, op.cit., pp.34-35. 
16 See P. Mayer, Droit international prive (1991, Montchrestien, Paris), pp.611. 
17 See H. Xanthaki, 1996a, op.cit., p.47. 
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system without being submitted to the counterbalancing obligations (taxation etc.) of 
either of the two. 18 
B3. The Theory of Incorporation 
Common law systems adopt the theory of incorporation, according to which the lex fori 
of a legal person derives from the law of the country where the company was incorpo-
rated. 19 Since the country of the company's incorporation and the one of its domicile are 
identical, this theory is also known as the theory of the domicile.20 It should be made 
clear from the start that the domicile of the shareholders or directors, or of the company 
as a legal entity are irrelevant. The theory of incorporation also prevails in Denmark and 
the Netherlands. It is applied in Greece too, but only in limited circumstances and only 
if the law expressly provides SO.21 The main advantage of the theory of incorporation 
(compared with the siege reel doctrine) lies in the precision and clarity of the criterion 
used for the determination of the lex fori. Since the incorporation of a company can only 
take place in a single, easily determinable location, neither the incorporation itself nor 
the fact that it occurred in the location put forward by the company can be debated. 
Thus, the phenomenon of foreign companies being considered by other jurisdictions as 
either non-existent or illegally formed is unknown to legal systems applying the theory 
of incorporation. Moreover, the company itself is assured about its validity and legal 
formation in whichever country of the world it wishes to establish. The liberalism of the 
theory of incorporation is profound. It comes as no surprise to discover that it is appli-
cable in countries with a long-standing commercial maritime tradition, whereas the 
18 See J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.33; also see O.K. Morse, "Mutual recognition of companies in England 
and the EEC" [1972] Journal of Business Law, p.199. 
19 See P.M. North and J.1. Fawcett, op. cit. , p.175; also see Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines 
Ltd [1902] AC 484 at 497, 498, 501, 505; A -G v Jewish Colonisation Association [1901] 1 KG 123 at 
135; Kuenigl v Donnersmarck [1955] 1 QB 515 at 535, 536, [1955] 1 All ER 46 at 52, 53. 
20 For an extensive analysis of the theory of incorporation, see R. Pennington, op.cit., p.98; also see 
G.K. Morse, op. cit. , p.l96; 1. Boukouras, op.cit., p.31; also see Newby v. Van Oppen 1872, L.R. 7 
Q.B.293; National Bank of Greece v. Metliss 1958 A.C.309. 
It should be noted that according to UK law the statutory seat of a company can not be transferred 
elsewhere. Thus, if a company chooses to declare in its Articles of Association that its seat is locate~ in 
England, it is to be considered as an En~lish company (even ifits siege reel!s located ~lsewhe~e). Sm~e. 
the company shall then be incorporated 10 England, the company's place of mcorporatlOn and Its domicile 
are identical. 
21 Vrellis refers to maritime companies, as one of the few cases where Greek law applies the theory of 
incorporation. A second case concerns subsidiary companies. See S. Vrellis, Private International Law 
(1988, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.99. 
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protectionist theory of the seat is mostly encountered in countries with a more mercan-
tilist tradition.22 
The different theories on the recognition of foreign companies have caused inse-
curity in international and EU trade. The parallel existence of two contradicting theo-
ries, which may result to a company's dual nationality or to a total refusal of recogni-
tion, essentially contradicts the very notion of the Internal Market. EU Member States 
have repeatedly attempted to reach an agreement on the multilateral application of a 
single criterion for the recognition of foreign companies. This agreement was first 
sought within the framework of the 1956 Hague Convention on the Mutual recognition 
of Companies and, later, in the 1968 Brussels Convention of Mutual Recognition of 
Companies and Legal Entities. 
B4. The 1956 Hague Conference 
It was in the first post-war session of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law in 1951, that the issue of recognition for foreign companies, associations and foun-
dations as legal entities was first discussed.23 A draft Convention was adopted and fi-
nally signed by some of the participants in 1956. Although the Hague Conference is not 
yet in force2\ the participation of the majority of the then EEC Member States2S makes a 
brief analysis of its regulations noteworthy, as they reflect the different views on the 
recognition of foreign companies within most of the then EEC states. Thus, it is fair to 
say that the importance of the Hague Convention lies more with the fact that the issue of 
company recognition was finally put forward, than with the actual results produced. 
Under the provisions of the Conference foreign companies, associations and 
foundations are recognised as legal entities, as long as there are no public policy issues 
dictating non-recognition (Art.8) and provided that under the law of their lex fori they 
22 See H. Xanthaki, 1996a, op. cit., p.48. 
23 The Hague Conference on Private International Law was founded in 1893 on the initiative of the 
Dutch Government. In 1925, it took the form of an international organisation with a permanent secretar-
iat. B. Goldman, 1973, op. cit. , p.69 notes that the issue of recognition of foreign legal persons as legal 
entities was on the agenda of the 1928 Conference, but was not discussed. Professor Basdevant (a French 
representative) suggested that the issue ought to be discussed in the next session. The proposal was ac- . 
cepted and the issue was brought up in the next session, which, however, took place a few decades later In 
1951. 
24 Art. I I provides that the Convention shall come into force once all the signatories have ratified it. 
Five countries have declined to do so and the Convention still remains unratified. 
2S The following countries participated in the Hague Conference: Austria, Finland, Japan, Spain, the 
UK, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands. Yugoslavia sent an observer. 
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can own property, enter into contracts and undertake other legal actions.26 The Confer-
ence determines the company's lex fori as the law of the state where the formalities of 
registration and publication have been completed. Thus, under Art. I of the Conference 
the legal personality acquired by a company under the law of the participating state, 
where the formalities of registration and publication have been complied with and 
where it has its statutory office, shall be recognised as of right in the other signatory 
states. At the same time, however, the Conference gives the countries of the siege reel 
doctrine the opportunity to refuse recognition to companies which (complying with the 
text of the Conference itself) held as their lex fori the law of the state of their incorpora-
tion, even though they were really seated within the state whose recognition they 
sought. Art.2 of the Conference states that "personality acquired under the provisions of 
Article I need not be recognised in another contracting state whose law takes the real 
headquarters into consideration, if these are considered as being on its territory". 
From the combination of the two recognition clauses it becomes clear that, in 
their effort to acquire agreement on a text on recognition, the signatories of the Con-
vention avoided to deal with the substance of this issue. Thus, they ended up in merely 
acknowledging the existing contradiction between the theories of incorporation and of 
the siege reel, without achieving a viable solution in the problem of the choice between 
the two. This probably explains why the Conference is still not ratified. It must be ac-
cepted, however, that the Convention is far from useless. It is the first international legal 
text regulating the ipso jure recognition of foreign companies, while at the same time 
regulating that states following the siege reel doctrine can not refuse recognition to for-
eign companies incorporated in a state other than the one where the company's real 
headquarters are situated, provided that both the state of the incorporation and the one 
of the real seat adopt the theory of incorporation.27 Furthermore, the participation of the 
majority of the then EEC Member States in the Hague Conference smoothed the way 
towards an agreement on the text of the next relevant international instrument, the 1968 
Brussels Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities. 
26 It must be noted that according to B. Goldman, 1973, op.cit, p.70 the Conference is applicable exclu-
sively to private companies. Moreover, Art. 1 provides that the Conference is applicable not o~l~ to .com-
panies, but also to associations and foundations. Since national law regulations in several partlclpatmg 
countries do not consider foundations and associations as legal persons, Art.9 stipulates that each country 
may limit the Convention's field of application. It should be noted that although France had some objec-
tions concerning the recognition of foreign foundations, it did not use the limiting power offered by Art.9. 
As far as companies are concerned, there were no disagreements. 
27 See B. Goldman, 1973, op.cit., p.72, who notes that: "Thus, the upshot is that only if a company set 
up in one country has its real headquarters in another country which itself adopts the system of incorpora-
tion, must all contracting states (including those which take the real headquarters into consideration rec-
ognise it". 
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B5. The EU View on Recognition 
Art.293 imposes an obligation on EU Member States to "enter into negotiations with 
each other" in order to secure the mutual recognition of companies, which some con-
sider a prerequisite28 and others a course of action29 towards the freedom of establish-
ment. After the failure of the Hague Conference to meet the needs of the then EEC 
Member States30, further agreement on the recognition of companies was sought by the 
states themselves. This effort resulted in the 1968 Brussels "Convention of Companies 
and Legal Entities" which, unfortunately, is not yet ratified by the Netherlands and is 
still not in force. 31 In spite of the improbability of the enforcement of the Convention in 
the near future,32 an analysis of its text is necessary for three main reasons. First, it illus-
trates the general attitude towards the recognition of foreign companies within the EU. 
Second, it is the only relevant EC legislative text. Third, it can be used as an authentic 
interpretation of the vague and ambiguous Art.293. 33 
It is widely accepted that the Convention basically adopts the incorporation the-
ory. However (as was the case with the Hague Convention), possible exceptions to the 
application of the incorporation theory lead to the possibility of a de facto abolition of 
this doctrine in favour of the doctrine of the siege reel. The basic concept of the Con-
28 J. Boukouras, op.cit., pp.43-44 notes that the refusal for recognition of a company could lead to the 
refusal of the company's right of establishment within the EU. He also states that the then Art.58 (new 
48) indirectly regulates the Member States' obligation to recognise foreign companies as legal entities, 
since without recognition the content of the freedom of establishment would be "deceptive". 
29 See K. Lipstein, The Law of the EEC (1974, Butterworths, London), p.248, who notes that the 
Treaty's main aim (which is the free movement of persons) can only be accomplished through two 
courses of action: 
a. the recognition of foreign companies; and 
b. the adoption of a common system of Company Law. 
30 See B. Goldman and A. Lyon-Caen, A., Droit Commercial Europeen (1983, Dalloz, Paris), p.192, 
who note that the Hague Conference (apart from the fact that it was not in force) did not cover the needs 
of EC Member States, because it left room for non-recognition of companies from the countries following 
the doctrine of the siege reel. At the same time, the then Arts. 52-58 EEC on the freedom of establishment 
determined the matter in such an abstract way, that the recognition of companies from all EC Member 
States was far from certain. 
31 Preparations for the Convention began in June 1962, the fmal text was laid open for signature on 
20.1.1966 at Strasbourg and was fmally signed in Brussels on 29.2.1968. The Convention was interpreted 
by the Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of29 February 
1968 on the mutual recognition of companies and legal persons, signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 1971. 
32 F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.135, notes that it "appears highly unlikely" that the Convention will come 
into force, because "of the prolonged failure" ofthe Netherlands to ratify the Convention and the Addi-
tional Protocol of 1971 conferring jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice and "of the doubts of the 
new members, which undertook to accede to the Convention's Art.3 of the respective Acts of Association 
and to negotiate modifications necessary for this purpose". 
33 For a detailed analysis on the importance of the Convention, see F. Caruso, La societa nella CEE: 
contributo alla teoria della nazionalita delle societa (1969, Casa Editrice Dott. Eugenio, Napoli), pp.21 0-
213. 
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vention lies in the statement that all legal entities34 are ipso jure recognised within the 
EU, provided that under its Arts.! and 2 of the Convention they: 
a. are formed in accordance with the commercial or civil law of their lexfori; 
b. are formed or incorporated under the law of any EU Member State; 
c. are registered, or have their statutory seat anywhere within the EU; 
d. are entitled to legal rights and are subject to legal obligations according to 
their lex fori, although under Art.8 they are not required to have legal personality;3S and 
e. aim to exercise economic activity normally for remuneration within the ED.36 
Three exceptions to the above general rules are provided by the Convention. The 
first two lead to the application of the theory of the siege reel, whereas the third excep-
tion refers to the usual notion of "public policy", which is also met in the Treaty of 
Rome and the Hague Conference, although under different terminology. Thus, the ipso 
jure recognition of legal entities can be refused on the basis that the relevant entity's 
siege reel is located outside of the Convention's territorial field of application and it has 
no genuine link37 with the economy of an ED Member State (Art.3). The company's real 
seat, as defined in Art.S, is the location of the central administration. Moreover, the ipso 
jure recognition may also be refused if the entity's real seat is located in the state, from 
which recognition is sought. In this case the respective authorities are obliged to offer 
recognition, but they reserve the right to offer it under the national mandatory38 provi-
sions applicable to domestic legal entities (Art.4).39 Furthermore, the regulations of the 
34 It is accepted that the Convention applies to civil and commercial law companies (Art. 1 ) and public 
organisations with profit-making object. See B. Goldman, 1973, op.cit., p.74. 
3S According to K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.250, Art.8 aims to expressly include in the Convention's field of 
application the German Offene Gesellschaft and the British partnership (both of which do have rights and 
obligations, but do not possess a legal personality under their lex fori). 
36 See R. Roblot, Traite elementaire de droit commercial (1984, Paris), p.I135; also see I. Cath, op.cit., 
p.252. According to K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.250, the Convention applies to legal entities which "normally" 
aim to make a profit. Since the Treaty of Rome expressly excludes entities without a but lucratiJfrom the 
application of Art.43, there appears to be a problem concerning the relationship between the two legal 
texts. If the term "normally" is considered to be a real criterion, then both provisions apply to the same 
range of activities: Art.48 excludes all non profit-making entities, while the Convention includes these 
entities, if they can operate with the aim of making a profit. If, however, this criterion is a legal one, then 
the Convention'S field of application is really wider that the Treaty's. 
37 The interpretation of the "genuine link" is still debatable. According to Stein, Harmonisation of 
European Company Law (1971, Bobbs and Merril, UK), p.397, note 202, this term is vague and unclear, 
but was included to prevent companies from non-EU Member States from demanding recognition on the 
grounds of possessing "a PO Box within the Community". 
38 G.K. Morse, op.cit., pp. 202-203 notes that Art.5 "represents the major concession to the real seat 
theory of recognition". He then interprets the "mandatory rules" as: " ... all those provisions in th~ Compa-
nies and other acts and decisions of the courts by which English companies are bound". Accordmg to J. 
Boukouras, op.cit., p.51, if the Convention is ratified, the ECJ shall have to determine and interpret these 
"mandatory rules". 
39 K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.251 and J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.53, state that non-mandatory rules are appl~ca­
ble only if there is no contradicting provision in the companies' Articles of Association (Art.4, par.~.I) 
and if the company can prove that it has operated for a substantial period of time within the state of Its 
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Brussels Convention may not apply if the entity's recognition may lead to harm in the 
host state's ordre public (Arts.9 and 10).40 It must be noted that the first exception to the 
theory of incorporation is phrased in such a vague and general manner, that "it leaves 
very little room to the theory of incorporation".41 The second exception actually regu-
lates the duality of the company's lex fori, since the company under recognition is com-
pelled to submit to the obligations imposed by the law of the state of its incorporation 
and by the mandatory provisions of the host state. As Stein notes, this duality forces the 
company to transfer its seat to the country where it was incorporated.42 
The role of the host country's law is described in Arts.6, 7 and 8 of the Conven-
tion. The company's lex fori (namely, the law of incorporation or of the siege reel) de-
termines its capacity. However, the host country may deny the company specific rights 
(even those granted by the company's lex fori), if the latter are not accorded to domestic 
companies of a corresponding type.43 It may only do so, if this denial is not in breach of 
private intemationallaw44 and does not diminish the company's capacity to have rights 
and obligations, to enter into contracts, to undertake other legal acts, or to take part in 
legal proceedings (Art.7). Such denial, however, can not be used by the recognised 
companies as a defence in law, as this right is reserved to domestic companies only.45 
Moreover, the capacity, rights and powers awarded to companies by the Convention 
may not be denied (wholly or partially) solely on the basis that the entity in question 
lacks legal personality under its lexfori (Art.8). 
incorporation (Art.4, par.2.ii). E. Cerexhe, Le Droit Europeen: La libre circulation des personnes et des 
entreprises (1991, Nauwelaerts, Brussels), p.349 notes that the regulation of Art.4 derives from art. 197 of 
the lois coordonees belges sur les societes and art.2505 of the Italian Code of Companies. 
40 The ordre public or public policy of the host state may be an obstacle to the recognition of legal enti-
ties within the EV. However, due to the vagueness of this provision Arts.9 and 10 also delineate the ap-
plication of "public policy". Public policy must therefore be interpreted within the meaning of private 
international law. This view is supported by K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.253; J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.58; B. 
Goldman, 1973, op.cit., p.76; G.K. Morse, op.cit., p.202; B.Goldman and A. Lyon-Caen, op.cit., p.200; 
and F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.140. It is argued that such ajustification for exclusion applies only in the 
cases of the one-man company, of rules contradicting the Treaties, of entities whose aim is believed to be 
other than profit-making (namely, purely political or propagandist), or of entities whose object, aim or 
activity may harm the host states' public health, morality or other vital interests. See B. Goldman, 1973, 
op.cit., p.76; also see B. Goldman and A. Lyon-Caen, op.cit., p.200. 
41 See I. Cath, op.cit., p.253. 
42 See Stein, op.cit., pp.411-412. 
43 I. Cath, op.cit., p.252, notes that the then Art. 7 (now repealed) must be considered as another ex-
ception to the general prevalence of the incorporation theory; 
44 K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.252, notes that Art.7 EEC is clearly an extension of the new Art.7. 
45 I. Cath, op.cit., p.253 notes that "Here again, the classical argument in favour of the si~ge reel.has 
crept in, i.e. that domestic companies should not be discriminated vis-a-vis foreign compames, subject to 
more lenient laws in relation to stricter domestic rules". 
J.Boukouras, op.cit., p.55 adds that in this manner foreign companies are denied rights th~t are con-
ferred upon them by the law of their lexfori, but which are also denied to domestic compames of the host 
state. Thus, foreign companies are not privileged vis-a-vis domestic companies. 
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Arts.6-8 of the Convention demonstrate the sincere efforts of all signatories for a 
compromise doctrine on recognition. However, due to the reluctance of the participating 
states to concede parts of their sovereignty, namely the imposition of national manda-
tory rules applicable to both domestic and foreign companies, the product of these ef-
forts is a rather vague legislative text full of contradictory regulations. Once again, there 
are so many extensive exceptions to the general rules that the basic provision is practi-
cally undermined. However, despite the Convention's failure to meet the needs of EU 
Member States concerning the recognition of foreign companies as legal entities, the 
Convention being the first of its kind within the EU constitutes an important step to-
wards the future adoption of common legislative measures in the field of the mutual 
recognition of companies. It can also be argued that due to the continuing harmonisation 
of company law, the need for the Convention "may perhaps have been lessened".46 
It is evident, therefore, that EC law follows the theory of ipso jure recognition of 
foreign legal entities. Such entities have legal personality provided that they have been 
awarded this right under the law of their lex jori, namely under the law of the country 
where these companies have their registered office, central administration or principle 
place of business. The latter also "serve as the connecting factor with the legal system of 
that particular state, like nationality in the case of natural persons". 47 It would seem 
therefore that no single theory for recognition of foreign companies is supported in the 
ED. The Treaty has taken into account the variety of relevant theories present in the 
laws of the Member States and has accepted both theories of incorporation and of siege 
reel. Since no agreements amongst Member States have been reached under Art.293, it 
seems that the established EC law position is the acceptance of both theories equally.48 
It must be noted, however, that a recent judgement of the ECJ may signify a 
change in the position of the ED in the field of recognition of foreign legal entities. In a 
request for a preliminary ruling the Court was called to rule whether the refusal of the 
Danish Trade and Companies Board to allow Centros Ltd, a private limited company 
registered on 18 May 1992 in England and Wales, to establish a branch in Denmark was 
in compliance with EC law. The legal basis of the refusal was the firm belief of the 
Board that the establishment of the company in Britain by its Danish owners was merely 
46 See F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.134; also see A. Papagiannidis andA. Christogiannopoulos, Clarifica-
tion of the Treaty of Rome (1981, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.558. 
47 See case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, con.18; also see case C-330/91 The Queen v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank ago [1993] ECR 1-4017, con.13; Opinion of Ad-
vocate General Lenz in case C-l/93 Hallibarton Services v Statssecretaris van Financien [1994] ECR J-
1137, con.l2. 
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a means of circumventing the Danish provision for the paying-up of a minimum share 
capital, as demonstrated by the fact that Centros never traded in the UK. The Board felt 
that the Danish branch would constitute a primary establishment and that Centros was 
obliged to comply with the relevant Danish provisions. The ECl ruled that Member 
States may not refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the 
law of another Member State in which it has its registered office, although Member 
States may adopt appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud either in rela-
tion to the company itself or in relation to its members, where it has been established 
that they are in fact attempting by means of the formation of a company to evade their 
obligations towards creditors within the state of reception.49 
Leaving the issue of fraud aside, Centros seems to be a clear sign of ECl support 
to the use of the criterion of incorporation for the determination of the company's lex 
fori to the detriment of the legal orders of countries following the true seat doctrine. It is 
interesting to note that the application of the Hague Conference and the Brussels Con-
vention to the Centros facts would lead to different rulings. Signatory states of the Con-
ference are allowed to refuse recognition to companies using their state of incorporation 
as their lex fori when their seat is located elsewhere, provided that both states involved 
follow the theory of incorporation. Thus, Denmark could refuse recognition, since Cen-
tros considers itself a British company even through its real seat is in Denmark. How-
ever, if the state of the seat was France, Greece or Italy, recognition could not have been 
avoided. If the Brussels Convention were to be applied, Denmark could not have re-
fused recognition, but it could have insisted that Danish laws on primary establishment 
are applied on the basis that the real seat is in Denmark, from which recognition is 
sought, and that the company has not functioned in the UK for a substantive period of 
time. Although neither the Conference nor the Convention are in force, they are indica-
tive of the intention of their signatories to accept both theories equally. This is reflected 
in the maintenance of both criteria in the Treaties and the past case-law of the ECl. It 
would therefore be premature to state that the EU no longer values the theory of the 
seat. In fact, Centros did not address the question of the companies' lex fori directly. 
Moreover, the ruling of ECl judges was reached in the light of the prevalence of the 
theory of incorporation in Denmark, which based its defense on other legal bases, such 
as the need for the protection of debtors and public order. In view of this, Centros can-
not be adequate for a change in the parallel prevalence of both theories in EC law. 
48 See case 81187 The Queen v H. M Treasury and ~ommissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily 
Mail and General Trust pic. [1988] ECR 5483; C-264/96 leI v Kolmer [1998] ECR 1-4675, con.20. 
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c. ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE EU 
Cl. Definition of Establishment 
The freedom of establishment of foreign legal entities is not synonymous to their recog-
nition. A state may recognise foreign companies, but set limitations or prohibit their es-
tablishment and functioning within its boundaries. so The freedom of establishment 
within the EU is regulated by Arts.39-48, according to which restrictions set by national 
laws for the establishment of companies owned or controlled by companies or persons 
from other Member States must be abolished.sl This is clearly an expression of the basic 
non-discrimination principle of Art. 12 which is considered lex generalis compared to 
Art.39S2 , as well as of the general aim of the EU to achieve "the abolition of obstacles to 
freedom of movement and persons".S3 Such is the importance assigned to the right of 
establishment by the legislator, that all rights awarded under Art.43 are unconditional 
and may not constitute the subject of agreements between states.S4 
The definition of the term "establishment" can be drawn from the Treaty itself. 
Art.43 stipulates that legal or natural persons, beneficiaries of the freedom of establish-
ment within the EU with the ability to conduct business on their own are considered to 
be established, when by commercially conducting an independent and profit-aiming ac-
tivity in a fixed base or basesss they are settled in a material arrangement or have a 
8 d See case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-ogSelskabsstyrelsen, 16 July 1999, unreporte . 
so However, the opposite can not happen. Establishment without recognition is therefore not possible. 
See E. Cerehxe, op. cit. , p.337. 
SI See 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971; [1985] 1 CMLR 99; 270/83 Commission v French Republic 
[1986] ECR 273; [1987] 1 CMLR 401; 197/84 Steinhauser [1985] ECR 1819; [1986] 1 CMLR 53; 
221/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 719; [1988] 1 CMLR 151; C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland 
pic v Elliniko Dimosio [1999] ECR 1-2651. 
S2 See A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.137; also see cases 2174 Jean Reyners v 
Belgium [1974] ECR 631; 90176 Van Ameyde v VCI [1977] ECR 1091; [1977] 2 CMLR 478; C-330/91 
The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank AG. [1993] ECR 1-4017, con.2l. 
The fact that the freedom of establishment must be viewed as an aspect of the non-discrimination prin-
ciple is also suggested by E. Strauss, European reckoning, the six and Britain's future (1962, George Al-
Ien and Unwin Ltd, London), p.37; also see G. Alexiou, EC: Critical analysis (Sakkoulas, Athens), p.372; 
G. Bournous, Freedom of establishment of enterprises and banks within the EC (1981, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens) pp.27-30; J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.7l. 
S3 See Art.3; case 71176 Jean ThiefJry v Conseil de I' ordre des avocats a la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 
765. 
S4 See case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, con.26. 
ss See P. Clarotti, "Progress and Future development of establishment and services in the EC in relation 
to banking" [1983-84] JCMS 199, p.203. Clarotti refers to the case of branches on wheels in the fonn of 
converted buses, noting that: " ... when one of these vehicles crosses the frontier and opens its .doors for 
business in another member-state, is it then established? My view would be that it was estabhshed, at 
least so long as it made stops at regular times at a given place or places". 
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"steady and permanent residence"56 in the host country/7 and their financial activity is 
integrated in the financial life of the host country.58 Thus, establishment within the 
meaning of the Treaty seems to involve "the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment". 59 In other words, two factors must be present: physical 
location and the exercise of economic activity, both, if not on a permanent basis, at least 
on a durable one. The exercise of economic activity means "integration into a national 
economy",60 whereas physical location covers exclusively the pursuit of effective and 
genuine activities to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as 
purely marginal and ancillary. The physical presence in the territory of the country of 
establishment must therefore be such as to enable effective and genuine activities to be 
pursued on or from the territory of the country of establishment.61 It seems therefore that 
the freedom of establishment covers the installation of foreign companies within other 
Member States, as long as it is permanent and financially genuine. 
C2. Establishment and provision of services 
It is the permanence of the base set up in other Member States which seems to distin-
guish between the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.62 
Thus, in the case of a person providing services entirely or principally in the territory of 
another Member State it is the provisions of the chapter relating to the right of estab-
S6 See C. Maestrepieri, "Freedom of establishment and freedom to supply services", (1973) 10: CML 
Rev., pp.150-173, at 150; also see G. Bournous, op.cit., pAO; J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.71; also see case C-
55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165; case C-221/89 The Queen v 
Secretary of State ex parte Factortame [1991] ECR 1-3905. 
57 F. Burrows, Free movement in European Community Law (1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.186-
187 notes that the permanence of the arrangement, where a legal or natural person is settled, cannot be a 
satisfactory criterion for its establishment. "Nor does it seem right in principle to regard only what is 
permanent as a form of establishment, and only what is ephemeral as a form of services". 
58 This definition is a synthesis of relevant elements found in G. Boumous, op.cit., pAO; G. Alexiou, 
op.cit., p.371; C. Maestrepieri, op. cit. , p.l50; J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.71; and F. Burrows, op.cit., p.186. 
59 See case C-246/89 Commission v UK [1991] ECR 1-4585, con.21. 
60 See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in case 81187 The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust pic. [1988] ECR 5500, con.3; also see 
Opinion of Advocate General Leger in case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale Forense 
[1995] ECR 1-4165, con.19. 
61 See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in case 81187 The Queen v H. M Treasury and Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust pic. [1988] ECR 5500, conA4. 
62 See F. G. Jacobs, "The basic freedoms of the EEC Treaty and Company Law", 13 (1992) The Com-
pany Lawyer, pA, who notes that "there is obviously a very fine distinction between the freedom of es-
tablishment and the freedom to provide services, depending essentially on the permanence of any base set 
up in another Member State. In other circumstances, the freedom to provide s~rvices may involve. no 
presence at all in the host state". Also see Opinion of Advocate General Lenz III case C-1I93 Hal hbarton 
Services v Statssecretaris van Financien [1994] ECR 1-1137, con.18; C. and L. Belmont, E.uropea~ Com-
pany Law (1989, FT Business Information Ltd, London), p.12; and L. and J. Vogel, Le droll europeen des 
affaires (1992, Dalloz, Paris), p.23. 
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lishment and not that on the provisions of services which are applicable.63 The lack of a 
widely accepted criterion for the distinction between establishment and provision of 
services has been the source of confusion, which was mainly based on the fact that the 
same persons pursuing the same activities may be subject both to Art.49 on the provi-
sion of services and to Arts.43-48 on the freedom of establishment.64 At the same time 
the EeJ sought a clear solution by stressing that establishment and provision of services 
are two separate branches of EC law, which are mutually exclusive, since on the basis 
of Art.50 the provisions on freedom to provide services are applicable only when the 
provisions on the freedom of establishment are not applicable.6s The clarification of this 
issue is extremely important for the evolution of this thesis. It is only after the clear dis-
tinction between establishment and provision of services that the first hypothesis 
(namely the existence of violations of the freedom of establishment in France, Italy and 
Greece) can be correctly analysed and effectively proven. The solution to this issue is 
found in the recent Gebhard case where the ECJ held that for the distinction between 
establishment and services two main criteria should be applied, a temporal and a geo-
graphical one.66 The provision of services is temporary, whereas the nature of estab-
lishment is permanent.67 Moreover, economic operators established in a Member State 
are chiefly directed towards the market in that state which is where they concentrate 
their activities, whereas economic operators providing services carry out their activity in 
the host state only on a secondary or ancillary basis.68 
Thus, the distinction between establishment and services does not lie with the 
nature of the activities exercised, but with the permanence and scale of economic op-
eration with which natural or legal persons choose to conduct these activities. 
63 Thus an insurance undertaking of another Member State which maintains a permanent establishment 
in the Me~ber State in question comes within the scope of the provisions on the right of establishment. 
See case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, cons.21 and 22; also see case 205/84 Com-
mission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, con.18. 
64 See cases 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 1637, cons.17 and 18., on the setting 
up of private educational institutes in Greece; 305/87 Commission v Hellenic ~epublic [1989] ECR 1461, 
cons.27, 28 and 29 on the acquisition by nationals of other Member States of Immovable .property from 
which or in which a service is provided; also see Joined Opinion of Advocate General Mlscho on cases C-
221189 Queen v Secretary o/State ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others and C-246/89 Commission v UK 
[1991] ECR 1-3905, con.26 (2) on fishing activities. 
6S See case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165, cons.18 
and 21. 
66 See case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165, con.31. 
67 See case 196/87 Steymann [1988] ECR6159, con.16; case C-53/95 In~stiv K~mmler [1996] ECR 1-
703· also see case C-205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, which clanfies that a permanent 
establishment should not necessarily take the fonn of a branch or agency. 
68 See Opinion of Advocate General Legere in case C-5/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale 
Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165, con.31. 
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C3. The nature of the freedom of establishment 
Having clarified "establishment" and the distinction between establishment and provi-
sion of services, the nature of the freedom of establishment needs to be determined. The 
issue is still in debate. The use of different tenns in the text of the Treaty as translated in 
each official language69 leads to several different interpretations. Three basic theories 
have been produced for the detennination of the nature of the freedom of establish-
t 70 S th . . I . h 71 men. orne argue at It IS a persona rIg t, others that it is a Programmsatz, a gen-
eral guideline,72 and others a basic freedom of Ee law.73 The practical significance of 
this debate lies in the fact that the first two theories link the implementation of Art.43 to 
further express regulation on its content and the penalties for its breach by EU or na-
tional authorities. Under the third theory, however, Art.43 must be implemented even if 
no relevant specific provisions are made. The third theory takes into account the teleo-
logical interpretation of the legal text (whose aim, is clearly the direct abolition of all 
discriminations) and the practical lack of specific regulations on the freedom of estab-
lishment. The theory is also supported by the direct effect of Art.43 which is considered 
to be self-sufficient and self executing. 74 
The compromising solution to this dilemma is provided in Klopp, where the 
freedom of establishment is described as "a fundamental right" which exists regardless 
69 The English text uses the term "freedom of establishment". So does the German (Niederlassungsfrei-
heit) and the Greek text (eleftheria egatastaseos). On the contrary, the Italian, French and Dutch texts use 
the term "right" (droit d' etablissement, diritto di stabilimento, recht van vestiging). 
70 According to H. Smit and P. Herzog the Treaty rejects two other techniques, the reciprocity rule and 
the most-favoured-nation clause. See H. Smit and P. Herzog, The Law of the EEC: a commentary on the 
EC Treaty (1976-1992, Mathew Bender and Co, London), p.537. 
71 See J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.70); also see V. Everling, Das Niederlassungsfreiheit in GM(1963, Ber-
lin-Frankfurt), p.15; A. Cassese, "11 diritto di stabilimento nel trattato insitutivo della CEE", [1959] 
RTDP, p.316; Arduini, "Limiti deriventi de trattato CEE agli ordinamenti interni degli stati membri", 
[1961] RDE, p.277; W. van Gerven, Le droit d'etablissement et la Iibre prestation des services, (1969, 
Bruxelles); P. Clarotti, op.cit., p.201; H. Smit and P. Herzog, op. cit., p.537; M. Chrysomallis, Elements 
of European Law (1991, Sakkoulas, Komotini), p.l 0 1. 
72 This view is adopted by J. Baumann, "Die Harmonisierung des Niederlassungsrecht in verschie-
den en Staatengruppen", in Deutshe Landesreferarte zum VI. Internationalen Kongress fur Rechts-
gleichung in Hamburg, (1962, Hamburg), p. 166; also see E. Schlachter, "Das Recht der freien Niederlas-
sung in CM", in Personlichkeitsrechtliche Fragen des internationalen Rechts (1962), p.61; G.E. Kalav-
ros, The right of establishment under the Treaty of Rome (1983, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.119. . 
73 See S. Froelich, Niederlassungsfreiheit und Freizugigkeit in der EWG und EFTA, (1965, ZUrich) 
p.42; also see P. Moehring, Aktuelle Wirkungen des EWG auf des Kartellrecht, das Niederlassungsrecht 
und das Agrarrecht, (1965), p.163 8. . 
74 The direct effect of Art.43 is also supported by G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.221; F. Burrows, op.cll., ~p. 
210-212; also see cases 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR425; 2174 Reyners v Belgian 
State [1974] ECR 631, [1974] 2 CMLR 395; 33174 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, [19!5] 1 CMLR 
298' 48175 Procurateur du Roi v Royer [1976] ECR 497, [1976] 2 CMLR 619; 197/84 Stemhauser 
, 
[1985] ECR 1819, [1986] 1 CMLR 53. 
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of whether the directives provided for by Art.4 7 have been adopted. 75 Thus, within the 
EU establishment is neither a right nor a freedom in the classical sense of the tenns 
adopted by national legal theories. The freedom of establishment is a particular EU legal 
right which exists even if no relevant specific regulations on its imposition are passed76 
and produces direct effect from the end of the transitional period. 77 
C4. Primary and secondary establishment 
One last term that must be clarified before proceeding with the analysis of the content of 
the freedom of establishment is secondary establishment, which constitutes the subject 
of this thesis. The freedom of establishment in its commercial aspeces may take the 
form of primary or secondary establishment. 79 Primary establishment takes place, when 
(through the purchase, foundation, fonnation, re-opening, administration or transfer of 
an industrial unit, a commercial base or an agricultural productive activity) the main 
administrative centre or registered office of a legal entity is transferred from one coun-
try to another, namely from the country of origin to the host country.so Secondary estab-
lishment takes place, when a legal entity retains its home office in one country and es-
tablishes a form "of financial activity dependent from the main office" in another. SI The 
choice of the particular form of establishment to be used belongs solely to the com-
pany. S2 Vogel believes that in relation to companies "in practice the freedom of estab-
H [ See case 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971; 1985] 1 CMLR 99. 
76 See cases 71176 Jean Thieffry v Conseil de I' ordre des avo cats a la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765, 
con.17; 107/83 L ' ordre des avo cats au barraeu de Paris v Onno Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, con. 1 O. 
77 See case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273. 
78 It is accepted that the right of establishment has two separate aspects, a personal and a commercial 
one. The personal implies the right of setting up in a trade or profession, whereas commercially it means 
the right of companies to set up branch organisations. 
79 See cases 198/86 Erwin Conrad and others v Direction de la concurrence et des prix des hauts de 
Seine and Ministere Public [1987] ECR 4469, con.9; 143/87 Christopher Stanton and others v INASTl 
[1988] ECR 3877, con. 11 ; Joined cases 154 and 155/87 INASTl v Heinrich Wolf and others [1988] ECR 
3897, con. 1 I. 
so See J. Molinier, Droit du marche interieur europeen (1995, LGDJ, Paris), p.120; also see case 81187 
The Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex partie Daily Mail and General Trust pic 
[1988] ECR 5483. 
SI The elements of these definitions were found in G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.125; G. Alexiou, op.cit., 
p.373; M. Egana, La comunidad economica europea (1967, Caracas), p.89; P. Leleux, "!he establishment 
of foreign subsidiaries in the European Community" in Ten Years of European Integration (1968, M.ont-
real), p.2; B. Goldman, 1973, op. cit., p.57; and 1. Molinier, op. cit., p.! ~ 1. Also see case C-1I93 Hal"~a~­
ton Services v Staatsecretaris van Financii!n [1994] ECR 1-1137; Opinion of Advocate General SagglO In 
Joined cases C-400/97, C-40 1197 and C-402/97 Administracion del Estado v Juntas Generales de 
GuipUzcoa and Others, 1 July 1999, unreported. . 
s1 See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweig-
niederlassung Deutschland v Finanzamt Aachen-Innerstadt, 2 March 1999, unreported. 
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lishment can only be exercised through secondary establishment".83 This is particularly 
valid in jurisdictions of the siege reel doctrine. Since primary establishment in a foreign 
country is defined as the transfer of the managerial and decision-making unit of the 
company from one country to another, in countries following the siege reel doctrine this 
would signify the dissolution of the company and the creation of a new company with 
its siege reel in a different country. This position has been found to be in compliance 
with Ee law.84 Thus, secondary establishment is the only legal form of establishment 
under French, Italian and Greek law, which follow the siege reel doctrine. 
In Ee law an office or agency is a secondary establishment without separate le-
gal personality. It is exploited by an agent or a mandata ire and deals with sales, corre-
spondence with prospect clients of the parent company, and administration. A branch 
(defined as a secondary establishment without legal personality whose proprietor is the 
parent company) has more independence from the main office and can form agencies. A 
subsidiary is a legal entity, separate from the foreign parent company, set up under the 
law of the host country (at least in countries following the siege reel doctrine)8s, con-
trolled by the foreign company mainly through ownership of a substantial part of its 
capital, or of the whole company (in jurisdictions where one-man companies are legal). 
Although authoritative definitions of these three concepts have not been provided, the 
Eel describes subsidiaries, agencies and other establishments as operational centres 
with the power, authority and means to conduct business with third parties who, as-
suming the link of these establishments with the parent company and not being able to 
enter into negotiations or contracts with the foreign company itself, prefer to deal with 
its extension,86 namely with its agency, branch, office87 or subsidiary.88 What distin-
83 See L. and l. Vogel, op. cit. , pp.24-25. 
84 See case C-81/87 Daily Mail [1988] ECR 5483. 
85 R. Pennington, op. cit., p.ll 0, notes that "the locally formed subsidiary will usually have its central 
direction or siege in the country where it is formed, and unlike its foreign parent company, will be subject 
to the company law of that country". 
86 The Court held that "the concept ofa branch, agency or other establishment implies a place of bus i-
ness which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension ofa parent body, has a manag7ment 
and is materially equipped to negotiate business with third parties, so that the latter, although knowmg 
that there will if necessary be a legal link with the parent body, the head office of which .is abroad, ~o ~ot 
have to deal directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of bus mess constltutmg 
the extension". See cases 33178 Somafer v Saar-Ferngas [1978] ECR 935; 14176 De Bloos v Boyer 
[1976] ECR 1510. It should be noted that this definition was provided t? c1ari~ the terms. ~sed in Art.5 of 
the Convention of 5 September 1968. There is no doubt, however, that It proVides a defimtlOn of the 
above terms from the aspect ofEC law and that it can also be used for the clarification of Art.43. 
87 In the German Insurance case the ECl suggested that "an enterprise would fall within the concept of 
establishment even if its presence is not in the form of a branch or agency but consists merely of an office 
managed by the enterprise's own staff or by a person who is independent but is authorised to act on a 
permanent basis for the enterprise". See case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, [1987] 2 
CMLR69. 
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guishes between subsidiaries and branches is that subsidiaries are judicially independent 
from the parent company which controls them, whereas branches lack autonomous legal 
personality thus serving companies wishing to exercise full control over their dec en-
tralised organisation. As a result, subsidiaries may enter into contacts independently, 
provided that the quality of the signatory is approved by the parent company, whereas 
branches may only enter into contracts on behalf of the approving parent company. 
Moreover, the debts and property acquired from the business activity of a branch belong 
to the parent company, whereas the subsidiary has the right to owe and be owed inde-
pendently from the parent company. 89 
cs. Ratione Personae Application of the Freedom of Establishment 
According to ArtA8 foreign companies or firms (English version) associations (French 
version) or Gesellschaften (German version) enjoy the same privileges as natural per-
sons. Ratione personae the above terms include companies nationals of other Member 
States,90 constituted under civil or commercial law, including public limited compa-
nies,91 co-operative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, 
save for those which are non-profit making.92 The aim of the legislator is clearly to in-
clude as many forms of legal entities as possible.93 The conditions under which entities 
88 For further analysis of the definitions of branches, agencies and subsidiaries under EC law, see B. 
Goldman and A. Lyon Caen, op.cit., p.143; also see B. Goldman, 1973, op.cit., p.60; G.E. Kalavros, 
op.cit., 127; A. Clarotti, op. cit. , p.200; H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.540. 
89 See Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskab-
sstyrelsen, 16 July 1998, unreported. 
90 See case 115/78 J. Knoors v Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [1979] ECR 399, con.16; also 
see case 136/78 Ministere public v Vincent Auer [1979] ECR 437, con.20. 
91 See W. Fikentscher, "The proposed directive on company law" (1964-1965) 2 CMLR, p.259; C. 
Maestripieri, op. cit., p.162; Y. Lousouarn, "Le droit d' etablissement des societes" [1990] 26 RTDE, 
p.237; K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.232; R. Plender, Plender and Usher's Cases and Materials on the Law of the 
European Community (1989, Butterworth, London) p.360; G.A. Zaphiriou, European Business Law 
(1970, Sweet and Maxwell, London), p.18; K. Lipstein, op.cit., p.136; W. van Gerven, op.cit., p.350; G. 
Alexiou, op.cit., p.381; B. Goldman and A. Lyon-Caen, op.cit., p.157; B. Goldman, op.cit., pp.85-87; 1. 
Boukouras, op.cit., p.780; F. Wooldridge, op. cit., p.2; G. Bournous, op.cit., p.42. 
92 See E. Pennacchini, R. Monaco, L. Ferrari Bravo and S. Puglisi, Manuale di Diritto Comunitario 
(1984, UTET, Torino), p.123. 
93 See P. Papanagiotou, "The right of establishment of foreign companies in Greece in view of the . 
status quo in the European Community" [1964] Epitheorisi Ellinikou Dikaiou 301, p.309; also see~. LIP-
stein, op.cit., p.231. According to F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.2, beneficiaries of the freedom of estabhsh-
ment are: partnerships, limited and unlimited companies, co-operative societies, building societies, mutual 
assurance clubs and legal entities governed by public law which pursue the objective of making a profit, 
such as nationalised industries. According to G.E. Kalavros, 1983, op.cit., p.165, the following French 
companies are included: societes civiles, socie/es en nom collect if, soc;e/es en commendite simple, socie-
tes en commendites par action, socie/es anonymes, societes d' assurance enforme limites, socie/es mu-
tuelles d'assurance, soc;e/es d'economie mixte, etablissements publics de charactere industriel et com-
merciel. In Germany the following legal entities are beneficiaries of the freedom of establishment: Ak-
/iengesellschaflen, Kommanditgesellschaflen auf Aktien, Gesellschaften mit beschrank/en Haftung, Reed-
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classified as companies or associations under Art.48 may be benefit from the freedom of 
establishment are the following three.94 First, the company must be profit-aiming. Sec-
ond, the company must have been formed under the law of a Member State and have its 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the EU.9s 
Third, insofar as non-EU companies are concerned, the company must have an effective 
and continuous link with the economy of a Member State.96 
The first condition has lead to much debate, since the meaning of the term 
"profit-making" is not clear. The determination of "profit-aiming" companies has theo-
retical and practical interest, as a strict interpretation would exclude from the applica-
tion of the freedom of establishment nationalised enterprises which make profit without 
having this aim, unions which under some national laws can not conduct financial ac-
tivity, or even companies dealing with financial activities but not making profit.97 Since 
the aim of the legislator was clearly to include within the scope of Art.48 as many types 
of legal entities as possible, the term profit-aiming should have a broad meaning. Ac-
cording to Wooldridge the phrase profit making means that "they have as their object, 
under their constitutions, the making of profit, whether they actually succeed in making 
one or not".98 Thus, only organisations whose objectives are mainly gratuitous,99 namely 
organisations with purely humanistic, religious, or cultural aims, as well as public law 
organisations dealing with activities not falling within the scope of the Treaty are ex-
cluded from the application of Art.48. The failure of the legislator to avoid the use of a 
clearer term should be noted. Instead of referring to companies aiming to profit (which 
may vary in each legal system), the legislator could have delineated the scope of the 
regulations on the freedom of establishment by reference to legal entities that participate 
in financial and commercial activity. 
ereien, offenen Handgesellschaften, Kommanditgesellschaften, Gesellschaften des burgerliches Rechts, 
Versicherungsvereine aufGegenseitigkeit, begrechtlichen Gewerkschaften, Genoj3enschaften, Stiftungen, 
Korperschaften, Anstalte des oeffentliches Rechts mit Aufgaben gewerblicher Art. See Gide-Lourette-
Nouel, Dictionnaire du Marche Commune (1975, Dictionnaires du Andre Jolly, Paris). 
94 See I. Cath, op.cit., p.252; G. Boumous, op.cit., p.4l; and H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.641-642. 
9S See case 79/85 Segers v Bestuur van de bedrijfsvereniging voor bank - en verzekeringswezen, 
groothandel en vrije beroepen [1986] ECR 2375, con. 
96 The condition is only applicable to non-EU companies; see Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola 
in case C-2l2/97 Centros Ltdv Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 16 July 1999, unreported. 
97 See G. Bournous, op.cit., p.42; G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., pp.164-l65; and 1. Boukouras, op.cit., p.85. 
98 See F. Wooldridge, op.cit., p.2. 
99 See case C-196/87 Steymann v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159; for an opposite exam-
ple of a sports company being characterised as profit-aiming, see case C-415/93 VRBSF A and Others v 
Bosman and Others [1995] ECR 1-4921; also see cases 13176 Dona v Man/ero [1976] ECR 1333; 36174 
Walrave and Koch v AVC! [1974] ECR 1405. 
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The second condition imposed by Art.48 comprises two elements. loo The com-
pany must be formed under the law of a Member State, and its registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business must be located within the EV.IOI These 
conditions clearly refer to the company's lex fori and to the issue of recognition. It 
should be noted that the Treaty (applying the non-discrimination principle) rejects the 
theory of control (according to which the company's lexfori derives from the law of the 
nationality of its members).102 At the same time, in an attempt to avoid problems in the 
application of Art.48 by Member States following another system for the detennination 
of lex fori, the Treaty avoids the choice between one of the two prevailing international 
legal theories, namely of incorporation and of the siege reel. 103 In fact, it must be ac-
cepted that the Treaty chooses the most liberal solution, since it "enables companies that 
have a mere legal tie within the Community" to enjoy the privilege of free establish-
ment. 104 The EC] has held with regard to companies that it is their prescribed seat or 
registered office that serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular 
state. Thus, the company must be regarded as established in a Member State if its cen-
tral administration, main establishment or registered office is situated in it. 
However, it is stated that "in the absence of either of the above links", the activ-
ity of the company must "show a real and continuous link with the economy of a Mem-
ber State. 105 This leads to the third condition for the establishment of legal persons 
within the EV: the effective and continuous link with the economy of a Member State. 
A real economic link is evidenced by either the amount of gross business done within 
100 See Y. Loussouam, op.cit., p.236, who notes that these two conditions are practically one, since 
companies are always formed according to the law of their statutory seat; see Opinion of Avocate General 
La Pergola in case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 16 July 1998, unreported. 
101 See case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273; C-330/91 The Queen and Inland Revenue 
Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank [1993] ECR 1-4017; C-264/96ICI v Kolmer [1998] ECR 1-4695; 
C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, judgement of9 March 1999, unreported. The 
registered office of a company is located at "the place designated as such in the incorporation papers" of 
the company. The executive office is located "where the company's organs issue the decisions that are 
essential for the company's operation". The principal place of business is the place "where the company 
has its principal operational facilities". See H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.644. 
102 The theory of control was rejected, because it was felt that companies fulfilling the conditions set 
by Article 58 should have the necessary link to the Community. The nationality of their shareholders was 
considered to be irrelevant. 
103 P. Leleux, op.cit., p.3, notes that: "In fact, in all our countries there is always a statutory head office 
of the country of incorporation. H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.643 say that this requireme~t "se~ks to 
ensure that companies benefiting from the right of establishment in the Community have a direct link to 
the legal system of one of the Member States". It is also noted that "i!, in one ~ember Sta.te the company 
is considered established even though some formality, such as the fihng of the IncorporatIOn papers, has 
been omitted, the company must be considered to have been formed, for the purposes of the T.reaty, even 
though that particular step is considered essential in the country of establishment". See H. Smlt and P. 
Herzog, op.cit., p.644. 
104 See B. Goldmann, op.cit., p.88. 
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the ED or by the permanent nature of the investments in the EU. 106 A "continuous" link 
is to be viewed as "the opposite of occasional,,107 and is defined as "a history of com-
d t · ". f h 108 merce or pro uc Ion In one 0 t e Member States. It would seem therefore that what 
is required by the Treaty for non-EU companies is a real, continuous link with the econ-
omy of a Member State, which exists when the company "already maintains a secon-
dary establishment" in the EU or when the EU is its "primary field of action. 109 
C6. The issue of EU subsidiaries of non-EU parent companies 
The third condition, imposed by The General Program on the Suppression of Restric-
tions on the Freedom of Establishment of 18 December 1961,110 has been criticised as 
giving the benefit of free establishment to subsidiaries of non-EU companies with a 
registered office within the EU. 1I1 
Thus, a situation has developed where a non-EU company can maintain a ficti-
tious, non-productive office within the EU and demand to import in terms of taxes and 
dumpingll2 regulations its non-EU products under the same conditions stipulated for EU 
products. The problem is acute in countries following the incorporation theory, because 
it is only there that a registered office suffices for the characterisation of a subsidiary 
company as domestic. Countries following the siege reel doctrine however would de-
mand that the subsidiary has autonomy from the parent company. In the past the danger 
of third countries penetrating the EU through the formation of subsidiaries seemed only 
theoretical l13 and it was thought that the demand of an efficient economic link of the 
company with the economy of an EU Member State would diminish all possibilities of 
105 See case 270/83 Commission v French Republic [1986] ECR 273; 1 CMLR 401; also see case 81187 
ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust pic [1988] ECR 5483; [1988] 3 CMLR 713. 
106 For further analysis on the third condition for the establishment of foreign companies see H. Smit 
and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.646; B. Goldmann, op.cit., p.89. 
107 See H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.646. 
108 See J. Boukouras, op.cit., p.123. 
109 See G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.173. 
110 See OJ 1962, pp.32-62. 
III C. Maestripieri, op.cit., p.163, notes that "some people feel that the Community has thus stripped it-
self of all defence against an invasion of capital from third countries and that its most important sectors. 
are likely to come under their control which will eventually, more or less in the long term, lead to techm-
cal underdevelopment." 
112 In its original sense "dumping" refers to a manufacturer selling an identical commodity abroad fo~ 
less than in he would in his home market. "Dumping" has been common practice for Japanese compames 
and has been the subject of multilateral negotiations between the EU-US and Japan. See K: Flamm~ . 
"Semi-conductors" in Hufbauer, Europe 1992: An American Perspective (1990, The Brukmgs Instltutlo~, 
Washington D.C.), p.273, note 69. For an example of this see Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola m 
case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 16 July 1998, unreported. 
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circumvention. 114 Maestripieri notes that "what really counts is that the company should 
belong to the economic life of the Community. Furthermore it is almost impossible to 
discover who is really in control of the company".I1S However, despite the application of 
the third corrective criterion, and following the signing of the GAIT agreements by the 
EU, companies from third countries were still able to penetrate the EU by establishing 
EU subsidiaries. For Member States with traditionally protective economic regimes, 
such as France and Italy, this was a blatant circumvention of the freedom of establish-
ment. For other Member States such as the UK and Ireland which enjoyed both a more 
liberal economic regime and benefits from this deVelopment (as many US and Japanese 
subsidiaries established there), the prevention of European subsidiaries from freely cir-
culating their products in the EU contradicted the freedom of establishment. 116 
Despite UK opposition the "protectionist" majority within the EU pressed on to 
establish a fourth criterion based on local content. 117 In 1988 the Nissan case triggered a 
controversy within the EU concerning the extent of local content. 118 Based on the provi-
sions of the Kyoto Convention,119 the then EC passed Regulation 2423/88 120 (widely 
113 See A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, Ope cit., p.152; P. Papanagiotou, Ope cit., pp.308-
309; B. Goldman, op.cit., p.89; and G. Alexiou, op.cit., pp.372-372. 
114 G. Bournous, op.cit., p.44 notes that companies with only a constitutional seat within the EU are not 
benefited, because the General Program for the abolition of the relevant limits has set a third corrective 
condition; also see I. Cath, op.cit., p.254; Y. Loussouarn, op.cit., p.236; W. van Gerven, op.cit., p.351; 
Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
16 July 1998, unreported. 
llS SCM ... . 163 ee . aestnplen, Op.Clt., p. . 
116 S. Micossi and G. Viesti note that "actually, the choice oflocating many companies in the United 
Kingdom seems to be explained, inter alia, by the climate of industrial relations, which is very favourable 
to the introduction of its system". See S. Micossi and G. Vesti, "Japanese direct manufacturing invest-
ment in Europe" in Winters and Venables, European Integration: Trade and Industry (1991, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge) 209, p.216. 
117 The issue oflocal content started in 1982, when BL launched export production of its Triumph Ac-
claim under the licence of Honda. Italy impeded imports claiming that the car was non European, as the 
British content was only 60%. 
118 In the autumn of 1988 Nissan Motor started to export its British built Bluebird cars in the other EU 
member-states. A dispute arose when France banned imports. Later on France permitted the import of 
Bluebird cars, but allegedly counted them as part of the quasi-annual quota for Japanese cars. France's 
example was then followed by Italy and Spain. See K. Ishikawa, Japan and the challenge of Europe, 
(1990, Pinters Publishers, London), pp.77-79; also see R. Eccles, "When a British car is not a British car? 
Issues raised by Nissan", [1989] ECR, pp.1-3. The conflict between Japan and the EU was not limited to 
the Nissan case. Recently Japan insisted that the EU has violated the GATT in six instances and the USA 
in nine. For further reports on the issue, see Naftemboriki, 17.7.1992, p.96. 
119 The International Convention on the Simplification and Hannonisation of Custom Procedures was 
adopted in 1975 and states that "the substantial transformation which is economically justifiable.should 
take place locally for a product to count as local, but it gives no specific percentage". See K. Ishikawa, 
op.cit., p.80. 
120 On 29 March 1988 the Commission sent the Council a proposal [COM (88) 112 final] for a Regula-
tion amending the Regulation of23 July 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidised impo~s from 
countries which are not members of the EU. "The aim is to make certain technical amendments 10 order 
to clarify the existing provisions (determination and comparison ofnonnal value and export ~rices, pr~­
cedural rules for investigations) and to make Community action more effective while uphold 109 the prm-
ciple of legal certainty". See Bulletin of the European Communities, Commission, no 3, 1988, p.86, para-
45 
known as "anti-screwdriver" Regulation) according to which a product is not subject to 
dumping penalties (namely, it is considered European), if at least 50% of its value origi-
nates from within the EU. 121 This Regulation has led to numerous debates between EU 
and third countries, centring on the method for the detennination of the percentage of 
local content and on the legality of such discrimination in view of GA IT. 122 Although 
this debate has not yet been resolved, the EU has proceeded to draft "rules of origin" for 
specific categories of products. 123 A general definition of "originating products" and a 
final determination of the criteria that must be used for the identification of a product's 
country of origin can be drawn from Protocol 1 of the 1989 Lome Convention. 124 The 
graph 2.2.3. According to the Proposal of the Commission [COM (88) 112 fmal], the modernisation of 
EC law on the issue was necessary due to the following situations: 
a. the character of antidumping procedures had changed enormously; 
b. the number of investigation has risen considerably; 
c. there is doubt concerning vague points of the interpretation of existing legislation, which sufficed in 
making reference to "certain vague principles"; and 
d. specific clarification is required in the determination of normal value, the determination of export 
price, the comparison between normal value and export price and the procedure of the investigations. 
121 According to K. Ishikawa, op.cit., p.82, anti-dumping duty is imposed where the value of parts or 
materials in the assembly or production operation, originating from countries whose products are subject 
to anti-dumping duty, exceed by at least 50% of the value of all other parts or materials used. 
122 The percentage of local content given by British authorities as far as Nissan-Bluebird cars were 
concerned was 60%, whereas Fiat suggested a mere 21 %. K. Flamm, op.cit., p.274, notes that "it is al-
leged that the frequent practice of European customs officials has been to assign origin to the country 
with the largest single share of components in number of value". Mr Yutaka Kume, President ofNissan 
Motor Co Ltd announced that further development of their British subsidiary shall take place. The crea-
tion of new department dealing with design and product control is a clear attempt by the company to in-
crease the percentage oflocal content of the Nissan cars. For further details on the matter, see Eleftheros 
Typos, 22.7.1992, p.33. 
K. Ishikawa, op.cit., p.83, refers to the view of Otto Grolig and Peter Bogaert, who note that "they have 
to import these components from a manufacturer in a non-member country in the same way and increase 
production when the finished products imported from a manufacturer in a non-member country are sub-
jected to anti-dumping duties. Then, an independent company, merely because it is not related to or asso-
ciated with a manufacturer of fmished products in a non-member country can escape from the imposition 
of an anti-dumping duty". 
Japan argues that the imposition oflocal content requirements is inconsistent with Article 2a and 6 of 
the GATT, as well as with its Anti-dumping Code, whereas the Commission has repeatedly explained that 
its attitude is based on Article 20 of the GATT. Flamm, op.cit., p.274, presenting the American perspec-
tive agrees that the anti-screwdriver regulation violates he GATT's "equal national treatment" stipulation 
as well as its Antidumping Code. However, both the proposal of the Commission COM(88)112 fmal, as 
well as the text ofthe Regulation [OJ L 209,2.8.88, pp.I-17] mention that the Regulation is adopted in 
accordance with the GATT (Art. 12 in particular) and the 1979 GAIT Anti-dumping Code. 
123 In February 1989 the Commission passed new rules of origin, according to which non-EU compa-
nies must conduct key manufacturing of the front-end process in the EU. This rule was followed by a 
proposal from the Commission to the Council for the definition of origin of photocopiers, according to 
which the product is considered European only if major parts are constructed within the EU. See K. Ishi-
kawa, op.cit., p.91. 
124 See Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome on 15 December 1989, Protocol 1 concerning the 
defmition of the concept of "originating products", OJ L 229, 17/08/1991, p.3-280; as amended by Deci-
sion No 5/95 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 3 November 1995 updating the list ofleast- devel-
oped ACP States in Article 330 (1) of the fourth Lome Convention, OJ L 327, 30.12.1995, p.31. Pr.otocol 
1 was amended by Decision No 2/97 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of24 April 1997 amendmg 
Protocol 1 to the fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lome to take account of changes to the hannonised 
commodity description and coding system and the adoption of rules of origin for petroleum products, OJ 
L 220, 11.8.1997, pp.6-57. For a fuller understanding of the rules of origin, also see Commission Regu-
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Convention distinguishes between wholly and partially originating products. Wholly 
originating are products which were wholly obtained, or sufficiently worked or proc-
essed with the country of origin or on vessels flying the flag of this country and owned 
by nationals of this country to a percentage of at least 50%. Partially originating prod-
ucts have to follow a complicated procedure for the determination of their country of 
origin which, for EU products, is certified in an E form. 
Consequently, it can be stated that companies wishing to benefit from the free-
dom of establishment must also fulfil a fourth condition set indirectly by EC secondary 
legislation, namely they must manufacture their products according to the rules of origin 
or the special anti-dumping regulations of the EU. In terms of the legality of local con-
tent requirements, it must be stated that GATT does not oblige the EU to treat third 
countries equally to its members. 125 Moreover, breaches of the freedom of establishment 
(initially meant to apply to companies with an effective and continuous link to the econ-
omy of one of the Member States, which is hardly the case with companies with merely 
an assembly unit within the EU) can not be legalised by any kind of international treaty. 
In tenns of expediency, however, the prevention of non-EU companies from establish-
ing in Europe is a conservative measure, which only helps widen the gap between EU, 
US and Japanese manufacturers. 126 Thus, the EU must limit the local content require-
ments to a percentage economically suitable for creating the necessary, effective link 
between the subsidiary and the economy of its receiving state. It should be noted that an 
infra-EU agreement on the issue must be achieved as soon as possible, because the cir-
culation of a product within one Member State automatically leads to its free circulation 
in all EU Member States. 127 
lation (EC) No 12/97 of 18 December 1996 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provi-
sions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Cus-
toms Code, OJ L 009,13.01.1997, pp.I-177; 9711621EC: Commission Decision of 18 February 1997 on 
the initiation of international consultation and dispute settlement procedures concerning changes to 
United States rules of origin for textile products resulting in the non-conferral of Community origin on 
certain products processed in the European Community, OJ L 062,4.3.1997, pp.43-45; Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986- 1994), OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, pp.273-289;Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986- 1994), OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, pp.144-150. 
125 See C. Karatzas, GATT and its Code for Export Subsidies: their function and influence in the legal 
order of the EC (1991, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.18. 
126 •• d G V" . 222 See S. MICOSSI an . lestl, op. cit., p. . 
127 The theoretical problem deriving from the Nissan case is whether the restrictive recognition theo~ 
of the siege reel can lead to the prohibition of import of products with at least 50% local content. On thIS 
issue, R. Eccles, op. cit., p.2, notes that this is impossible, because "if such cars or products were lawfully 
placed on the market in one EC Member State, then as a fund~mental principle of the E~C. free movement 
of goods rules, they should arguably be allowed to circulate WIthout quota or other restrIctions between 
Member States". 
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C7. Ratione loci application of the Freedom of Establishment 
The territorial limits of the freedom of establishment are set in Art.299, which deter-
mines the ratione loci implementation of the Treaty. Since Art.48(1) relates the compa-
nies' free establishment with the location of their statutory seat or centre of administra-
tion in a Member State, the determination of these countries becomes necessary. The 
Treaty (and consequently the freedom of establishment) applies to the fifteen Member 
States of the EU. 128 Under Arts.299, 183(3) and 182(1), the Treaty also applies to coun-
tries and territories with a special relationship with France, Italy and The Netherlands. 
This category includes the French Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique and Reinon. 129 
Another issue on the ratione loci application of the freedom of establishment 
concerns the continental shelf of EU Member States. Based on Art.299, EU officials 
have repeatedly insisted that the application of the freedom of establishment should in-
clude the Member States' continental shelves. The issue is still in debate. However, 
there is no doubt that companies dealing with submarine wealth are beneficiaries of the 
freedom of establishment. Moreover, the freedom of establishment "also includes that 
part of the continental shelf which is controlled by the Member States".130 The issue is 
of extreme interest in legal theory. However, because of the sensitive nature of the ac-
tivities that companies may undertake on the continental shelf, its still unsure extent un-
der international law and its special status, further analysis on this issue does not fall 
within the scope of this thesis. 
CS. Ratione materiae application of the freedom of establishment 
The determination of the nature and type of activities liberalised under Arts.43-48 is of 
particular importance for the critique of the activities prohibited to foreign companies in 
France, Italy and Greece and the evaluation of this prohibition under Ee law. In an at-
tempt to avoid a -possibly restrictive- reference to the precise activities covered by the 
freedom of establishment, the Treaty of Rome mentions only activities which are ex-
128 The Treaty does not apply to the dominion of Agion Oros (The Holy Mountain), which is located in 
Macedonia (Northern Greece) and is inhabited by Orthodox monks only. 
129 The Treaty does not apply to Algeria (which became an independent state in 1962), to Monaco, San 
Marino Andorra and the Vatican (because these states exercise their external relations independently 
under Art.299, par.4). However, the customs' union applies to Monaco (which is united with Fra~ce ~ince 
1861) as well as San Marino (which has signed with Italian Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation m 
1939 and 1953). See E. Pennacchini, R. Monaco, L. Ferrari Bravo and S. Puglisi, op.cit., p.125. 
130 See W. van Gerven, "The right of establishment and free supply of services within the Common 
Market", (1965-1966) 3 CMLR 351; also see G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.15l. 
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cluded from its field of application. The basic principles for the determination of liber-
alised activities are set via the classification of persons in three categories 131 among 
which only the self-employed may benefit from the right to establishment, as well as 
from the application of the non-discrimination principle of Art. 12 to all independent ac-
tivities and services that can be characterised financial or commercial. 132 Since the Sin-
gle Market covers all such activities, the freedom of establishment is applicable to all 
possible types of financial or commercial independent activities. 133 
The right of establishment embraces all sectors of economic life, including 
commerce (wholesale and retail trade), 134 industry,135 finance, agriculture,136 cinematog-
raphy,137 crafts and the professions, coal and steel, atomic energy, fishery,138 mining and 
131 The Treaty of Rome divides persons into three categories: workers, self-employed and providers of 
services. 
132 See D. O'Keeffe, "The free movement of persons and the Single Market" [1992] ELR 3, p.4.; also 
see E. Pennacchini, R. Monaco, L. Ferrari Bravo and S. Puglisi, op.cit., p.130; C. Maestripieri, op.cit., 
p.15l; A.T.S. Leenen, "Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the free-
dom of establishment and the freedom to provide services" [1980] CMLR 320, pp.262-263; Papa-
nagiotou, op. cit., pp.309-31 0; A. Dashwood and R. Wyatt, European Community Law (1993, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London), p.298-299; also see cases 36174 Walrave et autres v Association Cyclistes et aulres 
[1974] ECR 1405; 90176 van Ameyde v u.c.I. [1977] ECR 1091; 221185 Commission v Belgium [1987] 
ECR 719. 
133 See B. Goldman and A. Lyon Caen, op.cit., p.306; J. Boukouras, op. cit., p.76; also see case 167173 
Commission v French Republic [1974] ECR 359, [1974] 2 CMLR 216. It has been suggested that "the 
differentiation between wage-earning and independent activities has lost interest". See Zontanos, P., 
Champ d' application ratione materiae des regles du Traite CEE relatives ala libre circulation des per-
sonnes, des services et des capitaux (1987, Sakkouls, Athens), p.33. 
134 See Directives 64/223 of 25 .2.1964 OJ, no 56, 4.4.1964, p.863; 64/224 of 25 .2.1964 OJ, no 56, 
4.4.1964, p.869; 68/363 of 15.10.1968 OJ, no L260, 22.20.1968, p.l; 70/522 of 30.11.1970 OJ, no L267, 
10.12.1970, p.14; 74/557 of4.6.1974 OJ, no L307, 18.11.1974, p.5; 75/369 of 16.6.1975 OJ, no L167, 
30.6.1975, p.19; Council Directive 74/5571EEC of 4 June 1974 on the attainment of freedom of estab-
lishment and freedom to provide services in respect of activities of self- employed persons and of inter-
mediaries engaging in the trade and distribution of toxic products, OJ L 307, 18.11.74, p.5, as amended; 
Council Directive 86/6531EEC of 18 December 1986 on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member 
States relating to self-employed commercial agents, OJ L 382, 31.12.86, p.17. 
135 See Directives 64/428 of7.7.1964 OJ, no 117,23.7.1964, p.1871; 64/429 of7.7.1964 OJ, no 117, 
23.7.1964, p.1880; 68/365 of 15.10.1968 OJ, no L260, 22.10.1968, p.9; 69/82 of 13.3.1969 OJ, L68, 
19.3.1969, p.4. 
136 See Directives 63/261 of2 April 1963 OJ, no 62, 20.4.1963, p.1323; 63/262 of2 April 1963 OJ, no 
62,20.4.1963, p.1326; 65/1 of 14.12.1964 OJ, no 1,8.1.1965, p.l; 67/654 of24.11.1967 OJ, no 263, 
30.11.1967, p.6; 71118 of 16.12.1967 OJ, no L8, 11.1.1971, p.24; 67/530 of25.7.1967 OJ, no 190, 
10.8.1968, p.l; 67/531 of25.7.1967 OJ, no 190, 10.8.1967, p.3; 67/532 of25.7.1967 OJ, no 190, 
10.8.1967, p.5; 68/192 of5.4.1968 OJ, no L93, 17.4.1968, p.13; 68/415 of20.12.1968 OJ, no L308, 
23.12.1968, p.17. 
137 See Directives 63/607 of 15.10.1963 OJ, no 159,2.11.1963, p.2661; 65/264 of 13.5.1965 OJ, no 85, 
19.5.1965, p.1437; 68/369 of 15.10.1968 OJ, L260, 22.10.1968, p.22; 70/451 of29.9.1970 OJ, no L218, 
3.10.1970, p.37; also see C. Degrand, "Le marche commun, Ie cinema et les syndicats" [1972] Revue du 
marche commun, 663. 
138 See Opinions of Advocate General Mischo on case C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary o/State ex 
parte Factortame [1991] ECR 1-3905, con.l0; also see C.A. Fleischer, "L'acces aux lieux de peche et Ie 
Traite de Rome" [1971] Revue du marche commun 148; J.1. Lavenue, L 'organisation du secteur de la 
peche dans Ie marche commun (1974, Thesis, University of Montpellier); G. Olmi, "Agriculture and fish-
eries in the Treaty of Rome" [1972] CMLR 293. 
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quarrying, telecommunications, electricity,139 gas and sanitary services,140 food and bev-
141 bl· 142 . 
erages, pu lC contracts, manufactunng and proceeding industries, real estate and 
business, leisure services,143 the distribution sector,l44 banks,145 as well as personal serv-
ices (restaurants and the like)146, as long as they aim to financial activity in its broadest 
139 According!o the Commi~sion the liberalisation of these sectors are essential for the Single Market 
to be fully effective. See Special Supplement of the Report on the Operation of the Single Market 1995 
9.5.1996, http:/www.cec.luJ enlcomm/dgl5/smnl296/s1296.html. ' 
140 See Directive 66/162 of28.2.1966 OJ, no 42,8.3.1966, p.584. 
141 See Directive 68/367 of 15.11.1968 OJ, no L260 22.10.1968 P 16 142 ' , . . 
See Directives 641427 OJ, no 117,23.7.1964, p.1863; 64/429 OJ, no 117,23.7.1964, p.1880; 71/304 
OJ, no L185, 16.8.1971, p.1. 
143 See 64/242IEEC Commission Recommendation of 8 April 1964 to the Member States on the certifi-
cate attesting to the nationality of a film as provided for in Article 11 of the first Directive on the film 
industry, OJ, 063, 18.04.64,p.l025; Council Directive 89/552IEEC of3 October 1989 on the co-
ordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member 
States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ L 298, 17. 10.89, p.23; Directive 
95/47IEC ofthe European Parliament and of the Council of24 October 1995 on the use of standards for 
the transmission of television signals, OJ L 281,23.11.95, p.51; Directive 98/84IEC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consist-
ing of, conditional access, OJ L 320, 28.11.98, p.54. 
144 See case 198/86 Erwin Conradi and others v Direction de la concurrence et des prix des hauts de 
seine and others [1987] ECR 4469, con.l0. 
145 Council Directive 73/183IEEC of28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom ofestab-
lishment and freedom to provide services in respect of self- employed activities of banks and other finan-
cial institutions, OJ L 194,16.07.73, p.l; First Council Directive 771780lEEC of 12 December 1977 on 
the co-ordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pur-
suit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 322, 17.12.77 p.30, as amended; Council Directive 
86/635IEEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other 
financial institutions, OJ L 372, 31.12.86, p.l; 87/621EEC: Commission Recommendation of22 Decem-
ber 1986 on monitoring and controlling large exposures of credit institutions, OJ L 033, 04.02.87, p.lO; 
87/631EEC: Commission Recommendation of22 December 1986 concerning the introduction of deposit-
guarantee schemes in the Community, OJ L 033, 04.02.87, p.16; Council Directive 89/117IEEC of 13 
February 1989 on the obligations of branches established in a Member State of credit institutions and fi-
nancial institutions having their head offices outside that Member State regarding the publication of an-
nual accounting documents, OJ L 044, 16.02.89, p.40; Council Directive 89/299IEEC of 17 April 1989 
on the own funds of credit institutions, OJ L 124, 05.05.89, p.16, as amended; Second Council Directive 
89/646IEEC of 15 December 1989 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 
7717801EEC, OJ L 386, 30.12.89, p.l as amended; Council Directive 89/647IEEC of 18 December 1989 
on a solvency ratio for credit institutions, OJ L 386, 30.12.89, p.14, as amended; 90/1091EEC: Commis-
sion Recommendation of 14 February 1990 on the transparency of banking conditions relating to cross-
border financial transactions, OJ L 067, 15.03.90, p.39; Commission Directive 91/31IEEC of 19 Decem-
ber 1990 adapting the technical definition of 'multilateral development banks' in Council Directive 
89/647IEEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit institutions, OJ L 017, 23.01.91 p.20; 
Council Directive 92/30lEEC of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated 
basis, OJ L 110,28.04.92, p.52, as amended; Council Directive 921121IEEC of21 December 1992 on the 
monitoring and control of large exposures of credit institutions, OJ L 029, 05.02.93, p.l, as amended; 
Commission Directive 9417IEC of 15 March 1994 adapting Council Directive 89/647IEEC on a solvency 
ratio for credit institutions as regards the technical definition of 'multilateral development banks' (Text 
with EEA relevance), OJ L 089, 06.04.94, p.l7; Directive 94/19IEC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, OJ L 135,31.05.94, p.5; Commission Direc-
tive 95167IEC of 15 December 1995 making a technical amendment to Council Directive 89/647IEEC on 
a solvency ratio for credit institutions as regards the definition of 'multilateral development banks' (Text 
with EEA relevance), OJ L 314, 28.12.95, p.72; Directive 97/5IEC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of27 January 1997 on cross-border credit transfers, OJ L 043, 14.02.97, p.25. 
146 See A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.139; H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.d/., 
p.538; H. Bronkhorst, "Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services under the EEC Treaty, 
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sense, namely to "business or professional activity pursued for profit or remunera-
tion".147 These activities fall within the scope of the right of establishment, even if sec-
ondary EC legislation does not expressly subject them to the scope of Arts.43-48:48 In 
connection to companies, the right of establishment covers their setting up under any 
form considered suitable by their founders (branch, agency, office or subsidiary), their 
administration and their management. 149 Any restrictions concerning the acquisition of 
shares and the participation in existing companies under the same conditions as nation-
als are prohibited. 150 These restrictions may take the fonn of a prohibition to foreign 
companies to carry on certain kinds of businesses,151 "a requirement that they shall ob-
tain government consent" before establishing in the receiving state,152 or even a re-
quirement of residence for the natural persons that participate in the company. 153 
The freedom of establishment also covers the corollary activities of the above, 154 
namely these activities which are of assistance in the pursuit of a liberalised occupation 
or company activity:55 Thus, prohibited are restrictions in exemptions from taxation;56 
restrictions in the selling,157 renting or in accessing the tendering procedure for the allo-
cation of public property/58 in the right to obtain loans/59 as well as limitations in the 
free movement of capital, since the latter is considered a pre-condition for the effective 
three judgements of the Court of Justice" [1975] CMLR 245, p.246; D. Lasok and J.W. Bridge, Law and 
Institutions of the European Community (1987, Butterworths, London), p.408. 
147 See J. Steiner, EC Law (1995, Blackstone Press Ltd, London), p.185; also see B. Goldman and A. 
Lyon Caen, op.cit., p.308; H. Smit and P.Herzog, op.cit., p.539. 
148 Indeed, the Commission has no intention of proposing new relevant legislation, although it has the 
intention to fill the gaps. See Commissioner Monti's comment in Positive effects of the single market are 
already felt in the marketplace, 27.9.1995, http://www.cec.lulenlcomm/dg 15/smnlconf.html. 
149 See case 79/85 Segers v Bestuur van de bedrijfsvereniging voor bank [1986] ECR 2375, con.12. 
150 See case 81187 The Queen v H.M Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily 
Mail and General Trust pic [1988] ECR 5483, con.17. 
151 See case 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 1637, con.17 on the right to set up 
private teaching institutions in Greece; also see case 221/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 719, 
con.4 on the right to set up a clinical biological laboratory. 
152 See R. Pennington, op.cit., p.104; also see H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p. 539; M. Egana, op.cit., 
p.89; G.Alexiou, op.cit., p.371; A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.140; Y. Lo~s-. 
souarn, op.cit., p.237; cases 197/84 Steinhauser v City ofBiarritz [1985] ECR 1819; 221/85 CommiSSIOn 
v Belgium [1987] ECR 719. 
153 See case 182/83 Robert Fearon and Company Limited v Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677, 
cons.9 and 10. 
154 See case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Austria, judgement of 1 June 1999, unreported. 
155 See cases 63/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 29, con.14; 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Re-
public [1989] ECR 1461, con.21; C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Co~missio~ers e~ parte Com-
merzbank ago [1993] ECR 1-4017; C-1I93 Hallibarton Services v Statssecretans van FmanClen [1994] 
ECR 1-1137. 
156 See case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank Ag. [1993] 
ECR 1-4017, con.19. 
157 See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in case C-l/93 Hallibarton Services v Staatssecretaris van 
Financien [1994] ECR 1-1137, con.18. 
158 See case 197/84 P. Steinhauser v City of Biarritz [1985] ECR 1819, con.16. 
159 See case 63/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 29, con.15. 
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exercise of the freedom of establishment. 160 Such is the width of activities that may be 
considered as indirect hinders to the exercise of the freedom of establishment of foreign 
legal entities, that the Council's General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on 
the Freedom of Establishment considers prohibited restrictions to the right of establish-
ment even administrative practices which deny or restrict the right of foreign persons to 
participate in transactions, obtain licenses governed by public law, participate in a social 
security schemes, or to acquire, use or dispose of movable or immovable property. 161 
However, even such measures, which do prevent the effective exercise of the 
freedom of establishment, may be considered legal under EC law, provided that they 
fulfil the following four criteria: 
a. they are applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 162 
b. they are justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 163 
c. they are suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pur-
sue; and 
d. they do not go beyond what is necessary for the attainment of their aim. 164 
The question is what constitutes a discriminatory manner. From the text of the 
provisions on the freedom of establishment it is clear that their aim is equality of treat-
ment between domestic and foreign persons. 165 Thus, any national provisions, resulting 
from national rules of whatever kind (public or other) which seek to govern collectively 
the exercise of the activities liberalised by primary and secondary EC legislation by re-
stricting access to them on the basis of nationality, must be considered discriminatory 
and therefore illegal. 166 It must be noted, however, that not only direct, but also indirect 
or disguised discrimination is prohibited. Such discrimination occurs in the case of na-
tional provisions which, while applicable without distinction to nationals of all the 
Member States, in fact hinder or disadvantage primarily nationals of other Member 
160 See case 203/80 Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati [1981] ECR 2595, con. 8. 
161 See Council's General Program of 18 December 1961, OJ, English Special Edition, Second Series 
ix, p.7; also see case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461; case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Aus-
tria, judgement of 1 June 1999, unreported. 
162 See Opinion of Advocate General Alber in case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland pic v Elliniko 
Dimosio [1991] ECR 1-2651. 
163 See case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA [1997] ECR 1-2471. 
164 See cases C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Wuerttemberg [1993] ECR 1-1662, con.32; C-55/94 Rein-
hard Gerhard v Consiglio dell' ordine degli avvocati e procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR 1-4165, 
cons.37 and 39. 
165 See case 221185 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 719, con.9. 
166 See case 90176 Ufficio Henry van Ameyde v Ufficio centrale italiano di assistenz~ a~sicurativa . 
automobilisti in circolazione internazionale [1977] ECR 1091, con.28; also see V. GUlZZl, Manuale d, 
diritto e politica dell' Unione Europea (1994, Editoriale Scientifica, Milano), p.422. 
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States.
167 
Consequently, discriminatory application of national law involves the imple-
mentation of domestic provisions promoting or facilitating, directly or indirectly, for-
mally or de facto, 168 the domestic companies in the exercise of activities falling within 
the scope of Arts.43-48. The nature of such provisions can be very wide, covering mate-
rial, technical and fiscal discriminatory measures. 169 
C9. Relationship Between Transport and Freedom of Establishment 
A very important question is whether the provisions of the Treaty of Rome concerning 
the freedom of establishment are applicable to maritime companies, which (due to the 
nature of their activities) are also covered by the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on 
transport (Arts.70-80). The issue is of considerable importance. If the freedom of estab-
lishment is applicable to maritime companies, this thesis will have the opportunity to 
explore the Greek, Italian and French provisions on the access of foreign natural and 
legal persons to maritime activities. This would be of great practical value, as all three 
states are countries with long, maritime tradition. 
The theoretical basis of the view that Arts.43-48 EC are not applicable on the 
establishment of foreign maritime companies lies with an erroneous interpretation of 
Art.80(2), which states that the Council shall decide whether the Articles of the Treaty 
related to transport apply to sea transport. Those who support the view that transport 
and establishment do not mix argue that, since the Council has not introduced relevant 
legislation, shipping is excluded from the scope of the Treaty.170 Despite the lack of 
measures implementing Art.80, however, it is now widely accepted that sea transport 
falls within the scope of Arts.43-48 on the freedom of establishment. 171 According to the 
167 See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in case 3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, 
con.13; also see cases 3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, con.9; C-250/95 Futura Participations 
SA [1997] ECR 1-2471; C-279/93 Finanzamt Koln-Altstadt v Schumacker [1995] ECR 1-225; C-80/94 
Wielcockx v Inspecteur der directe belastingen [1995] ECR 1-2493; C-I07/94 Assher v Staatsecretaris 
van Financii!n [1996] ECR 1-3089; also see Cerehxe, op. cit., pp.72-78 . 
168 Fonnal discrimination derives from legislative texts, whereas de/acto discrimination derives from 
administrative or customary procedures and practices. See E. Cerehxe, op. cit. , p.80. 
169 See G. Usai and D. Velo, Le imprese e if mercato unico europeo (1990, Pirola Editore, Milano), 
pp.60-63; also see C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio del/'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR 1-4165; Opinion of Advocate General Pergola in case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Austria, 23 
February 1999, unreported. -
170 See G. Close, "Article 84 EEC: the development of transport policy in the sea and air sectors" 
[1980] 5 European Law Review 188, p.9, who states that according to the restrictive view "air and sea 
transport were excluded not only from the application of the rest of the Treaty". However, P., Mendes de 
Leon in "Le cabotage aerien dans les Communautes Europeennes" [1992] Revue de Marche Commun et 
de I 'Union Europeenne 631, p.632 supports the positive view. 
171 A large number of Commission proposals have been made concerning the enactment of measures 
under Art.80. Smit & Herzog, op.cit., p.833-834, refer to the Seventh General Report No 46 [1974]; 
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positive, so-called extensive, view adopted by the Commission and most legal com-
mentators "even if the transport provisions were inapplicable for the time being, the rest 
of the Treaty provisions did apply". 172 The main argument supporting this view is that 
the application of basic principles on sea transport is not categorically excluded by the 
text of the Treaty. The validity of this argument is emphasised by the fact that par.!, 
Art.51 expressly excludes the freedom to provide services from the sea transport sector. 
A second argument derives from the General Program of 18.12.1961 on the Abolition of 
Restrictions concerning the Freedom of Establishment, which includes measures clearly 
related to sea transport. The EC] has stated that the general principles of the Treaty are 
both implemented and completed by the Common Transport Policy, indicating further 
support for the extensive view. 173 Moreover, due to a general feeling that the rules on the 
application of the general principles in the field of transport remained "general to the 
point of being vague and imprecise",174 the Legal Service of the Commission issued a 
relevant internal document, according to which the freedom of establishment of legal 
entities is indeed applicable in sea transport. 175 
Thus, the current EC law position on maritime transport accepts that the activi-
ties of foreign maritime companies fall within the scope of Arts.43-48 on the right to 
establishment. Member States must respect this right, which includes the "equality of 
treatment between enterprises and means of transport on the one hand and users on the 
other" along with "freedom of action for the enterprises in fixing rates and in access to 
the various transport markets,,}76 When national provisions restrict the right of estab-
lishment of foreign maritime companies vis-a-vis national companies, infringements can 
also be brought before national courts. 177 
Eighth General Report No 355 [1975]; also see case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359; also 
see Commission of the European Communities, European Community and Transport policy in the ap-
proach to 1992 (1990, Commission of the EC, Luxembourg), pp.5-6. 
172 See Bredimas-Tzoannos, "In search of a Common Shipping Policy for the EC" [1981] Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p.99; also see Bernitsas, P., Transport and Accession (1985, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens), p.95; Cerehxe, op. cit. , p.18l. . . 
173 See case 16/78 Criminal Proceedings v Choquet [1978] ECR 2293. The case dealt With the question 
of compatibility with EC law of a Member State's requirement from citizens of oth.er Member States to 
obtain a driving licence issued by the receiving state, although the citizens in question had already ac-
quired valid driving licenses in their countries of origin. The issue arising at this point was whether the 
provisions on the free movement of persons were applicable in this case of road transport. AI~hough the 
ECl did not accept that this requirement restricted the person's freedom of movement, e~tabhshment and 
the freedom to provide services, it did accept that the measures taken by Member States In transport must 
comply with the basic freedoms of the Treaty of Rome. 
17 See K. Lipstein, op. cit., p.177. 
175 See Note jur/133874-MSIRGBI21.5. 74. 
176 . 40 See E. Strauss, op. CIt., p. . 
177 . 103 See Bredimas-Tzoannos, op.Clt., p. . 
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CIO. Exceptions to the Freedom of Establishment 
The Treaty of Rome (following the example of almost all international treaties) includes 
b f I · 178 • I anum er 0 exc USlve reservatIon causes, namely provisions which allow the Mem-
ber States to breach legally their obligation to follow the stipulations of the Treaty.179 
The most important exception to the application of the freedom of establishment con-
cerns administrative or legislative measures imposing identical legal restraints on both 
nationals and foreigners. Even if their freedom of establishment is limited by these 
stipulations, EU nationals cannot claim that a breach of EC law has taken place, because 
foreign natural or legal persons exercise their activities under the same conditions and 
restrictions imposed upon nationals of the host country. Thus, the freedom of estab-
lishment is not applicable in situations of an exclusively internal nature,180 although re-
strictions on the establishment of domestic companies in other Member States were 
found illegal by the ECJ. 181 
In an attempt to prevent foreigners from exercising activities connected with the 
imperium of the host country,182 the Treaty of Rome introduces the second exception to 
the freedom of establishment, which concerns activities connected, either permanently 
178 See cases 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others v The Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085; C-
288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commisariaat voor de Media 
[1991] ECR 1-4007; C-311197 Royal Bank o/Scotlandv Elliniko Dimosio [1999] ECR 1-2651. 
179 A reservation clause referring to public policy is also included in the text of the Hague Convention 
on the recognition of foreign companies, associations and foundations. See B. Goldman, op.cit., p.74. 
180 See cases 20/87 Ministere Public v Andre Gauchard [1987] ECR 4879, con.13; 204/87 Criminal 
Proceedings against Guy Bakaert [1988] ECR 2029, con.12; Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in 
Joined cases 54/88, 91188 and C-14/89 Criminal proceedings against Nino and Others [1990] ECR 1-
3537, cons.5 and 11. 
Art.43 refers to establishment in "another member-state". This may be interpreted in three ways: 
a. a Member State "other than the one under whose laws the company is formed, and other than the one 
where it has its registered office, central administration, or principle place of business within the Commu-
nity"; or 
b. "a Member State other than the one of which it is to be regarded as a national"; or 
c. a third possibility would be to interpret the term "in the territory of another Member State" as refer-
ring "to a territory other than the one in which it has hitherto been established". 
In view of the problems in the determination of the nationality of companies (the existence of two theo-
ries, the lack of unanimity in the application of tone of the doctrines of incorporation or of the siege reel), 
a broad "communautaire" approach should prevail. This approach "would suggest that for the purpose of 
applying Art.43 to companies, Art.48 either replaces all considerations as to nationality or spells out the 
sole test of nationality which is to be applied for the purpose of both Articles". See F. Burrows, op.cit., 
p.I82. 
181 See case C-379/92 Criminal Proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR 1-3453, con.3I; also 
see case 292/86 Claude Gullung v Conseil de I 'ordre des avo cats du barreau de Colmar and others 
[1988] ECR Ill, con.12. 
182 See the Resolution of the European Parliament of 17.1.1972, OJ, no C 10,5.2.1972, p.4; also see the 
Opinion of the Commission of 16.6.1980, OJ, no L176, 10.7.1980, p.39; M. Vilaras and G. Pa~a~imi­
triou, Access o/Community Citizens to Greek Administration (1993, Sakkoulas, Athens!Komotml); L. and 
J. Vogel, Le Droit Europeen des Affaires (1994, Dalloz, Paris), at 28. 
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or occasionallyl83 with the exercise of official authority, namely the execution of any 
action involving the exercise of rights and duties normally enjoyed by, or imposed 
upon, the acting person in a private capacity. 184 Only if a person, by exercising an activ-
ity with a direct and special bond with public authority, acquires exceptional authority 
(not common to all citizens) is there exercise of official authority. As far as the natural 
or legal person in question is concerned, it must be vested "with sovereign power" and 
must act in that capacity. 185 This exception refers to specific activitiesl86 and not to entire 
professions. 187 The implementation of this exception may not lead to the destruction of 
the effet utile of the freedom of establishment. 188 
Art.46( 1) provides the third set of exceptions (also found in most international 
conventions) which permit special treatment for foreign natural or legal persons l89 on 
grounds of public policy,l90 public security and public health. 191 These exceptions, im-
posed by legislative, administrative or other regulations, must be based on a serious and 
real threat to domestic society. The term public policy, as defined in EC law, refers to 
183 See H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.539; P. Papanagiotou, op. cit., p.311; P. Mathijsen, A guide to 
EC Law (1975, Sweet and Maxwell, London), p.70; C. Maestripieri, op.cit., p.164; G. Bournous, op. cit., 
p.92. H. Smit and P. Herzog, op. cit., p.607, note that since the Treaty refers to activities and not entire 
professions, the tenn "occasionally" seems "redundant". However, even an activity may involve the exer-
cise of public authority. If this is the case, the activity must be excluded from free establishment. An ex-
ample is presented by construction companies, "which may receive a kind of franchise to construct a su-
per highway and in return are authorised to levy a toll on the highway connected by them"; also see case 
C-42/92 Thijssen v Controledienst voor de verzekeringen [1993] ECR 1-4047. 
184 According to P. Zontanos, op.cit., p. 113, the importance of this exception has been reduced consid-
erably due to the fact that independent (non wage-earning) activities involved with the exercise of official 
authority are nowadays "very rare". ArtA4 on exemptions due to official authority has never been inter-
preted by the ECl. See Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in case 3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] 
ECR 4035, con.27. 
185 This is the criterion distinguishing the exercise of official authority from matters of public interest, 
which "should be the aim of every manifestation of official authority" without it being able to determine 
"what amounts to official authority". See H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.605. 
186 Even if the person's general activity does not involve the exercise of public authority, certain activi-
ties may be prohibited. For example, a person may pursue commercial activities in Greece, but cannot 
become President of the Greek Chamber of Commerce. See C. Simitis, "The effect of the participation to 
the EEC on Company Law" [1962] Nomiko Vima 545, p.549. 
187 The state can not monopolise a profession related to public authority, unless the activities related to 
the imperium are obligatory for the exercise of this profession. See G.E. Kalavros, op. cit., p.179; also see 
K. Zontanos, op.cit., p.116. 
188 See case 152173 Sotgiu v Deutshe Bundespost [1974] ECR 153. 
189 K. Zontanos, op.cit., pp.l27-128, notes that these can not be characterised as exceptions to the free-
dom of establishment, "since they do not permit the exclusion of certain activities from the freedom of 
establishment". Also see D. O'Keeffe, op.cit., ppA-5; P. Papanagiotou, op.cit., p.310. 
190 Difficulties arose to the translation of the term ordre pub/ique in English. The English version of the 
Treaty refers to public policy, but certain authors prefer the use of the term "pubic good", which is 
broader and comprises all basic principles of the ethical, political and economic order ofa state. See H. 
Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.617. 
191 G.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.182, notes that the issue of the proper definition of the three terms w~s re-
solved after the passing of Directive 64/221, which co-ordinates the legislations of Member States m ~~e 
public policy, security and health sectors; also see G. 'Alexiou, op.cit., p.378; cases 36175 Roland Rutlll v 
Ministere de I' Interieure [1975] ECR 1219; 30177 Regina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999. 
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all basic (and not only essential) principles of the ethical, political and economic order 
of the state and includes basic principles of state organisation. l92 The term public secu-
rity (usually confused with public policy) refers to the very foundation of society, the 
freedom and security of persons. The grounds for justifying such measures may not be 
invoked to serve economic ends. Derogation must be based on the personal behaviour of 
the person in question and may not exceed the limits of what is necessary for the pro-
tection of a democratic society. Public health refers to the "protection of health and life 
of humans" of Art.30. In the context of Art.48 public health includes all establishments 
whose activities cause pollution or produce commodities hazardous to health. 193 
The fourth exception to the freedom of establishment (restrictions concerning 
commerce and production of weapons and war materials) derives from Art.296(l)(b), 
according to which Member States may take necessary measures to protect basic inter-
ests of national security concerning the production, purchase and sale of weapons, am-
munition and war materials. These measures must be necessary for the host country's 
well being and their implementation must not harm competition on products not in-
tended to serve exclusively military activities. 194 The term weapons, ammunition and 
war materials refers to "any kind of material that can be used in war or for the prepara-
tion of war", whereas material -which can be used both in military action and for other 
purposes- is not subject eo jure to the above exception. 195 A sticto sensu interpretation of 
this relation is also indicated by Directive 68/363, which liberalises retail trade for cer-
tain kinds of weapons destructively mentioned in its text. 196 
According to Art.53(2) the Council may follow the relevant proposal of the 
Commission and exclude certain activities from the freedom of establishment. These 
exclusions -if passed- would apply to all Member States. 197 As the Council has never 
192 A violation of public policy is defined as "the existence, in addition to the perturbation ofthe social 
order which any infringement of the law involves, ofa genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the re-
quirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society". See case 30177 Regina 
v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999. 
193 My analysis of the three exceptions was based on elements found in I. Cath, op.cit., p.254; H. Smit 
and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.617; C. Maestripieri, op.cit., p.166; P. Zontanos, op.cit., p.142; G.E. Kalavros, 
op.cit., p.l83; F. Burrows, op.cit., p.208. 
194 Attention should be drawn to the fact that the interested country may avoid judicial control on the 
necessity and val idity of these restrictions based on its right of secrecy regulated by par. I a of article 223. 
See Zontanos, op.cit., p.122. -
195 See Papagiannidis-Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.564; also see Zontanos, op.cit., p.123. 
196 See Directive 68/363 of 15.10.1968, OJ, no L260, 22.10.1968. Alse see L.F. de la Gandara, and A. 
Caravaca, Libertad de establecimiento y derecho de societades en la Comunidad Economica Europea 
(1988, Tecnos, Madrid), p.32. . 
197 Until the present day the Council has never used the authority conferred by this regulatIOn. P. ~on-
tanos, op.cit., pp.124-125, refers to t?: view o~B. Goldman, ,:. Lyon Cae.n and E .. Ce:ehxe, who ~eheve 
that after the completion of the tranSItIOnal perIod, the CounCil has lost thIS authOrISatIOn. Accordmg to 
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used this power, the question, "what type of measures can the Council utilise?", is 
purely hypothetical. Smit and Herzog mention Regulations (which are considered "more 
appropriate" in view of the "scope of the whole paragraph") and Directives. 198 
Art.43(2) introduces the sixth (often considered "practically non-existent" ) ex-
ception to the freedom of establishment, which refers to the free movement of capital. 199 
The Treaty, recognising the close relationship between the two freedoms and the possi-
bility of indirect violations of the freedom of establishment under the form of restric-
tions to the free movement of capital, states that the freedom of establishment shall be 
implemented "subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital". Since EU 
companies wishing to establish in other Member States obviously need to import and 
export capital, freedom of establishment can not be exercised if the relevant EU compa-
nies are not allowed to freely import and export capita1.2°O 
The last exception to the freedom of establishment concerns state monopolies. 
Under Art.31 monopolies of a commercial character must be abolished.201 Moreover, 
Art.86 (which applies to pre-existing monopolies) forbids all Member States to enact or 
maintain in force any measure contrary to the Treaty, concerning public enterprises or 
enterprises with special or exclusive rights, namely companies which are closely con-
nected to the state or municipal organisations.202 State monopoly is defined as "the ex-
clusive possession of the trade in some commodity", or better as "every organisation 
with whom the Member State legally or practically controls, directs or substantially in-
fluences directly or indirectly de jure or de facto imports or exports from Member 
them "the Council has no authority to limit the content of this liberalisation since such a measure would 
turn against the regulations of the Treaty, which are now directly applicable". 
198 See H. Smit and P. Herzog, op.cit., p.613; also see A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, 
op.cit., p.147. 
199 F. Burrows, op.cit., p.206 notes that the phrase "subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to 
capital" indicates the will of the legislator to ensure the free movement of capital with actions based on 
Arts. 67-73 rather than Arts.52-58 EC. However, since the movement of capital "for this purpose was 
liberalised by the First Directive for the implementation of Article 67, ... for practical purposes Article 
52(2) need no longer be regarded as making any exception in this respect". 
200 P. Zontanos, op.cit., p.169, expresses the view that certain states implement restrictions to the free-
dom of establishment not for reasons of exchange policy, but as a means to control and limit the freedom 
of establishment in their territory. Also see Opinion of Avocate General Pergola in case C-35/98 Sta-
atssecretaries van Financien v B.G.M Verkooijen, 24 June 1999, unreported. 
201 Two principle methods of interpretation of Article 37 have been advanced. First, a literal interpreta-
tion leading to the conclusion that "the abolition of a monopoly's exclusive rights is necess~ only when 
such rights lead to discrimination in the production and marketing of goods between the natIona~s. of the 
Member States"; and second, a teleological interpretation, according to which "the a priori aboittl?n of 
exclusive rights is discriminatory per se. See F. Christoforou, "The rules governing state monopolIes of a 
commercial character under EEC law" [1981] EED, p.535. 
202 The relationship between public enterprises and the state may take the form of participation in the 
company's capital, control of the selection of the company's basic organs, or close supervision of the 
company from the state or other public enterprises. See A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, 
op. cit., p.235. 
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States.
203 
However, enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest are granted a limited exemption from the application of the Treaty. This 
economic interest must be general, namely it must not serve a limited number of per-
sons and must pursue social, educational or cultural aims. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this chapter was to present EC legislation on the freedom of establish-
ment, so as to define and delimit the legal framework within which the comparative 
analysis of EC and French, Italian and Greek legislation is to be made. The recognition 
of foreign legal entities is a prerequisite of the freedom of establishment without which 
the latter would lack practical value. The issue of recognition is twofold. First, does Ee 
law recognise foreign legal entities at all? Second, which is the nationality awarded to 
foreign legal entities? EC law follows the theory of ipso jure recognition of foreign le-
gal entities, which are recognised as having legal personality without the need to fulfil 
legal or administrative prerequisites. However, on the matter of the choice of the com-
pany's lex fori EC law lacks a clear position Two international instruments, the 1956 
Hague Conference on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and the 1968 Brussels 
Convention of Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities, have not yet been 
ratified. The main reason behind this is the parallel prevalence of the theories of incor-
poration, which determines the company's lex fori as the law of the company's incorpo-
ration, and of siege reel, which uses the location of the company's administration and 
management as its criterion. In an attempt to compromise both positions, and on the ba-
sis of Art.293 , EC law accepts the recognition of foreign companies under the law of the 
country of either their incorporation or of their siege reel. 
Establishment is defined as the actual pursuit of economic activity through a 
fixed establishment. Thus, establishment comprises physical location in a Member State 
on a permanent basis and integration into its national economy. The first factor distin-
guishes establishment from the provision of services. In Gebhard the ECl held that the 
distinction between the two concepts lies with the nature and extent of the exercised ac-
tivities. If these are conducted on a permanent basis and are primarily directed to the 
market of the host state, the company is established within the host state. If the activities 
203 See respectively F. Burrows, op.cit., p.89; Nestor, Papastamkos, Public Ent:rpr~s~s of Financi~l 
Aim (1991, Thessaloniki), p.64; also see F. Christoforou, op.cit., p.505; A. Papaglanmdls and A. ChrlstO-
giannopoulos, op.cit., p.84; O.E. Kalavros, op.cit., p.144. 
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are conducted on a temporary basis and are primarily directed to the market of another 
state, the company is merely providing services within the host state. 
The nature of the freedom of establishment is still under debate due to the differ-
ent terms used in various official languages in which the Treaty has been issued. The 
freedom of establishment is neither a freedom nor a right in the sense awarded to these 
terms by domestic legal terminology. It is a fundamental EC law right which exists irre-
spective of whether any concrete relevant secondary legislation has been issued. Thus, 
for the purposes of this thesis both the terms freedom and right are equally acceptable. 
"Secondary" establishment refers to the situation when a company retains its 
main office and extends its activities in other Member States by creating branches, 
agencies, offices or subsidiary companies. Under the national laws of countries follow-
ing the siege reel doctrine, secondary establishment is the only legal form of establish-
ment within their boundaries, since the transfer of the company's main office (seat) in 
another state would signify the dissolution of the existing company and the creation of a 
new entity with a new seat and a new nationality. Thus, primary establishment within 
France, Italy or Greece would be inconceivable, as companies would lose their foreign 
nationality on installation of their siege reel within them. The thesis will refer exclu-
sively to secondary establishment. 
The field of application of the freedom of establishment extends to any type of 
national legal entities, as long as they are profit-aiming, they have been legally formed 
under the law of their country of incorporation or of their siege reel and have an effec-
tive and continuous link with the economy of the receiving state. Due to the problem of 
EU subsidiaries of non-EU parent companies, non-EU entities must also comply with a 
fourth criterion: their products must comply with the rules of origin or the special anti-
dumping regulations on that specific type of product. 
Under Art.299 ratione loci the freedom of establishment is exclusively applica-
ble to companies originating from the fifteen Member States and territories with a spe-
cial relationship with these states. It does not apply to companies originating from the 
Agion Oros in Macedonia, Algeria, Monaco, San Marino, Andorra and the Vatican. 
Ratione materiae the freedom of establishment is applicable to all forms of fi-
nancial and commercial independent activities, irrespective of whether they have been 
expressly subjected to the freedom of establishment under secondary EC legislation. 
Such activities include industry, finance, commerce, fishery, electricity, telecommuni-
cations, agriculture, cinematography, crafts and the professions, mining, manufacturing, 
as well as their corollary activities. Maritime transport also falls within the scope of 
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Arts.43-48. However, the freedom of establishment is not applicable to situations of a 
purely internal nature, activities that tackle the imperium of the host state, or activities 
that should be prohibited on grounds of public policy, security and health. Moreover, 
activities relating to the commerce and production of weapons or activities excluded 
from the application of the freedom of establishment by the Council are also outside the 
scope of Arts.43-48. Furthermore, the freedom of establishment is applied subject to the 
provisions on capital movement and on state monopolies. 
National administrative or legal measures restricting or prohibiting such activi-
ties for foreign companies contradict EC law. It is only when such measures are applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner (directly or indirectly), are suitable for the attainment of 
their goal, do not go beyond the necessary for the attainment of this goal and are justi-
fied by general interest, that they may be considered legal under EC law. 
61 
CHAPTER 3 
Recognition of Foreign Companies in 
Greece, France and Italy 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As concluded in Chapter 2, company establishment involves actual establishment in the 
EU and recognition. The right to establishment lacks practical value for companies 
which, not being recognised, can not be subjects of rights and obligations under the law 
of the host state, thus being unable to function there. Recognition itself is twofold and 
involves the recognition of foreign legal entities by the host state and the determination 
of the national law which qualifies as the companies' lex fori in the host state. 
Chapter 3 aims to assess whether French, Italian and Greek law comply with EC 
provisions on the recognition of foreign companies. For the attainment of this aim, the 
legal and administrative conditions for the recognition of foreign EU companies in the 
three selected countries will be presented and comparatively analysed with EC law al-
ready presented in Chapter 2. Should this comparative analysis prove that the national 
requirements for recognition of foreign EU companies breach EC law, the first hypothe-
sis of the thesis, that breaches of the companies' right to establishment occur, will be 
proven. Should this not be the case, further analysis on the requirements for the secon-
dary establishmene of such companies in Greece, France and Italy will be necessary. 
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN GREECE 
In Greece the law regulating domestic and foreign public companies limited by shares is 
Law 219011920, according to which companies wishing to establish in Greece must 
have the right to function legally within the boundaries of the Greek state. In other 
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words, these companies must be the subject of legal obligations and rights, namely they 
must have legal personality under Greek law. Thus, in order to establish in Greece for-
eign companies must be recognised by the Greek state.2 Before the introduction of the 
1946 New Civil Code the problem of the recognition of foreign companies as legal en-
tities was the subject of much debate prompt to Laws XIIA of 10.9.1861 and KA of 
13.3.1881, which awarded to French companies the right to establish in Greece without 
the need of further official recognition by the Greek legal and administrative authorities. 
In view of Law's exclusive reference to French companies, some legal analysts and 
judges expressed the opinion that ipso jure recognition applied exclusively to French 
companies. Others supported the view that the reference to French companies was 
merely indicative of the will of the legislator to introduce ipso jure recognition for legal 
entities of all nationalities.) It is noteworthy that the theory of ipso jure recognition ex-
isted in Greece even before 1946, but was only applicable to foreign natural persons.4 
After 1946, however, and the introduction of the New Civil Code Greece has been con-
sistent in the prevalence of the liberal theory of recognition, according to which foreign 
companies are recognised as legal entities provided that they were legally formed ac-
cording to the regulations of their lexfori.s Art.! 0 of the New Civil Code (CC) regulates 
that "the legal capacity of the legal entity is ruled by the law of its seat".6 Consequently, 
the conditions set by Greek law for the establishment of Greek public companies are not 
1 Only this form is conceivable in these countries; see D. Tzouganatos, "Freedom of establishment of 
legal entities under Arts.52, 58 EC and International Company Law" in In memoriam of Alkis Argyriadis 
(1996, Sakkoulas, Athens), pp.l 005-1 028, at 1007. 
2 See Streit-Vallindas, op.cit., p.90; also see H. Xanthaki, "The Enforcement Mechanisms ofCommu-
nity Law in the Field of Company Establishment in Member States and Greece", EFARMOGES [1993] 
pp.257-286, at 258. 
) See E. Perakis, 1992, op. cit., p.439; also see Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 400/36; An 234/38. 
4 Megglidou notes that the ipso jure recognition was a theory based on certain regulations o~ Greek 
law such as Art. 13 Civil Law of 1856, Art.28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which were apphcable to. 
natural persons. However, they were considered to apply to some legal entities and espe~ially commerCIal 
companies as well. In that respect " ... regulations XII~'/,~0.9.1861 and ~'/13.3.1.881 vIolated the rules 
of the Greek legal system concerning foreign compames . See S. Megghdou, op.cll., p.202. 
5 See Thessaloniki Court of First Instance 4911/65; Thessaloniki Court of First Instance 4868/60; l:tE 
3395171; OA1:tE 722/54; and An 406/67. . 
6 See Spiropoulos, Private International Law, (1938, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.187; also see Fragistas: 
Representation offoreign companies limited by shares, (1940, Athens), p.281. For relevant court deCI-
sions, see Athens Court of Appeal 1002/1892, 1137/1898, 1416/1911 and Patras Court of Appeal 
789/1896. 
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applicable in the case of foreign companies.7 Thus, Greek courts cannot declare a for-
eign company invalid for its failure to fulfil the Greek provisions on its formation. 8 
The question is which is the legal system which serves as the company's lex fori. 
The matter is of significant theoretical and practical interest, as the company's lex fori 
regulates its validity, legal formation, functioning and dissolution, internal administra-
tion (attorneyship, valid decisions etc.), external relationships with third parties (legal 
transaction signing, liability, representation, etc.) and nationality.9 Art.IO CC, jurispru-
dence lo and Greek academic opinion confirm that the lex fori of legal persons derives 
from the law of their seat. II The main problem concerning the interpretation of this doc-
trine derives from the failure of Greek laws to clarify whether the lex fori of a company 
is linked to its statutory seat (the one declared in its constitutive instruments) or its true 
seat. Some commentators fail to see the point in distinguishing between the statutory 
and the true seat altogether on the basis that Greek law demands an accurate declaration 
of the company's true seat in its articles. Krispis notes that "one should not distinguish 
between the true and the statutory seat of a company, but between the true and a ficti-
tious or circumvented -in fraudem legis agere- seat". t2 The main argument of those de-
nying the distinction is that, as under most laws the transfer of the company's seat is 
allowed, companies have no reason to violate the requirement of sincere declaration of 
their seat. Although this seems logical, there are reasons forcing a company to maintain 
its seat in another country, even when transferring its seat is legal, such as taxation, 
7 Introductory Report of Pireus Court of First Instance 1152/1969: "The combination of Arts.3 7, 40 of 
the Commercial Law and Art.4 of Law 2190/1920 indicates that as far as companies truly seated in 
Greece are concerned ... Greek law is applicable; therefore, the conditions for its establishment are the 
ones regulated by the Greek law, even if in its Articles of Association the company is stipulated to be 
foreign." 
8 Athens Court of Appeal 51111912 regulates: "Even if Greek law requires supplementary or different 
actions, foreign companies formed legally according to the law of their true seat can not be asked to adopt 
the legal actions required by Greek law in addition to the ones stipulated by the law of the company's 
seat". Also see Dizis, Precedents of Commercia I Law 1845-1933 (1933, Athens), p.133. 
9 See Megglidou, op. cit., 201. 
to See An 46111978 which declares that the nationality of a public company limited by shares is deter-
mined by the law of the state, where it is seated. See also Athens Court of Appeal 262/1935, which states 
that the nationality derives by the state, where a company is seated; see also Athens Court of Appeal . 
11711982; An 1627/1986; Introductory Report of Pi reus Court of First Instance 1152/1969; Athens SIn-
gle-member Court of First Instance 1937/1974; Pireus Court of Appeal 65/1988; Pireus Court of Appeal 
163311989; An 1070176; An 59/1989; Pireus Court of Appeal 1633/1989; Athens Court of Appeal 
213511987· Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 494/1987; An 162711986; Pireus Multi-member 
Court of Fi~st Instance 2400/1983; Corfu Court of Appeal 75/1981; Sparta Single member Court of First 
Instance 74/1981; Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 1903/1979; An 61611976; An 439/1954; 
An 2111934; An 17111907. However, see contra An 358/1966. 
11 See Dizis, op.cit., pp. 128-133; Voutsis, Companies of Commercial Law (1986, Sakkou~as, ~then.s), 
p. 138 who notes that the criterion of the nationality ofa public company limited by shares IS maInly ItS 
seat; ~d Megglidou, op. cit., p.201, who states that " .. .In private international law theory, the seat ofa 
company is the place, where the administration ofth~ company .is s.eated, that.i~ the place wh~re the com-
pany's administration acts; in other words, the place where all slgmficant deCISions are taken. 
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market or other benefits. Moreover, Pireus Court of First Instance 115211969 (Intro-
ductory Report) clearly states that the seat of a company is the location, where its ad-
ministration really takes place and not the location stated in the company's Articles. 
Thus, the disctinction is accepted by jurisprudence. The question is which is the com-
pany's real seat. Since this is determined by the factual circumstances of each case 
, 
there is no legal text expressly introducing criteria for the identification of the true seat. 
Judges tend to order the litigants to prove their allegation regarding the seat's location 
with facts during separate proceedings. 13 The main criteria for the determination of a 
company's siege reel are introduced by Supreme Court 4611905, which declares that the 
lex fori of public companies limited by shares is determined by the location where: 
a. the main decisions on the company's actions are reached; 
b. the main guidelines and orders for the company's operation are produced; 
c. the company's control is exercised; and 
d. the results of the company's operation are harvested. 14 
The main significance of the lex fori is its role in the identification of the com-
pany's nationality. This represents the bond between the company and the state, whose 
law is the lex fori. 15 If the company's lex fori is Greek law, the company is considered 
Greek. If, however, the company is bound to a legal system other than the Greek, it is 
considered foreign and derives its nationality from that state. Adopting the stand-point 
taken by Art. I 0 CC, the Greek legislator includes the same provision in Law 2190/20, 
which stipulates that Greek public companies limited by shares must be seated in a city 
or community of the Greek state (Art. 6 CC). Companies not seated in Greece are not 
Greek and are considered foreign (argumentum a contrario). According to the Intro-
ductory Report of Pireus Court of First Instance 115211969 public companies limited 
by shares, whose administration is exercised in Greece, are Greek companies even if 
their articles state that their seat is located abroad. Consequently, Art.50 of Law 
219011920 on the secondary establishment of foreign public companies limited by 
shares is not applicable in the case of their establishment in Greece. 
12 S Kr" . 72 ee ISpIS, op.CIl., p. . 
13 See ibid, p.64. 
14 It should also be noted that before 1946 a small number of legal scientists believed that the seat of a 
company with more than one centres of administration was th.e one with the greatest importance for i~ . 
unhindered functioning. If more administrative centres were equally significant, the seat was t?e o~e .mdl.-
cated by the will of its founders in the company's Articles. See Spiropoulos, op.ci/" p.185. Thls,opmlOn IS 
based on the view that company law, being private, should leave the conditions of each transactIOn to the 
free will of the parties. It was, therefore, the statutory seat of the company which detennined the com-
pany's lex/ori. Recently, however, this doctrine has lost ground giving way to the theory of the siege 
reel. See Athens Court of Appeal 262/1935, Introduc~ory Report of Pireus Court of First Instance 
1152/1969, Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 1937/1974, 
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According to Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 2075/84 and Patras 
Multi-member Court of First Instance 2278/86, foreign public companies limited by 
shares, which were not legally formed under their lex fori yet operated in Greece, com-
panies are considered valid for the period of their functioning in Greece. 16 However, 
since they have not fulfilled the conditions for their formation, they are not public lim-
ited companies. They are de facto partnerships (a type of partnership best known in 
Greece as afanis eteria, which is legally formed following minimum requirements). 17 A 
different viewpoint was put forward by the Pireus Court of First Instance which consid-
ered such companies to be quasi public limited companies. Whichever opinion is fol-
lowed, it is widely accepted that all transactions with such companies are valid. Moreo-
ver, Patras Court of Appeal 191/1925 provides that the rescinding of the Decree on the 
company's establishment does not prohibit it from demanding the compulsory execution 
of its debts before the Greek COurtS. 18 Even after recognition the company does not ac-
quire Greek nationality. It remains foreign and is subject to the provisions on foreign 
legal entities. The main consequence of the company's recognition is that it is consid-
ered a legal entity, which signifies that its ability to exercise commercial activity in 
Greece while maintaining the powers awarded to it by its lex fori is acknowledged. The 
company also acquires the right to present itself before the Greek judicial and adminis-
trative authorities for its defence in any disputes deriving from its legal actions and re-
lationships (even those which took place abroad). 
C. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN FRANCEI9 
In Greece the ipso jure recognition of foreign companies is introduced by Art. 1 0 CC, 
which does not distinguish amongst companies of different forms. In France, however, 
IS See Streit-Vallindas, op.cit., p.83. 
16 See Athens Court of Appeal 17511988, which regulated that a foreign aviation company ~~tioning 
in Greece may be legally sued before the Greek courts, even if - under Art.66 of the Code of CIVil Proce-
dure- it has no independent legal personality according its lex fori. Only in the extreme case that, accord-
ing to its lexfori the foreigner wishing to present him/ or herself before the Greek courts doe~ n?t ~v~n 
have the attribute of being a natural or a legal person, only then do the Greek courts lack the JUrIsdiction 
to recognise his ability of performance. 
17 See E. Perakis, P. Karamanolis and A. Portolou-Mihail, "Greece" in Doing Business in Europe 
(1996, CCH International, Bicester), pp.42,00 1-48,702, at par.41-630 on p.42,572. 
18 However the minority of judges of that Court had the view, that the company's case to the court was 
inadmissible, because after the recall of the Decree, the company as a legal entity ceased to exist.and 
could not therefore demand the execution of its claims. As far as the determination of the exact time that 
the company as a legal entity began to exist, it is ruled by its lexfori, even if the dispute derives from the 
company's actions in Greece. See Krispis, op.cit., p.l03; 
19 See H. Xanthaki, "The establishment of foreign companies in France" [1996b] 17 The Company 
Lawyer 28, at 28-29. 
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this has not been the case. The societes de personnes, covering partnerships, founda-
tions and associations, have always been automatically recognised.20 This automatic 
recognition has been based on Arts.38 and 39 of the Code Civil (CC), which stipulates 
that the legal personality awarded to foreign societes de personnes by the law of their 
country of origin is recognised in France. Thus, foreign societes de personnes may 
function legally in France, provided that their activities do not threaten, directly or indi-
rectly, the French ordre pUblic. 21 The liberal status of ipso jure recognition has been ju-
dicially extended to private limited companies.22 
This is not the case with public companies limited by shares. Following the the-
ory of fiction, according to which foreign companies are mere fictional creations of a 
legal system which is the only one that can and must recognise them,23 and with the help 
of an extensive commercial and legal battle with Belgium,24 the Law of 30 May 1857 
expressly excludes foreign public limited companies from the field of application of the 
provisions on the ipso jure recognition of foreign private companies and expressly 
stipulates that public limited companies can only be recognised on the basis of a special 
or bilateral agreement between France and the country of origin. It would seem there-
fore that French law on the recognition of foreign public companies limited by shares is 
quite prohibiting. However, international agreements also form part of French law and 
under Art.55 CC are higher in the hierarchy of laws compared to any enacted domestic 
legislation. Moreover, the 1956 Hague Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Com-
panies and the 1968 Brussels Convention on Companies and Legal Entities have been 
ratified in France by Laws 62-704 of 29 June 196225 and 69-1134 of 20 December 
196926 respectively. On the basis of these two international agreements and Art.293 EC 
it is now accepted beyond doubt that public companies limited by shares originating 
20 See Yvon Loussouam and Pierre Bourel, Droit International Prive (1993, Precis Dalloz, Paris), 
p.663. 
21 See Yvon Loussouam, "Societes etrangeres" in Encyclopedie Dalloz, vol. Societe IV (Dalloz, 
Paris), p.3. 
22 See Rennes Court d' Appel, 8 July 1981, Rev. crit. DIP, 1982, note Mayer; also see D. Holleaux, J. 
Foyer and G. de Gouffre de la Pradele, Droit International Prive (1987, Mason, Paris), p.153. 
23 See Casso civ. 25 July 1933, DP 1936, 1, 121, note Silz; also see Y. Loussouarn and M. Trochu,."Les 
soc;etes etrangeres en France" in Labic, J., Collections des Juris-Classeurs, Juris-Classeurs de droll 
international, vol.8/2 (1994, Editions Techniques-Juris-Classeurs, Paris), Fasc.194-1, p.2; also see Y. 
Loussouarn, Encyclopedie Dalloz, op. cit., p.l. . 
24 The Belgian Court de Cassation with its judgement of 8 February 1849 refused to recogn!se a :-rench 
public limited company, thus creating chaos in the French-Belgian commercial and legal relationships. 
See ibid, p.2. 
2S See BLD 1962.402; JO 30 June 1962. 
26 See JO 23 December 1969. 
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from other EU Member States do not fall within the field of application of the Law of 
30 May 185727 and are therefore recognised in France ipso jure. 
Insofar as non-EU companies are concerned, these have to rely upon the signing 
of a decret collectifunder Art.2 of the Law of 30 May 1857, or of a bilateral convention 
between France and their country of origin.28 Recently the Court de Cassation in a se-
ries of revolutionary judgements has awarded legal personality for the purpose of debt 
recovery to all legal persons, irrespective of their country of origin, based on Arts.6 and 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Arts.1 and 5 of its Additional 
Protoco1.29 Thus, even non-EU companies whose country of origin has not signed a 
relevant bilateral or international agreement with France may be recognised as legal en-
tities within France for the purpose of safeguarding their property and the property of 
third parties. For debt recovery and collection purposes, such companies may legally 
submit their claim and present themselves before the French courts.30 However, they 
may still not exercise commercial or other activities within the French boundaries.31 
Having established that France recognises foreign EU public companies limited 
by shares as legal entities ipso jure, it is necessary to examine which legal system is 
determined as their lex fori under French law. In the past French legal theory seemed 
reluctant to accept that the notion of nationality could be extended to legal persons.32 At 
present, however, most authors accept nationality for legal entities. This is defined as 
the legal system which regulates the company's internal structure, internal relation-
ships,33 directors' powers,34 external relationships (constitution, dissolution and func-
tioning)3s and judicial competence.36 
27 See B. Mercadal and P. Janin, Memento Pratique Francis Lefebvre: Societes Commerciales 
(1995,Editions Francis Lefebvre, Levallois), p.1237; also see C. Galvada and G. Parleani, Traite de droit 
communautaire des affaires (1992, Litec, Paris), p.256. 
28 See, for example, the Conventionfranco-tunisienne of9 August 1963 (Rev.crit. DIP 1965, 8?1), the 
Conventionfranco-sovietique of3 September 1951 as modified (Rev.crit. DIP 1959,560); for a hst of 
such bilateral conventions, see Y. Loussouarn and M. Trochu, op.cit., p.7. 
29 See Crim 12 November 1990, Extraco Anstalt, Rev.crit., 1991,667,2, note Khairallah; also see 
Civ.l, 25 June 1991, Extraco Anstalt, Rev. crit., 1991, 667, 3 esp., note Khairallah, D 1992 Som. 163, 
obs. Audit. 
30 See Crim. 12 November 1990, Bull. crim., no 377; D 192.29, note Bouloc; Bull. Joly 1992.42, note 
Legros; Rev. societes 1992.39, note Roujou de Boubee; also see B. Mercadal and P. Janin, op.cit., p.1238. 
31 See P. Mayer, op.cit., p.657. . . . 
32 See J.-P. Niboyer, "Existe-t-il vraiment une nationalite des societes?" in Revue de droll mternat~onal 
prive [1927] 402-415; also see P. Mayer, op. cit. , p.657; also see Y. Loussouarn and M. Trochu, Op.Clt., 
pp.l-3. . I 
33 See Civ. 1, 17 October 1972, Bull. civ. I, no 204; Rev. cr. dr. inter. prive, 1973, 520, note Batlffo ; 
Rev. societes 1974, 127, note Bismuth. . 
34 See Com., 21 December 1987, J. c.P., 198, II, 21113, note Montanier; also see Com., 9 Apnl 1991, 
RJDA, 7/91, 613; Com., 9 March 1993, RJDA, 7/93,617. . . 
3S See Y. Chaput, Droit des societes (1993, Presses Universitair~s de France, Pans), p.48; also see CIV. 
17 October 1972, Rev. into dr. internat. prive, 1973, 520, note Battffol; Rev. soc., 1974, 127. 
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In view of the extensive role that nationality plays for its functioning, the deter-
mination of the company's lex fori is of great importance. Unfortunately, French laws 
fail to expressly define foreign companies. The only indication of the characteristics of 
foreign companies derives from Art.I83 7 CC, which defines French companies as those 
whose social seat is situated within the French territory.37 Legal theory defines foreign 
companies as "companies which without possessing the French nationality have a rec-
ognised legal personality and can be authorised to undertake on French territory certain 
acts and to exercise a certain number of rights".38 Another interpretation defines foreign 
companies as those "which based on the place where their statutory seat or central ad-
ministration is situated escape from the application of French law or of one of its 
branches (e.g. taxation law)".39 Several other criteria have also been put forward, such 
as the place of the company's registration, the place of its administrative and exploita-
tive centre, the notion of control and the place where its seat is situated.40 The Tribunal 
des Conjlits has expressly ruled that company nationality is determined via a combina-
tion of the criteria which better serve French public interest and the interests of the 
company itself.41 These criteria can even be introduced by special laws in cases where 
the state has a special interest in linking a company to either France or abroad. In the 
recent past, French law has bound the nationality of companies to the origin of their 
proprietors, directors or main capital sources law.42 The criterion of incorporation is 
rarely used in France.43 The criterion of the administrative and exploitative centre, 
which links the company's nationality to the legal system of the country where the main 
decision-making centre is situated, is used in France in certain special laws.44 Another 
aspect of the same criterion, often confused or used in conjunction with the criterion of 
36 See T. civ. Metz, 22 February 1950, D., 1950, Somm., 46; also Colmar, 23 June 1950, D., 19~1, 62, 
note R. Savatier; contra T. civ. Mulhouse, 2 May 1950, Rev. cr. dr. inter. prive 1951,157, note Nlboyet. 
37 See Y. Chaput, op.cit.), pA8. 
38 See Guide Juridique Dal/oz, vol. Societes etrangeres (Dalloz, Paris), pA80-1. 
39 See Guide Juridique Dal/oz, vol. Etranger (Dalloz, Paris), p.250-1. 
40 See M. Gennain, G. Ripert and R. Roblot, Traite de droit commercial (1993, Librairie generale de 
droit etjurisprudence, Paris), p.573. . 
41 See Tribunal des Conflits 23 November 1959, JCP 1960.11.11430, note Aymond; also see PariS, 17 
May 1967, D., 1968, 313; JCP, 1968, II, 15427, note Oppetit. 
42 See B. Mercantile and P. Janin, op.cit., p.140. 
43 See P. Mayer, op. cit., p.661. . . 
44 Thus the nationality of the establishment in France of the American company Remington TYpewn~er 
was considered American on the basis that it did not use its capital in France and was merely deahng With 
the sale of machinery made by the American establishment. See Req. 12 May 1931, S., 1932.1.57, rapport 
Bricout, note Niboyet, DP 1933.1.60, note Silz. 
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the administrative or exploitative centre, constitutes the notion of control, which binds 
the company's lex/ori to its "economic and political domination".4s 
Thus, the determination of company nationality in France does not always fol-
low uniform rules.46 However, the criterion that prevails in legal theory and practice is 
that of the siege social reel (real social seat),47 according to which a company's nation-
ality derives from "the place where the legal entity's judicial and economic integration 
is situated", 48 that is the place of the company's principal establishment. 49 The siege so-
cial reel is defined as "the place where the company has its centre of legal activity, bank 
accounts, accountability and general assemblies".so The siege social reel can be differ-
ent from the location where the establishment is situated,sl but in principle should be the 
same as the place ofincorporation.s2 The criterion of the real social seat prevails in judi-
cial practice. Moreover, Art.3 of the Law of 66-537 of 24 July 1966 expressly intro-
duces it as the criterion for the determination of the nationality of commercial compa-
nies. French legal theory tends to favour the combination of those of the above criteria 
which best serve the purpose of the whole exercise, which is to identify the state with 
the most substantial financial, legal and political bond with the company.S3 For the 
choice of the right country one or all of the above criteria can be used. In the particular 
case of secondary establishments of companies already established abroad what should 
be used is a combination of the criterion of the real social seat with those of the admin-
istrative/exploitative centre and of control. S4 The Cour de Cassation declared that the 
4S See J. Frossard, "Un vide legislatif: la nationalite des societes" in Dalloz et Sirey Jurisprudence Ge-
nerale [1969] 2e cahier, Chronique, p.16; also see B. Mercadal and P. Macqueron, Le droit des afJaires en 
France (1994, Editions Francis Lefebvre, Levallois), p.l 04. 
46 See B. Mercantil and P. Janin, op.cit., p.139; also see P. Didier, Les Soc;etes Commerciales (1991, 
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris), p.42. 
47 See Art.3(1) of the Law of24 July 1966; also see Conseil d' Etat, 22 February 1960, JCP, 
1960.2.11790, note Aymond; Casso req. 22 December 1986, S. 1987, 1.84; crim. 4 August 1906, 1. Clu-
net, 1907, 151; civ. 30 March 1971, Rev. crit. dr. inter. prive, 1971,451, note Lagarde, JCP, 
1972.2.17101 and 17140, note Oppetit, J. Clunet, 1972, 834, note Loussouarn; Paris, 26 March 1966, D., 
1966, Somm. 103; rev. crit. dr. inter. prive, 1968,58, note Loussouarn; Gaz. Pal., 1966, 1,400. 
48 See S. Boulin "Siege social" in J. Labic, op.cit., p.fasc.28 bis, p.24; also see Aix 23 October 1979, 
Bull. Aix 1979, 4,'p.31; Paris 17 October 1980, JCP, 80, ed. G, IV, 374; P. Louis-Lucas, "Remarques 
relative a 
la determination de la nationalite des societes" La Semaine Juridique [1953] 1104. 
49 See "Siege social", Guide Juridique Dalloz, op.cit., p.472-5. . 
50 See F. Lemeunier, Soc;etes Anonyme, Constitution - Gestion (1994, Delmas, Pans), p.39; also see 
Civ. 7 July 1947, D., 1948, Somm., 9; JCP 1947, II, 3871, note J. L; Casso civ., 10 March 1976, 
Rev.crit.dr.pr., 1976,658. . 
SI See Y. Chaput, op.cit., p.46; also see Com. 16 December 1958, Bull. civ., III, no 438. 
52 See B. Goldman, A. Lyon-Caen and L. Vogel, op.cit., p.91. 
S3 See Casso com. 12 December 1972, Bull. casso 1972,4, p.307; also see Paris, 20 March 1944, D., 
1945, 24, note Basdevant. ., , .. 
S4 See P. Mayer, op.cit., p.664; also see C. Hannoun,Le droit et les groupes des socletes (1991, ~Ibral-
rie General de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris), pp.275-278; B. Mercadal and P. Macqueron, op.cll., 
p.l04. 
70 
branch of the American company Shell in France, which had its real social seat, princi-
ple establishment and centre of direction and exploitation in France, should be consid-
ered a French company.55 This ascertains that under French law the primary establish-
ment of a foreign company is a theoretical impossibility, as such a unit would immedi-
ately acquire the French nationality. 56 
As a consequence of the recognition of foreign companies by the French legal 
order, these companies constitute subjects of rights and obligations.57 Non-recognised 
foreign companies are denied legal personality in France, and do not legally exist under 
French law. In principle, non-recognised foreign companies cannot present themselves 
before the French courts, cannot acquire property and are not recognised as legal credi-
tors.
58 However, under the European Convention on Human Rights non-recognised for-
eign companies may be considered de facto companies, thus enabling third parties to 
bring them before the French courts for the settlements of claims against them. 59 
D. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN ITALY 
The conditions for the recognition of foreign companies in Greece and France are sim-
ple and clear-cut. This is not the case with the Italian provisions. Although the direct or 
ipso jure recognition of foreign companies in Italian law is undoubtful, academic opin-
ion tends to disagree on the legal basis upon which such a recognition is made. In a 
much criticised relevant judgement,60 the Tribunale di Roma stated that the ipso jure 
recognition of foreign legal entities is based on the relevant well established principle of 
private intemationallaw which is part of Italian law under Art. I 0 of the Constitution.61 
This opinion stems from a similar view shared by the Belgian legal system, which 
adopts the principle of extra-territoriality on the basis of the relevant international law 
55 See Cass.civ. 10 March 1976, Rev.cr.dr.inter.prive, 1976,658; also see Cons. d' Et., 22 February 
1960, D., 1960,671, note Blancher; Com. 20 October 1953, D., 1954, Somm., 13; JCP 1954, II, 7898, 
note Freyria. . 
56 See F. Lemeunier, op.cit., p.41; see P. Le Cannu, Code des societes (19.95, Dalloz, Pans), p.25; also 
see B. Goldman, A. Lyon-Caen and L. Vogel, op.cit., p.93; also see TGI Seme, 1 February 1967, JCP, 
1967, 11,15163, note Fabre; Casso civ., 30 March, 1971, no 67, 13874; JCP, G., 1972, 11,17101, note 
Oppetit; Rev. crit. dr. inter. prive, 1971, 451, note Lagarde. . 
5'1 See B. Goldman, A. Lyon-Caen and L. Vogel, Droit commercial europeen (1994, PrecIs Dalloz, 
Paris), p.92. 
58 See Y. Loussouam and P. Bouret, op.cit., p.92. 
59 See Civ., 25 June 1991, Bull., 1,207; also see Crim.,.12 November 1990, RDJA, 1/91,25. 
60 See A. Santa Maria, Enciclopedia del diritto, vol.XLlI (1990, Giufrre, Milan), 883, at 883. 
61 See Trib. Roma, 2 May 1963, Giust. civ., 1964, 1,697-701. 
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principle.
62 
Morelli argues that foreign legal entities are recognised on the basis of their 
legal existence within a foreign legal system.63 However, the legal value of the rationale 
behind this interpretation has been questioned by many legal authors. 64 Others support 
the view that the ipso jure recognition of foreign companies is based on Arts. I 6,6S 1766 
or 25 disp. prel.,67 which refer to the status and capacity of foreign persons. It is argued 
that these regulations should be interpreted widely in order to cover not only natural but 
also legal persons. However, these provisions can only deal with foreign natural persons 
in specific, as they also regulate family relationships.68 Anyway, "the nationality of legal 
entities and the nationality of individuals are institutions profoundly different and there-
fore cannot be reduced to one concept". 69 Another group of legal authors base the rec-
ognition of foreign companies in Italy on Arts.2505-2509 Codice Civile (CC) on com-
panies with some connection to foreign legal systems. Since the lex jori, establishment 
and functioning of foreign companies are regulated by specific provisions of the Codice 
Civile and since such entities are allowed to function within the Italian economic sys-
tem, Italian law has no option but to recognise them and award them a legal personal-
ity.70 The result of all these doctrines leads to the ipso jure recognition of foreign legal 
entities.
71 
Despite the consequent minimal practical value of the choice of the theoreti-
cally correct doctrine, it is noteworthy that this seems to lie with the general principle of 
intemationallaw which is part of Italian law both directly (as a general principle) and 
indirectly (as a provision ofEC law). 
62 See H. J. Abrahams, Les societes en droit international prive, recherche du principe d' extraterrito-
rialite (1957, Paris-Liege), p.169. 
63 See Morelli, Elemento di diritto internazionale privato italiano (1986, Jovene, Italy), p.92. 
64 See A. P. Sereni, "La cittadinanza degli enti morali nel diritto internazionale" [1934] Riv. dire inter. 
171, at 171; also see B. Grossfeld, "Die Annerkennung der Rechtsfiihigkeit juristischer Personnen" 
[1967] RabelsZ 1, at 7. 
6S See Art. 16 of the preliminary regulations of the Codice Civile; also se~ Monaco, "P~rsonna gi-
uridica" in Novissimo digesto italiano, vol. XII, 1053, at 1053; also CassazlOne 2414/80 In Cendon, 
Commentario al Codice Civile (1991, UTET, Italy), p.1339. 
66 See Art. 17 of the preliminary regulations of the Codice Civile; also see Trib. Roma, 19 June 1968! 
Foro it. 1969 1006· Trib. Monza, 9 November 1985, Riv. dire inter. priv. eproc., 1969, 1006; also, Blg-
nami "Ricon~scime~to e trattamento delle societa straniere dell' ordinamento italiano" [1980] Rivista , 
societa 121, at 122. 
67 See Balladore Pallieri, Diritto internazionale privato (1950, Giufrre, Milano), p.134. 
68 See Cendon, op. cit. , p.1339. .. .. 
69 See Caruso Le Anstalten nell' ordinamento italiano (1979, Edltonale SClentlfica), p.21. 
70 See Cendo~, op.cit., p.1339; also see Trib. Milano, 4 !'Aay 19~8, Soc .. Idera Business ~.? v Falli-
mento Soc. Idera Business A.G., unpublished; also see Tnb.Napoh, 8 lugho 1995, Le Socleta, II, 1995, 
2.2670. 
71 See Cassazione 3089/85; Corte di appello di Genova" 28.aprile 1993, Riv:dir.int.priv. eproces., 
1993, 734; Trib. Livorno, 15 marzo 1994, Le Soc., 1994, 8; Tnb. Salerno, 21 dlcembre 1992, 
Riv.dir.int.priv. eproc., 1994,418; Trib. Udine, 18 giugno 1?93',Le~oc., 1993,~; also see :'-:,Santa _ 
Maria, Le societa nel diritto internazionale pr~ato (1?70~ GIUffre,. MIl~n), p: 127, M. Mo?t!, Legge re_ 
golatrice delle societa straniere: sedi secondarle delle soc leta stramere In Itaha [1975] Rivista delle So 
cieta, pp.1268-1294, at 1268. 
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Having established the ipso jure recognition of foreign companies in Italy, it is 
necessary to select the legal system which constitutes the company's lex/ori. Italian law 
defines the lex fori as the law which regulates the company's legal nature, its social 
rights, its constitution, transformation and existence, its capacity, its formation, its rep-
resentation regime, the rights and obligations of its shareholders, its liability regime as 
well as the consequences of the company's violations of the law or the regulations of its 
constitutive act.
72 
Until 1995 the company's lex/ori was regulated by Arts.2505-2510 
CC, which divided foreign companies into the following categories: 73 
a. companies incorporated abroad and having their seat within Italian territory; 
b. foreign companies with a secondary seat within Italian territory; 
c. foreign companies of a type different from that of domestic companies; 74 
d. companies incorporated in Italy but exercising their activities abroad; and 
e. companies with prevailing foreign interests. 
The first category of companies was regulated by Art.2505 CC, which stipulated 
that "companies incorporated abroad, which have within the territory of the state the 
administrative seat or the principle object of the enterprise, are subject to, even for the 
prerequisites for the validity of their constitutive act, the provisions of Italian law."7s 
Italian nationality was awarded on the basis of two alternative criteria, which were con-
sidered equally sufficient,'6 namely the company's administrative centre or its principle 
object of activity.77 In Italian law the principle object of activity is defined as "the pre-
cise activity presented to the world of finance", 78 which need not coincide with the lo-
cation specified in the constitutive act.79 The seat of the company is defined as the place 
where its principle object is administered,80 the "central seat of the company's direc-
tion, control and economic activity",81 or simply "the location where the decisions on 
72 See Art.25 of the Law of31 May 1995, N. 218 Riforma del systema italiano di diritto intemazionale 
privato in Gazz. UfJ., suppl. ord. n. 68 of3 June 1995. 
73 See E. Vitta and F. Mosconi, "Stato e capacita delle persone [1994] Dirillo Internazionale Privato e 
Processuale, pp.183-198, at 194. 
74 Since the topic of this thesis refers to public companies limited by sh~re.s, which do exist in Ita~y in 
the form of Societa per azioni, this category of companies does not fall wlthm the scope of the theSIS and 
will not be analysed here. 
75 See Art.2505 Codice Civile in G. Milloza, Codice delle societa (1995, Pirola, Milano), p.707. 
76 See A. Santa Maria, "Societa" in Treccani, G., Ope cit., p.7; also see C. Bignami, op.cit., p.163. 
77 See U. Leanza "Societa straniere" [1987] Novissimo Digesto Italiano 408-420, at 409. 
78 See Simonetto '''Trasformazione e fusione delle societa, Societa costituite all' estero" in Scialoja e 
Branca Commenta~io di Codice Civile (1976, Zanichelli-Foro Italiano, Italy), p.140. 
79 Se~ Caruso, Le societa nella C.E.E. (1969, Jovene, Italy), p.72; also see Capotorti, La nazionalita 
delle societa (1955, Jovene, Italy), p.215. .. . 
80 S E S· tt In Cl·t p 140· also see O. Cagmasso and M. Irrera, "Societa Estere" in W. Blglavl, 
ee . Imone 0, Or- .,. , 5 7 465 
Giurisprudenza Sistematica di Dirillo Civile e Commerciale (1990, UTET, Italy), pp.45 -53 ,at . 
81 S C· III 10 December 1974 1806· also see Cassazione, 26 May 1969, Foro it., ee assazlOne, sez. , " 
1969, 1,25381857; Trib. Roma, 2 May 1963, Giust. civ., 1964, 1,698. 
73 
the activity of the company are taken", 82 even if this is different from the location de-
termined in the statutes.83 The domicile or residence of the company's administrators is 
irrelevant.
84 
Thus, under Art.2505 CC for the determination of the company's lex fori 
Italian law relied on its siege reel social.85 Companies incorporated abroad, but having 
their siege social in Italy were considered Italian.86 The prevalence of the theory of the 
social seat signified that companies, which having been incorporated abroad and having 
their seat in Italy have failed to comply with the Italian conditions for their formation of 
such companies, lacked legal personality and under Italian law simply did not exist. 87 
However, such companies were considered to still have the capacity to present them-
selves before the Italian courts and could both sue and be sued for claims deriving from 
their activity.88 Moreover, companies constituted abroad but failing to comply with the 
conditions for their incorporation under the law of the state of incorporation did not ac-
quire legal personality under Italian law and were not recognised as legal entities in It-
aly.89 Furthermore, foreign companies, which moved their principle place of activity or 
their social seat in Italy, became Italian.9O The change in nationality, which was valid 
only if conducted under the law of the host state,91 occurred at the exact time when the 
seat or principle object of activity was moved to Italy.92 However, it was disputed 
whether Italian companies transferring their seat abroad were transformed to foreign 
companies93 or whether they withheld their Italian nationality even after the transfer of 
their seat or principle object of activity.94 
82 See T. BaBarino, op.cit., p.62. 
83 See ibid., p.388; also see Cendon, op.cit., p.1341. 
84 See E. Simonetto, op.cit., p.389; also see B. Ferraro, "Societa estere e sedi secondarie in Ita Ii a" 
[1986] Le Societa, pp.584-590, at 585. 
85 See T. BaBarino, op.cit., p.ll. 
86 See Cassazione, 26 May 1969, Foro it., 1969, 1,2538; also see Maisto. and Miscal.i, Bu~i?ess Law 
Guide to Italy 1992, CCH Editions Limited, Great Britain), p.32; T. Ballanno, La NazlOnalzta delle So-
cieta a la Condizione delle Scoieta Straniere (1976, CEDAM, Padova), p.1573. 
87 See Trib. Roma, 2 May 1963, Giust. civ., 1964, I, 698; also see Trib. Genova, 31 March 1967, 
R.I.P.P., 1967,802. 
88 See App. Milano, 8 May 1956, Foro pad, 1957, 11,40. . 
89 See T. BaBarino, op.cit., pp.75-76; also see P. Perlingeri, Codice Civile Annolalo can fa ~ot!nna 
(1991, Zanichelli, Italy), p.614; Cassazione., 20 October 1978, no 4750, RFI, 1978, voce Socleta, c.2502, 
n.348. . . ICE E " 
90 See S. Neri, "Lo stabilimento in Italia di societa commerciali c~~ ~,artlc.ol~~;.nguar?o.al a .. : . 
[1960] Riv.trim.dir.e proc.civile 894-957, at 922; also see C. Ange.hcl, Socleta m EnclclzpedlQ C!'-
uridica (1993, Istituto della Enciclopedia Giuridica, Italy), p.7; Tnb. Roma, 9 December 1982, R1V. not., 
1983,1213. .. d' d'" . I 91 See Art.25 of the Law of 31 May 1995, N. 218, Riforrna del systema Itahano 1 mtto mtemazlOna e 
privato in Gazz. Uf!., suppl. ord. n. 68 of3 June 1995. 
92 See Santa-Maria, 1990, op.cit., p.892. 
93 See Trib. Verona, 5 December 1996, Soc., 1997, I, 574. . . 
94 For a further analysis of the rationale behind both opinions and a hst of theIr supporter~, see .Cendon, 
. 1340 A S ta Marl'a 1990 on cit p 899 favours the opinion that such companies WIthhold Op.C11.,p. ., an , 'YO .,. , 3 Md' 1982 
their Italian nationality; also see Cassazione, sez. lav., 12 June 1982, No 357, ass. ec. ClV., , 
74 
Following Law 21811995, Art.2505 CC was repealed.9s The literal interpretation 
of the new provision signifies that the principle criterion for the determination of the 
company's lex fori now is the location of its incorporation, which regulates the legal 
nature, the denomination, constitution, transformation and extinction, the capacity and 
legal relationships of the company.96 However, the maintenance into force of Arts.2506-
2508 and 2510 CC and the second part of Art.25 of the Law itself introduces a radical 
exemption from the application of the theory of incorporation. The theory of the social 
seat applies to companies incorporated abroad but having their administrative centre or 
principle object in ltaly.97 On this basis, the currently prevailing view is that, in practice, 
the reform has not altered the criterion used for the determination of the companies' lex 
fori,98 which remains the company's social seat.99 Consequently, the previous interpreta-
tion of Art.2505 CC is still valid. 
The second category of foreign companies concerns companies establishing a 
secondary seat within the Italian territory. The legal regime referring to such companies 
is introduced by Art.2506 CC as modified by Directive 89/666IEC of 21 December 
1989 which was implemented pursuant to DL No 142 of 19 February 1992. This Article 
refers both to the lex fori of such companies as well as to the conditions for their estab-
lishment in Italy. The first issue will be analysed in this Chapter, whereas the second 
issue will be referred to in Chapter 4. Art.2506 stipulates that foreign companies formed 
abroad and having one or more secondary seats with permanent representation in Italy 
are subject for each secondary seat to the provisions of Italian law on the deposit of the 
articles of incorporation, the filing of these articles with the Company Registrar and the 
publication of their balance seats. Art.2506 CC is applicable if two conditions are met. 
Firstly, there must exist a secondary establishment in Italy and secondly this establish-
ment must represent the main company on a permanent basis. If either of these condi-
421.538; also Cassazione, sez. lav., 26 October 1982, No 5597, unreported. However, see contra Cian 
and Trabuccchi, op. cit. , p.1681, who supports the view that in this situation the company's nationality 
would change. 
9S See Arts.25 and 73 of Law 218 of31.5.1995 in UTET, Codice Civile e Leggi Collegate (1996-97, 
UTET, Milano), pp.481-489, at 484 and 489. 
96 See F. Gazzoni, Manuale di Dirittio Privato (1996, Ediz. Scientifiche Italiane, Italy), p.1342; also see 
T. Ballarino, Diritto lnternazionale Privato (1996, CEDAM, Italy), p.344. 
97 See A. Silverio, Riforma del Systema Italiano di Diritto lnternazionale Privato (1997, CEDAM, It-
aly) p.154· also see F. Moscomi, Diritto lnternazionale Privato e Processuale (1997, UTET, Italy), 
pp.31-33; F. Capelli, "La nuova legge applicabile aBe societa costituite all 'estero" [1995] Le Societa, no 
9. 
98 See A. Santa Maria, "Legge 31 Maggio 1995 N. 218" in [1995] Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Pri-
vato e Processuale, pp.l036-1043, at 1039. . ., 
99 See F Seatzo "Sulla nuova disciplina delle societa nel diritto intemazionale prlvato Italiano" [1997] 
Giurisprudenza C~mmerciale, pp.83011-8411I, at 838/1; also see T. Ballarino, Diritto Internazionale PrI-
vato: I Codici Esplicati (1997, Ed. Simone, Italy), pp.52-53. 
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tions are not met, Art.2506 CC does not apply even if company activity is frequently 
carried out in Italy.lOo A secondary establishment exists when "an organised Italian en-
terprise unit is organically bound with a foreign central seat through a relationship be-
tween the principle seat and the subject which administers the secondary seat in Italy" 
or "the subject which has invested in the stable representation in Italy". 101 Thus, an of-
fice of representation dealing exclusively with the collection and offer of information on 
behalf of the foreign company does not fall within the scope of Art.2506 ce. What falls 
within the scope of the Article is any unit or establishment, organically connected with 
the central seat, which enjoys a certain degree of administrative autonomy and whose 
administration is entrusted in a subject with the legal capacity to act in the name of or 
on behalf of the foreign company in a permanent manner. 102 The subject can be a legal 
and a natural person. 103 Permanent representation in Italy is established through the for-
mal delegation of a wide range of powers to the company's secondary seat. IM The per-
manency requirement refers to the functioning of the secondary seat and not to the 
domicile of the natural persons representing the secondary seat. lOS 
The provisions of Italian law indicate that for the determination of the compa-
nies' lex fori it is the theory of the social seat that prevails. I06 As a result of this preva-
lence, Art.2510 CC regulates that companies with prevailing foreign interests are sub-
ject to special Italian laws. Thus, companies falling within the fifth category mentioned 
above, namely companies formed and functioning in Italy, remain Italian even if they 
represent foreign interests. l07 The combination of this provision with the now repealed 
(yet unchanged in substance) Art.2509 CC I08 indicates that the subsidiaries of foreign 
companies are considered Italian and not foreign legal entities. The practical value of 
this observation will be evaluated in the second part of this chapter. 
100 See Cassazione, 26 October 1955, No 3491, Foro it., 1956, 1,335; also see E. Vitta, Manuale di 
Diritlo Internazionale Privato II (1975, UTET, Milano), p.99. 
101 See accordingly Cassazione, sez. un., 15 November 1960, No 3041, Giust. civ., 1961, 650; also s~e 
Trib. Roma, 2 May 1963, Giust. civ., 1964, I, 698; Cass., 19 November 1971, no 3319, unreported; Tnb. 
di Roma, 3 October 1984, Riv. dir. com. , 1985, 11,215. 
102 See Trib. Roma, 24 November 1987, Le societu, n. 4/1988, 395; also see M. Ginelli, "Questioni in 
tema di interpretazione degli artt.2506 ss. c.c." [1967] Rivista delle Societu, pp.620-625, at 620, note 1. 
103 See Cassazione, sez. I, 30 November 1967, No 2854, Giust. civ. Mass., 1967, 148. 
104 See Cassazione, 15 November 1960, No 3041, Giust. civ., 1961,650. 
lOS See E. Simonetto, op. cit., p.41 0.· . " 
106 See A. Santa Maria, "Problemi attinenti al diritto intemazionale privato e processuale delle soc leta 
[1987] Rivista delle Societu, pp.1473-1500, at 1498. 
107 See Trib. Genova, 21 February 1948, Giur. compl. Casso civ., 1948, IV, 873. 
108 According to the repealed article companies falling within the fo~h catego.ry, namely t~ose formed 
in Italy, were considered Italian even if their principle object of enterpnse or theIr seat. was situated 
abroad. See F. Capotorti, "Studi in tema di societa e di impresa nella C.E.E." [1966] RIV. delle Soc. 375-
389, at 389. 
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E. EVALUATION OF NATIONAL LAWS ON RECOGNITION 
The recognition of foreign legal entities from legal systems other than the one from 
which these companies originate is twofold, and includes both the recognition of such 
companies by the host country and the determination of the lex fori. With reference to 
the first issue, EC law follows the liberal theory or theory of ipso jure recognition of 
foreign companies as legal entities. This theory is followed in Greece on the basis of 
Art. 1 0 CC, in France on the basis of decrees and bilateral agreements which are now 
accepted to cover all company forms -even public companies limited by shares- origi-
nating from EU Member States,109 and in Italy on the basis of Arts.2505-2520 CC as re-
affirmed by Art.2 of Law 218/95 and numerous international Conventions to which It-
aly took part. 110 Moreover, the ipso jure recognition of EU foreign companies now 
forms part of the internal laws of the three selected states under Art.293 EC. III It is ar-
gued that this provision merely introduces the obligation of Member States to proceed 
to negotiations leading to the ipso jure recognition of foreign companies and does not 
introduce liberal recognition as such. However, it is widely accepted that the imposition 
of the theory of the ipso jure recognition is directly implied in the provisions on the 
freedom of establishment, which could not be realised without a liberal recognition re-
gime. 112 Furthermore, the liberal theory on the recognition of foreign companies is de 
lege lata introduced in EC law on the basis of the 1968 Brussels Convention signed by 
all the then six members of the EEC. The Convention constitutes one of the first legal 
instruments to expressly introduce the liberal theory of recognition for all signatory 
states. France has signed and ratified the Convention under Law 63-1134 of 20 Decem-
ber 1969, Italy has signed and ratified the Convention under Law 220 of 28 January 
1971,113 whereas Greece has done neither. However, all three countries follow the the-
ory of the ipso jure recognition, thus awarding legal personality to most foreign legal 
entities and especially to public companies limited by shares originating from other EU 
Member States. This position is in compliance with EC law as expressed directly in 
109 See B. Goldman, A. Lyon-Caen and L. Vogel, op.cit., p.91. 
110 For a list of such Conventions, such as the 1968 Brussels Convention on the recognition of compa-
nies the 1968 Convention on the execution of civil and commercial judgements within the EU, see A. 
San;a-Maria, 1993, op.cit., p.9; also see G. Girello, "La legge applicabile aIle persone giuridiche nel 
diritto intemazionale privato" [1996] Diritto del Commercio lnternazionale, pp.285-287, at 285. 
III Reciprocity is irrelevant. See E. CalC>, "Le persone giuridiche straniere" [1992-199.5] St~di e Mate-
riali, pp.119-126, at 121; also see G. Broggini, "Conflitto di leggi, arrnonizzazione.e umfic~lOne nel 
diritto europeo delle obligazioni e delle imprese" [1995] Rivista di Diritto InternazlOnale Prlvato e Proc-
essuale, pp.241-264, at 251. . 
112 See S. Neri, op. cit. , pp.940-941; also see C. Galvada and G. Parleani, op.cit., p.109. 
113 See Law 220 of28 January 1971 in G.v., 6 May 1971, no 113. 
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Art.293 EC and the 1968 Brussels Convention, and implied indirectly in the provisions 
on the freedom of establishment of foreign EU companies within other Member States. 
With reference to the lex fori, in Chapter 2 it was concluded that EC law deter-
mines it as the law of the country where the company has its registered office, central 
administration or principle place of business. In the light of this, Greek law on the rec-
ognition of foreign legal entities, which follows the theory of the siege reel, seems to 
comply with EC law. In Greece the real seat of the company is defined as the location 
where the company's basic decisions are made, where the guidelines for the company's 
operation are issued, where the company's control is exercised and where the results of 
the company's operation are collected. 1I4 The Greek description of the company's seat 
falls within its EC interpretation as the place of management and administration. How-
ever, Greek and EC legislation differ on the issue of the status of companies which, 
having been incorporated abroad, have their true seat in Greece. Under Art.4 of the 
Brussels Convention, which has been confirmed by Centros, liS these companies should 
be recognised after the imposition of certain mandatory provisions by the host country, 
whereas in Greece they are considered to be Greek companies with the same legal rights 
and obligations as companies registered in Greece. A second difference concerns the 
status of companies which were not legally formed according to their lex fori, yet func-
tion legally in Greece. Although the Brussels Convention neglects to tackle this issue, 
the implication is that since these companies are invalid according to their lex fori, they 
should also be considered invalid by the host country, on the grounds that the host 
country must award the companies under recognition the same powers awarded by the 
company's lex fori. In Greece, however, the prevailing theory awards such companies 
all legal rights, at least for the period of their functioning in Greece. The third variation 
between the two laws lies in the fact that the Convention is applicable within the EU, 
whereas Greek law does not really distinguish between EU and non-EU companies. All 
these problems, however, derive from the difference between Greek law and the regula-
tions of the yet unratified Brussels Convention, to which Greece did not take part. It can 
therefore be stated that Greek law is compatible with EC regulations on the recognition 
of companies from other EU Member States. However, this is not a direct result of 
Greece's membership to the EU, as the relevant Greek legislation was passed well be-
fore the Greek accession. Furthermore, Greece has not signed the Brussels Convention. 
This compliance is probably due to the fact that the Brussels Convention is really a 
114 See An 64/1905; also see Athens Court of Appeal 262/1935; Introductory Report of Pireus Court of 
First Instance 1152/1969; Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 193711974. 
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written report of the prevailing international law and Greece (in its effort to lure foreign 
companies within its dominion) has always been ready to observe international law. 
Contrary to Greece's willingness to recognise foreign legal entities irrespective 
of their country of origin, France underwent a long history of restrictive legal theory and 
practice. Despite the recent acknowledgement of the applicability of the notion of na-
tionality to legal (as well as natural) persons, French law is still failing to recognise ex-
pressly all foreign legal entities indiscriminately. The French legal regime is even more 
prohibiting in reference to foreign public companies limited by shares. The latter are 
recognised only if they originate from an ED Member State. Consequently, French law 
guarantees the recognition of all types and forms of ED legal entities, thus creating an 
exclusive, liberal environment for their establishment in France. The question however , , 
is whether French law on the non-recognition of foreign public companies limited by 
shares deriving from non-ED Member States complies with EC law and the Brussels 
Convention. 116 EC law and the freedom of establishment are ratione materiae applicable 
exclusively to ED companies. Thus, EC law does not apply to the French treatment of 
non-ED companies. This is reflected in Art.3 of the Brussels Convention, which ex-
pressly introduces the right of a signatory state to refuse recognition to companies 
which have no genuine link with the economy of an EU Member State. It must be ac-
cepted that companies whose legal, administrative and managerial centres are not lo-
cated in France lack genuine link with the French economy. Thus, such companies can 
legally, even under the provisions of EC law, be refused recognition. These companies 
are considered foreign non-EU companies in France, where the prevailing theory for the 
determination of the company's lex fori is that of the siege social reel. This is defined as 
the location where the company's principle legal, administrative and managerial centre 
is located, or as the place of the company's judicial and economic integration, or the 
location of the company's principal establishment. This criterion, almost identical to the 
one introduced by Greek law, is quite similar to the one introduced by EC provisions on 
the freedom of establishment. The Brussels Convention is also observed by France, 
whose method of determination of the companies' lex fori is in absolute compliance 
with its Arts. 1 and 2, as well as EC law. 
Another issue worth addressing concerns the status of companies which have 
been incorporated abroad, but have their true sociai seat in France. Art.4 of the Brussels 
Convention regulates that such companies should be recognised as legal entities by the 
115 See case C-212/97 Centros Ltd y Erhvervs-og S.elskabsstyrelsen, 16 July 1998, unreported. 
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signatories of the Convention. Recognition does not occur ipso jure. The signatory 
states may impose all regulations applicable to domestic companies of the same or a 
similar type. The Convention seems to imply that such companies should be recognised 
as foreign legal entities. However, in France, and as a direct result of the application of 
the theory of the true social seat, such companies are considered French. Insofar as rec-
ognition is concerned, however, the matter seems to be of theoretical importance, since 
both under French law and under the Convention these companies will have to go 
though the same recognition procedure, namely the one applicable to domestic compa-
nies of the same type or form. However, the matter is of practical importance for the 
treatment of such companies. Another problem concerns the treatment of companies 
which were not legally formed according to their lex fori. Under the regulations of the 
Brussels Convention such companies lack legal personality and should be considered 
non-existence both from the law of the lex fori as well as the law of the host state. How-
ever, in France such companies may present themselves before the French criminal and 
civil courts for the defence of their rights. This regulation seems to violate the Conven-
tion's stipulations. However, the relevant French law cannot be considered a breach of 
EC law, as its source is the European Convention on Human Rights, which also consti-
tutes a source ofEC law. In general, therefore, French law is in compliance with EC law 
on recognition. The willingness of France to adapt its legislation so as to accommodate 
the relevant EC law provisions is quite obvious and is reflected in the remarkable differ-
ence between the legal status of foreign non-EU public companies limited by shares 
which, in principle, are not recognised in France and the status of foreign EU public 
limited companies which are recognised as legal entities ipso jure. 
Italian law also recognises foreign companies ipso jure. The lex fori of legal per-
sons is defined as the legal system of the country where the company's administrative 
and managerial centre is located or as the place where the precise activity of the com-
pany is presented to the world of finance. Thus, in Italy the criterion for the determina-
tion of the company's nationality is its managerial and financial centre. The Italian in-
terpretation of the theory of the siege reel social, which is very similar to the Greek and 
French versions, is in absolute compliance with the relevant EC provisions. 
What is worth further examination is the legality -under EC law- of the Italian 
legal position concerning the nationality of comp~ies which, having been incorporated 
abroad, have their true social seat in Italy. The Italian position, which is very similar to 
116 In France there are still restrictions in the recognition of foreign non-EU socieles de capilaux. See B. 
Mercadal and P. lanin, op.cil., p.1238. 
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the French,117 is that since such companies have failed to comply with the conditions for 
their legal fonnation imposed by their true lex fori, namely Italian law, they lack legal 
personality altogether and are therefore not recognised as legal persons. This regulation 
seems to be in breach of ArtA of the Brussels Convention, according to which such 
companies must be recognised as legal entities following the completion special of 
mandatory procedures introduced by the law of the receiving state. 118 The matter is 
mainly of theoretical value. Under the Convention such companies need to undergo a 
special recognition procedure, whereas under Italian law such companies need to fulfil 
the conditions for their fonnation in Italy as domestic companies. The two positions 
seem quite similar with their only difference lying in the procedure to be followed for 
their recognition. However, things are not quite so simple. Should the Convention's 
rules be followed, the company would be recognised as a foreign legal entity with the 
rights and obligations awarded to foreign companies of that type or fonn. Should the 
Italian position be followed, the company would change nationality and become Italian. 
In that case problems would arise concerning the existence of the initial company and 
its relationship with the new Italian unit. However, this is a problem inherent in most 
countries following the doctrine of the true seat, which has recently been identified in 
Centros and confinns the need for an express, unifonn regulation at the ED level. 
Another issue arising here refers to the Italian stipUlations on the regime of for-
eign companies which have failed to follow the conditions for the fonnation of a com-
pany of this type or fonn under the law of their lex fori. In Italy these companies are 
considered to lack legal personality and are not recognised as legal entities. This posi-
tion is in compliance with the relevant provision of the Brussels Convention. However, 
Italian law allows such companies to present themselves before the Italian civil and 
criminal courts in order to participate in trials concerning the defence of their property 
rights. This seems to violate the general non-recognition guideline for similar compa-
nies. However, most ED jurisdictions do allow this minimum of rights to foreign com-
panies, even when the latter lack legal personality, on the basis of the relevant provision 
of the European Convention on Human Rights which is accepted as a source ofEC law. 
Italian law on recognition does comply with EC law. The same conclusion is 
applicable to Greek and French law. This does not mean, however, that problems and 
inequalities in the recognition of legal entities do· not exist. However, in view of the 
117 See T. Ballarino, La Sociela per Azioni nella Disciplina lnlernazionalprivalistica (1994, UTET, it-
aly), p.ll. . ., d /I 
118 G. M. Ubertazzi, "Riconoscimento e stabilimento delle societa nella C.E.E." 10 [1970] Rlvls(a e e 
Sociela 526-539, at 534. 
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similarity in the provisions within the three selected countries and the similitude in the 
nature and type of the precise differences between the three national laws and the rele-
vant EC stipulations, it must be accepted that these minor discrepancies derive from the 
application of the principle of the real seat as the prevailing doctrine for the detennina-
tion of the companies' lex fori and not an alleged intention of the three legislators to 
violate EC law. Another additional cause of problems is the inherent difficulties in the 
parallel application of two contradicting theories of recognition within the EU. It must 
also be acknowledged that any discrepancies between Greek, French and Italian law on 
the one hand and EC law on the other derive from the provisions of the Brussels Con-
vention, which at the moment is not yet into force. Obviously, these discrepancies dem-
onstrate the differences between the national positions of these three Member States on 
each particular issue and the underlying disposition of a the states which signed the 
Treaty of Rome. Although these discrepancies are noteworthy, they do not constitute 
violations of EC law. Insofar as the provisions of the Treaties are concerned, they seem 
quite vague in the definition and description of the criteria used for the determination of 
the companies' lex fori. The only relevant express provision refers to the introduction 
and equal acceptance of both the criteria of the true seat and of incorporation. 
Since the theory of the true seat is used in all three selected jurisdictions, it can 
be stated that Greece, France and Italy observe the regulations of EC law on the recog-
nition of foreign public companies limited by shares originating from a Member State 
other than the one from which recognition is sought. Thus, any breaches of EC law in 
the field of company establishment within these three countries must be sought in other 
aspects of their national law. Chapter 4 will refer to the fonnal requirements for the sec-
ondary establishment of foreign public companies limited by shares, whereas following 
Chapters will analyse the substantive requirements and restrictions imposed on such 
establishment by the legal and administrative provisions of the three selected states. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Formal Requirements for Secondary 
Establishment in Greece, France and Italy 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The question addressed in this Chapter is, whether France, Italy and Greece hinder the 
secondary establishment of foreign EU public limited companies via national legal or 
administrative regulations concerning the legal formation of a secondary unit within 
their boundaries. The main aim of Chapter 4 is to assess whether the relevant national 
laws comply with EC provisions on the freedom of establishment or whether breaches 
of EC law in this field still take place within the three selected countries. In order to 
achieve this aim, Chapter 4 will present the formal requirements, legal and administra-
tive, for the secondary establishment of foreign EU public companies limited by shares 
in Greece, France and Italy. This presentation will be followed by the comparative 
analysis of the relevant national laws with EC law already analysed in Chapter 2. 
B. ESTABLISHMENT IN GREECE 
B.l. The establishment of branches and agencies (Art.50 of Law 2190/1920) 
In Greece public companies limited by shares (Anonimos Eteria or AE) are defined as 
commercial companies with a separate legal personality, capital divided in equal 
amounts called shares, and liability for their own debts in totum. The companies' share-
holders are liable only to the extent of the unpaid ainount on their shares. 1 The legal and 
administrative requirements for the secondary establishment of foreign legal entities of 
a type equivalent to the AE in Greece are introduced by Art.50 of Law 2190/1920. In 
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order to establish a branch or an agency, foreign public companies limited by shares 
with the right to function legally in Greece must submit to the Greek Ministry of Com-
merce a ratified representation document of their plenipotentiary or agent, also ap-
pointing a person authorised to accept service of documents and declaring the date of 
the company's foundation and the names of its representatives at its seat. 2 Law 
2190/1920 introduces both the substantive and the procedural conditions for the estab-
lishment of foreign companies in Greece.3 
According to Greek legal theory neither branches nor agencies constitute legal 
entities4 separate from the foreign company which initiated and completed the required 
procedure for their establishment in Greece. S Consequently, branches and agencies ne-
gotiate and enter into contracts in the name of the main company. Branches and agen-
cies are types of permanent establishment.6 This characteristic distinguishes them from 
mere company representatives.7 Both forms of establishment have their own employees 
and material establishment (address). They also have identical rights and obligations. 
What distinguishes between the two is their relationship to the main office: the agency's 
relationship to the company's seat (ruled by commercial law) indicates a commercial 
representation,S whereas the branch's relationship to the company's seat (ruled by civil 
I See N. Rokas, Commercial Companies (1990, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.121. 
2 For the full text of the law and its official translation in English, see H. Xanthaki, 1996a, op.cit., ap-
pendix I. 
3 The Law includes two conditions for the establishment of a company in Greece: the company should 
have the right to establish under its regulations and it should also exercise its right by meeting the formal 
requirements of this Law. Consequently, Art.50 of Law 219011920 provides the answer to the following 
two questions: 
a. Which category of companies has the right to establish in Greece under this Law; and 
b. which are the legal actions that should be taken and the documents that should be presented by the 
company, in order to be allowed to exercise its right of establishment in Greece. 
4 See Thieffry et associes, Guide des societes dans la CEE (1992, Centre fran~ais du commerce exte-
rieur, Paris), p.180. The branch as a legal term has a completely different meaning from the simple exis-
tence of propriety or functioning ofa company's department in a location other than the company's seat. 
Factory or warehouse, simple internal departments are not enough to indicate the functioning of a branch. 
A branch as a term indicates "exercise of trade or transactions with customers through employers of the 
branch, which should be permanently established in a precise address". See L Georgakopoulos, National 
Company Law, Volume Ill: The public company limited by shares, (1972, Sakkoulas, Greece), p.13 5. 
S "When Law 2190/1920 refers to the company's offices, it means the company's seat. Branches are 
not identical with the seat or the main office of the company; the branch is not a separate legal entity". 
See Kribas, Commercial Companies, (1986, Sakkoulas, Athens), pp. 137-138; also Krispis, op.cit., p.29; 
L. Georgakopoulos, op.cit., p.135. Also see Athens Court of~irst Instance 6857177. 
6 See Krispis, op. cit., p.25. . 
7 Representatives of the company do not necessarily sustain an office, whereas branches and agencies 
must have a permanent office in a precise address. The representative has the power to represent the c?m-
pany in transactions and contracts which have been agreed beforehand, whereas "a branch exerc!ses 
commercial activity with staff of its own; a few transactions are not enough to indicate its legal functlon-
in~". See Athens Court of Appeal 5779/1982. . . 
See L. Georgakopoulos, Textbook o/Commercial Law, (1985, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.36. 
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law) indicates an employer-employee bond.9 Thus, the branch is usually defined as an 
organised unit where decisions of limited importance for the future of a company are 
taken, where decisions and guidelines introduced by the company's true seat are exe-
cuted and where one part of the enterprise activity, limited both from financial and legal 
aspect, of the company takes place. 10 The agency is defined as a unit which, according 
to its agency contract, undertakes the obligation to complete particular actions on behalf 
of the parent company.ll Greek jurisprudence defines an agency as an office conducting 
business at a specified location. 12 Agents are merchants (Art.2 of the Commercial Law), 
a characteristic distinguishing them from representatives, who act in the name of mer-
chants as their employee. 13 The second characteristic distinguishing between an agency 
or a branch and a representation office lies in the regularity and extent of transactions, 
material and legal, performed by these units within Greece. The secondary unit of a for-
eign company which deals with sporadic or isolated transactions in Greece is a mere 
representation office and is excluded from the application of Art.50 of Law 219011920. 14 
Due to their lack of legal personality both the branch and the agency inherit the 
parent company's lex fori. This can lead to jurisdictional difficulties. It is argued, how-
ever, that in principle cases deriving from the activity of the branch or agency in Greece 
should be judged before the Greek courtS. 15 Thus, the legal obstacle of the branch's lack 
9 If the staff working in the company's established office are not considered employees, but authorised 
representatives, this office is an agency. Still, the office must deal with customers and exercise independ-
ent commercial activity. If, however, this is not the case, then the legal relationship between the office 
and the main company is either simple representation or mandate. See L. Georgakopoulos, op. cit., 1972, 
p.135; also see Athens Court of Appeal 577911982, EEmpD, 1983,70. 
10 See E. Perakis, op.cit., p.440. 
11 See ibid, p.441; for a general introduction to the concept of the agency, see Th. Liakopoulos, "The 
Agency Contract" [1990] EEmpD 561. 
12 See An 17911936; also Athens Court of Appeal 1088/1908. Perifanakis notes, that: " ... One may de-
termine an agency as a private enterprise, which administers the transactions of third parties at a cost 
agreed beforehand, under the condition that this relationship is not considered otherwise by the Greek 
law". See Perifanakis, Company Law, (1956, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.96. 
13 An 55/1945 and 145/1947 state that "an agent acting exclusively as a company's or a merchant's 
employee, without exercising independent trade, is not a merchant". Thus, the "agent" of an aviation 
company is its employee and is not considered a merchant according to Greek Commerci~l. Law, whereas 
a the travel agent exercises trade and is therefore considered a merchant. See Thessalomki Court of Ap-
peal 419/1955 and An 284/1935 respectively. 
14 See E. Perakis, op. cit., p.442. 
15 This opinion is expressed by many Court decisions, the most recent of.",:hiCh are. Pireus. Court of Ap-
peal 9111982 and Athens Court of Appeal 277911984. I will refer to the deCISIOn by Plreus Sm~le-member 
Court of First Instance 1086/1984, which is quite representative: " ... At this case, the con:pany IS ~roved to 
be seated in Pireus, because only there can its activity take place. Moreover ... the PreSident of Its B~ard 
of Directors is Greek. However, it is judged, that even if the company w~ seat~d .ab~o~d and sus~amed 
only a branch in Pireus even then the Greek courts would have the international JUriSdIctIOn to deCIde on 
the case. Moreover, this court would have the local competence to decide on this case. P~agraph. 1. 0: 
Article 905 of the Code of Civil Procedure includes in its definition of 'residence' the 'spe~I~1 domicIle 
of the debtor, that is the branch of a foreign corporate body (Art.25, par.2 of the Code of CIvIl Procedure 
and Art.51 of the Civil Code)". 
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of legal personality (which could have led to its inability to present itself before the 
Greek courts) is put aside for the purpose of protecting third parties which must be able 
to sue the company in Greece. This provision protects third parties and the branch or 
agency itself, as it allows them to avoid proceedings before foreign courts. 
In order to become formally recognised, foreign companies must submit to the 
Greek Ministry of Commerce a copy of the document of representation of their agent or 
representative ratified by the Greek Consulate. 16 For the establishment of agencies the 
document must include the appointment of the company's representative, whereas for 
branches the company must name the person responsible for the functioning of the 
branch. The first question arising here concerns the issue of the determination of the le-
gal system which regulates the document of representation 17 and more specifically its 
form, its contents and the extent of the representatives' powers.18 Art.11 CC regulates 
that several national laws can be applicable for the determination of the document's 
form. 19 These include the law of the state where the interested parties declare their will 
to enter into the contract (locus regit actum) since representation is a unilateral declara-
tion of legal will, the lex patriae of the represented company, namely its lex fori, or the 
law of the state where the branch is located, namely Greek law.20 The document must 
also include the appointment of a person authorised to accept service of documents. 
Providing an exemption to the general rule of Art. 142 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which requires official declaration of the attorney receiving service of documents to the 
Secretariat of the Athens Court of First Instance, Art.50 of Law 2190/1920 requires only 
the submission of the document of representation to the Greek Ministry of Commerce. 
16 Kiandos specifies that this ratification is valid if done by any kind of authorised Greek authority 
abroad. These include Greek Embassies, General Consulates and any other type of Consulate and honor-
ary Greek consuls. See V. Kiandos, Private Law o/International Trade (1987, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.27. 
17 The submission ofthis document is necessary for the establishment of all types of foreign companies 
wishing to establish in Greece. See Law 319011955 and Presidential Decree 400/1970. 
18 Fragistas notes that in principle the extent of the representatives' power is regulated by the law of the 
company's seat. Basically, however, the regulations of the document prevail. If there are any vague 
points, or if no regulation on certain points was agreed, then one must apply the lex causae ?f the rep~e­
sentation, which is Greek law, as the law of the state, where the representative acts. See Fraglstas, Op.Clt., 
p.283. 
19 See ibid, p.281, who notes that the representation document provided by th.e foreign public limited 
company to its representatives in Greece is valid, provided that one of three natIonal laws are followed. 
These are the law of the state, where the representation was given, the law of the corl~pany's seat and 
Greek law. The latter must be followed when the foreign company gives its representatIve the power ~o 
enter into a contract involving transferring part or the whole of the company's real estate located in 
Greece. 
20 Megglidou notes that if any other than the Greek law is followed, one is led to w~nder about the ~x­
tent of the representatives' power. Moreover, this regulation concerning the estabhshment of foreign 
companies in Greece is a condition of establishment set by public law. Therefore, Greek law should pr~­
vail. In practice, a safe solution to the problem would be for the document to take the form o~ a pubhc 
document. The private form can be used, as long as the document may take the form of a publIc one ac-
cording to the law of the state of the person who edited it. See S. Megglidou, op.cit., p.206. 
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Theodoropoulos notes that the person appointed is the only one authorised to receive 
legal documents concerning litigation judged by foreign courts (provided that the litiga-
tion derives from the company's activity in Greece) and litigation judged by the Greek 
courts, even if they derive from the company's activity abroad.21 The document must 
include the year of the company's foundation and the names of its representatives at its 
seat. This regulation prohibits a foreign company not yet founded abroad from estab-
lishing in Greece. Moreover, it offers security to third parties interested in commercial 
dealing with the company's branch, since those entering into contract with the branch 
(being familiar with the names of the company's representatives) will be able to sue the 
parent company, if suing the branch is impossible. A representative of the company at 
its seat is defined as a member, who according to the company's articles expresses the 
will of the company as a legal entity and represents it before the courts. Their relation-
ship is an organic representation.22 
Public companies limited by shares are invalid if their aim is either illegal or 
contrary to Greek public order.23 The Minister of Commerce may reject an application 
for establishment in Greece, if s/he assesses that the company's activities and aims as 
stated in the company's articles are prohibited in Greece. Even if only some of the com-
pany's activities are illegal under Greek law, the Minister of Commerce has the right to 
prohibit its establishment. As this provision, passed to protect Greek public order, is 
valid for Greek and foreign companies alike, it is not discriminatory against foreign 
companies.24 The Decision of the Minister of Commerce on the establishment of a for-
eign public company limited by shares in Greece must be published in the Bulletin of 
Public Limited Companies of the Government Gazette.2S Only after this publication is 
the company legally established.26 The refusal of the Minister to publish the decision 
preventing the company from establishing in Greece is an administrative act, against 
which any interested party may appeal to the Council of State. 
21 See Theodoropoulos, Code o/Civil Procedure, Interpretation and precedents (1978, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens), p.303. 
22 See l:'tE 4815/1983. 
23 See Art.4a of Law 2190/1920. It is argued that the Greek state can decline the establishment of a for-
eign company in Greece, on the grounds that its capital is lower than the mi.ni.mum amount required for 
Greek companies. According to Legislative Decree 1027/83 of the Greek Mmlsil?' ~f Commer<:e the es-
tablishment of such a company would be opposed to Greek public order (Ar:.33 ~lvll Code). ThiS Dec~ee 
was based on the 781174 Plenary Legal Council of the State. However, Legislative Decree 70/67 consid-
ers this establishment as a circumvention of Greek law. 
24 See l:'tE 3395/1971. 
2S See Art. 1 of Presidential Decree 16/22.1.1930. 
26 Kiandos notes that the company must know precisely the conditions for its establishment.. Therefore~ 
the Ministerial Decision should not only become known to the company, but it should be pubhshed to th 
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It is interesting to note that the aim of Law 219011920 is twofold: to stipulate a 
simple procedure for the establishment of foreign companies in Greece, and to introduce 
a regime protecting the Greek public and foreign companies. Greek law shields foreign 
companies from the bureaucratic procedure set for the formation of Greek companies. 
As the required formalities are particularly limited in the case of public limited compa-
nies, it is concluded that the Law was intended to be favourable and therefore attractive 
to financially strong foreign companies.27 The attention given to the legality of the com-
pany's establishment combined with the need for publication of the Ministerial Decision 
indicates the second aim of the Law, the protection of Greek public and third parties. 28 
The surprising longevity of this old is probably due to the rigidity of Greek legislative 
procedure and the continuing existence of the main reasons for its initial passing. 
B.2. The establishment of CommerciaIlIndustrial Off-shore units (Law 89/67) 
Despite the efficiency of Law 2190/1920 the desire of the Greek administration to lure 
foreign companies to Greece led to the passing of Law 89/67, which regulates the es-
tablishment of offices for the exclusive purpose and with the sole responsibility to su-
pervise the company's commercial activities. Law 89/67 applies exclusively to foreign 
companies, namely companies whose real seat is located outside Greece.29 The Law ap-
plies to all known forms of commercial/industrial companies, including public limited 
companies. Art.l of the Law provides that foreign commercial/industrial companies of 
any type or form, functioning legally at their seat and engaged in commercial activity 
abroad, may establish in Greece after permission from the respective Minister. The ap-
plication, submitted to the Service for External Capital (/piresia Kefaleon Exoterikou) 
Government Gazette. Therefore, the decision of the Minister is in force after its publication in the Ga-
zette. See Kiandos, op.cit., pp.28-29. 
27 Oliver notes that while the number of companies in England and Wales (approximately 6,000) is 
small compared with that of private companies (approximately 816,000), it includes many large compa-
nies. See M. C. Oliver, Company Law (1987, Longman, London), op.cit., p.24. 
28 Foreign companies are compelled to declare their representation by their Greek branch or agency, 
appoint a person authorised to accept service of documents and specify the year of the company's foun-
dation, as well as the names of the company's representatives at its seat (Art.50, Law 2190/1 ~20). The 
Minister of Commerce controls the fulfilment of the above conditions, the legality and moralIty of the 
company's aim and decides on the establishment of the branch or agency in Gr~ece: .A:ccording to. the 
Law proposal, Art.50 ensures that both the foreign companies and the Greek publIc wlsh~g to enter l?tO 
contracts with the branches are protected from those fraudulently appearing as re~res.entatIves .of fore~gn 
companies, or even real representatives who either act without company authOriSatIOn on thiS speCific 
occasion or exceed the limits of their representation. 
29 Pireus Court of First Instance 11,428/1981 regulates that foreign companies established in Gre~ce 
under Law 89/67 and founded under a foreign law are not considered de facto Greek or afanis companies. 
Greek law applies only if these companies have the~ true seat in Greece and provided that they have been 
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must include a declaration of the nationality of the parent company, the form of the 
company functioning at its seat, the form of its establishment in Greece (as a b h ranc , 
agency or office), a description of the company's activities and the name of the new 
unit's administrator. The company must also submit a surety from a recognised national 
or foreign bank, which shall forfeit in favour of the Greek State, if the company's staff 
breaks any of the above rules. The Minister decides on the application within eight days. 
Greek authorities are precluded from prohibiting the establishment of companies 
on the grounds that they belong to a type unknown or invalid in Greece. In fact, the 
Minister lacks authority to determine whether the company belongs to a type familiar to 
Greek law.30 However, for the protection of the Greek public from fraudulent compani-
est, the Minister may order further inquiries on the company's legal formation and 
functioning at its seat.31 The term commercial/industrial is new to Greek law. The broad 
term used by the legislator indicates the wish to allow the majority of foreign company 
forms to benefit from this Law.32 Rokas defines commerce as an activity aiming to 
profit. 33 Commercial are these companies which act as mediators between production 
illegally founded according to the law of their statutory seat or if they have not followed the regulations 
of Law 89/1967. 
30 In the past foreign companies and the Greek authorities faced many difficulties trying to categorise 
foreign companies wishing to establish in Greece under Law 2190/1920, in terms of subjecting them to 
one of the legal fonns of companies stipulated by Greek Company Law. In an attempt to end such com-
plications, the legislator created one unique status for all types of companies establishing in Greece under 
Law 89/67. Thus, the SUbjection of foreign companies to Greek company types became both needless and 
pointless. Consequently, the Minister of Co-ordination when deciding on the company's petition to estab-
lish in Greece adopts the company's type, as it is expressed in its Articles and characterised by the com-
pany's lexfori. 
31 In practice the legality of the fonnation and functioning of the company is proved by a formal docu-
ment from the competent authority of the country where the company's true seat is located. On the basis 
of my research in the Government Gazette where the Decisions of the competent Minister for the estab-
lishment of foreign companies under Law 89/67 are published I reached the conclusion that Greek Law 
does not request a document from a specific office of the foreign country. What is required, is a formal 
document from the authority responsible for the control of the legal functioning of companies in the for-
eign country's dominion, which may differ from country to country. For example, Hong Kong companies 
submit a certificate from the "Company Secretariat", Liberian companies submit a document from the 
General Consulate of Liberia in Greece, American companies submit a document from the "Secretariat of 
Public Limited Companies" of the state where the company is seated or the Minister of External Affairs 
of the State. See Decisions IE/23636/11093, IE/63515/11 094, IE/28316/11099 and IE/27749/11 098 ac-
cordingly. British companies tend to submit a certificate from the Secretary of Companies of the town 
where the company's seat is located. 
32 In order to demonstrate the large variety of companies pennitted to establish in Greece under Law 
89/1967, it can be stated that before Special Laws on the establishment of foreign maritime companies 
were passed in Greece, even maritime companies adopted the regulation of Law 89/1967. See H. Xan-
thaki, "Compliance of Greek Law on the Establishment of Foreign Maritime Pies by the Law of the 
European Union", University of Athens Law Review [1993b] pp.100-118. 
33 See K. Rokas, Introduction to Commercial Law, (1970, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.3. Article 4 ~f the 
Proposal for the Greek Commercial Code (which has not been passed yet) regulat~s th~t. commercial are 
all financial activities, whose subject is the production, modification and the diSpOSItion of goods or 
services, credit or navigation. 
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and consumption.34 The question is whether the term commercial refers to the aim of the 
company or to its legal nature as a civil or commercial legal entity. As the legal nature 
of the company is regulated by another provision of Law 89/67 according to which for-
eign companies establishing under Law 8911967 may belong to any type, the legislator 
clearly refers to the activity and not the nature of the company. If the company's activity 
-as described in its articles- is trade, the company is characterised as commercial. 35 An 
industrial company is one, which either produces new products by processing raw mate-
rials or perfects old products by increasing their quality. In either case, the use of a large 
numbers of specialised machinery and staff is essential. 36 Although the characterisation 
of a company as industrial derives mainly from the declaration of the company's aim 
and activities in its articles,37 it must be able to prove the reality of its declaration with 
proof admissible to the Greek COurtS.38 Thus, the activity of companies establishing un-
der Law 89/67 may be either of the above two (commerce or industry) or a mixture of 
34 Kotsiris refers to the substantive criterion for the classification of companies and notes that commer-
cial companies are those whose object is commercial undertaking. Companies formed to engage in com-
mercial acts or commercial activities such as business are considered commercial under art. I of Greek 
Commercial Code. Commercial acts or activities are defmed restrictively by law in art.2 and 3 of Royal 
Decree of 1835. Commercial companies, designated as such in a broad sense because of their obj ect, are 
the general partnership, the limited partnership by shares, the silent partnership and the joint ship-
ownership. Civil companies carry on a civil object, such as farming, home leasing and buying and selling 
land. See L. Kotsiris, Greek Company Law (1989, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.35. 
35 M.C.T. FOOTWEAR COMPANY LIMITED seated in Hong Kong and established in Greece under 
Law 89/67 is a commercial company, whose activity is "general commerce, construction, export, import, 
purchase, sale and negotiation of commercial materials, products of every kind and every place of the 
world ... " See Ministerial Decision IE/23636111093 of February 1991. 
GAS AND PETROLEUM LIMITED seated in Liberia and established in Greece under Law 89/67 is a 
commercial company, whose main activity is the international trade of marine lubricants. See Ministerial 
Decision IE/63515/11094 of February 1991. 
MIPSO TRADING COMPANY LIMITED is a commercial company seated in Cyprus, whose activity 
is "general trade" See Ministerial Decision IE/29 545/11097 of May 1991. 
36 ttE 1147/1984 offers the definition industrial enterprises as enterprises, which using a large amount 
of capitals, specialised machinery and staff and elaborating natural or other materials, either produce new 
products or improve the already existing ones by improving their quality and with the aim to offer them to 
further industrialisation. 
37 SERVICE-MASTER MIDDLE EAST LTD seated in the State of New Jersey in the U.S.A. and es-
tablished in Greece under Law 89/67 is an industrial company, whose activity is "cleaning houses, of-
fices, hospitals and factories, as well as constructing, maintaining, functioning, repairing, distributing and 
storing machinery and other objects of the health sector." See Ministerial Decision IE/28316/ 11099 of 
May 1991. . 
CONARPO LIMITED seated in Britain (Cardiff) and established in Greece under Law 89/67 IS a com-
pany mainly occupied in oil industry. See Ministerial Decision IE/29303/111 00 of May 19? I. . 
DAR AL RIYADH INT'L LIMITED seated in the British Virgin Islands and established In Greece 
, . . 
under Law 89/67 is an industrial company, whose activity is the construction of Umverslty campuses, 
hospitals, railway stations and other public buildings. See Ministerial Decision IE/5217 5/ II 095 of March 
1991. 
38 An Opinion of the Legal Council of the Ministry of National Ec?nom~ 255/198~ on the establis~­
ment of foreign technical companies is quite interesting for this analYSIS, as Its re?ul~tlOns may be ap~lt­
cable here with an analogous interpretation. This decision notes that the charactensa~lOn of the enterpnse 
as technical derives from the document of its formation. Its activity may be proved With every legal mean, 
since the crucial point for the application of the law is the activity of the enterpri~e as t~chnic~~. Moreo-
ver, the activity of the company at its seat must be proved before the Minister pubhshes hiS deCISion. 
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both.
39 
Furthermore, the company's activity must exclusI·vely be th t· f 
e execu IOn 0 com-
mercial business outside the Greek boundaries. The term is interpreted in Arts.2 and 3 
of Ministerial Decisions approving the establishment of ~orel·gn c .. G 
11 ompanles In reece 
under Law 89/67, according to which branches, offices or agencies deal exclusively 
with the co-ordination, supervision, control, observation and promotion of the com-
pany's activities abroad. Conducting commercial business in Greece is "categorically 
forbidden".40 This type of arrangement is described as off-shore and involves companies 
whose capital and activities are located outside the country of establishment. This provi-
sion is another expression of the Greek desire to attract foreign companies.41 
Foreign companies wishing to establish in Greece under Law 89/67 submit an 
application and a document of suretyship from a recognised bank.42 The application in-
cludes a declaration of the company's nationality, type, form of establishment in 
Greece, its activities and the name of the manager or administrator of the Greek unit. 
The company also declares within two months the name of an attorney authorised to 
accept service of documents. The suretyship is forfeited in favour of the Greek State, if 
the company or its personnel violate the conditions of its establishment or Greek taxa-
tion laws.43 The suretyship document is evidence of the bank's parallel liability for the 
company's debts to the Greek State up to the amount stated in the document. The bank, 
however, can object to the payment of the company's debts until the Greek State has 
already completed the procedure for the collection of the money from the company it-
39 SFM INVESTMENT AND TRADING CO. S.A. "SINTRACO" seated in Panama and established in 
Greece under Law 89/67 is occupied in "commercial, industrial and agricultural activities". See Ministe-
rial Decision IE/246621 11 096 of March 1991. 
CONTROL DATA MIDDLE EAST INC. seated in the State of Minnesota of the U.S.A. and estab-
lished in Greece under Law 89/67 is occupied in research in the field of electronics and especially the 
control and processing of data, trade of computers and other relative activities. See Ministerial Decision 
IE/27749/11098 of May 1991. 
40 The Greek legislator wanted to prohibit any connection (even indirect) of the company with com-
mercial activities in Greece. To achieve this, in the form of the Ministerial Decisions approving the es-
tablishment of foreign companies under Law 89/67 it is stated that every connection or parallel offer of 
services from the branch itself or its foreign personnel to other forms of establishment of the mother com-
pany in Greece is prohibited as illegal, if the other establishment is permitted to conduct any form of 
commercial activity within the boundaries of the Greek state. The two establishments are prohibited from 
having any relation, dependence or co-operation, same seat or accounting books. 
41 Giannitsis refers to the policy of the dictatorship concerning foreign companies as bridge-poli~y, ex-
plaining that Greece's intention was to play the role of a bridge uniting the markets of the West With the 
ones of the Middle East. See Gianitsis, Foreign banks in Greece (1982, Gutemberg, Athens), p.1 06. 
42 According to the text of the Law the petition for the company's establishment must be s~b~itted to 
the Service of Foreign Capitals of the Ministry of Co-ordination. This Ministry ceased to eXist In 1985 
and its responsibilities were transferred to various other Ministries. The Service of Fo~eig~ ~apitals ~as 
specifically transferred to the Ministry of National Economy and as a department of thiS ~1~IStry contIn-
ues to exist and function in the same way it did when Law 89/67 was passed. Thus, the petition must now 
be addressed to the Greek Ministry of National Economy, Service of Foreign Capitals. 
43 According to Megglidou this regulation is set for the protection of the Greek ~tate in ca~e that the 
foreign company or its personnel breaks the stipulations of the Greek law. See Megghdou, Op.Clr, p.207. 
91 
self and this procedure proved fruitless. 44 The bank's objection to pay is inadmissible, if 
any attempt for execution against the company is obviously useless.4s The Minister 
must decide on the company's application for establishment within eight days.46 
Apart from the conditions of Law 89/67 additional conditions for the establish-
ment of foreign companies in Greece are set by Greek legal theory and texts. First, the 
company is legally established only after the publication of the Ministerial Decision ap-
proving the company's application. The publication date is the date of the actual circu-
lation of the relevant issue of the Government Gazette, not the date printed on it.47 Sec-
ond, establishment and functioning of the company is prohibited, if its object is unlaw-
ful or contrary to public policy.48 However, this prohibition is limited to cases where the 
object of the company is prohibited by a law set to protect exclusively the Greek public 
or vital Greek interests.49 Third, as Law 4310/1929 prohibits non-EU natural persons 
from working without permission, the company must submit formal documentation by 
the Greek authorities allowing non-EU agents or representatives to work in Greece.so 
B.2.1 Choice of the Appropriate Establishment Law 
Commercial/industrial foreign public companies limited by shares are subject to both 
Laws 2190/1920 and 89/67. The existence of two laws with the same field of applica-
tion gives rise to questions concerning the laws' validity, parallel legal value and precise 
applicability rationae materia. In fact, under the principle lex posterior derogat lex pri-
ori, Law 89/67 as a newer law may have implicitly abolished the older Law 2190/1920 
as far as the establishment of foreign commercial/industrial public limited companies 
44 See Pireus Single-member Court of First Instance 1026/86. 
45 See Athens Court of Appeal 3196/83. 
46After Prime Minister's Decision Y 120115.10.90 concerning the determination of the responsibilities 
of the Deputy Minister of National Economy, both the Minister and the Deputy Minister of National 
Economy have the authority to approve or reject the petition of foreign companies for their establishment 
in Greece. 
47 Decision of the l:'tE 3289/1980 regulates that according to the relevant stipulations, which were 
passed to insure not only the safe and sure publication of the administrative acts,. but m.ainly the ~eali~~­
tion of the Constitutional principle of the clear action of the State for the declaration of Its a~ts to I~S Citi-
zens, whose legal status they affect, the time of the publication in the Government Gazette.ls considered 
to be not the date printed on the Gazette, in favour of which exists only rebuttable presumptIOn of authen-
ticity, but the date, when the Gazette was really and truly released for circulation. 
48 See Article 33 of the Greek Civil Code. According to Legal Advice of the Ministry of Commerce (by 
Argiropoulos St.) 102711983 the company's aim must be an insult to the Greek public order .... 
49 As this clause could offer the Greek authorities an excuse, albeit lawful, for the prohibition of the 
establishment of any company non grata in Greece on the grounds that the company's objectives contra-
dict one of the thousands of existing Greek laws, the Athens Court of Appeal 946171 has ruled that the 
term unlawful in Art.33 of the Greek Civil Code should be strictly interpreted. 
50 See Legal Opinion of the Greek Ministry of Commerce 51/1983. It should b: noted, however, that 
very recently (in 1993), Law 4310/1929 was modified and does not apply to EU natIOnals. 
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are concerned.
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However, Law 2190/1920 on public companies limited by shares is a 
special law compared to the general law 89/67 (regulating the establishment of all types 
of companies). According to the principle lex posterior generalis non derogat /egi pri-
ori speciali, the newer but general Law 89/67 does not abolish the older but special Law 
2190/1920.s2 This is reflected in the express declaration of Art.4 of Law 89/67 that it 
does not abolish Law 2190/1920. Consequently, both Laws are applicable in parallel. 
The question is, which are the differences in their fields of application. The dis-
tinction between the two laws lies with the aims of the Greek secondary establishments. 
Although Law 2190/1920 does not prohibit (therefore allowing) any activity within and 
outside Greece, Law 89/67 prohibits engagement of the Greek unit in commercial busi-
ness in Greece.S3 Consequently, if the company's Greek establishment aims to execute 
commercial transactions in Greece, the company must follow the procedure of Law 
219011920. If the activities of the Greek unit are limited to co-ordination and control of 
the company's activity abroad, Law 89/67 is applicable. Thus, Law 89/67 applies to the 
establishment of branches or agencies of foreign commercial/industrial companies of 
any type establishing in Greece solely for the co-ordination of their business abroad, and 
to the establishment of foreign commercial/industrial public limited companies when 
the unit's activity is exclusively trade abroad. Law 219011920 is applicable to the estab-
lishment of foreign public companies doing business within and outside Greece, and to 
the establishment of all commercial/industrial public limited companies not subject to 
Law 89/67. Law 89/67 creates ideal taxation and commercial status for companies es-
tablishing in Greece and ensures their favourable treatment. S4 Proof of its efficiency is 
SI Simandiras notes that such an abolition of a law may be categorical or silent. Categorical is the abo-
lition of the law, when the newer law includes a special Article, which states that the older law is abol-
ished (or modified). Silent is the abolition of the law, when the content of the new law indicates the will 
of the legislator to abolish the previously applicable law, or when the newer law is opposed, or incom-
patible to the older one. See OAAn 310/1966. This is the case, when the newer law regulates the same 
issue either exclusively or in a way completely different from the previous law. See An 558/1969. How-
ever, when the newer law does not categorically abolish an older one, the issue of the extent of the abol-
ishment of the older law is a matter of interpretation. See C Simandiras, General Principles o/Civil Law, 
3rd edition, Semi-volume A (1980, Sakkoulas, Athens). 
S2 See Georgiadis-Stathopoulos, Civil Code, General Principles (1978, Sakkoulas, Athens), ~p.~-8" 
Newer general laws do not abolish older but special laws (lex posterior generalis non derogat legl prIOrI 
speciali). Then again, it is a matter of interpretation whether this principle is applied in each case or not. 
See An 221148,661/61. , , 
S3 The Ministerial Decisions approving the company's establishment un~er Law ~9/67 cl,early pr?hlblt 
not only the direct, but also the indirect involvement either of the company Itself or Its staff 10 any kmd of 
commercial activity or trade within the boundaries of the Greek state. 
S4 See Julian Maitland-Walker, The Guide to European Company Laws (1993, Swe~t and ~axwell, 
London), p.189, where it is noted that offices operating under the status of Law 89/67 enJoy.certa1O bene-
fits, for example, they are exempted from Greek taxes, they may keep their book~ in a foreIgn !anguage, 
they may import free of custom duties and other charges all necessary office equlpm~nt a~d pn.vate cars 
of its foreign employees, who are also entitled to obtain work permits regardless of therr natIOnality etc, 
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the large number of foreign companies choosing to establish in Greece under it.55 In 
tum, this proves that the companies' main interest is not to undertake commercial activ-
ity in Greece, but to supervise their international trade. 56 
B.3. Subsidiaries 
Despite the frequent use of subsidiaries as a form of company expansion within the EU, 
Greek legal theory and commercial practice is not familiar with it. This is due to the 
combination of the complicated procedure required for their formation and the lack of 
taxation and other advantages. In addition to this, the continuing Greek breaches on the 
free movement of capital (analysed in Chapter 5) signify a prohibition to the export of 
more than 10% of the companies' capital and 12% of their annual profits.57 Although 
Acts of the Director of the National Bank of Greece have been waiving these restric-
tions for one year at a time since 1992, the relevant restrictive laws have not been abol-
ished and the law applicable after the expiry date of each Act is uncertain. These disad-
vantages combined with the limited (in volume) commercial activity in Greece lead for-
eign companies to the formation of branches, agencies or off-shore units. However, af-
ter the implementation of Presidential Decree 40911986 adopting Directive 83/349/ 
1983, which sets the basis for the harmonisation of Greek with EC law and the moderni-
sation of Greek law on subsidiary companies, their frequency is increasing. Under De-
cree 40911986, which supplemented Law 2190/1920 through the addition of Art.42 (e5), 
a company is considered the subsidiary of a parent company when the latter controls the 
majority of the subsidiary's shares or exercises a dominant influence over its admini-
stration, either directly or through third parties (accumulation principle).58 A parent-
subsidiary relationship exists when the parent company controls at least 50% of the 
votes of the subsidiary's share-holders or members, either by ownership or by authori-
55 Even in the period of the dictatorship, which was characterised by instability and hesitation on behalf 
of foreigners to invest in Greece, the number of foreign companies establishing a branch or an agency 
under Law 89/67 was impressive. According to Megglidou the fmancial press estimated that many hun-
dreds of companies had already established in Greece by 1971. See Megglidou, op. cit., p.207. 
From my research in the Government Gazette, where the Ministerial Decisions approving the estab-
lishment of companies are published, the number of foreign companies establishing in Greece under Law 
89/67 is staggering (at least two approvals are published daily in the Issue of the Government Gazette). 
56 See B. Bizet, L' entre prise dans les etats de la CEE (1992, Belfond, Paris), p.123. 
57 See B. Bizet, ibid, p.119. 
58 The establishment of subsidiaries is regulated by article 42 of Law 2190/1920, although the estab-
lishment of foreign companies in Greece is stipulated by article 50 of the Law. See Perak~s, op.cit., p.4~2. 
However Pamboukis considers the acquisition of dominant influence over a Greek pubhc company lIm-
ited by shares (through the acquisition of shares) by a foreign company, as a form. of establ.ishment of th.e 
foreign company in Greece, which must be regulated by Art50. See C. Pambouk~s,. InclUSIOn of a public 
company limited by shares to a multi-national group (1989, Sakkoulas, Thessalomkl), p.25. 
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sation of third members;59 controls the majority of shareholders' or members' votes 
through an agreement for co-operation with third parties; participates in the capital of 
the subsidiary and has influence in the appointment and removal of the majority of the 
subsidiary's directors; and exercises dominant influence over the subsidiary, i.e. pos-
sesses at least 20% of the votes and influences its management. 60 
Subsidiaries have separate legal personalities.61 This leads to the need to deter-
mine their lex fori. Rokas considers Greek subsidiaries of foreign companies as separate 
Greek companies on the basis that their seat is located in Greece.62 This view is sup-
ported by the express provision that Decree 409/1986 supplements Art.42 of Law 
2190/1920 on the formation of Greek companies rather than Art.50 on the formation of 
foreign companies. It must be noted that the characterisation of the Greek subsidiaries 
of foreign companies as Greek is an exemption from the theory of the real seat. Subsidi-
aries located and formed in Greece but controlled or dominantly influenced by the for-
eign parent company have their true seat abroad and under Art. 1 0 CC would be consid-
ered foreign companies. The parallel validity of Art. 1 0 CC and the Decree led Pambou-
kis to the false assumption that the acquisition of dominant influence over a Greek com-
pany, as a form of establishment of a foreign company in Greece, must be subjected to 
Art.50 of Law 2190/1920 on foreign companies.63 Although this view is an accurate ap-
plication of the prevailing theory of the true seat, it is incorrect in the case of subsidiar-
ies as it disregards the characterisation of subsidiaries as Greek companies.64 In view of 
their Greek nationality, subsidiaries need not seek recognition in Greece and are formed 
under the procedure of Law 2190/1920 on the formation of Greek companies. 
In order to form Greek subsidiaries, foreign public companies limited by shares 
must first draft the Articles of Association of the new company. This is a transaction 
between two or more natural or legal persons65 or their representatives66 certified by a 
59 See N. Rokas, op. cit., p.183. 
60 The last two conditions are added by L Kotsiris, op.cil., p.79. 
61 See G. Mihalopoulos, "Protection of creditors of subsidiary companies" [1981] 32 EED, pp.33-41, at 
356; also see N. Rokas, op.cil., p.183. 
62 See ibid, p.16. 
63 See C. Pamboukis, op.cil., p.25. . 
64 V. Kiandos justifies the subjection of subsidiaries to Greek law, b~ noting that they are legally lO?e-
pendent of their parent companies. Consequently, they should be conSIdered (legally~ Greek c~~p?nte.s. 
See V. Kiandos, op.cil., p.51; also see H. Xanthaki, "The Establishment of ForeIgn Subsldlanes 10 
Greece", Nomiki Orizonles [1993a] pp.16-19, at 17. 
65 According to Art. 1 of Legislative Decree 4014/1959, the Greek state can be allowed to form a com-
pany by itself. However, a permitting Ministerial Decision is necessary. . 
66 The company's Articles of Association include the name of the company, the aIm of the company, 
its duration, the seat of the company, the amount of the share capital, details on the company's shares 
(number, worth, type) and the identity of the company's founders. 
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notary.67 Second, the capital is subscribed either through a decision to maintain all 
shares with the founders, or through the offer of a number of shares to public sUbscrip-
tion. These are paid for in a bank before the third stage Third the co . 
. , mpany acquIres 
administrative authorisation by the County governor68 who assesses the company's le-
gality and expediency.69 Fourth, publication requirements must be met. Under Legisla-
tive Decree 406/86 on the harmonisation of Greek Company Law with EC regulations, 
the company submits its permission to establish and its Articles of Association to the 
Registry of Public Limited Companies. A notification of registration is published to the 
Issue of Public and Private Limited Companies of the Government Gazette. The com-
pany acquires legal personality after its registration to the Register of Public Limited 
Companies. Publication of the relevant notification to the Government Gazette how-, 
ever, is extremely important for the company's functioning, as only published provi-
sions of ita articles are admissible to the Greek courts in support of the company.70 Third 
parties may rely on all particulars (published or unpublished) entered in the Register. 
The procedure introduced for the formation of Greek subsidiaries, which IS 
identical to the procedure followed for the formation of Greek companies, is compli-
cated compared to the formation of branches, agencies or off-shore units where only the 
last two stages are necessary. The extent of state administrative control on the formation 
of subsidiaries is broader than that exercised on the formation of branches, agencies and 
off-shore units. The latter are established with the legal authorisation of the respective 
67 The notary document is written by a qualified notary, who verifies the truth of the document's con-
tent, calls the interested parties, reads the content of the document to them and (after the signing of the 
document) keeps the original in his archive and has the authority to give certified copies to all who are 
interested. Thus, the content of the document can not be altered and its content and date of signing can not 
be argued. Although the notary must prevent the parties from making any kind of legal errors, the parties 
are also represented by an attorney. 
68 If the administration rejects or refuses to answer to the company's application, the company can ap-
peal to the Council of the State. According to precedents of the Council of the State, the administration 
controls the formal and substantial legality of the regulations of the company's Articles. See l:tE 
413/1950 and 3167/1968. Also see Legislative Decree 53211970. 
69 The extent of this control has been an issue repeatedly discussed both in theory and in practice. Two 
opinions have been produced. It is suggested that the state administration has the power to control bO.th 
the company's legality (i.e. the completion of the legal acts required for its legal formation), as well as Its 
expediency (i.e. its aim and its compatibility with the Greek market in general). Those opposed to the 
control of the company's expediency state that the administration has no author~sation.to ~ontrol ~hether 
the company plays a positive role in the development of the Greek economy, or Its capltall~ su!fIclent ~or 
the completion of its aim). They believe, therefore, that the administration has the legal obligatIOn to give 
its permission for the formation of the company, provided that ~he latter ."'a~ le~ally formed. Law 
2190/1920 adopts the mixed administrative system, according to which authOrIsatIOn IS necessary for the 
company's legal formation, but the administration controls only the l.egality o.f.the compa~y. See P. Da~: 
toglou, "I. Constitutional protection of shares; II. Principle of prevIous audition of the I~t~rest:d part 
[1979] 27 No.V pp.1409-1415 and 1556-1560, at 1556. In certain cases, .however, the adm~mstratlon may 
judge on the expediency of the company's statutes (for example banks, Insurance companies and real es-
tate agencies). See N. Rokas, op.cil., p.l12. 
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Minister, who is hierarchically superior to the governor who pennits the establishment 
of subsidiaries. This is due to the fact that the legality of subsidiaries is already super-
vised by the notary on the first stage of fonnation, while the legality of branches, agen-
cies and off-shore units is supervised solely by central administration. Thus, the scrutiny 
of its administrative instruments is necessary. The publication of the company's pennis-
sion to establish and its articles (imposed to all fonns of establishment) protects the 
public by guaranteeing the company's legality and ensuring knowledge of its articles. It 
must be noted that Greek authorities may not refuse a pennission of establishment with-
out sufficient legal justification. Illegal or inadequate justification is grounds for the an-
nulment of the act by the administrative courts, which may abolish the act of the Minis-
ter or the governor and order them to allow establishment. 
C. ESTABLISHMENT IN FRANCE 
Cl. The establishment of branches or agencies 
In France secondary establishment may take the fonn of a branch (succursale), agency 
(agence) or subsidiary (filiale). Despite the popularity of branches as fonns of secon-
dary establishment, both by French and foreign companies, French legal texts fail to in-
troduce an express direct definition of this tenn. This is usually attributed to the will of 
the French legislator to subject to this term a wide range of legal relationships between 
the main establishment and its permanent secondary units. 71 This phenomenon is not 
exclusively French.72 However, it leaves ground for the manipulation of the concept of 
succursale by the French courts, which tend to take the opportunity to follow the inter-
pretation, restrictive or broad, which better serves French public interest in each par-
ticular case. Thus, the types of secondary units characterised as branches for the pur-
poses of exemption from publicity requirements tend to be rather restricted, whereas the 
range of secondary units defined as branches for taxation purposes tends to be much 
broader. 73 This variation in the interpretation of the tenn, which -admittedly- must no 
70 Even published regulations are admissible 15 days after their publication, if third parties can prove 
that they could not possibly learn about them earlier. 
71 See Casso req., 5 November 1928,S., 1929, 1,177, note Solus. . 
72 For an analysis of the same rationale in the Swiss legal system, see F. Diesbold, Les succursales SUIS-
ses d' entreprises etrangeres (1958, Lausanne). 
73 See Cons. D' Etat, 7 December 1883, Rec. Conseil d' Etat, 1884, 892; Cons. d' Etat, 9 February 
1895, Rec. Conseil d' Etat, 1895, 146; Cons. d' Etat, 26 April 1895, Rec. Conseil d' Etat, 1895, 366; 
Conseil d' Etat, 16 March 1900, Rec. Conseil d' Etat, 1900,207. 
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longer be exaggerated,74 has created insecurity for companies wishing to establish a 
French branch. The issue is of particular importance to foreign companies, since it is not 
only the establishment requirements but also the nationality of their French unit that 
may change according to the various interpretations of the term. In an attempt to solve 
the problem legal authors usually define branches of foreign companies broadly as "in-
dustrial or commercial establishments without legal personality owned by a foreign 
company".75 In view of the lack of an express legislative definition and the great number 
of various interpretations of the term provided by legal authors, French courts now ac-
cept that an adequate definition of branches can only be achieved through the descrip-
tion of the concept's constitutive elements.76 
Despite some initial isolated objections,77 it is now accepted by French courts 
and academic opinion that one characteristic of branches is permanence.78 This view 
complies with the will of the legislator, who would not have introduced publicity re-
quirements for the establishment of mere temporary or occasional units. Another ele-
ment of branches, adopted in the past by certain judgements defining them as important 
"centres of business", seems to be a "certain grade of importance". 79 On this basis, a lo-
cal unit employing one person was not allowed to serve as a branch.80 However, recent 
judgements and academic opinion do not accept that the characterisation of a unit as a 
branch depends on its importance for the parent company.8! This view, which succeeds 
in diminishing the importance of the volume of business conducted by branches, reflects 
the rationale of the introduction of branches as forms of establishment. Companies re-
quiring legally and financially active secondary units will probably invest on a subsidi-
ary, a form of establishment which guarantees greater freedom of action but requires 
greater financial and legal commitment from the main establishment. Moreover, the 
lack of an importance requirement for the characterisation of a unit as a branch seems to 
comply with the choice of the legislator not to award branches a legal personality. 
74 See M. Cabrillac, '''Succursales'' in 1. Labic, Collection des Juris-Classeurs, Traite des Societes, vol. 
1 (1994, Editions Techniques Jurisclasseurs, Paris), fasc. 28, p.3. 
75 See B. Goldman, A. Lyon-Caen and L. Vogel, op.cit., pp. 94-95. 
76 See Cass., req., 5 November 1928, S., 1929, 1, 177, note Solus. 
77 Trib. com. Compiegne, 7 October 1921, S., 1922, II, 69; Trib. com. Saint-Nazaire, 15 November 
1923, Gaz. Pal., 1924, I, 188. 
78 See Peytel and Heymann, "Les etablissements a succursales multiples" [194~] G~. ,:~l., ~octr. 30, 
n.l0; also see M. Cabrillac, "Unite ou pluralite de la notion de succursale en drOIt pnve In DlX ans de 
conferences d' agregation, Etudes en hommage a J. Hamel (1961, Paris), p.119. 
79 See Casso req., 18 November 1890, Rev. Soc., 1891, 144; Casso civ., 16 March 1927, Gaz. Pal., 1927, 
11,43; Casso civ., 5 April 1949, Bull. civ., 1949, II, n.168, 394; Orleans, 2 February 1889, Rev. Soc., 1889, 
199; Rouen, 16 February 1898, DP, 1898, II, 408. 
80 See Rennes, 21 March 1907, Journ. Soc., 1909, 69 .. 
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One last point of interpretation concerns the extent of the branch's independence 
from the main establishment. Two issues arise at this point. First, does the end of the 
branch signify the end of the main unit? The legal basis of the answer to this question 
can be used as another example of the use of the lack of an express definition of the 
term by the courts for the support of French interests. In order to introduce the publica-
tion requirements for the formation of branches, French judges accepted that the end of 
the branch must signify the dissolution of the main company.82 Subsequent judgements 
have tried to generalise this rationale by using it as the legal basis of arguments con-
cerning most aspects of company functioning. 83 It is certain that due to lack of legal per-
sonality by the branch, the dissolution of the main establishment signifies the end of the 
branch's activity. However, since the branch is not considered to be of vital importance 
for the main establishment, its end does not necessarily signify the dissolution of the 
parent company. I therefore tend to disagree with Cabrillac and support the view that 
the answer to this issue must be a matter of individual consideration of the importance 
of the branch for the functioning of the company in each case and of the extent to which 
the b~anch is financially or otherwise dependent to the main company. 84 The second is-
sue arising here concerns the extent of autonomy required for the characterisation of a 
secondary company unit as a branch. The view of the French courts has always been 
that a branch totally isolated from the main establishment is inconceivable.8s Moreover, 
ab dejinitio the branch enjoys a certain degree of autonomy reflected in practice by its 
separate clientele, staff, relationship with third parties86 and activities.87 However, abso-
lute autonomy is not a requirement. 88 The decision to exclude absolute autonomy as a 
criterion for the classification of a secondary unit as a branch is in compliance with the 
will of the legislator, who introduced the branch as a unit without separate legal person-
ality as opposed to the subsidiary which has separate personality and therefore enjoys a 
greater degree of autonomy from the main unit. 
Branches can be defined as commercial or industrial units89 which are controlled 
by a representative of the principal company,90 have a permanent distinct material es-
81 See Casso civ., 20 October 1965, D., 1966, 193; also see M. Cabrillac, 1961, op.cit., n.10; Peytel and 
Heymann, op. cit. , n.l0. 
82 See Bourges, 7 November 1923, Gaz. Pal., 1924, I, 188; Rev. Soc., 1924,67. 
83 See Agen, 5 April 1950, Gaz. Pal., 1950, II, 31; D., 1950, somm., 46. 
84 See M. Cabrillac, 1994, op.cit, p.4. 
8S See Douai, 23 April 1951, Gaz. Pal., 1951, II, 79; Montpellier, 14 May 1951, Gaz. Pal., 1951, I, 349. 
86 See Casso civ., 20 October 1965, D., 1966, II, 192. 
87 . 6 See Y. Loussouam, op.CIl., p. . . 
88 See Bordeaux, 16 May 1923, Journ. Soc., 1924, 280; Riom, 25 July 1931, G~z. Pal., ~ 931, II, 454. 
89 See B. Mercadal and P. Macqueron, op.cit., p.210; also see Thieffry et Assocles, op.cll., p.154. 
99 
tablishment, a certain autonomy to enter into contracts with third parties either in their 
name or on behalf of the principle establishment91 and a separate clientele.92 The advan-
tage of this type of establishment is that, despite the limited investment required for its 
formation, it has the power to pursue independent commercial activity. This is the main 
reason for the popularity of branches as a form of expansion of foreign companies in 
France. It must be noted that the three main elements of this definition, namely perma-
nence, a certain degree of autonomy and some liberty and diversification insofar as cli-
entele and relationship with third parties is concerned, were also used for the definition 
of branches in EC law by the ECJ. 93 
The importance of the branch for the functioning of the principle establishment 
is precisely the criterion that commonly distinguishes it from an agency. Agencies are 
usually secondary units with limited powers to act and simple organisation,94 which 
usually conduct mere informative, rather than commercial, activity.95 To be more pre-
cise, the agency is an independent intermediary negotiating and eventually concluding 
contracts in the name of the company which it represents.96 However, this distinction 
has little legal value, since in the majority of cases97 the law views both branches and 
agencies simply as a set of units lacking legal personality.98 As for subsidiaries, the main 
element distinguishing them from branches and agencies is their legal personality which 
is separate from that of the parent company. 99 
90 Such is the importance awarded to the control of the branch's actions by a representative of the prin-
ciple company, that the Court de Cassation urges the French judges to use this as a principle element in 
their evaluation on the existence ofa branch. See Casso com., 18 October 1989, Gaz. Pal., 1990,2,416, 
note Barbier. 
91 See Bordeaux, 16 May 1923, J. Soc., 1924,208; Riom, 25 July 1931, Gaz. Pal., 1931, II, 454; Agen, 
22 July 1935, Gaz. Pal., 1935, II, 695. 
92 See M. Cabrilliac, op. cit., p.6. 
93 See case 33178 Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183; [1979] 1 CMLR 490. 
94 See ibid, p.5. 
95 See Thieffry et associes, op. cit., p.154. 
96 See B. Bizet, op.cit., p.92. 
97 Thus, an agency fulfilling the conditions for the existence of a branch can also be consi~ered as .a 
branch. However, the contrary is not always true. Thus, the creation of an agency and the aw~rd!ng of thiS 
title to an establishment abroad does not necessarily indicate willingness on behalf of the prmclpal estab-
lishment for the creation of a subsidiary. See Rennes, 10 November 1959, Gaz. Pal., 1960, 1,40; RTD 
Com. 1960, 304, note Jauffret. 
98 See Besancon, 25 January 1928, Gaz. Pal., 1928, I, 546; also see G. Ripert and R. Roblot, Droit 
Commercial Tome 1 (1993 Librairie General de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Pans), p.247. 
99 See Cas~. 20 Novembe~ 1922, s., 1926, I, 305, note Rousseau. It must be noted here that some judges 
have used this difference between branches and subsidiaries as a means of abolishing the conseque~~es. of 
the existence of a separate personality in some cases of insolvency. Thus, they named some sub~ldlan~s 
as branches so as to be able to exploit the subsidiary'S property in the case of the parent company s temll-
nation of payments. See Casso 13 May 1929, S., 1929, I, 289, note Rousseau; also see A~gers 13 July 
1956, JCP, 56, ed. G, 11,9514; Gaz. Pal., 1958, 1,150; Casso civ. 111,11 March 1959; Bull. c.rv. 111, n 135, 
p.124: see contra Casso com. 28 June 1957, JCP, 1957, p.349; also see Casso com. 25 Apnl 1968, Bull. 
civ. IV, n 133, p.117; RTC com. 28 June 1968, 1138, note Houin. 
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Despite its lack of legal personality, the branch can sue and be sued before the 
French courts,IOO provided that it meets two conditions. First, it must have a permanent, 
stable establishment in France. A unit dealing exclusively with the administration of 
personnel, the administration of the company's recruitment or acting exclusively as the 
executionary intermediary of the main unit cannot sue and be sued before the court of 
the location of its establishment. 101 Equally, an agency serving as a mere administrative 
centre of the company cannot sue before the tribunal of the location of its establish-
ment.
102 Second, the case brought before the tribunal of the branch's or agency's estab-
lishment must refer to the operation of the branch or agency and not to the activities of 
the main unit. \03 For any other case the company must still be sued before the courts of 
its social seat. \04 If this social seat is abroad, French creditors may sue in France both for 
cases deriving from the operations of the foreign company and from the activity of the 
French branch or agency. 105 However, for companies originating from other EU Mem-
ber States cases relating to the validity, nullity or dissolution of the company are heard 
before the courts of the company's social seat even when the creditor is French. 106 
Recognised foreign companies wishing to establish a branch or agency in France 
must follow an administrative procedure. 107 They submit to the Tribunal de commerce 
of the area of the proposed unit two official copies, translated in French, of the com-
pany's articles of association along with any modifications. 108 The company also under-
takes the obligation to submit two copies of its annual accounts as published in the 
country of the company's social seat. Similar requirements concerning French compa-
100 See B. Mercadal and P. Macqueron, op.cit., pp.210 and 177; also see Casso req., 15 June 1909, DP, 
1912, 1,209, note de Boeck; 8., 1911, I, 81, note Naquet; Casso civ., 20 October 1965, D., 1966, II, 192; 
Aix, 28 June 1978, Bull. Cour d' Au, 1978, 3, 54; Casso req., 20 January 1936,8., 1936, I, 127; Paris, 12 
January 1902, DP, 1904, 11,156; Amiens, 25 October 1916,JDI, 1917,623. 
101 II See Soc. 10 February 1971, Bu ., V, 99. 
102 See T.G.I. Chartres, 20 January 1983, BRDA, 1983,20, 18. 
103 3 D·..{ See Paris, 16 February 1994, Bull. Joly, 1994, 50 ,note algrc. 
104 See Civ., 25 March 1954, Bull., 11,132; Casso civ., 17 June 1958, Rev. crit. dr. com., 1958,704, note 
Francescakis; Rev. trim. dr. com., 1959, 255, note Loussouarn; Paris, 2 November 1962, JCP 63, II, 
13014; Paris, 26 March 1966, Clunet, 1966,841, note Goldman; Rev. crit. dr. intern at. prive, 1968,58, 
note Loussouam; Casso civ., 28 May 1963, Clunet, 1963, 1006, note Goldman; JCP, 63, II, 13347, note 
Malaurie. 
105 See Art. 14 CC; also see Trib. com. Seine, 7 June 1938,8. 1940, II, 51; Clunet, 1939,628; Trib. civ. 
Metz, 22 February 1950, D., 1950, Som. 46; Rev. trim. dr. com., 1950, 703; Colmar, 23 June 1950, R~. 
trim. dr. com., 1950, 704, note Loussouarn; however, see contra Trib. Mulhouse, 2 May 1950: Rev. crll. 
dr. internat. prive, 1951, note Niboyer; Rev. trim. dr. com., 1951, 396, note Loussouarn; Cour d Appel de 
Paris, 13 March 1976, Gaz. Pal., 1976, II, Som., 309. . 
106 See Arts.16-2 of the 1968 Brussels Convention; see Cour d' Appel Versailles, 26 September 1991, 
RJDA, 1992, no 298. . 
107 It must be noted here that Directive 89/666, JOCE, L 395, 30 December 1989 on the esta~hsh~ent 
of EU companies within other member states of the Union must also be taken into acco~nt. It IS wl~ely 
accepted, however, that the current French laws on publicity and establishment do not Violate the direc-
tive in question. See M. Cabrillac, 1994, op. cit., p.1 0.' 
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nies have been abolished since 1935 and 1967 respectively.l09 Moreover, the company 
submits to the Tribunal within 15 days of the unit's opening a document with informa-
tion on the principal company and the secondary unit and a request for registration in 
the Registre de commerce et des societes. 110 The relevant Decree, passed in 1967, is ap-
plicable to all types of permanent establishments in France where commercial activities 
are conducted. 111 The Decree was modified in 1984 and the newly introduced delimita-
tion of secondary units obliged to register with the Registre includes all permanent 
units, distinct from the primary establishment and directed by a person with the power 
to represent the primary unit in legal acts with third parties. 112 Furthermore, the branches 
or agencies of foreign companies must always include in their commercial documents 
the registration number of the main unit, its name, its legal form and the location of its 
social seat. 1I3 Companies must also make sure that any non-EU branch employees have 
permission to work in Francell4 and that non-EU directors of the branch or agency pos-
sesses a carte de commer~ant etranger. lIS The relevant documents are also included in 
the registry. Although this provision may seem discriminatory against foreign employ-
ees and directors of branches or agencies in France, two points must be taken into ac-
count. First, this provision does not apply to EU citizens, hence there is no difference in 
the treatment of such persons on the basis of their nationality. Second, French directors 
of branches or agencies of foreign companies are also included in the registry along 
with an extract of their birth certificates or proof of naturalisation. Furthermore, since 
the creation and extension of a branch or agency is considered a direct investment in 
France, foreign recognised companies must also acquire the relevant permission of the 
Minister of the Economy and Finance. 1I6 After the fulfilment of these administrative re-
108 See Art 55 of the Decree 84-406 of 30 May 1984, as modified by Decree 92-521 of 16 June 1992. 
109 See M. Cabrillac, op. cit., p.l O. 
110 See Arts.l and 5 of the Decree 84-406 of30 May 1984. For further analysis, see G. Riper and R. 
Roblot, op.cit., p. 157. 
111 See Art.21 of the Decree no 67-237 of 23 March 1967; also see Rep. min. no 30725, JOANQ, 11 
August 1980, p.3380. 
112 See Art.9, par.3 of Decree no 84-406 of30 May 1984. 
113 See Art.72, par.2 of Decree no 84-406 of 30 May 1984 as amended by Decree 92-521 of 16 June 
1992. 
114 On the carte de resident, see Art. 17 of the Ordonnance no 45-2658 as recently modified. 
liS See Art.5 of the Decree of 2 February 1939; also see the Decree of27 October 1969. The carte ~ay 
only be refused on the basis of the person's incapability to fulfil its obligati.ons as a c0m."!er~ant; see eIre. 
24 October 1985, JO, 6 February 1985, 2093. The carte is no longer reqUIred of EU citizens under Art. 1 
of L. no 84-622 of 17 July 1984. 
116 It must be noted here that this declaration is needed in the case of direct investments of mor~ tha.n 
FF50m invested by companies whose annual turnover (Including that of their controlled compame~) ~s 
above F'F500m. See Decree of 29 December 1989, JO, 30 December 1989, Arts. 1-5 (as complem;.~e d bY 
Decree 90-58 of 15 January 1990, Art 1; JO, 16 January 1990, rect. JO, 20 January 1990) as mo I Ie y 
Decree 92-134 of 11 February 1992, JO, 12 February 1992. 
O~~~<~.~ 
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quirements, the branch may legally function within France. The lack of legal personality 
signifies that the branch shares the nationality of the principle unit. 117 Thus, the branch's 
internal structure and powers are ruled by the law of the foreign company's lexfori. 118 
C2. Participation in French companies 
Branches and agencies are the form of establishment usually chosen when the principal 
unit wishes to bring its business closer to the French public without risking the loss of 
control over its secondary units. However, if the foreign company wishes to enter the 
French market through an independent establishment with its own legal personality and 
the right to exercise activities different from those conducted by the principal establish-
ment, participation in an already existing French company may be the optimum solu-
tion."9 This can be achieved through the placement of capital and the consequent acqui-
sition of some degree of control over the company.120 Placement of capital can be either 
direct or indirect. In the first case, the company may offer property (e.g. immovables or 
services) to the French entity, or purchase shares or subscribe capital in an increase of 
capital. In the second case the company may use intermediaries for the offer of property, 
purchase of shares or subscription of capital. 121 The characterisation of an offer of prop-
erty, purchase of shares or subscription of capital as indirect participation is a matter of 
factual interpretation for the French judges, whose aim is to evaluate the intention of the 
parties. The purchase of shares by six natural persons, who also were the six out of eight 
shareholders of another company, was declared an indirect participation, even though 
the six people involved had purchased shares under their own name. 122 The same ration-
ale was followed in a purchase of shares belonging to a French company by the natural 
persons who were shareholders of a foreign company. This was also declared an indirect 
method of participation. 12l For the purposes of the law participation only occurs when 
the acquisition of shares or capital of an already existing company is of a percentage 
117 See B. Mercadal and P. lanin, op.cit., p. 1239; also see S. Boulin, op.cit. par.36; Casso civ., 20 Feb-
ruary 1979, JCP, 79, ed. G, 11,19147, note Gulphe; Rev. SOC., 1979,856; Dr. prato com. inter., 1979, IV, 
533, note Mercadal. 
118 See Com. 21 December 1987, JCP, 1988, II, 21113, note Montanier; Com. 9 April 1991, RJDA 7/91, 
no 613; Com. 9 March 1993, RJDA, 7/93 no 617. 
119 See M. Germain, "Groupes de Societes" in 1. Labic, Trai~e des societe~: ~~1.1 (1992, ~d~tio~s T~,c~­
niques luris-c1asseurs, Paris), Fasc. 165-2, pp 6-11; also see M. Gegout, Flhales et p~lclpatlons . ill 
Encyclopedie Dalfoz, vol Societes (Dalloz, Paris), pp.I-30; M. Delapierre and C.-~. Mlchalet, Les Im-
plantations etrangeres en France: Strategies et Structures (1996, Calmann-Levy, ParIS), p.28. 
120 See B. Mercadal and P. lanin, op.cit., p.l057. 
121 See ibid, p.l058. . 
122 See Com., 13 luly 1948, JCP, 1949, 11,4938, note Bastian. 
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between 10 and 50%.124 In the calculation of this percentage non-voting preferred shares 
are not taken into consideration. 125 
Such participation bears certain consequences. The directors or members of the 
directorate or the supervisory board (as well as their spouses) of a company owning 
more than 10% of the capital of another company may not serve as its statutory audi-
126 Th . f fu . d tors. e exercise 0 nctIons reserve to statutory auditors must not necessarily be 
permanent, direct, or beneficial to the company directed by the person in question. 127 
Indeed, in a case brought before the Cour de Cassation the mere payment of a director's 
salary which amounted to more than double the average director's salary was consid-
ered sufficient proof that the director in question was also acting as an auditor for a 
company to which the one under his direction was participating. 128 The second conse-
quence of participation is that for a period of five years after the termination of their 
services, statutory auditors may not be exercise the same function in companies owing 
more than 10% of the capital of the company where they were initially employed or a 
company they have audited or of which that company owes 10% of the capital at the 
time of the termination of their services as statutory auditors. 129 This prohibition is a 
mandatory regulation, the violation of which results to nullity of the acts reached ir-
regularly.130 Another consequence of participation is that the board of directors, the di-
rectorate or the manager of any company having interests must annex to the balance 
sheet a table for the purpose of showing the condition of such interests. 131 Moreover, a 
company holding 10% or more of the capital of a company on the basis of debts or other 
obligations may not, at any General Assembly meeting, participate in the voting proc-
ess by using the bonds/debts which it holds.132 Furthermore, as a general principle, a 
stock company may not own shares of another company if the latter holds more than 
10% of its capital,133 whereas if a company other than a stock company has as one of its 
partners or associates a stock company holding more than 10% of its capital, the first 
123 See Casso Req., 20 November 1922, s., 1926, I, 306, note Rousseau. 
124 See Art.355 of Law 66-537 of24 June 1966 on Commercial Companies. 
125 See Art.269-9 of Law 66-537 of 24 June 1966 on Commercial Companies, as modified by Law 78-
741 of 13 July 1978. 
126 See Art.220-3 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
127 V'd I See Crim., 18 October 1983, D., 1984,361, note I a. 
128 See Crim., 24 May 1983, D. 1984, 101, note Vidal. 
129 See Art.221, par.2 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
130 See Soc., 20 October 1976, D., 1976, JR., 296; Rev. SOC., 1977,277, note Guyenot. 
131 See Art.357 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
132 See Art.308, par.4 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
133 See Art.358, par. 1 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
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company may not hold shares issued by the second.134 However, these regulations, ap-
plicable exclusively in the case of public companies limited by shares, I3S are widely 
considered inapplicable in the case of foreign companies. 136 
C3. Subsidiaries 
Company participation to a percentage higher than 50% constitutes secondary estab-
lishment via a subsidiary. French law expressly defines the subsidiary as a company 
whose capital belongs to another company in a percentage of more than 50%.137 In the 
calculation of this percentage non-voting preferred shares are not taken into considera-
tion. 138 Goldman and Lyon-Caen define the subsidiary of a foreign company as a com-
pany separate from the foreign one, which has been constituted under the law of its so-
cial seat and whose parent company has control through the ownership of a substantial 
part of the subsidiary's capital either by financial or by other means. 139 The definition of 
subsidiaries by the law seems to rely on a purely mathematical criterion. However, it is 
now widely accepted that the mathematical criterion is inadequate. 140 Therefore, it is not 
the precise percentage of capital participation, but the dependence of the one company 
on the other that characterises a relationship between parent company and subsidiary.'41 
This dependence may derive from either financial or administrative control of the parent 
company over the subsidiary. 142 The exact percentage of capital participation that would 
lead to financial control cannot be generally stated. It is agreed that it cannot be below 
10%.143 In general it can be stated that the percentage required is the one necessary un-
der the particular circumstances of each case for the acquisition of control over the sub-
134 See Art.359, par. 1 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
135 See Rapp. au Senat, 27 April 1966, JO, Deb. Sen at, p.364; also see Rep. Minist., !O, Deb. Ass. Nat., 
31 October 1974, p.573; Rev. soc., 1975, 184; Rev. trim. dr. com., 1975, 104, note Houm. . 
136 See Gegout, op.cit., p.13; also see Instr. D.G.E. no 4643,3 May 1943, JCP, 1943, III, 7917; Decis. 
Minist. Fin., 11 May 1943 in response to an inquiry by ANSA: ANSA, Communic., no 378; Percerou, 
"Commentaire de la 10i du 4 mars 1943" [1943] DC L, 61, Art.8, n.2. 
137 See F. Lemeunier, op. cit. , p.60; also see Art. 354 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. 
138 See Art.269-9 of Law 66-537 of24 June 1966 on Commercial Companies, as modified by Law 78-
741 of 13 July 1978. 
139 C' 93 See B. Goldman and A. Lyon- aen, op. Cit., p. . 
140 See B. Mercadal and P. Janin, op.cit., p.l057. 
141 See M. Gegout, op. cit., p.7. 
142 See B. Mercadal and P. Macqueron, op.cit., p.259. 
143 A percentage of a mere 26% was considered sufficient for the characterisation o~ a ~ompany as sub-
sidiary on the basis that in that particular case it allowed.the parent company to exercise Influence on the 
execution of the subsidiary's social object. See Com., 24 November 1992, Bull. civ., IV, 367; Bull. Joly, 
1993,224, note Le Cannu; Dr. SOC., 1993, 11, note Nabasque; D., 1993, JR., 14. 
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sidiary by the parent company.l44 Administrative control exists when the parent com-
pany has, on its own or after agreement with other participants, control over the major-
ity of votes in the general assembly. This occurs when the parent company holds, di-
rectly or indirectly, a percentage of capital giving it the majority of voting rights at 
shareholder's meetings of the subsidiary, when the parent company has -under an 
agreement with other shareholders 145_ the majority of voting rights of the subsidiary, or 
when the parent company can determine through its voting rights the decisions of the 
shareholders' meetings of the subsidiary.146 Proof of any aspect of administrative control 
(in the board of directors or other decision-making organs) may be adequate proof of 
parent company-subsidiary relationship.147 Thus, the establishment of a company by the 
agency of another company, which also rented the building where the first company had 
its social seat was considered sufficient proof of a parent-subsidiary relationship.148 
Also, the employment of three common administrators was judged as a factor creating a 
subsidiary-parent linle 149 However, a common aim, common general interests and com-
mon commercial agents were not considered enough evidence of such a bond. ISO 
One of the main characteristics of the subsidiary is the combination of financial 
or administrative control by the parent company with legal and judicial autonomy. This 
autonomy is reflected in the fact that, despite the possible financial and administrative 
bonds between parent company and subsidiary, the latter is considered a legal entity 
separate from the company which participates in its capital and might share its directors 
and administrators. 15l One of the results of this separate personality, and one of the main 
attractions of subsidiaries as a form of establishment, is that they do not share the parent 
144 See ibid, p.8; also see Nancy, 5 February 1921, Gaz. Pal., 1921, II, 397; Rennes, 16 June 1930, 
Journ. soc., 1932,401, note Lecompte; Requ., 12 May 1931, DR, 1931,329. 
145 In principle, a shareholder cannot renounce his/her right to vote. See Com., 10 June 1960, Rev. SOC., 
1961, 34, note Autesserre. Any such agreement is not valid. See Com., 17 June 1974, Gaz. Pal., 1.9~5., I, 
127; RTD com., 1975,534, note Houin; Rev. soc., 1977,84, note Randoux. However, agreements hmltmg 
the right to vote for the protection of a social interest are valid. See M. DaiIly, JO, Deb. s.enat, 25 June 
1985, p.1589; also see Trib. com. Paris, 1 August 1974, Rev. soc., 1974,685, note Oppet.lt; RTD com., 
1974, 130, note Houin; Trib. com. Paris, 4 March 1981, RJ com., 1982,7, note de Fontbressm. 
146 See Art.354 of the Law of24 July 1966. 
147 See Art.355-1 of the Law of 24 July 1966. For an analysis of the notion o~ co.n~ol" s~e M. Gegout, 
op.cit., pp.8-9; also see M. Germain, op.cit., pp.3-6. It m~st be noted he~e that Judl.cI~1 actIOn for the ex-
clusive purpose of declaring that a company is controlled by another IS not admISSIble. See M. Bour-
guignon,JO, Ded. Ass. Nat., 13 June 1985, p.1647. 
148 See Req., 20 November 1922, s., 1926, I, 305, note Rousseau. 
149 See Com., 13 July 1948, JCP, 1949, 11,4938, note Bastian. 
150 See Civ., 21 November 1934, S., 1936, I, 289, note Rousseau. 
lSI See Paris, 31 May 1989, D., 1989, JR., 227;.Paris, 4 May 1990, D., 1990, JR, 156; Rev. soc., 1990, 
449. 
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company's debts and vice versa. IS2 Attempts to argue the opposite on the basis that the 
companies share a common name, representation and interests failed. ls3 Thus, the parent 
company may not attempt to pursue payment for the subsidiary' debts.ls4 Moreover, the 
parent company may not intervene in the decisions of the subsidiary's directors con-
cerning property of the subsidiary which is separate from the one shared by the share-
holders. ISS Furthermore, the end of administrators' or agents' employment or agency 
contract with the parent company does not necessarily signify the end of their contract 
with the subsidiary, provided that it is not due to their acting illegitimately.ls6 Also, co-
operation between parent and subsidiary for the fulfilment of obligations deriving from 
contracts of exclusivity constitutes a breach of that contract. IS7 Lastly, the direct or indi-
rect acceptance of remuneration by the statutory auditor of a public company limited by 
shares from a subsidiary company is a criminal offence. 158 
The main consequence of the subsidiary's autonomy is its separate legal person-
ality. Since the subsidiary's centre of business, direction and administration lies in 
France, its is considered a French company,IS9 which -without need for recognition- can 
freely establish in France under the same procedure and conditions followed by domes-
tic companies. 160 Thus, a French subsidiary of a foreign company, whose social seat, 
principal establishment, direction and exploitation was in France was considered a 
French company. 161 This separate legal personality has often been used by French 
judges in their assessment on the legal nature of a secondary unit in France. Two units 
sharing the same administrators, location, buildings, personnel and liability obligations 
were evaluated as a main company establishment and an agency, rather than a subsidi-
152 See Paris, 31 May 1989, D., 1989, JR., 227; Com., 4 January 1982, Rev. SOC., 1983,95, note Burst; 
Com., 28 May 1991, Bull. civ., IV, 182; Defrenois, 1992,906, note J, Honorat; Rev. SOC., 1991, 764; 
Com.,6 April 1993, RJDA, 1993, 705; Bull. Joly, 1993,677. 
153 See Civ., 21 November 1934, s., 1936, I, 289, note Rousseau. 
154 Ch . See Com., 12 May 1981, Rev. soc., 1982, 318, note artIer. 
ISS See Paris, 16 May 1978, Rev. soc. 1979, 72, note Guyenot. 
156 See Reims, 10 November 1975, Rev. SOC., 1976,307, note Guyenot. 
157 See Com., 24 May 1982, Rev. SOC., 1983,361, note Beguin; Com., 29 June 1993, Bull. Jo/y, 1993, 
1124, note Couret. 
158 See Art.220-4 of the Law of 1966; also see Trib. corr. Nantes, 25 September 1981, D., 1982,. 568; 
Rev. soc., 1981, 775, note Guyon; Crim., 18 October 1983, D., 1984, 361, n~te Vid~l. Equally f~rbldde.n 
is global remuneration, indeed without being necessary for the judges to attrIbute thIS or part of.lt to ~hls 
forbidden activity. See Crim., 3 January 1983, D., 1983, JR, ~08; JCP, 1983, II, 20070, note Vlvandler; 
Rev. soc., 1984, 114, note Bouloc. . 
159 See Casso 25 February 1895, D., 95,1,341; s., 95, 1, 180; Req., 9 April 1913., s., 1913, 1,225; CIV. 
15 June 1957, D., 1957,596; Paris, 30 January 1970, RDC, 1972,493; also see B. Bizet. 
160 See M. Gegout, op. cit., pp.16 and 21. . . 
161 See Cass., 8 February 1972, Bull. civ., III, 83; Clunet, 1973,218, note Oppettt; Rev. trim. dr. com:, 
1973, 672, note Loussouam; Rev. crit. dr. inter. fr., 1973, 299; also see Cass., 10 March 1976, Rev. crll. 
dr. inter. prive, 1976, 658. 
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ary:62 The same fate awaited a secondary unit sharing with the primary establishment 
the same funds and shareholders, whose employees and agents were supervised by and 
accountable to the main unit. 163 Also the debtors of two units with the same social aim 
, 
social seat, branches, telephone number and correspondence signature, which were 
evaluated as sharing the same legal personality and were linked in a company-agency 
relationship,l64 were allowed to pursue payment by either of the two. 165 
Foreign companies may choose to establish under any of the several company 
types introduced by French law. However, in view of the favourable taxation, the lim-
ited liability for all associates 166 and the possibility for entrance in the Stock Exchange, 
companies tend to opt for a company limited by shares. Since the subsidiary is a French 
company, its structure and functioning is ruled by French law on the functioning of do-
mestic companies. 167 Foreign companies wishing to establish a subsidiary SA in France 
may chose between two types of formation, with or without public offering. 168 For the 
incorporation of a subsidiary without public offering, the company is formed by sub-
scription to the capital,169 the adoption of its statutes by a minimum of seven bona fide 
shareholders 170 and the completion of publicity requirements. 171 Subscription to the 
capital, which cannot be less than 250,OOOFF, may take the form of payment in cash or 
contributions in kind, namely offer of services or transfer of real rights. 172 These must be 
162 See Req., 13 May 1929, s., 1921, 1,289. 163 See Angers, 13 July 1956, Gaz. Pal., 1956, II, 125. 164 See Req., 19 June 1929, s., 1930, I, 176. 
165 See Poitiers, 7 March, 1933, s., 1933, II, 124; also see Paris, 20 March 1986, Rev. SOC., 1987, 98; 
Aix-en-Provence, 11 January 1985, Rev. SOC., 1987, 98; Com., 8 October 1988, Bul. Joly, 1988, 923, note 
Le Cannu; Com., 1 March 1994, Bull. civ., IV, 93; Dr. SOC., 1994,87, note Bonneau; Trib. com. Paris, 10 
March 1992, RJDA, 1992, 831; Trib. civ. Seine, 15 November 1957, JCP, 1958, II, 10420. 
166 The liability of all associates in both private and public companies limited by shares is limited. to 
the value of their contributions. See C. Morlou, Creez votre entre prise dans la CEE (1990, ANCE, ParIS), 
p.70. 
167 See M. Gegout, op. cit. , p.21; also see B. Bizet, op. cit., p.93. 
168 Formation with public offering is regulated by Arts.74-83 of Law 537 of 24 July 1966, whereas 
formation without offering is stipulated by Arts.84-88 of the same law. 
169 Under Art.71 of Law 537 of 24 July 1966 the capital must be FF 1 ,500,000 if the company.makes 
public offering of shares and FF250,000 if it does not. Under Art.72 of the same law, a company IS con-
sidered to make public offerings mainly if its securities are officially listed on a stock exchange. 
170 See Art.73 of Law 537 of24 July 1966. The choice of number seven in the number of shareholders 
required for the legal fonnation of a company seem to have no rational explanation. See Y. Guyon, La 
Societe Anonyme (1994, Dalloz, Paris), p.9. 
171 See CCH International, French Law on Commercial Companies as of January 1, 1988 (1988, Com-
merce Clearing House, Chicago), p.3; also see B. Bizet, op.cit., pp.95-96; Arts.74-88 of Law 537 of 24 
July 1966. 
172 See Crim., 14 January 1905, DP, 1906, I, 129, note.Le Poittevin; s., 1907, I, 529, n~te ~~l~ also 
see Brebner and Co, op.cit., p.79; P. Didier, Les societes commerciales (1991, Presses Umversitalres de 
France, Paris), p.4 7. 
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legal and transferable. 173 The funds used for the sUbscription of capital must be depos-
ited to a notary, a bank or the Caisse des depots et consignations. 174 After the end of the 
formation procedure and on production of a certificate of registration by the secretary of 
the relevant tribunal,175 funds can be withdrawn by the directors of the company.176 The 
adoption of the company's statutes by less than seven shareholders results in its nul-
lity;77 even when the company has managed to complete the administrative procedure 
for its legal formation. 178 The requirement of a minimum of seven shareholders ceases 
after the adoption of the statutes. 179 There are no specific conditions for the qualification 
of natural or legal persons as shareholders. Spouses or even non-emancipated minors 
may legally sign the company's statutes:80 The publicity requirements consist of the 
publication of the company's statutes in the Journal d' annonces legales of the location 
of its social seat, the submission of two copies of the constitution, the shareholders' list 
and the report of the statutory auditor to the clerk of the Tribunal de commerce of the 
company's social seat and the registration of the company to the Registre du commerce 
et des societes and other administrations, namely tax and social security authorities, a 
procedure which usually takes approximately one month. 181 
For the constitution of a subsidiary with public offering, a procedure of six 
stages must be followed. First, the company's statutes signed by one or more founding 
shareholders is submitted to the clerk of the commercial tribunal at the location of the 
company's social seat. Second, a notice is published in the Journal d' annonces legales 
of the location of its social seat. This notice is also submitted to the Commission des 
operations de bourse. Third, the subscription of capital (minimum of 1,500,000 FF) 
takes place:82 Fourth, the elements of this capital are submitted to a notary, a bank or 
173 See Civ., 21 July 1987, JCP, 1987, E, 16959, note Viandier et Caussain; also see Y. Chaput, op. cit., 
p.73. 
174 This certificate bears no legal certifying value; it is a mere administrative document required for the 
company's matriculation in the company registry. See Trib. com. Paris, 20 February 1991, Dr. SOC., 1991, 
319. 
m This has to be produced within five days of the submission of the relevant documents. S?ould ~he 
clerk fail to reach a decision on the legality of the matriculation within five days, the company IS consid-
ered matriculated. See Art.31 of the Decree of30 May 1984; also see Y. Guyon, op.cit., p.13. 
176 See Y. Reinhard, op.cit. p.4. 
177 See Com., 17 November 1969, Bull. civ., IV, 346; D., 1970, Som., 115; JCP, 1970, 11,16304; Rev. 
SOC., 1970, 290, Gaz. Pal., 1970, I, 38. It must be noted here that the relevant Art.87 of the Law of 1966 
has been modified by Law 83-1 of3 January 1983. . 
178 See Com., 17 July 1974, Bull. civ., IV, 233; Rev. SOC., 1975,649, note Hemard. 
179 p. See Bordeaux, 20 July 1931, DP, 1933, II, 129, note IC. 
180 See Y. Reinhard, "Societe Anonyme" in Guide Juridique Dalloz (Dalloz, Paris), fasc.475, p.2. 
181 See C. and L. Belmont, European Company Law (1989, FT Business Information Ltd., London), 
p.52. . . . 
182 See Art.75 of Law 66-537 of24 July 1966 as modified by Law 94-475 of 10 June 199~. ~nor to thiS 
modification only half of the capital had to be subscribed. It must be noted that any subscnptlon must be 
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the Caisse des depots et consignations. 183 Fifth, the first constituting General Assembly 
is called
l84 
and agrees the value of shares, adopts the statutes, ratifies decisions already 
taken and agrees on the participants to the company's bodies. 18s Sixth, the company's 
statutes are included in the Journal d' annonces legales of the location of its social seat 
, 
two copies of the constitution are submitted to the clerk of the Tribunal de commerce of 
the social seat and the company is included to the Registre du commerce et des soc;etes. 
D. ESTABLISHMENT IN IT AL Y 
Dl. The establishment of branches or agencies 
Italian law does not distinguish between branches or agencies. The relevant provisions 
refer to secondary seats, a terminology which has not been altered even after the modi-
fication of Art.2506 CC on foreign companies with secondary seats in Italy for the pur-
pose of harmonising this provision with Directive 89/666 on the publicity requirements 
concerning the "branches" of foreign companies within other EU Member States. 186 The 
only distinction in forms of secondary establishment refers to secondary seats of foreign 
companies in Italy regulated by Art.2506 CC and governed by the law of the principal 
unit's social seat, and foreign companies establishing a principal place of business in 
Italy regulated under the newly modified Art.2505 CC. 187 
Secondary seats are defined as locations of business with permanent representa-
tion from the main unit, located in a place different from the location of the principal 
unit, with a stable organisation of persons and means directed to the development of the 
company's social activity.188 The activity of the secondary seat must be conducted in a 
location different from the one of the main unit. 189 It must both be relatively independent 
simple and pure. See Rouen, 21 June 1957, D., 1957,628; s., 1958,53; Rev. SOC., 1957,405; also. see T. 
com. Lyon, 28 February 1944, Journ. SOC., 1945, 115. Thus, conditional obligations are not vahd. See 
Paris, 9 May 1868, DP, 1868, II, 173. 
183 In the case of fraud committed by the company's director by not submitting all capi.ta.1 to the notary, 
bank or Caisse, the remaining capital can be added without any consequences on the valIdIty of the com-
pany formation. See Crim., 10 May 1993, Bull. Joly, 849, note Le Cannu. 
184 See Art.79 of Law 66-537 of 24 July 1966 as modified by Law 83-1 of 3 January 1983. . 
185 For further analysis on the process and aim of the constitutive General Assembly, see Y. Remhard, 
op. cit., p.5; also see F. Lemeunier, op. cit. , pp.228-230. 
186 See D.Lgs. of29 December 1992, no 516. 
187 See G. Millozza, op.cit., p.708. . 
188 See F. Martinelli, Manuale delle societa azionarie (1995, Pirola, Milano), pp.31-32. 
189 See Cass., 4 February 1969, no 341, Foro it., 1969, I, 1842341169; also see Cendon, op.cil., p.884. 
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from the activity of the company's main unit and permanent. l90 Thus, the creation of a 
mere representation office and the offer of legal services for the signing of contracts 
between the main unit and its clients was not considered a formation of a secondary seat 
in Italy. 191 Moreover, the characterisation of a shipping agency as the secondary seat of a 
foreign company was not allowed to be based on the mere permanent, independent ac-
tivity of the agency. The latter had to prove the formation of an organisational nucleus 
with organic bonds with the principal unit and a separate legal purpose for its existence 
in Italy other than to merely represent the main unit by signing contracts with its cli-
ents. 192 Furthermore, a representation office serving as a mere information point of the 
principal unit for possible clients at the location of the secondary unit was not classified 
as a secondary seat. 193 Indeed, it is this independent activity that gives rise to pUblicity 
requirements by the secondary seat. The latter has the obligation to publicise the details 
of the formation, existence and functioning of the secondary seat, as well as the exact 
nature of its dependent relationship with the main establishment of the company "whose 
it is only an organ, although it might seem to appear as legally autonomous".194 The or-
ganic bond between the principal and secondary seat of a company does not necessarily 
imply the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the twO. 195 Thus, a 
general managerial service for the principal company could fall within the activities of a 
secondary seat. 196 The assessment on the existence of a branch is a matter of factual in-
terpretation. 197 Thus, agents or even legally independent companies may constitute a 
branch depending on the relevant factual circumstances. 198 
In the past the need for publicity requirements was under debate. The substance 
of the debate concerned the need for ratification of the permission for secondary estab-
lishment by the Italian tribunals. Those who argued for the necessity of ratification sup-
ported the view that the will of the legislator to introduce state authorisation for the es-
190 See C. Angelici, "Societa costituite 0 operandi all' estero" in Trecchani, G., Enciclipedia Giuridica 
(1993, Istituto della Enciclopedia Giuridica, Italy), p.5; see Cian-Trabucchi, op.cit., p.1680. 
191 See Trib. Roma, 24 November 1987, Soc., 1988,395; also see Cass., 4 February 1969, no 341, Foro 
il., 1969, I, 1842; Trib. Milano, 9 December 1963, Banca borsa, 1964, II, 114. 
192 See Cass., sez. I, 8 March 1969, no 762, Mass. dec. CN., 1969, fasc. 3, no 339.074. 
193 See Trib. Roma, 24 November 1987, Soc., IV, 1988,395. 
194 See Cass., 6 September 1968, no 2881, Riv. dir. com., 1970, II, 9; also see Cass., 19 November 
1971, no 3319, Riv. not., 1972,581. 
195 See Casso, sez. un., 15 November 1960, no 3041, Dirofall., 1961, II, 317. . 
196 See Tribo Venezia, 24 June 1969, Foro it., 1970, I, 653; App. Genova, 18 October 1962: F.0ro It: 
Rep., 1964, Societa, 316-317; Casso, 15 November 1960, no 3041, Foro it. Rep., 1960, Socleta, 493, 
Casso, 26 October 1955, no 3941, Foro it., 1956, 1,335. 
197 See Casso, 15 November 1960, no 3041, Giust. civ., 1961,650. 
198 See Cass., 30 November 1967, no 2854, Boll. trib. inJ, 1968, 722. 
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tablishment of branches was clearly reflected in the need for pUblicity requirements. 199 
Those opposing ratification could not see the need for pUblicity either.2°O The issue is no 
longer under debate. Consequent to the introduction of Legislative Degree 516/1992, an 
express compromising position is now in force. Ratification or authorisation by the 
Italian authorities is not required for the legal formation of a secondary seat in Italy. 
However, publicity requirements have to be met.201 This position is similar to the Greek 
and French provisions, which in turn are harmonised with Ee legislation. It must be ac-
cepted that publicity requirements are useful for the protection of Italian public order, 
the foreign companies and the Italian public. However, it is doubtful whether Italy as an 
EU Member State could justify the need for state ratification for the functioning of a 
unit, which -not being a subject of rights or obligations under Italian law- lacks legal 
personality separate from the main company unit. 202 The introduction of such a ratifica-
tion requirement could have been characterised as a hindrance to the free establishment 
of foreign companies in ltaly.20J 
Secondary seats lack legal personality. 204 Thus, the transfer of employees from 
the secondary seat to the principal unit can not entail the end of their initial contract 
with the branch and its novation by a contract with the principal unit. 205 This is based on 
the opinion that the initial employment contract was really with the main establishment, 
even if the contract was between the employee and the secondary seat.206 Moreover, due 
to the lack of legal autonomy between the principle seat and the secondary seat, which 
is considered a mere organ of the main unit, their participation in a creditor-debtor rela-
tionship is not legally conceivable.207 The main unit is fully liable for all debts and obli-
gations of the secondary unit.20S Furthermore, the change of company type must be an-
nounced in the locations of both the company's primary and secondary units.209 
199 See Trib. Milano, 19 March 1979, Riv. not., 1979,275; Trib. Roma, 11 July 1984, Soc., 1985, 73~; 
Trib. Milano, 10 February 1976, Giur. comm., 1976, II, 810, note Ubertazzi; Riv. soc., 1975, 1268, MontI. 
200 See Trib. Firenze, 12 April 1979, Riv. not., 1979,656; Trib. Roma, 25 January 1980, Foro it., 1980, 
1,3099. 
201 See Trib. Udine, 18 June 1993, Soc., 1993, IX, 1255; Trib. Livomo, 15 March 1994, Soc., 1994, IIX, 
1112. 
202 See Cass., sez. lav., 26 October 1982, no 5597. 
203 It must be noted, however, that for reasons of public interest such an obligation is introduced for 
units dealing with banking. See Trib. Milano, 10 February 1976, Giur. ~omm., 1976, II, 810 note Uber-
tazzi; Trib. Roma, 3 October 1984, Riv. dir. com., 1985, 11,215, note Ferri. 
204 See Cian-Trabucchi, op.cit., 1680. . 
205 See Cass., sez. lav., 12 June 1982, no 3573, Mass. dec. civ., 1982,421,538. 
206 See Cass., sez. lav., 1 December 1986, no 7096, Mass. dec. civ., 1986, fasc.12. 
207 See Cass., sez. I, 6 September 1968, no 2881, Giust. civ. Mass., 1968, 1500; Dir.fall., 1969, 11,272; 
also see Benini, Le societa civili e commerciali nei paesi minori d' Europa (1964, Padova), p.3 70. 
208 See J. Maitland-Walker, op. cit. , p.252. . 
209 This must also be included in both registries. See App. Milano, 27 March 1959, Dir. fall., 1959, II, 
427. 
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The procedure for the establishment of secondary seats in Italy has recently been 
modified in order to comply with Ee law.210 A copy of the company's constitutive act 
must be submitted for registration in the Registro delle imprese of the location where 
the company establishes a secondary seat with permanent representation within thirty 
days from the establishment.211 In order to prove the permanence of the representation, 
the company has to delegate a wide range of powers to the representative.212 The perma-
nence requirement refers to the unit and its activity and not to the natural or legal person 
who serves as a representative.213 The copy must state the registry where the company is 
registered and the date of registration. With relation to public companies limited by 
shares, a copy of the decision of its General Assembly or a clause in its statutes permit-
ting the formation of secondary seats must also be submitted for registration. 214 Moreo-
ver, the company must ensure that the creation of its secondary seat is included in the 
registry where the primary unit is registered. Furthermore, a form signed by the com-
pany's permanent representatives must also be registered.2ls This fonn must also include 
the name, surname, date, place of birth and authentic signature of the permanent repre-
sentatives.216 The aim of these publicity requirements is not to notify the public of a di-
vision in the company, but to expressly manifest the organic bond between primary and 
secondary establishment.217 Ratification by the tribunal of the location of the secondary 
seat is not required for the legal formation of a secondary unit. This can be attributed to 
the fact that the legislator did not intend to link the formation of secondary seats with 
modification of the company statutes.2lS However, some argue that a modification does 
in effect take place and support the consequent view that a decision for extension can 
only be taken by the special majority introduced by the company's lex/or; for the intro-
210 See Legislative Decree 142 of 19 February 1992, which enacts Directive 89/666 of 21 December 
1989 on publicity requirements for the establishment of branches within the EU; also see Trib. Milano, 8 
March 1994, Riv dir.int.priv.proc" 1995, 135; Trib. Livomo, 15 March 1994, Riv. not., 1994, 1444. 
211 See Trib. di Roma, 3 October 1984, Le Soc., 1985, 303; also see Ministero dell' Industria, del 
Commercio edell' Artigianato, Circolare n.3202IC: Istruzioni sugli accertamenti da ~ffettuare. e sul!a 
documentazione da richiedere per Ie denunce di iscrizione, di modijicazione e di cessaZlOne per II regls-
tro delle ditte, 22 January 1990, Gazzetta Ufficiale, Serie generale, n.31, 7.2.1990, p.3. 
212 See Cass., sez. un., 15 November 1960, no 3041, Giust. civ., 1961,650. 
213 See Maisto and Miscali, op.cit., p.33. 
214 See App. Milano, 19 January 1979, II Sole-24 ore- Guida nprm., 1979, no 6, p.95. 
21S See Art.2299 CC. 
216 See Art.2506 CC; also see F. Laurino, "Pubblicita delle succursali all'estero" [1993] Rivista delle 
Societa, pp.250-254, at 252. . , 
217 See Cass., sez. 1,13 May 1967, no 1005, Dir.fall., 1967, II, 854; also Graziani, Dirilto ~elle sOClela 
(1963, Napoli), pp.139 and 190; Greco, La societa nel sistema legislativo italiano (1959, Tormo), pp.491 
and 504. . 
218 See Trib. Torino, 10 July 1986, Giur. comm., 1986, II, 868. 
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duction of major decisions on the development of the company's activity.219 In addition 
to these publicity requirements, the branch must register with the Chamber of Com-
merce of the province of its location. The branch must deposit a certified copy of the 
company's articles, a copy of its resolution to set up a branch, the name of its represen-
tatives and its fiscal number.220 Persons liable for non-completion of these requirements 
are the company administrators and the notary appointed to certify the legal formation 
of the branch.221 However, the non-fulfilment of the administrative requirements for the 
legal formation of a secondary seat does not lead to the nullity of the formation, but to 
the mere lack of proof concerning the company's characteristics against third parties.222 
Thus, such a company would be considered a de/acto personal partnership.223 
D2. The establishment of subsidiary companies in Italy 
The issue of subsidiaries is complicated, as Italian law makes no direct or express refer-
ence to this concept. The need for the clarification of this term and the determination of 
the equivalent Italian concept first arose for the purposes of EC law. The Italian text of 
Art.43 EC refers to filiali, a term which Italian judicial theory and practice considered 
"substantially equivalent" to the notion of secondary seats.224 As a result of this, the fili-
ale of a foreign company was considered to be a "general agency" which dealt exclu-
sively with contracts signed between the parent company and third parties in Italy and 
shared the property of the parent company. 225 On this legal basis, filiali were not consid-
ered to have a legal personality separate from the parent company and for their estab-
lishment in Italy applicable were the regulations concerning the formation of secondary 
seats.226 This initial misunderstanding derived from the wrong terminology used in the 
Italian version of the Treaty of Rome. The termfiliali might sound similar to the French 
219 See Trib. Bari, 26 September 1983, Vita not., 1984, 10 10; App. Milano, 13 June 1983, Vila nol., 
1983, 1551; also see F. Martinelli, op. cit., p.3!. 
220 See Art.7 of the relevant Ministerial Decision of9 March 1992. 
221 See F. Di Sabbato, Manuale delle societa (1992, UTET, Torino), p.182. 222 
See Art.2297 CC. . 
223 See Cass., sez. 1,26 June 1990, no 6491, Mass. dec. civ., 1990,468.017. 
224 See A. Pietrobon, L' interpretazione della nozione comunitaria di filiale ~ 1990, CEDAM, Rome), 
p.1O 1; also see Messineo, Manuale di diritto civile e commerciale ( 1952, Milano), p.332; Scarpello, 
"Succursale" in Nuovo Digesto Italiano ( 1940, Torino) pp.1188-1190, at 1118. 
22S See Cass., sez. II, 8 January 1966, no 157, Giur. it., 1966, 1,1,723; Foro it., 1966, 1,1310 .. 
226 See Trib. Bologna, 25 February 1966, Giur. it., 1966, I, 2, 289; Dir. fall., 1966, II, 28-l, also see 
Cass., sez. II, 18 June 1964, no 1556, Dir.fall., 1964, 11,410. 
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term jiliales, but in Italian law corresponds to a completely different concept. 227 The 
suitable term reflecting the characteristics of subsidiaries as used in EC primary and 
secondary regulations would have to be societa affiliate, which refers to autonomous 
legal entities with some degree of control by the parent company.228 However, even the 
use of the most suitable term fails to solve the problem. Societa affiliate are not ex-
pressly regulated in Italian law, which views them as Italian companies whose estab-
lishment in Italy is often misevaluated as primary establishment. 229 Under Art.2S1 0 CC 
companies with prevailing foreign interests are subject to Italian law. Thus, companies 
formed and functioning in Italy remain Italian even if they represent foreign interests.23o 
Under Art.2S09 CC companies formed in Italy are considered Italian even when their 
principle object of enterprise or their seat is situated abroad. Thus, the Italian subsidiar-
ies of foreign companies are considered Italian and not foreign legal entities.23\ Conse-
quently, their legal formation is subject to the provisions on domestic companies.232 
Subsidiaries of foreign Societa per Azioni (SpA) can be incorporated by private 
or, less commonly,233 public subscription. In the first case, all participants meet before a 
notary and sign the Constitutive Act, recording their will to incorporate a company and 
some essential information, and the company statutes, including the internal provisions 
for the company structure, operation, functioning and dissolution. The Constitutive Act 
must indicate the company's name, the names, dates of birth and domicile of the share-
holders, its true social seat, the nominal value of shares, the company duration, its ob-
ject, the subscribed capital and details concerning its administrators.234 The company 
name must be consistently referred to in the Act. Only one abbreviated form can be 
used.23s It must include the indication SpA/36 be original237 and may contain the names 
227 See R. de Dominicis, "Article 52" in Commentario CEE (1966, Milano), p.413, who notes that the 
use of this term in the text of Art.52 reflects "a frignteningly wrong concept, under the influence of the 
aPf:arent analogy of the French term". 
28 See A.Pietrobon, op.cit., p.IOI; also see Cass., 11 January 1957, no 45, Giur. it., 1957, I, 1,847. 
229 See ibid, p.l15; however, see contra S. Neri, op.cit., p.957. 
230 See Trib. Genova, 21 February 1948, Giur. com pl. Casso civ., 1948, IV, 873. 
231 See Maisto and Miscali, op. cit. , p.401. 
232 See Cass., S.U., 26 May 1969, no 1857, Foro it., 1969, I, 2538. . . 
233 The procedure of public subscription is rarely used in practice due 0 Its compleXity. See P. Verru-
coli, Italian Company Law (1977, Oyez Publishing, London), p.20. . 
234 See Art.2328 CC. The notary involved must ensure that the company shareholders ~gree on these IS-
sues even if when they are not included in the Act. See App. Torino, 8 March 19.82, G,ur. c~~m., 1983, 
II, 288, note Buralis and Boero; also see C. Angelici, "Atto costitutivo e statuto" m C. AngelIcl, Traltalo 
di Dirilto Privato (1985, UTET, Italy), pp.229-239, at 229. 
m See Trib. Casale Monferrato, 5 December 1991, Giur. comm., 1992, II, 622, note ConstanzO. 
236 See Art.2326 CC. . . 
237 See Cass., sez. I, 10 April 1968, no 1077, Dir. fall., 1969, II, 89; Trib. Milano, 13 May 1965, RIV. 
dir. comm., 1966, 11,48. 
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of natural persons as long as their relationship to the company is also indicated.238 The 
reason for this last condition is that the inclusion of a person's name in the company 
name may be perceived as an indication of his unlimited liability for company debts, 
which would be misleading in the case of a SpA. Any natural or legal person, private or 
public, may participate in a SpA.239 Even unrecognised associations are able to become 
shareholders.24o The domicile of the shareholders can not be used as a qualifying condi-
tion for their participation in the company.241 What the law requires as and indication of 
the company's seat is still under debate. The prevailing view in academic opinion seems 
to be that a mere note of the community where the seat will be located is sufficient, al-
though jurisprudence insists that what is really required is a precise address within this 
community.242 The Act must also include the company's social object, which is often 
defined as the economic activity determined by the company itself as the type they wish 
to exercise.243 The company's social object must be determined, namely not vague,244 
and possible, namely proportionate to the social object to be achieved.245 The mere de-
termination of a company's object as commercial, industrial or agricultural without 
specification of the specific area of activity, such as trade of books, is unacceptable.246 
The approximate cost of the formation must also be included in the Constitutive Act. 247 
238 See Casso sez. I, 17 October 1960, no 2772, Giur. it., 1961, I, 1, 1136. 
239 See App. Venezia, 15 May 1989, Riv. Soc., 1990,351. 
240 See F. di Sabato, op.cit., p.244; also see T. Bologna, 29 November 1984, Foro Pad, 1985, 1,430; 
App. Milano, 22 April 1986, Dir. fall., 1986, II, 814; App. Bologna, 18 July 1985, Riv. Not., 1987,873; 
App. Bologna, 6 February 1987, Vita Not., 1987,808; however, see contra T. Roma, 4 July 1984, Giur. 
il., 1985, 1,2,613, note Mariconda; Trib. Lucca, 2 February 1994, Riv. Soc., 1994,807. 
241 See Trib. Cassino, 29 April 1992, Foro it., 1992, I, 3200; Trib. Cassino, 9 June 1989, Foro it., Rep. 
1989, Societa, 384; Trib. Roma, 27 September 1982, Foro it., 1984,318. 
242 See the liberal views of G. Millozza, op.cit., p.208; also F. di Sabato, op.cit., p.246. However, see 
conlra Trib. Catania, 29 April 1982, Le societa, 1982, X, 1154; App. Torino, 13 July 1981, Riv. not., 
1981,964; Trib. Milano, 8 February 1982, Le societa, 1982, V, 536; Trib. Torino, 11 Sepetember 1990, 
Le sociela, 1991, 73; App. Brescia, 7 October 1988, Le societa, 1989, 74; App. Genova, 9 March 1984, 
Vita Nol., 1984,612; App. Perugia, 21 February 1985, Riv. nol., 1985,458; Trib. Perugia, 14 December 
1984, Riv. not., 1985, 458; Trib. Ascoli Piceno, 27 March 1985, Le societa, 1985, 979; Cass., 7 March 
1984, no 1573, Rep. Foro it., 1984, Societa, 244; Cass., 26 June 1984, no 3772, Giust. civ., 1984, 1,2476, 
note Finocchiaro; Trib. Treviso, 31 July 1982, Le societa, 1983,493; Trib. Vicenza, 24 November 1983, 
Dir.fall., 1984, 11,191; Trib. Udine, 24 September 1983, Dir.fall., 1984, 11,180; Cass., 26 October .1982, 
no 5593, Le societa, 1983, 1013; App. Torino, 24 March 1982, Foro it., 1982, I, 2935; Ap~. Cat,ama, 29 
April 1982, Dir.fall., 1982, II, 707; App. Milano, 22 April 1982, Riv. not., 1982,337, note dl FabiO. 
243 See F. di Sabato, op.cit., pp.246-247; also see P. Jaeger and F. Denozza, Appunli di diritlo commer-
ciale (1994, Giuffre, Milan), p.246. . 
244 See Trib. Rimini, 11 February 1983, Foro it., 1983, I, 1104; Trib. Ascoli Piceno, 20 May 1982, Dlr. 
fall., 1982, II, 221; Trib. Roma, 13 December 1977, Foro it., 1977, I, 281. 
245 See Trib. Udine, 12 June 1982, Foro it., 1982, 1,2619; Trib. Udine, 26 March 1982, Dir·fall., 1982, 
11,722; also see Trib. Rimini, 11 February 1983, Foro it., 1983, 1,1104; Trib. Roma, 14 December 1977, 
Giur. comm., 1978, II, 738; Trib. Leece, 19 April 1983, Le sociela, 1984, 193. . . 
246 See Trib. Bologna, 15 January 1991, Le societa, 1991, 824; Trib. Cosenza, 21 June 1990, Le socIela, 
1990, 1386; Trib. Cassino, 6 April 1990, Le societa, 1990, 1505. . . 
247 If not, the Act is invalid. See Trib. Leece, 24 October 1987, Le sociela, 1988, II, 188; Tnb. CasS!~o, 
18 January 1991, Foro it., 1991, 1,999; on the types of acceptable expenses, see D. Santosuosso, Le 
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In the case of public sUbscription incorporation comprises two stages. In the 
preparatory stage the promoters draw up a file including the company object,248 capital, 
share details,249 the eventual participation reserved for the promoters, a basic Instrument 
of Incorporation and the deadline for its execution.250 This file is kept by a notary, who 
also collects the details and funds of subscriptions.251 This takes place via the submis-
sion to the notary of a relevant authenticated private document or through a declaration 
signed before any notary. 252 The rationale of this requirement is that sUbscriptions con-
stitute parts of the company incorporation and need the increased legal value of the cer-
tified document form. 253 Under the new Codice Civile, which is inapplicable to compa-
nies already incorporated before its entering into force,254 the promoters of the company 
may reserve a percentage of no more than 10% of the net company earnings for a period 
of no longer than 5 years.255 Any other form of an additional beneficiary clause for the 
promoters is illegal. 256 In the second constituent stage at least 50% of the subscribers, or 
their legally appointed representatives/57 meet before the notary, adopt the final version 
of the Instrument of Incorporation and appoint the directors and auditors.258 The aims of 
this Assembly is to ascertain the fulfilment of the conditions for the company's legal 
formation, ratify the constitutive act and the beneficiary regulations concerning the 
promoters, and appoint the directors and auditors. The conditions required for the com-
pany's legal formation and ratified by the Assembly concern the details of capital sub-
scription and the existence of any legal authorisations required by special laws on the 
spese per la costituzione di societa di capitali: considerazioni intorno all' art.2328, n.12, CC" [1988] Gi-
uris.grudenza Commercia/e, pp.874-895. 
2 8 See Trib. Rimini, 11 February 1983, Foro it., 1983, I, 1104; the object cannot be generic: see App. 
Bari, 16 May 1989, Riv. Soc., 1989, 1079; Trib. Udine, 12 June 1982, Foro it., 1982, 1,2620. 
249 It is legal to issue shares carrying a preferential participation in the administration of the company. 
See Trib. Genova, 3 January 1986, La societa, IV, 1986,411. 
250 See Trib. Cassino, 26 April 1989, Riv. Soc., 1989, 1305; App. Torino, 10 February 1984, V. not., 
1985,359. . . . 
251 See Art.2333 CC; also see Cass., 7 August 1963, n.2228, ur.eported; C~s~., 21 ~pnl 1,?83, GlU"~. 
Comm., 1984,380; Firma, "Un esempio di costituzione per pubbhca sottoscnzlone dl s.p.a. [1987] Gl-
urisgrudenza Commercia/e, pp.200-211. 
22 See Trib. Torino, 12 June 1961, Giur. it., 1961, 1,2,811. . ' 
253 This is why subscriptions in the case of capital increased do not need to be authentIcated or SIgned 
before a notary. See Cass., sez. III, 7 August 1963, no 2228, Giust. civ. Mass., 1963, 1.044. 
254 See Cass., sez. I, 29 August 1963, no 2372, Riv. dir. comm., 1964, II, 49; Tnb. Genova, 20 June 
1961, Riv. dir. comm., 1961, II, 444. 
25S See Art.2340 CC; also see Trib. di Roma, 2 November 1972, Temi rom., 1973,433. 256 
See Art.2431 CC. . . d t of a re resen-
257 For the legal appointment of such representatives an authentIcated pnvate ocumen v.p 
. . S A M'lano 17 November 1961, Ita not., tattoo contract signed before any notary IS necessary. ee· pp. I , 
1962,439; Foro pad., 1962, 1,228; Foro it., 1962,1,787. 258 See Arts.2334 and 2335 CC. 
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fonnation of companies undertaking certain types of activity, such as banking.259 When 
ratifying the Instrument of Incorporation the Assembly must, in principle, ensure that it 
contains all the details required by law and that all details are correct. However, it is 
widely accepted that shareholders must check the legality not only of the Instrument but 
also of the Constitutive Act.260 Administrators cannot be appointed for a period exceed-
ing three years.261 The board of auditors, the body which the law entrusts with the duty 
of supervising the activities of the board of directors/62 consists of three or five mem-
bers, shareholders or not. 263 The mere nomination of the auditors without their express 
appointment by the Assembly does not constitute a fault in the formation procedure.264 
In both private and public SUbscription the formation of the company is legal if 
four basic conditions are met. First, the equity capital must be fully subscribed. Cur-
rently, the minimum capital must be Li200,000,000, a sum often accused for lack of 
touch with modem commercial practice.265 Second, three-tenths of the capital must be 
deposited with a bank.266 Third, the company must acquire an authorisation from the 
Treasury if its capital exceeds Lil 0,000,000,000.267 Fourth, after a relevant court deci-
sion on the basis of a favourable opinion of the Public Prosecutor on the company's 
compliance with the requirements of the law concerning its legal formation, the com-
pany must register in the Register of Enterprises with the clerk's office of the tribunal of 
its social seat. Only after this registration does the company acquire a legal personal-
ity.268 It is the responsibility of the notary conducting the company formation to ensure 
that the Constitutive Act is submitted to the registry within thirty days from its re-
ceipt. 269 This publicity requirement is mandatory and any clause within the Act relieving 
the notary from such an obligation "does not produce legal effect".270 The obligation of 
259 See Art.2329 CC. It must be noted that for the formation of credit institutions three tens of the sub-
scriptions must be deposited in cash. Lack of this condition leads to the company's illegal formation. See 
Cass., sez. 111,21 April 1983, no 2745, Mass. dec. civ., 427.658; also see Cass., sez. III, 26 October 1962, 
no 3036, Vita not., 1964,282. 
260 See App. Firenze, 16 January 1967, Riv. not., 1967, 113. 261 See Art.2383 CC. 
262 See, P. Verrucoli, op.cit., p.IIO. 263 See Art.2397 CC. 
264 See App. Cagliari, 26 September 1958, Rass. giur. sarda, 1959, 724. . . . 
265 See Art. 1 I of Law 904 of 16 December 1977; for a critique of the law and the m Immum capital re-
quired, see App. Napoli, 12 October 1984, Dir. giust., 1985, 170, note Santoni. . 
266 See Art.2329 (2)CC and Art.251 disp. trans. as amended. by Art.36, d.p.r. no 3?/l?86 which ref;;~ 
exclusively to the Bank of Italy; also see Trib. Treviso, 9 December 1982, Le. s~cleta, VI, 1983: 7 , 
however, see contra for non-credit institutions Trib. Udine, 21 June 1982, Le soclela,. III, 1983, 353, App. 
Venezia, 23 May 1981, Foro it., 1982, I, 258; App. Milano, 2 December 1964, Foro 11.,1965, I, 560. 
267 See Art.21, Law no 281 of 4 June 1985. 
268 See F. di Sabato, op.cil., p.240. '. I I) 79 
269 See Art.2330 CC; also see F. Galgano, Diritto Civile e Commerclale (1994, CEDAM, ta y ,p. . 
270 See Trib. Cassino, 29 April 1992, Foro il., 1992, I, 3199, note Morera. 
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the notary is to achieve the company's ratification by the tribunal of location of the 
company's true social seat, not to achieve its registration.271 This is the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the administrators/72 who must apply for registration within fifteen days 
from the day of the company's constitution.273 The legitimacy of such strict publication 
and ratification requirements for the formation of a public limited company derives 
from the old Italian legal requirement for the recognition of all, foreign and domestic 
legal entities, by the judicial authorities.274 After the company's constitution and before 
its ratification by the Italian judicial authorities, a copy of its Instrument of Incorpora-
tion must also be deposited in the Chamber of Commerce of the company's social seae7S 
and published in the Official Bulletin of public and private limited companies.276 
E. EVALUATION OF GREEK, FRENCH AND IT ALlAN LAW 
The definitions of the concepts of branch, agency and subsidiary seem to be very similar 
in the three selected countries. An agency is a representation office with the additional 
characteristic of permanence. A branch is a relatively autonomous, permanent secon-
dary unit with its own clientele and sphere of activity in the host country. A subsidiary, 
the only unit with legal personality separate from the parent company, is an independent 
legal entity which is legally or financially controlled by the parent company. The na-
tional definitions of all three concepts are in absolute harmony with EC law. Even the 
permanence requirement, so clearly and expressly introduced by EC law as the distin-
guishing factor between establishment and provisions of services, also exists in the three 
countries as the qualifying factor of secondary establishment within their boundaries. 
Greek company law introduces three basic forms of secondary establishment for 
foreign public companies limited by shares: branches or agencies, off-shore units and 
subsidiaries. Branches, agencies and off-shore units are subsumed within the legal entity 
of their founding company. Due to their lack of legal personality, they are considered 
foreign and before their legal establishment in Greece must be recognised by Greek law. 
Subsidiaries are ruled by the law of their statutory seat which must be a sincere reflec-
tion of its true seat. The procedure stipulated for the establishment of branches, agencies 
271 Pret. Alexandria, 29 April 1981, Giur. comm., 1983, II, 809, note D' Amico. 
272 See App. Milano, 10 May 1961, Temi, 1962, 173, note Candian. . 
273 See Casso pen., sez. III, 13 January 1964, Giur. it., 1964, II, 338; Casso pen., sez. III, 13 Apnl 1964, 
Giust. pen., 1964, II, 998. . . .. I 
274 See C. Angelici, "Societa per azioni e in accomandita per azioni" in EnciclopedlQ d, dmtlo: Vo. 
XLII (1990, Giuffre, Milano), pp.977-1 042, at 1030. . 
27S See F. Martinelli, op.cit., p.19. 
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and off-shore units is fairly simple and brief. Essentially what is required by the law is 
the submission of a legal document, including details on the parent company and the 
branch representatives. The establishment is ratified by the Greek Commerce Minister 
and published in the Government Gazette. Under Greek standards, this procedure is 
quite simple and relatively free of bureaucracy. The exemption of foreign companies 
from the bureaucratic formation procedure imposed on Greek companies and the fa-
vourable status awarded to foreign companies reflects the clear aim of the legislator to 
attract foreign companies. Thus, the procedure itself does not pose obstacles to the 
companies' freedom of establishment in Greece. 
One stage in this procedure is worthy of special comment, namely the require-
ment for ratification of the establishment of a branch or agency by the Greek Minister of 
Commerce. This seemingly harmless administrative requirement can be used by a male 
fide official as the basis for a legal, under Greek law, prohibition of establishment. This, 
if imposed in a discriminatory manner, would indirectly breach the company's freedom 
of establishment. However, Ministerial ratification is also required for the establishment 
of secondary units of Greek companies. Thus, the introduction of this requirement is not 
discriminatory in itself. Moreover, the only area of control allowed to the Ministry is the 
evaluation of the legal completion of the procedure for the valid secondary establish-
ment of the company in Greece and the assessment of the legality of its activities under 
Greek law. This is also the basis for the Minister's decision to allow the secondary es-
tablishment of Greek companies. Thus, even the substance of the ratification require-
ment can not be characterised as an indirect breach of the freedom of establishment. Its 
aim, which clearly is the protection of Greek public order, is tolerated in EC law which 
expressly allows even discriminatory national provisions set for it. 
What seems to be anomalous, however, is the difference in the treatment of sub-
sidiary companies. The conditions set by Greek law for the establishment of Greek sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies form a complicated, time-consuming procedure, which 
can have negative effects on the number of foreign companies wishing to establish in 
Greece. High taxation and the ambiguous Greek regime on the export of company prof-
its imply that the Greek legislator chose to attract the non-incorporated presence of for-
eign companies. The most probable reason for this preference is that due to their lack of 
legal personality the legal and profitable functioning ·of branches, agencies and off-shore 
units is guaranteed by their flourishing parent companies, whereas legally autonomous 
subsidiaries may pose a danger to their creditors. However, this view ignores the fact 
276 See V. Allegri, A. Cerrai et aI., Dirillo Commerciale (1993, Monduzzi, Bologna), p.246. 
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that, in practice, subsidiaries are also financially and organically dependent on their 
(usually successful) parent companies. Having noted the Greek preference for branches 
and agencies as forms of secondary establishment, compliance with EC law must be as-
sessed. The main problem of the procedure introduced for the establishment of subsidi-
aries lies with its complexity and bureaucratic nature. The introduction of such a process 
can be seen as a direct discouragement and therefore an indirect hurdle for the estab-
lishment of foreign subsidiaries in Greece. However, it must be noted that foreign sub-
sidiaries are considered to be companies possessing Greek nationality. Thus, the proce-
dure introduced for their establishment is exactly the same with the one introduced for 
the primary establishment of domestic public companies limited by shares. In that re-
spect this procedure, albeit complex and bureaucratic, does not discriminate against for-
eign public limited companies. Another issue arising here derives from the Greek provi-
sions on the determination and definition of subsidiary companies. The strict Greek 
rules concerning the exact percentage of financial or legal control required for the char-
acterisation of a company as a subsidiary could be used for the limitation of the range of 
controlled companies which may benefit from the freedom of establishment. Such a re-
mark would be unfair, as it is applied in a non-discriminatory manner both on Greek and 
foreign legal entities. Moreover, the relevant Greek provisions were modified in 1986 in 
compliance with Directive 83/349. It can be stated therefore that the Greek administra-
tive requirements for the secondary establishment of foreign public companies limited 
by shares are in absolute compliance with the EU freedom of establishment. 
French law introduces three types of secondary establishment: branches and 
agencies, participation in an already existing French companies and subsidiaries. The 
formation of branches or agencies requires the completion of an administrative proce-
dure before the French commercial courts introduced for the protection of both the con-
stituting company and third parties wishing to deal with the company through the 
branch or agency. This procedure consists of a judicial stage, namely ratification of the 
company's establishment within France, and an administrative stage, namely publica-
tion requirements. The question is, whether this procedure is in compliance with EC 
law. Admittedly, French branches or agencies do not have a ratification obligation when 
establishing in France. Thus, the relevant requirement is imposed on foreign companies 
in a discriminatory manner. However, it would be difficult to deny that the judicial con-
trol of the legal submission of all required documents by the French judicial authorities, 
and especially the submission of details concerning the main establishment, the branch 
and its directors, serves public interest. The que~tion is, which is the purpose of such 
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proceedings and the extent of control that French authorities have in deciding whether 
to ratify the companies' establishment. From the text of the law it becomes clear that the 
only purpose for this procedure and the only role of French courts in it is to evaluate 
whether all steps for the legal completion of the required proceedings have been taken. 
Thus, the procedure cannot serve as an indirect hurdle to establishment in France. 
With reference to publication requirements, these are deemed necessary primar-
ily for the protection of third parties that, having entered into contract with the company 
through the branch or having claims against the company deriving from the branch's 
operation, may decide to sue the company at the tribunal of the location of the French 
branch. In this case, the full details of the identity (residence and nationality) of the 
branch's or agency's director are crucial for the legal submission of the relevant writ 
and the execution of the judgement against the branch or agency. The need for such 
protection, introduced for the benefit of the public of the host country and the company 
itself, was acknowledged by the EU in the eleventh Directive of 21 December 1989.277 
In fact, the French publication requirements are a direct result of the transposition of the 
Directive into French law. Thus, the administrative procedure for the formation of sec-
ondary units of foreign companies in France is in compliance with Ee law and do not 
hinder their expansion there. 
Participation in an already existing French company requires no administrative 
procedure for foreign EU nationals, but awards very little control over the company's 
direction and administration. The minimal administrative and substantive obligations 
imposed on companies wishing to establish in France via participations, the independ-
ence of the French unit for the purposes of insolvency and the relevant favourable re-
gime introduced for foreign companies renders this form of establishment quite attrac-
tive. However, its obvious disadvantage is the lack of any control over the investment of 
the foreign unit in France. Due to the relatively small percentage of shares or capital 
owned by the foreign company, any attempt to participate in the direction, administra-
tion or decision-making process of the French unit would not be successful. These dis-
advantages are inherent to the type of investment, rather than to the French law on the 
establishment of foreign companies in France. In fact, the obligations and restrictions 
imposed upon foreign companies are not only the same, but much lighter than those im-
posed on French companies. It would therefore be unfair to state that the relevant 
French legislation mayor does act as an addition burden, namely a form of indirect hin-
drance, for the secondary establishment of foreign EU companies in France. 
122 
Should a company opt for control over its investment in France, subsidiaries are 
the best solution. They combine a degree of autonomy deriving from their separate legal 
personality with a degree of financial or administrative control from the principal unit. 
Subsidiaries are considered French companies, hence their formation follows the rules 
for the incorporation of a French SA. Their creation takes place at the end of a long ad-
ministrative procedure which, albeit bureaucratic and time-consuming, is not discrimi-
natory against foreign subsidiaries. Thus, French law on the formal requirements for the 
secondary establishment of foreign ED companies is in compliance with EC law. The 
conditions for the establishment of subsidiaries in France by foreign companies are ex-
actly the same as those imposed to domestic companies. Therefore, this form of estab-
lishment does not suffer from breaches of the freedom of establishment. 
For the final evaluation of French law on secondary establishment, reference to 
the French provisions on foreign direct investments, which is applicable to all three 
forms of secondary establishment in France, is necessary. Direct investments are de-
fined as the creation of an extension, purchase or acquisition of branches or agencies or 
any personal company, or any other operation which leads to the control or acquisition 
of any commercial, industrial, financial, real estate or agricultural company. 278 Partici-
pation in an already existing foreign company through placement of capital constitutes 
such a direct investment if it amounts to more than 20% of the company's capital, 
whereas contributions of less than 10% are considered mere placements of capital and 
do not fall within the scope of either the law on participation or on direct investments.279 
This signifies that the creation of a subsidiary, where company control is a definitive 
characteristic, is always a direct investment in France. The establishment of branches or 
agencies is expressly characterised as a direct investment.28o The result of the characteri-
sation of an action as direct investment by foreign national, natural or legal persons, is 
the obligation to obtain prior authorisation for the investment by the Minister of Econ-
omy, Finance and Budget. This could indicate some form of state control over the es-
tablishment of foreign companies in France, which could lead to a violation of EC pro-
visions. However, ED nationals are exempted from this obligation.28I This exemption, 
277 See 11th Directive of21 December 1989, no 89/666, JOCE., L. 395, 30 December 1989. 
278 See Lamy, Lamy Socitites Commerciales (1994, Lamy, Paris), p.954; also see Arts. 1-5 of Decree 89-
938 of29 December 1989, as modified by Decree 90-58 of 15 January 1990. 
279 See G. Ripert and R. Roblot, op. cit. , pp.1307-1308. 
280 See Decree 89-938 of 29 December 1989 as modified by Art. 1 of Decree 90-58 of 15 January 1990 
and supplemented by the Circulaire of 28 December 1990, JO, 1 January 1991. . . .. n 
281 See Decree 94-658 of 27 July 1994. Exemptions are awarded by the same MIniStry wlthm fiftee 
days from the submission of the relevant application. 
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introduced only recently, lifts the last administrative hurdle for free company establish-
ment in France, at least from a formal point of view. 
Of the three selected countries Italy seems to be the one with the least complex 
legislation on the establishment of foreign companies. This simplicity is reflected in the 
lack of a distinction between branches and agencies. Both types of establishment con-
stitute secondary seats and are regulated in an identical manner. The issue is not of par-
ticular practical importance. In Greece and France the distinction is of theoretical value , 
since the establishment of branches and agencies is regulated in an indistinguishable 
manner. What is important for EC law is that the permanence requirement for all types 
of secondary seats does exist in Italian law. Thus, the concept of secondary establish-
ment in the Italian legal system does not differ from the EC notion, where permanence 
is the main distinguishing factor between establishment and provision of services. 
The procedure for the establishment of secondary seats in Italy is quite simple as 
it consists of the publication of certain company details in the company registry. The 
relevant Italian provisions were modified in compliance with Directive 89/666. The 
prevailing view in academic opinion and jurisprudence is that the ratification of the 
company's establishment in Italy by the tribunal of the location of the secondary seat is 
not required. However, the matter is still under debate. The question is, whether the ba-
sis of the argument for the need for ratification is the intent to introduce an indirect hur-
dle to the establishment of foreign companies in Italy. The same debate refers to the es-
tablishment of secondary seats from domestic companies. The heart of the debate lies in 
the legal nature of the creation of a secondary unit. Should this be considered a matter 
of importance for the functioning of the whole company, the formation of a secondary 
seat would require the modification of the company's statutes. This would then require 
ratification by the tribunal of the location of the company's social seat. However, the 
formation of secondary seats does not fall within the scope of the law on statute modifi-
cation. Thus, ratification is not required. Even the supporters of the need for ratification 
do not wish to impose it as a means of hindering the free establishment of foreign com-
panies. If this view were to prevail, it would be implemented to foreign and domestic 
companies equally. Thus, even then Italian law would not be discriminatory. 
It is unfortunate that the simplicity of the procedure for the establishment of sec-
ondary seats in Italy is not a characteristic of the procedure required for the creation of 
subsidiaries. The presentation of Italian law on the establishment of subsidiaries indi-
cates that their formation entails a very complex, bureaucratic procedure of multiple 
administrative requirements. The complexity in the formation of subsidiaries character-
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ises not only Italian, but also Greek and French, law. What differs here is the require-
ment for an official judicial ratification of the constitutive acts and the demand for judi-
cial authorisation of the company's formation. This last condition could indicate the in-
tention of the Italian legislator to limit the establishment of subsidiaries in Italy and 
could give ground to selective scrutiny by the Italian administrative authorises in the 
benefit of domestic companies and against foreign ones. However, the same procedure 
applies to all, domestic and foreign, companies. Thus, the imposition of such a require-
ment for the establishment of subsidiaries of foreign companies in Italy cannot be con-
sidered discriminatory and is in compliance with EC law. Moreover, the nature of the 
authorisation, which is based on the legality of the procedure followed for the com-
pany's constitution and does not extend to its nature, activity or general status, indicates 
that the aim of the relevant Italian provision is to ensure that Italian subsidiaries are le-
gally formed for the protection of the public entering into transactions with such com-
panies and not to indirectly prevent certain companies from establishing in Italy. 
The assessment stemming from the presentation, analysis and evaluation of 
Greek, French and Italian law on the secondary establishment of foreign EU companies 
is that they do comply with EC law. The administrative requirements for the establish-
ment of branches or agencies are minimal and mainly consist of the obligation to publi-
cise the intention to expand within the three countries and to specify the exact nature of 
the relationship of the new unit with the main company seat. This procedure, set for the 
protection of the companies and the public of the host state, is legal under EC law and 
necessary on the basis of Directive 89/666. Insofar as subsidiaries are concerned, all 
three national laws introduce a fairly complex, bureaucratic, time and resources-
consuming procedure. This could be interpreted to reflect the intention of the national 
legislators to discourage foreign companies from expanding within Greece, France and 
Italy through the formation of a subsidiary. However, subsidiaries of foreign companies 
have ab dejinitio their true social seat within the host state and in countries following 
the doctrine of the true social seat, such as all three selected states, are considered do-
mestic companies. Thus, the regulations concerning the formation of subsidiaries in 
Greece, France and Italy, albeit detailed and demanding to the point of frustration, are 
not implemented in a discriminatory manner. Consequently, they do not clash with EC 
law on the companies' freedom of establishment. 
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CHAPTERS 
Substantive Conditions for the 
Establishment of Foreign Companies in 
France, Italy and Greece 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to establish that, despite the long period of consid-
erable effort and movement towards integration,l breaches of the freedom of establish-
ment of foreign public companies limited by shares still occur. Chapters 3 and 4 proved 
that the formal and procedural preconditions for recognition and secondary establish-
ment in the three selected countries comply with the EU freedom of establishment. 
However, the mere provision of the opportunity to establish under a non-discriminatory 
administrative and legal regime, albeit important, does not suffice for the realisation of 
the freedom. Although, admittedly, this constitutes the first step to free establishment, 
the setting-up of secondary commercial units really is the mere foundation of the forum 
from which the right to establishment may be exercised. The realisation of the substance 
of this right, the practical exercise of its content, has not yet been examined. 
The analysis of the right of foreign public limited companies to set up a secon-
dary unit within the three selected countries would be incomplete without a study of the 
French, Italian and Greek legislation on the substantive conditions for their secondary 
establishment. The second element of the freedom (along with the company's durable 
physical presence within a Member State other than the state of origin) is economic 
activity within the host state to an extent allowing the company's integration to the na-
1 For a report on the effort of the Commission to abolish violations in the field of the Single Market, see 
European Commission, "Impact and Effectiveness of the Single Market", Single Markel News, no 6, 
January 1997; European Commission, "Action plan sets agenda", Single Markel News, no 8, July 1997; 
European Commission, "Strengths and weaknesses of the Single Market", Single Mark~1 ~ew~, n~ 10, 
December 1997; European Commission, "Progress n implementing Single Market legislation , Smgle 
Markel News, no 15, December 1998. 
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tional economy of the host state. The right of foreign public limited companies to fonn 
secondary establishments within the three selected countries and their recognition as 
legal entities under the conditions imposed to equivalent domestic units would lack 
substance and practical value, if these secondary units were prevented from exercising 
their right to establishment.2 This could be the result of special national laws limiting 
the exercise of the company's chosen activity to domestic persons, or allowing it under 
conditions deemed discriminatory on the basis of the company's nationality. The main 
aim of Chapter 5 is to asses whether the national administrative and legislative require-
ments for the exercise of commercial activity comply with EC law. In other words, 
whether the substantive conditions for the secondary establishment of foreign compa-
nies in France, Italy and Greece are equally liberal as the formal conditions, or whether 
the tolerant regime of establishment is limited to these areas of law which do not ad-
versely affect domestic companies. 
This examination will be carried out by selecting case-studies from these coun-
tries where breaches of EC law have occurred. For the selection of the violations to be 
used as case-studies, the wide field of application of the freedom of establishment rati-
one materiae has been taken into account. Since the broad application of the non-
discrimination principle of Art. 12 applies to all independent activities and services that 
can be characterised as financial and commercial, the companies' freedom of establish-
ment covers all possible types of financial and commercial independent activities and all 
sectors of economic life, irrespective of their express subjection to Arts.43-48 via sec-
ondary legislative texts. As concluded in Chapter 2, for legal persons in specific the 
freedom covers all aspects of their functioning, administration and management. In 
view of this, any restrictions on the type of business pursued by foreign companies, any 
obligation to obtain government consent before establishing in the receiving state, or 
even a requirement of residence for the natural persons that participate in the company 
are strictly illegal under EC law. Thus, breaches selected as case-studies in this chapter 
include limitations on the setting-up of coaching schools in Greece; restrictions on the 
activity of dealing in transferable securities by companies registered in Italy; and limi-
tations to companies dealing in crude oil and petroleum products in Greece. 
The freedom of establishment also covers corollary activities of the above, 
namely activities which are of assistance in the pursuit of a liberalised occupation or 
company activity, such as limitations to the free movement of capital, or restrictions to 
the choice of employees of the foreign company based on their nationality. Thus, 
2 See T. Ballarino, Lineamenti di dirillo comunilario (1992, CEDAM, Milano), pp.298-299. 
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breaches of the freedom of establishment selected for presentation include restrictions 
on the denomination and type of company dealing with transferable securities in Italy; 
on the denomination of private coaching schools in Greece; on the nationality of tourist 
guides in France, Italy and Greece; on commercial agents in Italy and France; on the 
recognition of diplomas for certain professions in France, Italy and Greece; and on the 
import and export of capital in Greece. With reference to the violation on the nationality 
of tourist guides, it is noted that the distinction between establishment and provision of 
services does not lie with the nature of the activities exercised, but with the nature and 
extent of the activities themselves. Although the relevant ECJ judgements refer to 
breaches of the freedom to provide services, the same factual circumstances constitute 
violations of the freedom of establishment, should the activity in question be conducted 
on a permanent, rather than a temporary, basis and be primarily directed to the market 
of the receiving state. Moreover, since the freedom of establishment also applies to 
maritime companies, ED Member States must guarantee "equality of treatment between 
enterprises and means of transport on the one hand and users on the other" along with 
"freedom of action for the enterprises in fixing rates and in access to the various trans-
port markets".3 Therefore, Greek and French breaches on the nationality of ships as well 
as the French, Italian and Greek legal regime on cabotage are also analysed. 
In the course of the research for this chapter, it became obvious that the existing 
violations of the companies' freedom of establishment tend to appear in clusters of per-
sistent breaches of EC law referring to similar fields of commercial activity. Although it 
was initially thought that the best methodological approach to the topic would be to 
present each violation separately in a sub-chapter referring to each of the selected coun-
tries, the findings of the research led to the modification of the methodological structure 
selected initially. Thus, the examination of the selected violations will be presented by 
reference to the area of commercial activity restricted, directly or indirectly, for foreign 
companies through prohibiting national legislative measures in some or all of the three 
selected countries. In order to facilitate the reader to follow the conclusions of this 
chapter, such clusters of violations are presented by reference to their directness and 
subdivided on the basis of their purity. For the purposes of this chapter, direct are viola-
tions deriving from national legislation explicitly restricting an activity to domestic per-
sons, whereas indirect are violations resulting from the application of seemingly non-
restrictive national legislation. Pure are violations deriving from breaches referring ex-
clusively to the freedom of establishment, whereas disguised violations are mere secon-
3 See Straus, op. cit., p.40. 
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dary results of breaches of basically other provisions of the Treaties. The selection of 
areas of violation was made on the basis of the number of breaches of EC law declared 
as such by the ECl and referring to each particular sector of activity, the persistence of 
the breaches evident by subsequent ECl judgements and the priority awarded to the 
final implementation of the relevant provisions of EC law on the specific cluster of 
breaches by the European Commission. 
The national laws chosen for presentation have already been declared illegal 
under EC law by the ECl. Since the second main aim of this chapter is to assess the best 
way under which companies which suffered damages as a result of breaches of EC law 
may successfully achieve compensation, it was thought that already declared violations 
would be the ideal basis of claims for compensation at the national and EU levels. Thus, 
there is at least one declared violation in each area of activity described. However, in an 
attempt to demonstrate that additional breaches of EC law occur, more violations, either 
yet unidentified or not yet brought before the ECl, are also analysed. It must be noted 
that, although most Member States (amongst which the three selected countries) follow 
the civil law tradition, which allows even undeclared violations to constitute the legal 
basis for claims of compensation allowing the court to evaluate the existence of such a 
breach as a preliminary matter within the framework of the civil trial on the award of 
compensation, the national procedural rules within some Member States (such as the 
UK) are not equally accommodating. 
B. DIRECT VIOLATIONS 
Bl. The Establishment of Private Coaching Schools in Greece 
The only direct violation of the companies' freedom of establishment revealed in the 
course of the research for this chapter, which constitutes one of the most obvious viola-
tions of the companies' freedom of establishment, concerns the establ ishment of pri vate 
coaching schools in Greece. This breach was selected for presentation here on the basis 
of its directness, purity and seemingly unusual persistency. Indeed, although several 
judgements of the Eel have been reached on this area of law, the establishment, ad-
ministration and teaching in such schools continues to be one of the activities consid-
ered a privilege reserved for Greek nationals. Art.68 of Emergency Law 2545/1940 
regulates that the setting-up of a "frontistirion" is subject to authorisation from the 
Ministry of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs. This authorisation is issued to persons 
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who possess the qualifications required for the post of public service as a teacher under 
the state education system. Under Article 18 of the Public Service Code one of these 
qualifications is Greek nationality. Thus, foreign companies wishing to establish in 
Greece coaching schools providing instruction in foreign languages are prevented from 
doing so on the basis of lack of Greek nationality. 
Private vocational schools which do not fall within the field of application of 
this law are, in theory, excluded from the restrictive regulations concerning the nation-
ality of the natural or legal persons wishing to exercise coaching activities in Greece. 
However, even this activity is preserved to Greek nationals under the relevant Decrees 
of 9 October 1935 and of 27 October/8 November 1972. These two decrees are still in 
force, even though Law 576/77 which expressly introduced a relevant prohibition for 
all, Greek and foreign, private natural and legal persons, has been repealed by Law 
1404/83, albeit partially.4 Even private tuition at home, which by nature is not covered 
by Law 2545/1940, as it is not undertaken in organised groups, is limited to Greek na-
tionals under the Public Service Code. A special provision applies to teachers of foreign 
language coaching schools. Decree no 4508/1976 of the Minister of Education and Ec-
clesiastical Affairs allows the employment of a ratio of foreign teachers, which is set at 
one foreign national to five Greek nationals. 
In order to evaluate the extent of the field of application of this Emergency Law 
one must take into account the definition of a coaching school, called a "frontistirion" in 
Greek. Under Article 63 of Emergency Law 254511940 a "frontistirion" is defined as an 
organisation which offers, in the same place and on a weekly basis, courses for groups 
of no more than five persons or, regardless of the composition of the groups, of no more 
than ten persons, which have as their purpose either to supplement and consolidate in-
struction forming part of the curriculum for primary, secondary and higher education, or 
to teach foreign languages, music, dance or general education in no less than three hours 
daily per group consisting of the same persons. This includes instruction in shorthand 
and typing, commercial correspondence, accounting and word-processing, as well as 
assistance in the preparation of students for national examinations (the UK equivalent to 
GCE examinations) for registration to University. The field of application of the Law 
also covers teaching at University level, since private Universities and/or US-styled 
Liberal Arts Colleges are only recognised as post-secondary education institutions 
awarding diplomas (not degrees) in Greece. 
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Insofar as foreign companies are concerned, Article 68(1) of Emergency Law 
2545/1940 introduces authorisation to set up a "frontistirion" of any kind to natural per-
sons only. However, by Decision no 1583791A11025 of 4 November 1967 of the Min-
ister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs, which was confirmed by Emergency Law 
284/1968, legal persons may set up coaching institutions, as long as they provide in-
struction in foreign languages. Moreover, according to Art.2(1) of Royal Decree 6581 
1972, which as subsequent to Emergency Law 2545/1940 prevails when in clash with 
the provisions of the Law, authorisation to set up private vocational schools of a secon-
dary level or below may be awarded to legal persons, provided that they have Greek 
nationality. Art.2( I) of Presidential Decree no 45711983 provides that authorisation for 
the establishment and administration of music and dance schools must be awarded ex-
clusively to Greek natural persons and legal persons where the majority of the admini-
stration is in the hands of Greek nationals. It seems therefore that foreign companies are 
affected by the restrictive Greek legislation on education in the areas of foreign lan-
guage tuition, vocational courses at or below secondary level, as well as dance and mu-
sic schools. Under Art. 1 0 CC, analysed in Chapter 3, companies are considered foreign 
in Greece when their true seat, namely the place where the administration and decision-
making really takes place, is located outside the boundaries of the Greek state. 
The provision of instruction at the post-secondary level applies equally to for-
eign and Greek private natural and legal persons. In fact, even after the repeal of Law 
576/1977 on the prohibition of the provision of vocational and technical training at post-
secondary level, these activities are restricted to all private entities, both Greek and for-
eign, on the basis of Art. 16(7) of the Constitution according to which "vocational train-
ing shall be provided by the State". This legal regime, which was clarified and re-
affirmed by Art.48 of Law 1268/1982 and Law 1404/83, was held constitutional by the 
Greek Council of the State, the highest administrative court. This provision, as non-
discriminatory, does not constitute a violation of Ee law. However, all restrictions in 
the area of education and especially -for the purposes of this thesis- prohibitions on the 
setting-up, administration and teaching in private "frontistiria" of foreign languages or 
vocational and technical training at a secondary level or below, are discriminatory. 
These prohibitions severely limit the freedom of establishment of foreign companies 
wishing to exercise such activities in Greece and they "therefore breach Art.43 directly. 
4 In case 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 1637, at 1644: Y. Galmot, ~e J~dge~ 
Rapporteur, expressed the legally valid opinion that the I?w was ~e~ea,l,ed "only With regard to e ucatlOna 
establishments which provide higher technical and vocatIonal trammg . 
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Although even the Greek state accepts this position, it has always argued that the 
relevant national legislation does not constitute a violation of Arts.39, 43 and 49. The 
two main justifications for maintaining this legislation have been that the establishment 
of private institutes should be excluded from the application of the Treaty as an activity 
related to public authority and that in practice Greek authorities avoid its enforcement 
and do pennit the establishment of foreign educational companies. Indeed, Greece has 
often argued that the existing restrictions in the area of education are justified by refer-
ence to Article 16(2) of the Greek Constitution according to which the provision of in-
struction is a "fundamental duty" of the Greek state which is connected with the exer-
cise of official authority and includes the objective of developing the national con-
sciousness of Greeks and ensuring the free and responsible exercise of the rights and 
obligations deriving from the Greek citizenship.s Thus, it is alleged that teaching or 
administering such educational establishments falls within the scope of "public author-
ity" which, under Art.45, constitutes an exemption to Arts.39, 43 and 49. 
However, the analysis of this provision in Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the 
definition and detennination of "public authority" is to be interpreted very narrowly.6 It 
would be difficult to dismiss the Greek arguments in the case of teaching of specialised 
subjects, such as "The Behaviour of a Greek Citizen" or even "Greek Civilisation" by 
foreign nationals, who may lack the substantive qualifications for such instruction. It is 
equally difficult, however, to comprehend how instruction in dance, music, foreign lan-
guages and technical or vocational courses may provide a better understanding of the 
rights and obligations deriving from Greek citizenship and the content of Greek con-
sciousness. If anything, teachers of foreign languages do the absolute opposite, namely 
in addition to language they also provide instruction in the culture and consciousness of 
foreign nations. Thus, this Greek argument lacks legal standing. Equally, the argument 
of the Hellenic Republic that in practice foreign citizens are not prevented from estab-
lishing in Greece is not only irrelevant but also untrue, as will be proven below. The 
EeJ has consistently held that administrative practices which, by nature, are alterable do 
not suffice as proper fulfilment of the Member States' obligations under EC law.' 
Therefore, the Greek legislation on "frontistiria", private music and dancing 
schools, and private tuition at home breaches the companies' freedom of establishment 
S See case 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic ECR (1988] 1637, at 1642. . 
6 See case 2174 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631; also see case 149179 Comm~ssion v Belg~um 
[1980] ECR 3881 and [1982] ECR 1845; also see M.-F. Sc~i?t, "Lib~rte d'etabhssement et hbre 
prestation de services" in Joly Communautaire( 1996, GLN Joly Editions, Pans), at 20. 
, See case 236/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 3989. 
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both directly, through prohibitions in the setting-up of "frontistiria", and indirectly, 
through restrictions in their administration and staffing. This was expressly declared by 
the ECJ in infringement proceedings brought against Greece by the Commission under 
Art.226.
8 It is noteworthy that this ECJ judgement was contested in three instances by 
the Panhellenic Federation of Owners of Foreign Languages Institutes (POIFXG), the 
Panhellenic Association of Owners of Foreign Languages Institutes (PALSO) and the 
Panhellenic Association of Owners of Private Technical, Professional and Maritime 
Educational Units (PSIITENSM) on the grounds that the breach held by the ECJ refers 
exclusively to instruction through private tuition at home for the first two applications, 
or exclusively to coaching schools of foreign languages for the applicants of the third 
application.9 All three applications for third party proceedings were not examined in 
substance by the ECJ, which considered them all inadmissible. 10 
In fact, the initiation of third party proceedings was the argument put forward by 
the Greek state in an attempt to justify its delay to comply with the ECJ judgement in 
new proceedings under Art.228 brought against it by the Commission in 1990. In that 
case Greece argued that its compliance, albeit extremely difficult due to the long period 
of time during which the relevant laws had been into force, was imminent via two 
Presidential Decrees, one permitting nationals of other Member States to set up music 
and dancing schools and another permitting the setting-up of "frontistiria" by nationals 
of other Member States. II The ECJ considered the Greek arguments irrelevant and the 
alleged Greek attempt to comply with its Treaty obligations inadequate. After this 
judgement Greece passed Presidential Decree 21111994 of 10 August 1994 aiming to 
abolish all relevant forms of discrimination on the ground of nationality and allowing 
EU nationals to set up "frontistiria" under the same conditions as Greek nationals, 
namely on production of the certificate imposed by Article 14 (10) of Law 1566/1985. 
This law introduces the obligation of all non-Greek nationals to produce a certificate 
attesting that they speak Greek fluently and that they have a knowledge of Greek his-
tory. This certificate is obtained by examination at the Ministry of Educational and Ec-
8 See case 147/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637. 
9 See cases C-147/86 TO 1 Panhellinia Omospondia Idioktiton Frontistirion Xenon Glosson (POIFXG) 
and Others v Hellenic Republic and Commission [1989] ECR 4103; case C-147/86 TO 2 P~nhe//ini~s 
Syndesmos Idioktiton Frontistirion Xenon Glosson (PALSO) and Antonios Trechas v ~ell~mc Re!,u.bllc 
and Commission [1989] ECR 4111; case C-147/86 TO 3 Panhe/Jenios Syndesmos Idl~ktlton Idl.otlkon 
Technikon Epangelmatikon ke Naftikon Scholikon Monadon (PSIITENSM) v Hellemc Republic and 
Commission [1989] ECR 4119. d 
10 For a commentary on these cases see V. Christianos, "Commentary on cases C-147/86 TO 1,2 an 
3" [1990] Receuil Dalloz Sirey, pp. Jur. 381-385; also see S. Denys, "Commentary on cases C-147/86 
TO 1,2 and 3" (1993) Journal de droit international, pp.393-395. 
II See case C-328/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR 1-425, at 1-428-429. 
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clesiastical Affairs. In 19 March 1997 the European Court of Human Rights heard the 
case of two UK citizens, Mr and Mrs Hornsby, living on the island of Rhodes whose 
numerous applications since 1984 to set up a school of English have been rejected by 
Greek administrative authorities. Although the judgement of the ECHR is irrelevant for 
the evaluation of the Greek compliance with EC law, it is noteworthy that the ECHR 
remarked on Greece's late implementation of EC law which has caused considerable 
damages to the applicants. 12 The judgement is also important as an undoubtful sign of 
non-compliance with EC law by Greece even after the two relevant ECJ judgements. 
The fact that these breaches are still on-going in Greece, even after the two ECJ 
judgements, is noted by the Commission, which in a fonnal opinion sent to Greece ex-
pressed concern about the discriminatory regime applicable to the establishment of 
"frontistiria" in Greece. 13 On 19 February 1998 and after an infonnal letter by the 
Commission, Greece notified its compliance with the content of the Commission's letter 
via the adoption of a new Decree which limits the need for a certificate to the teachers 
of "frontistiria" and restricts the relevant examinations to tests on their linguistic capac-
ity alone. 14 This seems to settle the matter for the Commission, which follows closely 
the Greek legal regime on the setting-up of private coaching schools in order to ascer-
tain that the relevant violations are indeed a thing of the past. 
Unfortunately, however, another violation of the freedom of establishment in the 
same area of Greek law seems to be taking place. The Commission is worried that the 
obligation of all educational establishments in Greece must have Greek denominations 
limits their right to establishment, as it prevents successful foreign units from exploiting 
their good reputation through the use of the denomination under which they are known 
in their country of origin. As the Greek authorities failed to respond to the Commis-
sion's letter, the matter is in the process of being brought before the ECJ. IS 
The variety of direct and indirect breaches of the freedom of establishment in the 
area of coaching schools in Greece and the Greek persistence to inhibit as much as pos-
sible the participation of foreign companies in this area of economic activity seem to 
justify the Commission's continuing observance of the relevant Greek provisions. From 
the point of view of this analysis, the question is, whether there are any legal reasons 
justifying the Greek reluctance to comply with EC law. The core argument of the Greek 
position in all relevant cases brought before the EC) and all Greek replies to reasoned 
12 See Hornsby v Greece [1997] European Human Rights Reports, vol. 24, pp.250-277, at 277. 
13 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 7, April 1997, p.14. 
14 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 14, October 1998, p.13. 
IS See European Commission, Single Market News, no 7, April 1997, p.15. 
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opinions sent by the Commission has been that, by nature, education does not fall 
within the field of application of Arts.43-48. There is little legal basis to this argument. 
Although the main aim of educational institutions should be the pursuit and dissemina-
tion of knowledge rather than the pursuit of financial profit, activities falling within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment are only required to have the pursuit of profit as 
one, albeit secondary, of its aims. Thus, the establishment of educational units of the 
type defined as coaching schools in Greece clearly falls within the filed of application of 
the freedom of establishment. The question is whether the relevant Greek legislation is, 
directly or indirectly, discriminatory against foreign nationals. It is clear from this pres-
entation that the relevant legislation is applicable exclusively to foreign nationals, thus 
introducing a discriminatory regime for foreign natural and legal persons. It is also clear 
that the aim of the relevant laws, which should be the amelioration of the means under 
which knowledge is disseminated in these schools, is not served by this discrimination, 
which achieves lower, rather than higher, standards of education. Thus, the second ar-
gument of the Greek state, that the relevant laws fall within the scope of one of the ex-
emptions to the freedom introduced by the Treaty, the exercise of public authority, must 
be addressed. Although the argument could probably be considered valid in the case of 
teaching related to the substance of Greek citizenship, it is difficult to see how public 
authority is possibly connected with instruction in dance, music, foreign languages and 
assistance in secondary education. Thus, there is little doubt about the fairness of the 
relevant ECl judgements. There is equally little doubt that Greece seems to persist in its 
breach of the companies' freedom of establishment, albeit indirectly through the intro-
duction of the general obligation of all coaching schools to use Greek denominations. 
c. INDIRECT VIOLATIONS 
Cl. Pure indirect violations 
Ci.i. Dealing in transferable securities in Italy 
An indirect but pure violation of the freedom of establishment, declared by the EeJ, 
refers to restrictions introduced in the dealing of tnmsferable securities in Italy. Under 
Italian Law no 1 of 2 January 1991 16 activities covered by this tenn include dealing for 
. . . tm nt and 
one's own account or the account of others in transferable secuntles; Inves e 
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distribution of transferable securities with or without prior sUbscription or purchase at a 
fixed rate or acceptance of guarantees with respect to the issuer; management of assets 
by means of operations relating to transferable securities; collection of orders for the 
purchase or sale of transferable securities; the provision of advice on transferable secu-
rities; and soliciting savings from the public by actions of a promotional nature. The 
Law prescribes that, in order to pursue legally their activity, security dealers must obtain 
authorisation by the Italian State. This authorisation is awarded exclusively to compa-
nies which are founded in the form of a share company or partnership limited by shares, 
whose registered office is in Italy and whose denomination includes the description 
societa di intermediazione mobiliare. The Law is expressly not applicable to banks and 
finance companies of which at least 90% is controlled by banks under the Decreto Leg-
islativo no 385 of 1 September 1985.17 The core argument supporting the existence of a 
breach of Art.43 in this case is that the Italian Law does not allow the secondary estab-
lishment of foreign public limited companies through branches or agencies in Italy, 
since the legal entities wishing to establish in Italy must, in order to pursue legally their 
activity, create a commercial unit in the form of a company or partnership limited by 
shares registered in Italy. They are obliged to establish a new domestic company, possi-
bly a subsidiary of the main foreign unit. Moreover, there are two further limitations to 
the freedom of establishment set out in the same law, which restricts the choice of form 
and denomination of the new domestic commercial unit. 
The first issue under examination concerns the application of the provisions on 
the freedom of establishment to this area of activity. There is little doubt that the aim of 
companies dealing with transferable securities is the achievement of profit. There is also 
little doubt that the nature of this activity falls within the general area of finance and 
business which, as concluded in Chapter 2, certainly falls within the field of application 
of Arts.43-48. This is clearly demonstrated by the regulation of investment markets in 
the security field and the provisions on the capital adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions through Directives 93/221EEC and 93/6/EEC. 18 It is also reflected in 
the declaration of the need for further regulation in this area of activity included in the 
Commission's White Paper on the implementation of the internal market of 1985.
19 
16 See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 4 January 1991, no 3. 
17 See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 30 September 1993, no 230, Ordinary Supplement. 
18 See OJ 1993 L 141, p.27 and OJ 1993 L 141, p.l accordingly. . I 
19 See European Commission, Commission White Paper addressed to the European CounCil: Comp e-
lion of the Internal Market (June 1985, European Commission, Luxembourg). 
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The next issue to be addressed refers to the legality of the Italian provisions, in 
view of the fact that national provisions may be considered legal, if they are introduced 
in a non-discriminatory manner, are justified by the general interest and are suitable for 
attaining their aim (which, however, may not be the introduction of inequality between 
domestic and foreign companies). It is obvious that the Italian Law in question serves 
little other than the protection of domestic companies through the introduction of ad-
ministrative hurdles to the establishment of foreign companies.20 It is equally evident 
that the protection of the general interest, which is the protection of investors and the 
stability of the capital market, can be served in ways other than the total ban of non-
Italian companies dealing in transferable securities. A suitable, more acceptable, way 
could be the express application of the relevant measures to secondary establishments of 
foreign companies of any type or form and under any denomination.21 
The main argument for the legality of the relevant Italian legislation is that the 
obligation to establish a primary Italian unit of the description introduced by the Law is 
imposed to entities of all nationalities, domestic and foreign. Thus, there is obviously no 
direct discrimination in this case. However, even indirect discrimination may suffice for 
the subjection of a national measure to the prohibition introduced by the primary and 
secondary EC legislation on the freedom of establishment,22 as even provisions applica-
ble without distinction may have restrictive effects.23 Indirect inequity is interpreted 
very widely and includes technical and material discriminatory legal and administrative 
measures. It is clear that the prohibition of establishment through branches or agencies 
imposes on foreign companies the obligation to assume a different nationality, which 
inevitably leads to the duplication of the administrative conditions for access to their 
occupation within Italy and their country of origin.24 This duplication is not required by 
Italian companies which are only requested to establish under the conditions of the Law. 
Thus, the Law on transferable securities is discriminatory against foreign companies. 
However, one additional issue must be analysed, namely the justification of the 
Italian position on the basis of its exemption from the provisions of the Treaty on the 
grounds of public order under Art.46. As concluded in Chapter 2, the exemptions of 
20 Branch offices are seen as 'agile and strong' instruments of foreign comp~nies in Ita~y. See G.F. Bo-
rio, "L'impresa estera in Italia: Ospitalita fiscale cercasi" 17 (1997) CommerclO InternazlOnale, F 817, at 
pJ. 
21 See case C-I01l94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR 1-2691, at 1-2694 and 1-2702. 
22 See J. G. Huglo, "Droit d' etablissement et libre prestation des services" 28 [1992} RTDE, pp.687-
711, at 690. . 
23 See case C-340/89 V/assopoulou [1991] ECR 1-2357,. par.1; also see case C-I04/91 Aguirre Borrell 
and Others [1992] ECR 1-3003, pars.5 and 7. . 
24 See case C-I01l94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR 1-2691, at 1-2701. 
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public policy, public order and public security introduced by Art.46 must be interpreted 
narrowly and relate exclusively to provisions which have discriminatory effect for a 
clearly defined and strictly limited purpose.2S Discriminatory provisions are therefore 
compatible with EC law only if they are justified by imperative reasons of public inter-
est, and are suitable and necessary for attaining the aim pursued, that is proportionate26 
and indispensable for the achievement of the aim of the law.27 However, the total ban of 
foreign companies in the field of transferable securities cannot possibly be considered 
proportionate for the achievement of transparency and security in the relevant transac-
tions or for the protection of the companies' customers. This aim could have been 
equally successfully achieved with the provision of equivalence for administrative con-
ditions already complied with in the companies' state of origin.28 Thus, the restrictive 
Italian provisions on the setting-up of foreign companies dealing in transferable securi-
ties can not be justified by reference to Art.46 and is in breach of Art.43. 
The same rationale and the same conclusions apply to the restrictions on the 
type and denomination of the companies dealing with transferable securities. These are 
covered by the provisions on the freedom of establishment, since they fall within the 
general classification of aspects of the functioning, administration and management of 
companies. These provisions are indirectly discriminatory against foreign companies 
which, again, must duplicate the conditions for their establishment in order to gain ac-
cess to their occupation. These conditions are not justified by reference to public order 
as they are disproportionate to the aim of the provisions, which is the protection of the 
market and the security of the relevant transactions. Thus, even these two Italian clauses 
constitute violations of the freedom of establishment and must be abolished. This was 
the conclusion reached by the ECJ in its judgement of 6 June 1996, where it also de-
clared that these provisions clash with the freedom of foreign companies to provide 
services in Italy under Art.49.29 Unfortunately, the Italian government has failed to 
modify this legal text in compliance with EC law and the relevant ECJ judgement, thus 
allowing the continuing violation of the companies' freedom of establishment. 
2S See R. Quadri, R. Monaco and A. Trabucchi, Trattato Instflulivo della CEE (1965, Milano, Giuffre), 
p.435. 6 
26 See C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR 1-1663, par.32; also see case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-41 5, 
par.37. 
27 See case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, par.15. 
28 See case C-I0I/94 Commission v Ilaly [1996] ECR 1-2691, at 1-2707. 
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Cl.2. Companies dealing in crude oil and petroleum products in Greece 
The area of Greek law referred to here is quite complex and has been the subject of 
lengthy negotiations, which led to private agreements between the Greek state and some 
private enterprises30 and to numerous reasoned opinions from the Commission in a vari-
ety of specific topics. From the point of view of the Commission and the ECl)1 the main 
area of interest so far has been the extensively restrictive Greek legislation on all areas 
of commercial activity concerning crude oil and petroleum products. In the past the 
Greek state monopoly covered not only the production, but also the import, export, 
marketing, distribution and transport of such products. This monopoly was based on 
Law AMZZ of 19-3/24-5-1884, as modified and supplemented by the Royal Decree of 
7/14.7.1938 (under which the state monopoly is limited to the exclusive right of import 
and purchase) and Legislative Decree 1642 of 30.7/14.8.1942 (which allowed the im-
port of oil after special permission of the Financial Supervisor). The sale of all liquid 
fuel was permitted after a relevant Decision by the respective Minister. Following the 
Greek Accession to the then EEC and under Art.40 of the Greek Accession Act the Hel-
lenic Republic undertook the obligation to abolish all state monopolies by 31 December 
1985.32 In fact, paragraph 2 of this provision regulated the immediate abolition of exclu-
sive rights to the export of: petroleum by-products, fertilisers and tracing paper, as well 
as the exclusive rights for the import of sulphate of copper and saccharine. It is on the 
basis of this obligation that Greece amended the relevant restrictive legislation through 
Law 1571185 of 21 October 1985.33 However, even after this amendment, some illegal 
restrictions in this area remain. Although the Commission is monitoring this situation, it 
is only recently that it turned to the implications of the relevant laws to foreign compa-
nies wishing to establish a secondary unit. 34 Despite the lack of an ECl ruling on the 
compliance of these laws with the freedom of establishment, this case is presented here 
due to its characterisation by the Commission as a priority case of infringement.3s 
30 See Article 3( 1) of Law 1769/88 of 7 April 1988 ratifying the Agreement of 9 December .1987 
amending the Agreements between Greece and certain oil companies and Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4 pubhshed 
in Greek Official Gazette rfJEK A' 66 of 7.4.1988.. . 
31 See case C-347/88 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1990] ECR 1-4747; also see M. A. Henmtte, 
"Case-note on case C-34 7 /88" (1991) Journal de droit international, pp.482-483. . ' .. 
32 For a brief analysis on state monopolies, see J.J. Montero Pascual, "I monopo1i.n~ionah pubbhcl In 
un mercato unico concorrenziale" (1997) Rivista italiana di dirillo pubblico comumtano, pp.663-672. 
33 See Greek Official Gazelle <I>EK A' 192 of 14.11.1985. 
34 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 12, May 1998, p. 14. 
35 See Commission's letter sent to the Hellenic Repubic on 23 September 1997. 
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There is little doubt that the vast majority of the restrictions introduced by the 
relevant Greek legislation in this area of commercial activity inhibit trade for all under-
takings to a great extent. There is no legal basis for the limitations on the refining and 
import of petroleum oil in Greece. There is no valid justification for the obligation on all 
companies dealing in Greece to use Greek distributors for a certain percentage of the 
product specified by Ministerial Decree. However, all these provisions do not infringe 
the freedom of establishment rules, as they apply equally to foreign and Greek under-
takings. However, the situation may be different in respect of another Greek provision 
which relates to the establishment of companies dealing in the aspects of trade of petro-
leum oil now allowed by the Greek government. Article 15(1) of Law 1571185, as 
amended by Article 5(3)(d) of Law 1769/88, provides that in order to trade in petroleum 
products all companies, domestic and foreign, must acquire special authorisation by the 
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Technology prior to their establishment in Greece. In 
order to obtain such authorisation all undertakings concerned must fulfil a number of 
conditions, including the declaration of the tankers at their disposal for the transporta-
tion of petroleum products. The minimum and maximum number of tankers are fixed by 
Ministerial Decisions. Unfortunately, this complaint was not considered by the ECJ in 
the case against Greece. Greece argued successfully that it is was inadmissible as it was 
not clearly mentioned in the formal letter sent to it by the Commission.36 
However, the specific provision on the obligation of companies to acqUIre 
authorisation by the Greek Ministry of Industry, Energy and Technology before they 
establish within Greece needs to be discussed in the light of the freedom of establish-
ment. The first question concerns the inclusion of this provision in the field of applica-
tion of Art.43. Since this provision includes commercial activity in a vast variety of 
areas including industry, there is little doubt that the setting-up of companies dealing in 
crude oil and petroleum products is covered by the companies' freedom of establish-
ment. However, the question is, whether Greek law impedes the companies' freedom of 
establishment and whether this is done in a discriminatory manner. Indeed, in the case 
against Greece the Commission was of the view that the need for authorisation did re-
strict the activity of companies dealing in this area.37 In its prior case-law the ECJ has 
held that even administrative provisions in the form. of mere formalities not involving 
the grant of authorisation at the discretion of competent authorities may be considered 
36 See cases 211181 Commission v Denmark [1982] ECR4547; 124/81 Commission v UK [1983] ECR 
203; also see case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-4747, at 1-4784. 
37 See case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-4747, at 1-4759. 
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hurdles in the activity of companies "on account of the delay it involves and the dissua-
sive effect it has upon trade".38 On this basis, the complex authorisation required by 
companies including the declaration of the tankers available for the transportation of the 
product is an impediment of these companies' free establishment. 
However, even obvious restrictions do not fall within the illegal impediments 
prohibited by the Treaties, as long as they are introduced in a non-discriminatory man-
ner, justified by the general interest, suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue, or if the restrictions do not go beyond what is necessary for the at-
tainment of their aim. In this particular case and according the express declaration of the 
Hellenic Republic the aim of the law is to secure the supply of petroleum products in 
view of the fact that on several occasions in 1985, 1988 and 1989 the refusal of owners 
of tankers to carry such products led to interruption in their supply in Greece.39 Al-
though the concern of the Greek state and its eagerness to ensure regular supply of such 
products is understandable and does fall within the general interest, the measures taken 
are neither necessary nor proportionate for the attainment of this aim. It is clear that the 
Greek government could have ensured supply through the already existing obligation on 
suppliers of such products to stock at any given moment in time a surplus of product in 
order to cover unusual circumstance of unusual demand in the market. It is also clear 
that such restrictions cannot possibly be accepted under EC law, as the same argument 
could be applicable to a variety of restrictions in the trade of a series of products which 
are equally important for the genera interest, from food to drugs and other similar prod-
ucts. Thus, such a rationale can only lead to a useless nationalisation of a vast part of 
trade whose effect would be anything but the protection of the general interest. 
The other debatable issue, is whether these restrictions are discriminatory 
against foreign companies in view of their general application to domestic and foreign 
companies equally and that even provisions applicable without distinction may have 
restrictive effects.40 Since the matter has not yet been considered by the ECl, there is no 
authentic interpretation of the provision. However, the opinion expressed by the Com-
mission in the case against Greece and in its recent reasoned opinion on the issue of 
petroleum products in Greece that the relevant provisions are discriminatory is persua-
sive. A mere request for authorisation does not necessarily signify a breach of the free-
dom of establishment. However, the use of discretion by national authorities which have 
38 See case 68176 Commission v France [1977] ECR 515. 
39 See case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-4747, at 1-4759. 
40 See case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR 1-2357, par.l; also see case C-I04/91 Aguirre Borrell 
and Others [1992] ECR 1-3003, pars.5 and 7. 
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been persistently trying to maintain some degree of control over this area of trade can 
only be received with suspicion by foreign companies. In view of precedent in this area, 
foreign companies would be excused to assume that authorisation will be based on na-
tionality. In fact, there is little basis in the discretion awarded by the law to the Minister 
of Industry, Energy and Technology, whose acceptable role should have been the formal 
control of the conditions of establishment in Greece. Other relevant authorisations have 
been expressly declared "simple declarations" by the Ministry.41 Moreover, the law does 
not waive any conditions of establishment on the basis of equivalency for companies 
already established abroad, thus leading to the duplication of the administrative condi-
tions for access to their occupation within Greece and their country of origin. Is this 
breach justified by Greek national security, in view of the Greek geopolitical situation? 
As the ECl expressly held in the case against Greece this argument cannot be accepted. 
Indeed, the proximity of Greece with the oil producing countries do not seem to support 
the Greek argument which was dismissed by the Court. On the basis of this analysis, 
therefore, it is submitted that the authorisation required by undertakings for their set-up 
in Greece is an unjustifiable violation of their freedom of establishment which, in all 
probability, will be addressed by the ECl in the imminent case against Greece. 
Cl.3. Commercial agents in Italy and France 
The third and last indirect and pure violation chosen for presentation in this chapter 
refers to the declared breach 42 on commercial agents and their activities in Italy and 
France. This breach was selected for presentation due to its current interest and clarity. 
The term "commercial agents" was introduced in EC law by Directive 
. I 43 86/653IEEC on the co-ordination of laws relating to self-employed commerCIa agents. 
The Directive includes provisions concerning the legal relationship between commercial 
agents and their principals. Although this directive does not deal with issues concerning 
the establishment of natural or legal persons acting as commercial agents as such, it 
provides an authentic definition of the term. Under Art. I (2) of the Directive, a commer-
cial agent is defined as a self-employed intermediary, who has continuing authority to 
41 See, for example, Ministerial Circular of 20 January 1989 on Decree no 3663 of 17 February 1987 in 
Greek Official Gazette (/)EK B' 121 of 16.3.1987. 
42 See case C-215/97 Barbara Bellone v Yokohama SpA [1998] ECR 1-2191. . 
43 See OJ 1986 L 382, p.17; for an analysis of the Directiv;, see J.-M. Leloup, "La directlv~ europee~~ 
sur les agents commerciaux" (1987) La Semaine Juridiq~e, Edition generale, no 48, p.I-3308, also see . 
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negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of another person called the principal 
or to negotiate and conclude transactions on behalf of and in the name of that principal. 
As clarified in Art.l (3) of the Directive, the tenn does not include persons empowered 
to enter into commitments binding a company or association, partners lawfully author-
ised to enter into commitments binding partners, receivers, liquidates or trustees in 
bankruptcy. According to Art.2(l) of the Directive, its text is not applicable to commer-
cial agents whose activities are unpaid and commercial agents operating in the com-
modity market, on commodity exchanges or the Crown Agents for Overseas Govern-
ments and Administrators in the UK. Although the Directive imposes no pre-conditions 
for the free exercise of such activities by natural or legal persons pursuing profit in this 
area of trade, Art. 1 of Italian Law no 204 of 3 May 198544 links the exercise of the rele-
vant professional activities with registration in the registry of the Chamber of Com-
merce introduced by Art.2 of the same Law. Under Art.9 persons failing to fulfil this 
obligation are prohibited from pursuing activities within Italy and, if they do, are subject 
to an administrative penalty of between LIT 1,000,000 and LIT 4,000,000. Moreover, 
agency contracts entered into by unregistered persons are void under Art.9 of the Law 
and Art.1418 of the Italian Civil Code.4s These provisions, in specific the imposition of 
sanctions for unregistered agents, were declared a breach of the Directive by the ECl.46 
The question is whether these national measures hinder the freedom of estab-
lishment of legal persons wishing to pursue their activities within this area through the 
establishment of an Italian branch or agency consisting of one or more self-employed 
commercial agents. In view of the fact that the field of application of the freedom of 
establishment covers all aspects of commerce and finance, there is little doubt that the 
activities of commercial agents fall within the scope of Art.43. In fact, the protection of 
the agents' freedom of establishment, be it natural or legal persons, is set as the main 
objective of the relevant Directive and expressly referred to in the first and second recit-
als of its preamble. The question is, whether these restrictions inhibit the secondary 
establishment of such companies in Italy. Although this was not the main issue in the 
case before the ECl, the Court did hold that the Italian provisions are "capable of sig-
nificantly hindering the conclusion and operation of agency contracts between parties in 
different Member States and therefore from that point of view also are contrary to the 
M. Leloup, "La directive europeene sur les agents commerciaux" (1987) La Semaine Juridique, Edition 
enterprise (Etudes et commentaire), no 15024, pp.491-499. 
44 See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana no 119 of22 May 1985, p.3623. 
45 See R. Baldi, "II contratto di agenzia (1997, Milano, Giuffre), p.322. I 
46 See Opinion of Mr. Cosmas of29 January 1998 in case C-215/97, op. cit. , p.I-2201; also see the re e-
vant judgement, op. cit., con.12. 
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aim of the Directive" which is the elimination of restrictions to the freedom of estab-
lishment.
47 
As Advocate General Cosmas clarified, from the point of view ofEC law the 
objection is not to the introduction of the obligation of all commercial agents to register 
in Italy as such, which merely ensures that all professionals in the list are qualified to 
exercise the relevant activity, but the imposition of sanctions on those not registered.48 
On 23 December 1998 the Commission decided to refer Italy to the ECl for its 
failure to comply adequately with the Commercial Agents Directive on three different 
points. First, with regard to the conditions under which an agent is entitled to be indem-
nified on termination of his contract, Italian law requires only that the agent should have 
brought new customers or that the indemnity should be equitable, whereas the Directive 
requires that both conditions are met. Second, according to the Directive each party to 
an agency contract is entitled to request a copy of a written contract or written evidence 
of an oral agreement. However, Italian law does not provide for a contract to be in 
writing, whereas in verbal agreements there is no obligation for parties to provide writ-
ten documents as evidence that the agreement took place. Third, the entitlement to 
commission on transactions concluded after the agency contract has terminated is not 
restricted to transactions entered within a reasonable period after the termination. Thus, 
the Commission has decided that a referral to the ECl is necessary, especially since the 
Italian promise to amend its law by the end of 1998 has not materialised.49 
It must also be noted that a similar legislative regime is applicable in France, 
where commercial agents are required to be entered in a special register which is nor-
mally kept by the tribunal de commerce of the area where the commercial agent is reg-
istered.so Commercial activity is prohibited for unregistered agents, whose failure to 
register may result in imprisonment or fine, whereas the agency contract may be redes-
ignated a commercial representation contract (contrat de representation commercial). 
From the analysis of this case-study it is clear that the Italian and French legisla-
tions on the conditions for the exercise of the activity of a commercial agent restrict the 
choice of personnel used within the area of Italy to only those persons registered in this 
country. Failure to use such persons results in the invalidity of the undertaken transac-
tions, thus hindering the freedom of establishment of foreign companies wishing to 
open a secondary unit by employing one or more self-employed commercial agents. 
47 See case C-215/97, op. cit., con.17. . 01 
48 See Opinion of Mr. Cosmas of29 January 1998 in case C-215/97, op.elf., pp.I-2200 and ~2 .' 
49 See European Commission, "Services and Establishment: Commission decides to pursue mfnnge-
ment procedures against six Member States", 23.9.1999, . 
httro://europa.eu.intlcommldgI5/enlservices/infring/1174.htm, p.3. 
oSee Art.4(2) of Decree no 58-1345 of23 December 1958, as amended. 
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C2. INDIRECT DISGUISED VIOLATIONS 
C2.1. Tourist guides in France, Italy and Greece 
One of the most harmonisation-resistant areas of national legislation in all three selected 
countries refers to the conditions under which foreign tourist guides may exercise their 
activities within other Member States. The issue has been heard by the ECJ in three 
separate infringement proceedings against the three selected countries.51 In all three 
cases the ECJ held that an infringement has indeed taken place, albeit an infringement 
of the freedom to provide services for undertakings and natural persons who work for a 
tour operator established in one Member State which from its operating centre organises 
group travel in one of the three selected countries for tourists. 
The question here is whether the same national legal background may lead to the 
inhibition of the freedom of establishment for companies, which have set a secondary 
establishment within France, Greece or Italy, dealing with the organisation of travel 
within that country and wishing to exercise their activity through tourist guides of the 
nationality of their country of origin. In Chapter 2 of this thesis it was concluded that, 
although the same persons pursuing the same activities may be subject both to Art.49 on 
the provision of services and to Arts.43-48 on the freedom of establishment,52 on the 
basis of Art.SO the provisions on freedom to provide services are applicable only in 
cases where the provisions on the freedom of establishment are not applicable. 53 It 
would seem therefore that in the case of the declared violation of the tourist guides' 
freedom to provide services, the provisions on the freedom of establishment could not 
apply. This is certainly true, at least under the exact same factual circumstances de-
scribed in the case brought before the ECJ, where the undertakings and guides in ques-
tion were established temporarily in another Member State and merely organised visits 
to the host state whenever the opportunity arose. 
51 See cases C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659; C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] 
ECR 1-709; C-198/89 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1991] ECR 1-727. . 
52 See cases 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 1637, cons.17 ~d 18., on the settmg 
up of private educational institutes in Greece; 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR 1461, 
cons.27, 28 and 29 on the acquisition by nationals of other member states of immova~le property from 
which or in which a service is provided; also see Joined Opinion of Advocate General Mlscho.o~ casesu~ 
221/89 Queen v Secretary of State ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others and C-246/89 Commission v 
[1991] ECR 1-3905, con.26 (2) on fishing activities. . 
53 See case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio' nazionale Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165, cons.18 
and 21. 
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However, the situation would be different for undertakings which, having 
opened a permanent secondary unit within the host state wished to exercise their tourist 
activity within both the state of origin and the receiving state~ by engaging tourist 
guides qualified, and even based, in the country of their main, primary establishment. 
The main distinction between services and establishment lies with the permanence of 
the establishment in question and the scale of its commercial activity. 55 Thus, the rules 
on freedom to establish, and not those on the freedom to provide services, apply to per-
sons providing services entirely or principally in the territory of another member state. S6 
A secondary commercial unit of a foreign public company limited by shares whose 
main activity is the organisation of tours within the state of secondary establishment for 
tourists originating from the country of the primary unit would fall within the provisions 
on establishment rather than services. This means that the Greek, Italian or French 
branch or agency of a foreign public limited company whose main activity is to organise 
tours within Greece, Italy or France for tourists originating from the country of the pri-
mary unit has the right to establish within these three countries and any hurdle in this 
right constitutes a violation of the company's freedom of establishment under ArtA3. 
What remains to be seen is whether this right of establishment could be hindered 
in any way by the obligation of this unit to use guides qualified within the host country. 
In order to assess whether this is the case, it is necessary to look into the nature of the 
guide's profession and the obligations imposed to foreign guides by the three selected 
countries in some detail. Art.63 of Decree no 77-363 of 28 March 1977 French law de-
fines a tourist guide as a person whose task is to guide French or foreign tourists and, in 
particular, to conduct guided tours in public thoroughfares, museums and historical 
monuments and on public transport. 57 Art.ll of the Italian Law 217 of 1 7 May 1983 
defines guides as a person whose occupation is to accompany individuals or groups of 
persons on visits to works of art, museums, galleries and archaeological excavations, 
and provide commentary of points of historical, artistic or architectural interest, land-
scapes and national features. 58 Art.1 of Greek Law 710 of 26 and 27 September 1977 
defines tourist guides as persons who accompany foreign or national tourists or visitors 
54 See Opinion of Advocate General Leger in case C-5/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale 
F orense [1995] ECR 1-4165, con.31. . 
55 See case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio nazionale Forense [1995] ECR 1-4165, con.31 ~ also 
see case 196/87 Steymann [1988] ECR 6159, con.16 . 
56 Thus an insurance undertaking of another member state which maintains a permanent estab~lshment 
in the me~ber state in question comes within the scope of the provisions on the right of estabhshment. 
See case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, cons.21 and 22. 
57 See Official Journal of the French Republic, 1977, p.1890. 
58 See Gazzella Ufficiale della Repubblica Italian a no 141 of25 May 1983, p.4091. 
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to the country, guides them and shows them local points of interest, historic or ancient 
monuments, works of art of each period, and explains their significance, their purpose 
and their history, and gives general information on classical and present-day Greece.S9 
Thus, these three countries have a common concept of a tourist guide, namely a natural 
person who conducts guided tours with a commentary for local and foreign tourists.6O 
The other common element is the obligation for guides providing such tours to 
qualify within the host state. Foreign guides wishing to provide their services, even on a 
scarce or temporary basis, need to qualify in Greece, France and Italy accordingly. This 
is possible through special examinations which -with the exception of France- are con-
ducted wholly in the language of the host state. These include factual knowledge of the 
cultural heritage, history and economy of the state in question. In addition to the above, 
each of the three countries has added an extra element of examination. In France the 
ability of the guide to conduct guided tours in France is also tested. In Greece knowl-
edge on whatever subjects were taught in the previous year in the school of guides in 
Greece are examined. In Italy basic knowledge of the Italian history, archaeology and 
objects of art in Italy is also checked.61 As the EeJ has held in all three relevant cases, 
the introduction of these obligations constitutes a direct breach of the free provision of 
services both for guides wishing to work within these three countries on a temporary 
basis, as well for undertakings wishing to provide their services using their own staff. 62 
For companies, in particular, the imposition of the obligation to use domestically 
qualified guides with an excellent command of the language of the host state leads to 
the duplication of the conditions necessary for the exercise of their commercial activity. 
Companies have to employ either two different sets of persons for the same trip for each 
side of the border from the group's state of origin and from the host state accordingly, 
or persons with additional linguistic and professional qualifications for these two coun-
tries. Since the freedom of establishment also covers the activities which are of assis-
tance in the pursuit of the company activity,63 there is no doubt that for companies or-
ganising tourist guided excursions for foreign tourists through a branch or an agency 
within the three selected countries the obligation to employ guides qualified domesti-
S9 See Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic ifJEK A' 283,26-27.9.1977. . 
60 See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz on case C-154/89, which deals with all three cases agamst 
France, Greece and Italy; see case C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659, at 1-666. . 
61 For France, see Art. I 0 of Law no 75-627 of II July 1975, Official Journal of the French Repub/tc, 
p.7230, and Art.63 of Decree no 77-363, op.cit.; for Italy, see Art.ll of Law no 217 of 17 May 1983, 
op. cit.; for Greece see Art. I (I) of Law 710 of 27 September 1977, op. cit. . . 
62 For an analysis of these cases, see A. Boutard-Labarde, "Casenote", (199~) Journal de drOit mterna-
tional, pp.473-475; also see A. Camelutti, "Casenote", (~992) Gazette du Palms, I Jur, pp.198-199. 
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cally is a violation of their freedom of establishment.64 This breach is totally unjustified 
as the relevant obligation is applied in a discriminatory manner, is not justified by im-
perative requirements in the general interest, is not suitable for securing the attainment 
of the objective which the relevant laws pursue and goes beyond what is necessary for 
the attainment of the aim of the relevant national legislation. 
In the case of French, Italian and Greek branches or agencies of foreign tourist 
companies the obligation to employ guides also qualified in the host state prohibits the 
use of the regular, legally qualified staff from the state of primary establishment. Thus, 
the companies in question are forced to employ specially qualified personnel for each of 
the countries visited by the same group, in addition to the qualified guides escorting the 
group from their country of origin. According to the ECJ, this additional disproportion-
ate obligation is not justified by considerations of general interest, suitability and neces-
sity. Despite the arguments of France, Italy and Greece that the relevant restrictive na-
tional legislation protects the general interest, namely the proper appreciation of the 
heritage of the host country and consumer protection, the ECJ found that the imposed 
lack of contact of the tourist group with persons of their own language, culture and spe-
cific expectation inhibits, rather than assists, their appreciation of local culture and, con-
sequently their protection as consumers which is realistically guaranteed anyway in 
view of the competitiveness of the tourist market.6S Thus, the relevant Greek, French 
and Italian legislation does breach the companies' freedom of establishment. However, 
even after the relevant ECJ judgements, the Italian and Greek laws presented in this 
case-study have not been modified. Thus, the Commission has decided to send a rea-
soned opinion to the Italian government in order to instigate infringement proceedings 
against Italy for its failure to comply with a prior ECJ judgement under Art.228.66 
C2.2. Restrictions related to the recognition of qualifications for certain profes-
sional activities in Greece, Italy and France 
The second indirect and disguised violation presented in this selection of case-studies 
derives again from a declared breach in the area of provision of services. The relation-
63 See cases 63/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 29, con.14; 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Repub-
lic [1989] ECR 1461, con.21. . at 
64 See J.-F. Couzinet, "Case-note on case C-198/89", (1991) Receuil Dalloz Slrey, pp. Jur.465-469, 
467. C . 
65 See case C-198/89 Commission v Hellenic Repub/ic[1991] ECR 1-727, con.23; C-180/89
19 
ommls-
sion v Italy [1991] ECR 1-709, con.22; C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659, con. . 
66 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 5, October 1996, p.ll. 
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ship between the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services has been 
analysed in Chapter 2 and in the study of the first indirect and disguised breach. Essen-
tially it was concluded that circumstances which have already led to declared violations 
of the freedom to provide services may also constitute breaches of the freedom of es-
tablishment, should the activity of the unit in question be conducted on a permanent 
basis and be directed to the market of the host state.67 The breaches presented here have 
been selected for analysis on the basis of their suitability as commercial activities con-
ducted by undertakings and of their classification by the Commission as priority issues. 
One relevant case, especially referred to here due to its wide scope of applica-
tion, refers to the failure of Greece to comply with Council Directive 89/48IEEC on a 
general system for the recognition of higher education diplomas awarded on completion 
of professional education and training of at least three years' duration.68 According to 
the Directive, Greece was obliged to introduce by 4 January 1991 a system ofrecogni-
tion of all foreign professional qualifications, provided that the relevant theoretical and 
practical training had lasted more than three years. In compliance with this obligation, 
the Republic issued a Joint Decree of the Ministers for the Economy, Health, Welfare 
and Social Security in 1992. However, this Decree applied only to the health and wel-
fare professions. In March 1995 and on the basis of this partial implementation of the 
relevant Directive, the ECJ declared that Greece failed to fulfil its EU obligations.69 
The effects of this national legislative regime is detrimental for the secondary 
establishment of foreign public limited companies specialising in trade in many fields of 
commercial activity, where staff must, by the nature of the activity in question, be na-
tionally trained and qualified. This includes architects, dentists, nurses, doctors, phar-
macists, midwives, vets, paramedical professions, legal professions, sports professions, 
teachers, hairdressers and engineers.7o In all these fields, foreign companies are obliged 
to employ natural persons whose professional qualifications are recognised by the 
Greek state. Since recognition for persons qualified abroad is not possible under the 
current legal provisions in Greece, the employees of foreign companies must be nation-
ally qualified. These are, by default, Greek nationals. This restricts disproportionately 
67 See M-J Domestici-Met "Droit d' etablissement et libre prestation des services" in J. Labic, Collec-
tion des Jurisclasseurs, Trai;e de droit europeen, VoI.2., 1996, Paris, Fasc. 710, point 40. . 
68 See OJ 1989 L 19, p.16; for an analysis of the Directive, also see~. Bal.larino, op.cit., pp.288-293; It 
is noteworthy that Directives 89/48IEEC and 92/51IEEC are under m~~lficatlOn: se~ CODI1997/0345 and 
COM (1997)0638 which are still awaiting the Council common POSItion; see file.lllAlrrhe Observatory 
procedure viewRECDIPL.htm. 
69 See case C-365/93 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1995] ECR 1-499. 
70 For a table of the relevant professions and the infringements by state in each for 1996, see European 
Commission, Single Market News, no 7, April 1977, p.16 
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the selection of staff for the secondary establishment of foreign companies, which 
would in many cases prefer to use in their secondary establishment persons already em-
ployed in the primary unit. Since this is a situation mainly affecting foreign companies, 
this provision is discriminatory. As there is no obvious reasons of public health, safety 
or order justifying this inequality, the relevant Greek legislation is in breach of Arts.43-
48. This is also the view of the Commission, which on the basis of the clash of this re-
gime with the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services decided to 
initiate the first stage of infringement proceedings against Greece for its failure to com-
ply with the judgement of the ECJ on this issue.71 
The same rationale "renders discriminatory, and therefore, illegal other national 
laws referring to various professions, such as the non-recognition of the qualifications 
of ski-instructors in France,72 the residency requirement for the registration of individu-
als as dentists in Italy and the loss of registration for foreign dentists transferring their 
residency outside the territory of the Italian state under Law no 1398 of 14 December 
1964,73 the persistent administrative practice of the Italian authorities to delay the rec-
ognition of engineering qualifications by more than four months and to ignore the expe-
rience gained by migrants,74 the Italian restrictions referring to the registration of con-
signors of goods,75 the reserve of the profession of consultant in the field of road circu-
lation to Italian nationals under Law no 264/91,76 as well as the non-recognition of the 
professional qualifications of vets, psychiatric nurses and hairdressers in France.77 All 
these violations have been identified by the Commission which placed them in its list of 
71 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 7, April 1997, p.16. 
72 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 7, April 1997, p.17; also see European Commis-
sion, Single Market News, no 12, May 1998, p.17. 
73 See IP/98/1122 of 16 December 1998; also see European Commission, Single Market News, no 12, 
May 1998, p.16. 
74 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 12, May 1998, p.16. . . 
7S See http://europa.eu.int/commldgI5/en/services/infring/295.htm of29/04/98; the Commission has 
sent a reasoned opinion arguing that Italian Law no 1442 of 14 November 1941 breaches the freedo~ to 
provide services for consignors of goods wishing to exercise their profession in Italy on a non-exclUSive 
basis. 
76 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 5, October 1996, p.ll. 
77 See European Commission, Single Market News, no 5, ~cto~er 1996, p.I~. In ~uly 1 ~97 ~he com~ 
mission decided to refer this case to the ECl. For a non-exclUSive hst of professIOns hbera~lsed m F~anc 
in the 1960s see C. Doucouloux-Favard, "L'adaptation du systeme juridique fran9als ~ la hberte 
, . .(' . t I CEE" m M Maz-d'etablissement et a la libre prestation des services, prevues par Ie Traltc mstltuan a . 
ziotti et aI., La liberte d' etablissement et la libre prestation des services dans les pays de la CEE (1970, 
Milano, Giuffre), pp.211-264. 
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priority cases.
78 
Equally discriminatory is the Italian condition of reciprocity for the 
recognition of foreign qualifications leading to access to professions in Italy. 79 
It is submitted, therefore, that these national provisions in all three selected 
countries constitute indirect, disguised violations of the freedom of establishment of 
foreign public limited companies wishing to create secondary units within France, 
Greece and Italy. This dimension of the relevant violations has so far been ignored by 
the Commission, which seems to focus exclusively on the direct clash of such provi-
sions with the relevant professionals' freedom to provide services. 
C2.3. Limits to the free movement of capital in Greece 
The third indirect and disguised violation presented in this chapter refers to the on-going 
restrictions to the free movement of capital in Greece. This breach was selected on the 
basis of its persistence and its main reference to a chapter of the Treaty of Rome other 
than establishment and services. As proven in Chapter 2, free movement of capital is 
considered a necessary prerequisite for the effective exercise of the other freedoms en-
sured by the Treaty and especially of the freedom of establishment. Indeed, since the 
freedom of establishment also covers the corollary activities of the liberalised areas of 
trade falling within the scope of Art.43, namely activities assisting the exercise of the 
company occupation, limitations in the free movement of capital are widely accepted as 
restrictive of the freedom of establishment itself.80 In fact, the Eel has characterised the 
free movement of capital as a "prerequisite" of the freedom of establishment8! and the 
freedom of establishment as "to a certain extent accessory to the liberalisation of 
movement of capital". 82 It can therefore be stated that restrictions to the free movement 
of capital inhibit the freedom of establishment, as foreign EU undertakings would be 
unable to use their right to establish freely in another member state, if they did not have 
the right to transfer sufficient capital to and from the host state. 83 
78 It must be noted that for the purposes of this thesis, health professions are of interest fo~ France ~nd 
Greece. In Italy such professions cannot constitute the main activity of commercial compames, espeCially 
public limited companies. See Tribunale di Cassino 19 June 1992, Le societa, 1992, G .1388. . . 
79 See Cass., 19 April 1992, n.4240, Riv. dir. int.priv.proc., 1992, 387; also see F. Tonello, La Condlz /-
one dello Straniero (1997, CEDAM, Italy), p.21 O. . 
80 See A. Santa Maria, Diritto Commerciale Comunitario (1995, Giuffre, Milano), p.197. 
8! See case 203/80 Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati [1981] ECR 2595; [1982] 1 CMLR 
365, con.8. 691 
82 See the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in case C-I0 1194 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR 1-2 , 
at 1-2697. 
83 For further analysis on the close relationship between freedom of establishment and fre~ movem.ent 
of capital, see F. Burrows, op.cit., p.271; A. Papagiannidis and A. Christogiannopoulos, op. elf., p.163. P. 
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The original version of the EEC Treaty already spoke of the abolition of obsta-
cles to the freedom of persons, services and capital as one of the main objectives of the 
Community. The old Art.67(2) Ee, now repealed, provided that current payments con-
nected with the movement of capital between Member States shall be freed from all 
restrictions by the end of the first stage at the latest. In view of this provision, further 
provision in the field through Directives or other secondary legislative instruments was 
not necessary. Notwithstanding that, the Council did adopt the First Council Directive 
and the Second Council Directive "for the implementation of Article 67 of the EEC 
Treaty", which lay down liberalisation arrangements which vary according to categories 
of transaction, grouped together into separate lists. List A covers provisions on the re-
patriation of liquidated profits from direct investments. However, it was really the Sin-
gle European Act of 1987 which, in the second paragraph of Art.I8, equated the free 
movement of capital with the other, more established, freedoms. Under this provision 
the 31 5t December 1992 was the deadline for the realisation of free movement of capital 
within all Member States. The "movement of capital Directive" 88/361IEEC repealed 
all earlier directives on the old Art.67 and brought free movement of capital, defined 
very broadly to include all financial techniques available in the market, into effect on 
expiry of the transposition period on 1 July 1990.84 The new legal regime was incorpo-
rated into the Treaty by Arts.56 and 60.85 
Insofar as Greece is concerned, Art.52 of the Greek Act of Accession stipulates 
that blocked funds of EC nationals must be abolished by 15t January 1986.86 In fact, this 
provision in combination with the general provision on the free movement of capital 
pre-Maastricht constituted the basis of the main arguments of the Commission in a case 
brought against the Hellenic Republic,87 where Greece was identified as the only Mem-
ber State which (under Law 1704/1939) prohibited export of funds belonging to foreign 
natural and legal persons on the grounds that allegedly Art.52 of the Act of Accession 
required funds blocked in Greece belonging to residents of other member states to be 
released solely for use in Greece and not for transfer out of the country. The ECl held 
that Greece was in breach of the free movement of capital and that it was under the duty 
Zontanos, op.cit., p.169; P. Oliver and J.-P. Bache, op.cit., p.62; also see case 203/80 Criminal Proceed-
ings against Guerrino Casati [1981] ECR 2592; [1982] 1 CMLR 365. 
M . 
See OJ 1988 L 178, p.5. 
85 See OJ C 224 of 31.8.1992. . 
86 Article 52 of the Greek Act of Accession regulated that: "Funds blocked in Greece belon~mg to per-
sons resident in the present Member States shall be progressively released by equal ann~al Instalments 
starting from accession until 31 December 1985, in six stages, the first of which ~hall ~egm on 1 Jan~:~ 
1981". Smit & Herzog, op.cit., p.726, note that "those paYments are thus to be hberahsed as of the 
of accession". . 
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to release all blocked funds including such funds arising from operations which were 
not personal, thus rendering the funds of EU legal and natural persons arising from any 
legal transaction or activity unrestricted and freely transferable in Greece. 
Special reference must be made to Law 2687/53, which is of particular interest 
to companies. It stipulates that foreign companies which on authorisation of the Minis-
ter acquire the right to import foreign exchange (a term interpreted broadly to include 
machinery, materials, technology, inventions, manufacturer's and trade marks, and 
which aim at productive activities, i.e. exporting business, industries or other commer-
cial activities leading to the import of foreign exchange), have the exceptional right to 
export a small percentage of their capital (10% of the imported capital annually) and 
annual profits (12%). The latter restriction was modified by Legislative Decree 
4256/1962, which increased the transferable value of capital and interest to 70% of for-
eign exchange receipts. EC law on the free movement of capital imposes the abolition 
of these (admittedly limited) restrictions on the import and export of capita1.88 
In an attempt to comply with the relevant EC legislation, the Director of the 
National Bank of Greece issued Act 2022 of 28.1.1992, according to which foreign 
companies subject to Law 2687/1953 may export foreign exchange equal to the amount 
of their 1991 profits,89 provided that these profits derive from the import of foreign ex-
change under the provisions of Law 2657/53. Profits gained in the future are also liber-
ated. Art.2 of the Act provides that previous profits may be exported in three equal in-
stalments from 1 May 1992. These provisions, allowing free movement of capital for 
EU and non-EU nationals, aim to harmonise Greek and EC law and to create a liberal 
market for foreign companies. It must be noted, however, that no provision is made for 
the export of the company's capital or interest from other investments or other funds. 
Although the Commission seems to be of the opinion that the Greek position has 
changed adequately for the purposes of respecting the free movement of capital, and 
consequently the freedom of establishment of foreign companies, it must be accepted 
that from a legal point of view the value of the Act is questionable. Being an adminis-
trative act, it regulates the issue of the export of capital for a certain period of time 
without abolishing the previously existing Greek law, only merely modifying it for the 
87 See case 194/84 Re Blocked Accounts: EC Commission v Greece [1987] ECR 4737. .' 
88 I d Art" "P I cy IS-See Boumous on. cit. pp.208-209; Kalavros, op.cit., pp.272-273.; Buckle an ISlen, old 
'r ' . . I' G Portugal an 
sues of intra-EC direct investment: British, French and Gennan multl-natlOna s In reece, 
Spain, with special reference to employment effects", [1987] JCMS, p.221. 
89 ••• • 3 d K d 31 1 1992 P 4 where it is clarified that See relevant articles m [Imerlsla, 31.1.1992, p. ; an er os, .. ,. , . 
companies may export an amount equal to their annual profits minus the companies' taxation or commer-
cial debts. 
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set period of time. Despite the subsequent Acts published by the Director of the Na-
tional Bank. since
90 
and the underlying willingness of the Greek government to maintain 
the new relatively liberal regime, legally the old restrictive laws are not repealed and 
may come back into force if and when the Director of the National Bank decides not to 
renew the relevant Act. It is also worth noting that the liberalisation in the export of 
capital seems to be advancing for the purposes of private transactions only. The amount 
allowed for export for tourist purposes was increased at 10,000 ECU, whereas for com-
mercial purposes the amount of capital allowed for export seems to be stuck at a mere 
2,000 ECU.91 In view of this and of the persistently expressed opinion of the Eel that 
mere administrative acts do not suffice for compliance with EC law, 92 it can be con-
cluded that the Greek legislative regime on this issue is not in absolute compliance with 
EC law, despite its being hailed as "the impressive completion of the liberalisation of 
capital export".93 The ECl has consistently held that the incompatibility of national leg-
islation with the provisions of the Treaty can only be achieved by "means of national 
provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be 
amended", as mere administrative practices are alterable at will be national authorities. 
and are not given the appropriate pUblicity.94 
In view of the proven inter-relation between free movement of capital and free-
dom of establishment, this is yet another breach of the freedom of establishment of for-
eign companies in Greece. The only difference to all the other case-studies presented 
here is that this violation derives from restrictions to the free movement of capital. 
C2.4. Limits in the area of maritime transport in France and Greece 
Persistency and variety in the area of commercial activity are the two main criteria for 
the selection of this case-study, which refers to violations of the companies' freedom of 
establishment in the area of maritime transport. The first issue to be addressed concerns 
the applicability of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome in the field of maritime trans-
port, which is regulated by the special chapter of the Treaty on transport (Arts.70-80). In 
other words the question here is whether the subjection of transport to the special provi-
90 See Presidential DecreelBank of Greece 2344/19.12.94; also see Presidential DecreelBank of Greece 
2449/5.8.99. d 
91 See Presidential DecreelBank of Greece 2449/5.8.99; also see Kathimerini, 10.8.1999, pp.l, 21 an 
22; Imerisia, 10.8.1999, pp.4 and 5. 
92 See case 147/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637, [1989] 2 CMLR 845. 
93 See Kathimerini, 10.8.1999, p.l. . 
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sions of Arts.70-80 excludes the application of the provisions of the Treaty on the free 
movement of services, persons and capital. Despite the negative view of some Member 
States, driven by interest rather than legitimacy,9S the ECJ has held that the rules on the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital constitute the foundation of the 
Community. These are applicable to the whole complex of economic activities, includ-
ing maritime transport, unless otherwise expressly regulated by the Treaty. Thus, for the 
application of the freedom to provide services on specific aspects of maritime transport 
a Regulation was necessary. 96 Since the rules in respect to the freedom of establishment 
do not exclude the transport industry, they apply to cases tackling maritime transport.97 
In fact, in reference to this issue the ECJ has held that, far from derogating from these 
fundamental rules, the object of the provisions relating to transport is to implement and 
complement them by means of a common action.98 This view was also adopted by the 
Legal Service of the Commission in an internal document, according to which the free-
dom of establishment of legal entities is indeed applicable in sea transport.99 
This was one of the main issues discussed in detail in a case brought by the 
Commission against Franc.e in as early as 1973. 100 The subject of the case was the com-
pliance of Art.3(2) of the French Code du Travail Maritime with the provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome on the freedom to provide services. Article 3(2) of the Code of 13 De-
cember 1926 provides that "such proportion of the crew of a ship as is laid down by 
order of the Minister for the Merchant Fleet must be French nationals". The Ministerial 
Order of21 November 1960, as amended by the Ministerial Order of 12 June 1969 is-
sued in implementation of this provision,IOI reserves employment on the bridges, in the 
engine room and in the wireless room of French vessels to French nationals. Under 
Art.2 of this Order certain other employment on every ship are reserved in the ratio of 
three French to one non-French. In its judgement, the ECJ held that the relevant provi-
sions of the French Code are in direct clash with the free movement of workers, since it 
94 See case C-334/94 Commission v France [1994] ECR 1-1307, at 1-1342, con.30; also see case 168/85 
Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 2945, con.13. . . 
9S See J. Rogissart, "Observations: un arret de la Cour de justice capital pour la pohtlque commune des 
transports" (1974) Cahiers de droit europeen, pp.577-587, at 584. .. 
96 See Regulation (EEC) of the Council of22 December 1986; also see case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries 
Italia s.r.l. v Corpo dei pi/oli del porto di Genova ECR [1994] 1-1783. 
97 See M.L. Tufano, "I trasporti" in A. Tizzano, Professioni e servizi nella CEE (1985, CEDAM- Casa 
editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, Padova), p.170. . 
98 See case 167173 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359; case C-334/94 Commission v Franc~ [~996] 
ECR 1-1307· case C-381193 Commission v France [1994] ECR 1-5145; case C-62/96 CommiSSIOn v , 
Greece [1997] ECR 1-6725. 
99 See Note jur/133874-MSIRGB/21.5.74. 
100 See case 167173 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359. 
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introduces a discriminatory legal regime based on the nationality of the worker. l02 It is 
evident that these French provisions violate the free movement of workers, since they 
introduce discriminatory conditions for access of foreign workers to employment on 
French vessels. The question is, whether this violation is also a breach of the freedom of 
establishment. Advocate General Fennelly in his Opinion on a subsequent case ex-
pressed the view that crewing is one of the conditions under which the right to estab-
lishment is exercised. Thus, the imposition of selection criteria for the crew of French 
vessels "presents obstacles to entrepreneurs from other Member States who wish to 
establish in France,,103 and must be considered a violation of Arts.43-48, and Art.39. 
Despite the judgement of the ECJ on the case concerning the crewing of French 
vessels, the French state failed to comply with the relevant jUdgement. Twenty years 
after this first case, the Commission decided to initiate infringement proceedings under 
Art.228 against the French Republic for this "surprisingly 10ng"l04 failure and, while 
doing so, took the opportunity to explore the general French regime on the registration 
of vessels and their right to the French flag, \05 which is contingent on registration under 
Art.217 of the Code Franr;ais des Douanes. In order to be registered, a vessel must, in 
respect of at least a majority stake, belong to French nationals, who, if resident in 
France for less than six months a year, must elect French domicile for all administrative 
and judicial purposes relative to the vessel; belong wholly to a company with its head-
quarters in France, or a company which, having its headquarters in another state where, 
pursuant to a convention concluded with France, French companies are permitted to 
exercise their activity, elects French domicile for all administrative and judicial pur-
poses relative to the vessel; belong wholly to a combination of natural and legal persons 
fulfilling the conditions of the first two categories; be destined to belong to persons in 
the first two categories after the exercise of an option to acquire the vessel under a 
leasing agreement; or in the case of a vessel flying a foreign flag, become French prop-
erty in total after shipwreck on the French coast and after repairs amounting to at least 
four times the purchase price. Registration is allowed after authorisation by the Minis-
101 See JO of 1.12.1960, p.l0770 and JO Of 1.12.1960, p.l 0770 and JO of 13.6.1969, p.5923 accord-
ingly. 
102 See J.-V. Louis, "Discrimination interdite et manquement de I' Etat" (1974) Cahiers de droit eu-
ropeen, pp.588-592, at 591. -
103 See Opinion of Advocate General Mr. Fennelly in case C-334/94 Commission v France [1994] ECR 
1-1307, at 1-1326, con.35; also see the relevant case-notes by D. Wyatt (197~) ~LR, pp. 61/6~; T. Hartle~ 
(1975) ELR, pp.53-54; D. Ruzie (1974) La Semaine Juridique, Edition general, II, 17863, B. Pactea 
(1974) Receuil Dalloz Sirey, ppJur.719-722. 
104 See S. Denys, Europe, Revue Mensuelle, 1996, vol.6, fasc.380, p.9; a!so see S. Denys, Europe, 
1996, no 181, p.9; P. Chaumette, Le droit maritimefran~ais, 1996, Dalloz, PariS, pp.752-758. 
lOS See case C-334/94 Commission v France [1994] ECR 1-1307. 
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ters for the Navy and for the Budget in two cases. First, when natural and legal persons 
falling in the above categories own only a majority interest in the vessel in circum-
stances where a total interest is required, so long as the management of the vessel is 
entrusted to them or to other persons fulfilling these conditions. Second, if the vessel 
has been taken under a bare-boat charter by a French undertaking which controls, fits 
and manages it, where such a change in flags is permitted by the state whose flag the 
vessel previously flew. From the point of view of this thesis, this brief reference to the 
relevant French legislation renders clear the fact that the aim of the legislator is to link 
the nationality of the vessel in question with its true social seat, the private international 
law theory followed by France (as established in Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Does this provision inhibit the companies' freedom of establishment in France? 
Following Factortame lO6 it is now clear that where the use of a vessel for economic pur-
poses requires the proprietor to have a fixed establishment in the Member State con-
cerned, its registration entails observance of the rule on the freedom of establishment. 
Therefore discriminatory rules based on the nationality of the natural or legal persons 
owning, managing or even crewing the vessel in question are prohibited, especially 
registration rules which require that the owners or charterers of the vessel have a par-
ticular nationality or, for legal persons, have a certain proportion of shareholders or 
directors of a certain nationality. Such rules are contrary not only to Arts.43-48, but also 
to Art.294 on the equal treatment of EU nationals on participation in the capital of com-
panies within the meaning of Art.48. Equally discriminatory, and hence prohibited, are 
provisions making registration contingent on the location of the centre of control of the 
vessel in the Member State concerned, as they preclude a secondary establishment from 
operating under instruction from a primary establishment in another Member State. 107 
The same regime applies to fishing vessels, as the real economic link between 
the fishing vessel and the Member State in question required for the licensing of vessels 
with relation to fishing quotas concern only relations between the vessel's activity and 
the local populations dependent on fisheries and related industries,I08 rendering any na-
tional rules imposing nationality or residency requirements in respect of ownership, 
management or crewing of fishing vessels unrelated to the objectives of the Community 
106 See case C-221189 The Queen v Secretary of State ex parte F actortame and Others (F actortame 1/) 
[1991] ECR 1-3905. 
107 See ibid, cons.22, 29-31,33 and 35; also see case C-246/89 Commission v UK [1991] ECR 1-4585; 
case C-93/98 Commission v Ireland [1991] ECR 1-4569. 
108 See case C-3/87 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p'arte .Agegate [198~ 
ECR 4459, cons.17 and 27; case C-216/87 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, FIsheries and Food 
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quota system. In so far as vessels not used for economic activity is concerned, they do 
not directly benefit from the freedom of establishment, whose main aim is to cover ac-
tivities in pursuit of profit. Having said that, the registration of a vessel for leisure pur-
poses only is the corollary of the freedom of workers and to the freedom of establish-
ment, as persons and companies establishing in the Member State in question must en-
joy the same rights as domestic natural and legal persons. 109 This rationale led the ECJ 
to declare once again that the French legislation on the registration of vessels is in 
breach ofEC law and constitutes a violation of Arts.43-48. 
The persistence of this breach over a period of above twenty years and the rare 
width of the field of application of the relevant discriminatory national provisions 
should not be too surprising, not after the Factortame judgements. What became evident 
after the French condemnation for its registration provisions was that the relevant laws 
tend to be discriminatory and restrictive in a number of EU Member States. In proof that 
this phenomenon is not limited to the UK and French borders, the ECJ delivered a third 
relevant judgement describing the relevant Greek legislation on the same issue as a fail-
ure to comply with its EU obligations deriving from the following provisions: 
a. Arts. 12, 39,43,48 and 294; 
b. Art.7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1251170 of the Commission of29 June 1970 on 
the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been em-
ployed in that State; and 
c. Art.7 of Council Directive 75/34IEEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the 
right of nationals of a Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State 
after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity. 110 
Art.5 of the Greek Nationality of the Vessel Code describes in detail the condi-
tions under which Greek nationality (flag) may be granted to all vessels, including lei-
sure and fishing ships. Under this provision, the Greek flag is granted to vessels, upon 
application by their owner and upon submission of the document of title, whose shares 
belong to Greek natural or legal persons by a percentage of more than 50%, or whose 
capital is held by Greek nationals to a percentage of 50% or above. If at any given time 
these two conditions are no longer fulfilled, the ship in question loses the Greek nation-
ality under Art. 16, par.1 of the Greek Code of Public Maritime Law. The law concern-
parte Jaderow [1989] ECR 4509, cons.I8 and 43; case C-246/89 Commission v UK [1991) ECR 1-4585, 
cons. 12 and 35. . . 
109 See case 186/87 Cowan v rresor Public [1989] ECR 195; also see case C-45193 CommiSSIOn v 
Spain [1994] ECR 1-911. . 
110 See case C-62/96 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1997] ECR 1-6725. 
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ing access to the Greek flag is so strict, that when 50% of a Greek ship is transferred to 
a foreign legal person, "the transaction is invalid as far as 1 % of the ownership is con-
cerned" and the foreign person in question is entitled to compensation for damages in 
the Pireus Court of First Instance. III These provisions introduce a discriminatory regime 
for foreign companies, which are excluded from trade restricted to domestic ships. Ac-
cording to Tzoannos, in general such discrimination usually includes exclusive carriage 
of certain goods by national ships, purchase of goods by foreign countries in F.O.B. or 
C.I.F. prices which leads to the exclusive carriage of these goods by national ships only 
(a method utilised by countries of the former Eastern Bloc), regulation of measures dis-
advantageous to foreign ships (such as higher prices for the use of national ports, long-
lasting and complicated procedures for the loading and unloading of foreign ships, ex-
emption of foreign ships from the coastal commerce) and last but not least exemption of 
foreign ships from the execution of certain kinds of activities (such as cabotage).112 Ac-
cording to the Greek government, these provisions protect Greek national security, as 
they are required for the Greek military defence organisation which is of specific char-
acter due to historical and geo-political reasons. These arguments were not accepted by 
the ECl, which noted that the Greek military requirements are adequately served by its 
right to decide the requisition for military purposes of all Greek vessels alike. l13 
From the analysis on the provisions concerning access to the French and Greek 
flag it becomes obvious that the restrictive provisions in both countries are in clash with 
the companies' freedom of establishment. 114 However, these are not the only limitations 
to the exercise of commercial activity of foreign companies in these two countries. In 
1994 the ECll15 declared that Art. R.212-217 of the French Code governing maritime 
ports is in breach of Art. I of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 applying the prin-
ciple of the freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States 
and between Member States and third countries. 116 This article introduced a system for 
levying charges on the disembarkation and embarkation of passengers from vessels 
using port installations situated on French continental or island territory. Charges were 
higher in the case of passengers embarking for ports situated in another Member State 
III fbi' M .. L See Art. 16, par.2 of the Greek Code 0 Pu IC antlme aw. 
112 See J. Tzoannos, European Community and Greek Shipping, Speech in the Financial Conference of 
6-9 March 1979 (1980, Papazisis, Athens), pp.20 1-202. . 
113 See ibid, con.26. d 
114 The registration of vessels and granting of flag rights in France is still discriminatory and pr~cee -
ings continue whereas the Commission initiated proceedings for the failure of Greece to comply WIth the 
Eel judgme~t in case 62/96. See European Commis~ion, Update of the Single Markel 1998, 
httr.:lleuropa.eu.intlcommlsglsgb/infringements/pdfl text.,..rap98 _en/pdf, p.51. 
ts See case C-381193 Commission v France [1994] ECR 1-5145. 
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than when they travelled from a port situated on national territory. Thus, the French 
Republic was in breach ofEC law. "7 
It is obvious that the French provisions mentioned here are discriminatory. Even 
though the regulation is applicable to ships of all nationalities, thus introducing a seem-
ingly equal regime, the higher services apply to intra-Community transport, which is 
naturally the activity usually performed by foreign ships. Thus, the relevant French pro-
vision secures "a special advantage" for the domestic market and internal transport 
services within France,1I8 thus clearly breaching EC law, albeit indirectly. It is on that 
basis that the ECl considered this provision a violation of Art.49 on the freedom to pro-
vide services. The question is whether this French provision can restrict in any way the 
freedom of establishment of foreign companies, whose ships operate under the dis-
criminatory regime described in this case-study. It has been established that the same 
provisions may constitute breaches of both freedoms, given the circumstances sur-
rounding the establishment within the host state. Thus, a foreign company with a secon-
dary establishment in France, exercising transport activity on an intra-Community basis 
mainly for the market of France would be established within that country. The provi-
sions of the French Code, which undoubtedly affect the corollary activities of the com-
pany in question with regard to the cost of levies imposed on it, would be suffering from 
a restrictive regime, applied on a discriminatory basis under conditions which could not 
possibly be justified by the general interest or the exemption of public health, national 
security or public office. Thus, there is little doubt that the provisions in question limit 
the freedom of establishment of foreign companies and are in breach of Arts.43-48. 
Another area of restrictions worth mentioning here concerns the limitations to 
the activity of foreign ships in the area of maritime cabotage. This issue is of particular 
importance for the three selected countries, as they all impose cabotage restrictions 
along with Portugal and Spain. Cabotage is defined as the "carriage of passengers or 
goods by sea between ports in anyone Member State, including the overseas territories 
of that State".119 France maintains petit cabotage involving trade between ports of 
Mediterranean France and grand cabotage involving ports in France's overseas territo-
ries such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, whereas Italy maintains cabotage restrictions 
116 SeeJORF 1986 L 378, p.l. . f7 
117 See Art. R.212.219 of the Code, as contained in Decree No 9211 089 of 1 October 1992 In JORF 0 
October 1992. 
118 See case C-381/93 Commission y France [1994] ECR 1-5145, con.21. 
119 See V. Power, EC Shipping Law (1992, Lloyd's of London Press, London), p.21 1. 
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in all its coastal line under Art.224 of the Italian Codice di Navigazione. 12o Greek Law 
6059 of 14/20.2.1934 introduces cabotage restrictions, of which only sailing vessels and 
freighter steamships for ports suitable for vessels of total weight tonnage of less than 
100.121 However, despite the obvious clash of these provisions with the freedom of es-
tablishment of foreign ships and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 
1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within 
Member States,122 the Commission has yet to announce any measures against their ap-
plication within the three Member States apart from the French referral to the ECJ in 
1998.123 In order to assess the Commission's inaction, one must take into account that 
the Regulation entered into force on 1 January 1993, whereas many states managed to 
secure derogation from its provisions. For France island cabotage in the Mediterranean 
islands may be extended until 1 January 1999, whereas Greek cabotage provisions for 
regular passenger and ferry services and services provided by vessels less than 650gt. 
are valid until 1 January 2004 for Greece. 124 From a political point of view, the legisla-
tion on cabotage and the usefulness of its abolition is still in debate within the EU. 
Thus, it seems that the Commission has so far chosen to ignore the relevant restrictions, 
possibly in order to secure a political agreement before initiating infringement pro-
ceedings against a large number of Member States whose geographical position as 
coastal nations renders cabotage a profitable, and hence sensitive, area of commercial 
activity. However, this position is due to change. The newly proposed Council Regula-
tion amending Regulation 3577/92 resolves in a clear manner the problem of the deter-
mination of the national law governing the manning, required proportion of EU nation-
als in the crew (namely all staff employed on board) and the employment rights of peo-
120 See ibid, p.213; also see M.L. Corbino, "Operativita e limiti della riserva del cabotaggio" [1988]. 
Rivista dei trasporti, pp.61-69; P.A. Toma, "La liberalizzazione temuta" ~1992~ Rivista del Porto d, 
Nagoli, pp.20-22; G. De Bartolo, "II cabotaggio maritimo" (1994, Ed. Cacuccl, Ban), p.21. 
21 See H. Xanthaki, H., The Establishment of Foreign Companies in Greece with Particular Reference 
to the Compliance of Greece with the Law of the EU (1995, Sakkoulas, Athens), pp.120-127. 
122 See OJ L 364 of 12.12.1991, pp.7-10. Also see Commission Decision 93/396IEEC of 13 July 1993 
on Spain's request for adoption by the Commission of a prolongation of safeguard m~asures .pursuant t~ 
Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to prOVide servl~es to man-
time transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), OJ L 173,16.7.1993, pp.33-35.1t IS notewor-
thy that the Directive is currently under modification following COM(1998)0251 and COD/1998/0 158, 
which is currently awaiting the Council common position; see file:IIIAlrrhe Observatory procedure 
view.htm. 
123 See European Commission, Update on the Single Market 1998, 
httg:lleuropa.eu.inticommJsg/sgb/infringementsJ pdfltext_rap98 _ en.pdf, p.51.. ., ",f 
24 See A. Kiandou-Pambouki, "Community Liberties in Maritime Transport" 10 I. Koukladls, The E -
fect of Community Law to Greek Private Law (1995, Sakkoulas, Athens), pp.181-195, at 193. 
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pIe working on vessels dealing with maritime cabotage. 125 The passing of a new legisla-
tive text, the clarity of its provisions and the lack of any derogations can be seen as a 
clear indication of the Commission's willingness to deal with the issue of maritime 
cabotage in a manner ensuring uniformity and compliance with existing EC law. 
D. EVALUATION OF FINDINGS 
The main aim of Chapter 5 was to prove one of the two main hypotheses of this thesis, 
namely that violations of EC law in the field of secondary establishment of public lim-
ited companies are still present after more than 40 years of European integration at the 
legal and political level. As France, Italy and Greece were the countries selected for 
analysis in the thesis, the chapter concentrated on examples of breaches there. Reference 
to national provisions in more than eight sample areas of law (see Table 3) proved that 
breaches of the companies' freedom of establishment are very much a problem in all 
three selected countries. Admittedly, the sample legislation selected represents some of 
the most persistent and widely applicable breaches of EC law. Although these may, 
consequently, be seen as a set of cases of extreme non-compliance, they still prove be-
yond doubt the existence of violations of the freedom of establishment which adversely 
affect the formation and functioning of secondary units. This observation seems to clash 
with the negative findings of violations in the evaluation of the formal conditions for the 
recognition and establishment of such units reached in Chapters 3 and 4. However, there 
is no discrepancy in the concluding remarks of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Consideration of the 
relevant findings in conjunction indicates that, quite simply, the three selected Member 
States have abolished the easily traceable prohibitions of establishment (which by de-
fault refer to the formal prerequisites for the recognition and establishment of secondary 
units), but have maintained a regime of restrictions in the substantive conditions for the 
establishment and functioning of foreign secondary units. 
This finding justifies the methodological choice to look closer both into the for-
mal and the substantive conditions of establishment. It is also consistent with the fact 
that most breaches still present appear to be well camouflaged in indirectly discrimina-
tory cases which may be equally disruptive for the activity of foreign secondary units, 
but (from a legal point of view) are far more difficult to detect. Research for this chapter 
revealed only one case of persistent direct violation, the case of Greek coaching schools. 
125 See Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 ~~­
plying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (mantlme 
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It is therefore evident that, although national legislation that clashes with Ee law is ob-
viously still in force, the national authorities of the three selected countries seem to have 
eradicated laws of obvious non-compliance. 
In fact, the analysis of indirect and disguised breaches has brought to light the, 
seemingly unidentified, effect that violations of Ee provisions in other areas of Ee law 
have on the establishment and functioning of foreign secondary units. Research has 
shown that breaches of other Ee legal provisions restrict the formation and functioning 
of secondary establishments considerably and, as such, also violate the companies' 
freedom of establishment. This has been demonstrated in the case of restrictions in the 
free movement of capital in Greece, provision of services for tourist guides and profes-
sions requiring recognition of diplomas, and in the area of maritime transport in all three 
selected countries. The main point of evaluation of this phenomenon refers to the large 
number and diverse nature of fields of commercial activity affected by breaches of Ee 
law in the area of the freedom of establishment. For the general evaluation of the find-
ings of this thesis it is significant to note that currently existing breaches of the freedom 
of establishment hamper the functioning of foreign secondary units dealing with a vari-
ety of commercial activities. In fact, the wide field of application of such breaches 
strengthens the initial assumption that research on this issue is worth pursuing. 
The second observation, which plays a primary role in the evaluation of the 
protection offered to foreign companies suffering damages due to breaches of their right 
to establishment, concerns their inability to use Eel judgements based on other chapters 
of the Treaty for claims for compensation referring to restrictions of the right to estab-
lishment. Since in some EU Member States, such as in Italy, the legal basis of a claim 
for compensation can only be a declared breach of relevant legislation, the declaration 
of the Eel that a particular administrative or legal practice is a violation of another as-
pect of the Treaty would not suffice for the successful achievement of compensation for 
damages resulting from breaches of the freedom of establishment. Even for the rest of 
the Member States, such as in France and Greece, where such a requirement is not in-
troduced by their national procedural provisions, the lack of a declared violation of the 
freedom of establishment would far from strengthen the case of the applicant company. 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the question is why are there, still, so 
many persistent violations in the area of secondary c~mpany establishment? In order to 
appreciate fully the extent of the problem, it is necessary to assess the nature and extent 
of the breaches analysed in this chapter. Although, the sample laws used as case-studies 
cabotage), OJ L 364,12.12.1992, p.7. 
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were selected on purpose from a wide field of areas of commercial activity, they do 
demonstrate the diverse number and nature of activities affected by breaches of EC law. 
Indeed, even a glance at the fields referred to in this chapter demonstrates that violations 
of EC law are spread in the widest possible array of activities, ranging from crude oil 
and maritime transport to commercial agents and transferable securities. 
The sheer volume of the breaches in the field of secondary company establish-
ment could signify a lack of effectiveness in the enforcement procedures of the EU. 
Could the reasons for the existence of so many persistent violations be the inability of, 
mainly, the Commission to identify such breaches?126 On the basis of the variety of 
fields of commercial activity affected by violations of EC legislation it is difficult to 
support the view that violations in the freedom of establishment only occur in obscure 
fields of law, which tend to escape the attention of willing but overloaded EU enforc-
ers.
127 In fact, if anything, the concentration of such violations in clusters of similar 
breaches in particular fields common to more than one Member States seems to facili-
tate their detection. 128 A primary example is that of maritime transport with a number of 
persistent breaches in all three selected Member States. 
It is also true that these persistent breaches were detected by the Commission, 
which referred them to the ECl. However, in all selected cases Member States tended to 
be usually unaffected by reasoned opinions by the Commission and ECl judgements on 
infringement proceedings. The examples of tourist guides and access to the national flag 
are the most prominent violations analysed in this chapter, shared by more than one of 
the selected Member States. In both cases, reasoned opinions by the Commission and 
even ECl judgements declaring the relevant legal or administrative practices illegal 
under EC law were ignored by the states in question, thus forcing the Commission to 
initiate proceedings under Art.228 a few years down the line. In fact, in the vast major-
ity of the cases used here Member States continued to violate EC law years after a 
damning judgement by the ECJ. 129 One of the longest examples of non-compliance with 
a prior ECl judgement concerns the French legislation on access to the French flag, 
126 The Commission has admitted that violations in the field of establishment are amongst the ~ost ~if­
ficult to resolve. See European Commission, "Progress on implementing Single Market legIslatIOn, 
op.cit., p.l ofthe Report. .' '11 
127 Blaise argues that the criterion of the Commission selectiveness in respect of the vlOl~tlOns they WI 
pursue concerns economics, i.e. which violations affect the fmancial prosperity of compames. See J.B. 
Blaise, "1993: L' entreprise dans Ie Marche unique" 29 [1993] RTDE pp.285-287, at 286. . . 
128 The Commission has recognised the need to "remove sectoral obstacles" to market mtegratlOn. See 
European Commission, "Action plan sets agenda", op.cit., p.1I of the Report.. h 
129 The Commission has acknowledged the need to introduce better enforc~ment mstru~ents ~or t I~ 
Single Market. See European Commission, "Impact and effectiveness of the Smgle Market , op. ell., p. 
of the Report. 
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condemned as illegal in 1996 after an initial judgement in 1973. Although one criterion 
for the selection of the breaches presented in this chapter was their persistent non-
compliance with reasoned opinions by the Commission and prior ECJ judgements, and 
do not therefore reflect the percentage of compliance generally achieved by these 
means, it is still quite surprising that there are so many cases of non-compliance in only 
one specific chapter of EC legislation. The reasons for this are worthy of further analy-
sis, as they tackle the effectiveness of the system of protection offered to foreign com-
panies at the national and EU levels. This is the topic of Chapters 6 and 7. 
However, it would be unfair to conclude that the jUdgements of the ECJ and the 
supervisory work of the Commission have no value. 130 It is precisely the relatively suc-
cessful combination of the two,131 which has limited the number of direct infringements 
of the freedom of establishment to fewer, usually persistent, breaches of indirect and 
disguised nature. The example of coaching schools in Greece reflects the attempts of 
Member States to invent innovative, indirect ways in which to protect their interests 
against the freedom of establishment. 132 Equally demonstrative is the case of the Italian 
restrictions in the denomination and form of companies dealing in transferable securi-
ties, which -being more difficult to identify- has a better chance of passing undetected. 
It can therefore be stated that one of the reasons for the existence of so many 
persistent breaches of EC law in the area of secondary company establishment, which 
can be viewed as a reflection of the general level of compliance with EC law, lies with 
the evident inability of the ECJ and the Commission to play their role as enforcers effi-
ciently. However, this observation does not address the reason for the existence of such 
breaches in the first place. Although the role of the Commission is to ensure that EC law 
is implemented within the Member States and the role of the ECJ is to condemn viola-
tions, it is surely an obligation of Member States to comply with EC legislation without 
the need for further encouragement or persuasion by EU institutions. 
One reason for the number and extent of the breaches examined in this chapter 
could be the general level of compliance in these three particular countries. However, 
the findings of this chapter demonstrate that there is no truth in the commonly expressed 
stereotypical belief that there is considerable difference in the level of compliance 
130 See A. Silvestro-Littlechild and M. Silvestro, "L' hannonisation juridique et fiscale des societes" 
[1993] Revue du Marche Commun et de /' Union europeen, pp. 33-35, at 34. . . 
131 .. h' th C rt See European CommiSSion, Most mfrmgement cases are resolved before reac 109 e ou. 
"Strengths and weaknesses of the Single Market", op.cit., p.1I of the Report. k 
132 According to the Scoreboard, there is a steady improvement in the i~plementation of Single ~~. et 
legislation by Member States with a percentage of Direct,ives not yet applIed by all Member States a 109 
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amongst Member States. If anything, this research has shown that traditionally pro-
European France tends to breach EC legislation in the same manner and to comparable 
extent with traditionally defiant Italy. Similarly, older Member States (France and Italy) 
tend to have similar levels of non-compliance with the relatively newer Greece Th 
. us, 
the three chosen countries, with their seemingly diverse attitudes to compliance with EC 
law, share similar levels of non-transposition. Consequently, the selection of the three 
specific national legal systems seems to playa minor role in the justification of the ex-
istence of so many persistent breaches in the field of secondary company establishment. 
The possibility that the three selected Member States genuinely believed that 
their national legislation was in compliance with EC law seems to be excluded by the 
fact that in the vast majority of cases before the ECJ the three Member States felt the 
need to justify their violations by reference to exemptions from Arts.43-48, such as 
public interest or public authority. It is equally interesting that in many of the cases 
analysed in this chapter the accused Member States avoided to discuss the substance of 
their alleged breach altogether. The other possibility, that the three Member States 
somehow neglected to comply with EC law in the same field perhaps as a result of un-
successful and vague relevant EC provisions, seems to be eliminated by the number of 
relevant violations and the wide variety of fields affected by such violations. It is sig-
nificant that in many cases of breaches, such as the case of tourist guides, the relevant 
EC instruments are not considered unsuccessful by other countries which have already 
transposed them into their national laws. 
This line of thought can only lead to the conclusion that the violations in ques-
tion are not a result of genuine mistakes or gaps in the process of legislative drafting at 
EU level or transposition at national level. It looks as if Member States are well aware 
of the fact that they adversely affect the establishment and functioning of foreign secon-
dary units. Indeed, instead of attempting to comply with their EU obligation to trans-
pose, the Member States in question attempt to devise innovative ways to obstruct the 
detection of the breaches and to comply with the remedies introduced by the Commis-
sion and the ECJ. What is equally significant is that the violations used as case-studies 
occur in clusters of identical or similar breaches within the same area of commercial 
activity in all three selected countries. For the evaluation of this remark it is interesting 
to note the similarity in the legal systems of the three" selected countries, their common 
protectionist nature of commercial laws, and their similar geographical location. All 
to 14.9% compared to 26.7% in November 1997. See European Commission, "Progress on implementing 
Single Market legislation, op. cit., p.l of the Report. 
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selected countries are situated in the Mediterranean, which creates similar opportunities 
for sources of income, the most obvious of which are tourism and shipping. The occur-
rence of persistent breaches in these particular areas of trade, such as the violations re-
ferred to tourist guides and maritime transport, indicate that the reasons for the existence 
of such persistent breaches of Ee law is the protection of the national economies from 
the 'intrusion' of foreign secondary units in areas of commercial activity which are con-
sidered to be cornerstones of national income. This explains the similarity in the nature 
of the breaches. The similarity in the legal sources of such breaches is simple to iden-
tity. Since the legal systems of the three countries share a civil law structure and, very 
often, almost identical legislative texts, the legislative or administrative instruments 
chosen for the introduction of restrictive legislation or practice is obviously the same. 
It can therefore be stated that the combination of similar legislative texts with 
analogous sources of state income indicates that the main reason for the existence of 
cluster cases of protectionist legislation clearly reflects a similarity in the protectionist 
interests of the three states. These, rather than maliciously deciding to defy EC law in 
specific fields, attempt to reserve areas of commercial activity of particular importance 
to their economies to domestic companies. After all, it is not accidental that all three 
countries follow the theory of the real social seat for the determination of a company's 
nationality. It must be accepted, however, that the interpretation of the existence of the 
breaches used as case-studies in this chapter does not explain the obvious inability of 
the Commission and the Eel to force Member States to comply with Ee legislation. 
From the case-studies presented here it is evident that even when the Commission does 
identify the relevant violations and does fulfil its duty to refer the issue to the ECl, there 
is little guarantee that the violation in question will come to an end. In fact, the possibil-
ity of continuing violations remains even after the ECl has reached a relevant con-
demning judgement. The realistic danger of persistent violations of EC law in the area 
of establishment poses questions about the nature, extent and effectiveness of the pro-
tection offered to foreign secondary establishments whose interests are harmed by such 
breaches. The identification of these questions at national and EU level and their clarifi-
cation will be the subject of further discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Table 3 
Violations used as case-studies 
Direct Violations 
Pure Disguised 
Establishment of private schools (G) Exams on language fluency for teachers (G) 
National denominations for schools (G) 
. . . Indirect Violations 
Pure 
Transferable securities through 
branches or agencies (I) 
Trade in petroleum oil with obliga-
tory declaration of tankers (G) 
Commercial agents' registration (I 
and F) 
G= Greece 
F= France 
1= Italy 
Disguised 
Tourist guides (G, F, I) 
Recognition of qualifications (G, F, I) 
Capital import and export (G) 
Access to flag (G, F) 
Cabotage (G, F, I) 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Protection of Foreign Secondary Units 
at National Level 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the search of the main cause for the continuing occurrence of breaches of EC law in 
the field of company establishment, a possible reason put forward in Chapter 5 is the 
lack of effective enforcement mechanisms with which the three selected Member States 
could be encouraged to comply with EC legislation. These mechanisms offer judicial 
protection to foreign companies suffering damages as a result of breaches of EC law. 
The question is, what means are available to foreign companies suffering damages from 
such frequent breaches of EC law? More importantly, are they adequately effective? 
The second hypothesis of this thesis is that the protection currently offered to foreign 
companies suffering damages as a result of the Member States' violations in the field of 
company establishment is inadequate and ineffective. 
Judicial protection is offered to foreign companies at the national and EU levels. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the level of protection offered to foreign companies 
at the national level, that is before the national courts of the three selected countries. It is 
important to note that, for the purposes of this analysis, protection at the national level 
signifies judicial routes leading to compensation by use of the national courts. This in-
cludes national court cases where the state liability doctrine as a general principle of EC 
law is applied. In order to discuss protection at the national level in adequate depth the 
relevant procedure before the French, Italian and Greek courts will be presented. The 
method initially chosen for this presentation involved the analysis of the relevant proce-
dure before each Member State separately. However, "in the process of the research for 
this chapter it became obvious that the three selected countries share the same jurisdic-
tional divisions and very similar substantive and procedural provisions in this area of 
law. This resulted in the modification of the methodological approach of the chapter. 
169 
The chapter is structured in themes of topics which are important for the evaluation of 
the legal position. These are discussed by reference to the legislation of all three se-
lected countries. This approach facilitates the evaluation of the effectiveness of the leg-
islative regime in the three chosen Member States, which leads to the assessment of the 
protection offered to foreign secondary units at the national level. 
Specific emphasis is given to the choice of courts offered to foreign secondary 
units. As all three countries divide their courts into criminal, civil and administrative, 
the determination of the court with the jurisdiction to judge on the application of the 
company for compensation is crucial. Much more so for companies whose lex fori fol-
lows a unified court structure, where administrative courts are unknown. Another issue 
of particular importance refers to the special privileges granted to the state by special 
legislation. Such privileges may render the attempt of foreign companies to seek com-
pensation from the state a difficult task. Last but not least, the issue raised in Chapter 5 
on the possible difficulty faced by foreign companies wishing to achieve compensation 
for either non-declared breaches of Ee law or declared breaches of other chapters of the 
Treaties will be addressed. 
In July 1999 the new Greek Code of Administrative Procedure came into force. 1 
Albeit mainly a mere codification of pre-existing provisions, the new Code regulated 
some issues -such as enforcement of administrative judgements and the state's obliga-
tion to comply with administrative judgements- in a different manner. The novelty of 
the provisions and the consequent lack of interpretative works and implementing 
judgements, as well as the lack of an express declaration of the Greek legislator on the 
particular pre-existing provisions that are abolished or modified after the new Code, 
renders the final provisions of Greek law on these matters uncertain and unclear.2 For 
this reason, reference is made both to pre-existing laws and the new Articles of Code. 
B. BRIEF GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 
The main common feature of the French, Italian and Greek legal systems on the topic 
discussed in this chapter (which primarily led to the methodological decision to examine 
all three jurisdictions in parallel) refers to their court structure. In the widely acceptable, 
classical Dutreil classification on the administratiori of justice in Europe, the three 
countries fall within the group of jurisdictions which follow the Latin model commonly 
I See Law 2727/1999 Code of Administrative Procedure, <I>EK 97 A'/17.S.1999. , 
2 See A. Karamichalelis, "The new Code of Administrative Procedure", 3 [1999] Evv1lYop0C;, pp.26-29. 
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found in the countries of the Council of Europe.3 The main characteristic of this model 
is the existence of a separate administrative jurisdiction which is headed by an institu-
tion acting as the highest administrative court and also as the legal councillor of the 
government. 
4 
Indeed, in all three selected countries there is a separate court structure for 
administrative justice headed by the French Conseil d'Etat, the Greek LVJ1.fio6A.zO 
ETrIKparsiac; (Council of the State) and the Italian Consiglio di Stato.s 
The main legal basis for the introduction of a third type of courts, apart from the 
civil and criminal, in all three selected countries lies with the basic constitutional princi-
ple of the separation of powers. The principle signifies that ordinary courts are not com-
petent to hear disputes of an administrative character.6 A contrary solution would lead to 
the unacceptable situation of the jUdiciary controlling the legislature and the executive. 
This would be a breach of the doctrine of the separation of judiciary, executive and leg-
islature as the three distinctive functions of a modern democratic state. 7 It is important 
to note that the principle of the separation of powers and the consequent doctrine of the 
independent judiciary constitute a legal argument which justifies, rather than abolishes, 
the judicial control of the administration. In order to secure obedience to the law from 
both the administration and the judiciary, the Constitution of all three countries intro-
duces judicial control over the legality of administrative acts. In view of the principle of 
the separation of powers, this judicial control is awarded by the administrative courts.8 
As a general rule, therefore, the judicial control of acts of the legislature and the 
administration (including the government) in all three selected countries is conducted by 
the administrative courts. For the purposes of this thesis and for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the protection offered to companies suffering damages as a result of 
breaches of EC law on the freedom of establishment by the three chosen countries, it is 
necessary to establish the type of national courts which have the jurisdiction to judge on 
the claim of such companies for compensation. 
3 See R. Dutreil, "L 'administration et les juges en Europe" Rivista trimestrielle di diritt~ pu?b~ic~ 4~ 
[1992] 1017-1025, at 1017. The other two groups are the countries of separate adm.in~strat~ve ~ur~sd .. ct~on 
(the German model) and the countries of the British model, where no separate admInlstratlve JUrIsdlctlOn 
is recognised. 
4 See ibid, p.l018. 
S See Ph Vegleris Administrative Justice and its Problems (1977, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.31. 
. , . d ) 46 
6 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, The French Legal System (1996, Sweet and Maxwell, Lon on , p. . 
7 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, Droit administratif(l994, Dalloz, Paris), pp.9 and 14; also see T.G. 
Waitkin, The Italian Legal Tradition (1997, AshgatelDartmouth, AldershotiBrookfield 
USNSingapore/Sydney), p.151. L 
8 See P. Dagtoglou, Administrative Procedural Law (1994, Sakkoulas, Athen~), pp.74-75; also s~e . 
Bocchi, "Considerazioni suI processo amministrativo: tra ipotesi di riforma costltuzlOnale e recentl nor-
mative ordinarie" 74 [1998] Foro amministrativo, pp.288-300, at 288. 
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C. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS 
In order to detennine the national courts with the competence to judge on breaches of 
EC law similar to those analysed in this thesis, it is necessary to establish the type of 
liability incurred. This can only be achieved through the identification of the possible 
case scenarios which may be presented before the national judges by secondary com-
pany units seeking compensation for damages suffered as a result of breaches of EC law 
by the state. These possible case scenarios can be divided into two wide categories, 
namely breaches resulting from national legislative measures which restrict the compa-
nies' freedom of establishment unjustifiably and are therefore illegal under EC law, and, 
perhaps more frequently, acts or omissions of the administration which restrict the free-
dom of establishment in breach of primary and secondary EC legislation.9 
In the first type of violations, companies suffer damage as a result of a national 
binding legislative text which brings in a legislative measure introduced in a discrimi-
natory manner for the protection of domestic companies. Examples of such breaches of 
EC law include the restrictive national laws on tourist guides in all three states, the law 
on commercial agents in Italy and France, and the Greek laws which restrict the export 
of capital analysed in Chapter 5. It must be noted that in this type of breach the mere 
existence of an illegal national legislative text suffices, as long as the law is still in 
force. The company suffering damages due to this legislation will turn against the na-
tional legislature for its failure to comply with its obligation to abolish all measures in 
clash with EC law and to refrain from introducing new illegal legislative texts. 
In the second -most frequent- type of violations, the company will turn against 
the administrative authorities of the state which restrict trade in a discriminatory manner 
through prohibiting administrative acts. In this second type of violations the existence of 
a discriminatory legislative framework does not suffice. The company must have re-
quested permission to either establish within the state or to pursue a type of commercial 
activity there and the pennission must have been denied. In this case, the illegality of 
the state's treatment of the foreign company lies with a particular administrative act 
which is illegal under EC law, even though it may be legal under national law. For ex-
ample, in the case of Greek law on private schools, the company seeking compensation 
must have applied to the Minister of Education for permission to establish in Greece and 
that application must have been rejected on the basis of the company's nationality. 
Omissions of the state may also constitute sources of state liability. The state's omission 
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to consider the company's application for pennission to establish or trade within rea-
sonable time, its omission to proceed to necessary internal operations, or even its fore-
stalling to proceed to material acts necessary for the completion of the requested task 
may constitute the basis of a claim for compensation by the state. 10 
From this analysis it is clear that the same national laws may constitute the 
source of compensation under both types of violations. However, in the first type it is 
the illegality of the legislative regime which constitutes the basis of the company's 
claim, whereas in the second the basis of the claim is a concrete illegal administrative 
act issued on the basis of this illegal legislative regime. Although in both situations the 
state is clearly at wrong, it must be admitted that it is in the second type of violation 
where the case of the company is stronger, at least in practice. This is due to four main 
facts. First, the company will be turning against a published act and not a general legal 
regime whose interpretation and application in practice can be debated by the state. 
Second, the act is issued by a concrete organ of the state (basically the respective Min-
ister) that can be identified beyond doubt and easily called to the stand to clarify the 
state's position. Third, the administrative act in question will inevitably include the jus-
tification of the state's refusal to allow the establishment or pursuance of activity of the 
foreign company. This justification is indicative of the reasoning of the state and will 
guide both the applicant company and, ultimately, the court in the evaluation of the ar-
guments of the state and the legality of its policy. Fourth, it is fair to say that the liabil-
ity of the state for legislative acts is a very recent doctrine mainly introduced through 
the recent case-law of the EeJ. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, in the three se-
lected countries the success of the relevant claim for compensation is uncertain. 
Cl. The choice of national court 
In France and Greece disputes involving "the administration of the state" are brought 
before the administrative, rather than the ordinary courts. II Disputes are defined as is-
I · 12 In sues on which there is legal doubt which is presented before the court for reso utlOn. 
an attempt to clarify the complex distinction between disputes falling within the juris-
diction of the administrative courts and those falling within the ordinary jurisdiction, 
9 See E. Spiliotopoulos, Droit administratif he/lenique (1991, LG DJ , Paris), pp.163-164. 
10 See ibid, pp.164-165. Also see ~tE 1218178, ToE, 1978, 367; ~tE 4677/83. / 
11 See G. Danet Batonnier and B. Weiss-Gout, "France" in M. Sh:rida~ and J. Cameron, EC ir:~~e-8' 
Systems: An Introductory Guide (1992, Butterworths, LondoJl-Dublm-Edmburgh-Brussels), p. , 
also see Y. Gramatides, "Greece", ibid, at Greece-S. 
12 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op. cit., p.lll. 
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Cairns and McKeon state that administrative disputes are those that involve the admini-
stration in the widest possible meaning of the term. This includes "any administrative 
unit, be it the state itself or the smallest local authority".13 Katras defines administrative 
disputes as those involving a legal debate between the state and the citizen.14 The crite-
rion of the public legal personality of one of the plaintiffs is used by Spiliotopoulos, 
who defines administrative liability as the liability of public legal persons. IS This crite-
rion is reminiscent of the notion of service public as the determining factor for the clas-
sification of disputes as administrative. According to the older case-law of French and 
Greek administrative courts, all actions falling within the organisation and functioning 
of general and local public services constitute administrative operations giving rise to 
administrative disputes. 16 Despite its support in the case-law of the French courts, this 
criterion has been strongly criticised for imprecision in the dividing line between private 
and public persons, inability to adapt to the complexity and diversity of contemporary 
social and commercial transactions, and unawareness of the common aim of private and 
public law rules, which is the introduction of legal provisions aiming at the protection of 
the general interests of society.17 The recent introduction of private contracts in the 
functioning of traditional public services and the increasing state commercial and in-
dustrial activity has led to a wide recognition of the fact that the notion of public service 
is no longer a suitable criterion for the detennination of the competent court. 18 The cur-
rently prevailing criterion for the distinction between ordinary and administrate compe-
tence lies therefore with the nature of the provisions applicable in each case,19 or -
expressed in a different manner- with the existence of an administrative activity as the 
13 See W. Cairns and R. McKeon, Introduction to French Law (1995, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
London), p.13 8. 
14 See I. Katras, Codification of Administrative Procedure (1996, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.1237. 
IS See E. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., p.l60. 
16 See C.E., 6 fev. 1903, Gr. Ar., no 12, conct. Romieu, Rec., p.94; also see T.C., 8 fev. 1873, Blanco, 
Gr. Ar., 15; T.C., 29 fev. 1908, Feutry, Gr. Ar., no 20; T.C., 13 avr. 1908, de Fonscolombe, Rec., p.448; 
C.E.,4 mars 1910, Therond, Gr. Ar., no 24; C.E., 20 avril 1956, Epoux Bertin, Gr. Ar., no 91, conct. 
Long, note Waline, R.D.P., 1956, p.869; C.E., 12 avril 1957, Mimouni, D., 1957, p.413, conct. Talcot, 
note P.LJ.; C.E., 19 oct. 1956, Soc.Le Beton, Gr. Ar., no 92, conct. Long, D., 1956, p.81. 
Also see Athens Court of Appeal 4163/87, Elliv1], 1987,942; Athens Court of Appeal 7261/86, 
EAk:1v1], 1986, 156; An 418178, NoB, 1978, 192. 
17 See C. Dadomo and S. Faran, op.cit., p.22. . 
18 See C.E., 31 juil. 1912, Ste des gran its prophyrordes des Vosges, Gr. Ar., no 29; T.C., 22J~~~'8~921, 
Ste Commercile de I 'Ouest africain, Gr. Ar., no 40; C.E., 28 juin 1963, Narcy, R .. D.P., 196~, p. 1953 
C.E., 22 nov. 1974, Federation des industries du sport, J.c.P., 1975, I, NO 2724, C.E., 23 Janv .. T C' 26 
Audoin, J.c.P., 1954, II, no 7916, note Vedel; C.E., 13 juillet 1967, Allegretto, A.J.' ~967, p.538, 4 ii 
mai 1954, Moritz, J.c.P., 1954, II, no 8334, note Vedel; C.E., 5 fev. 1954, EI Hamldw, J,C~'A ~~ A dU 
NO 8136; T.C., 10 juillet 1965, Ste Bourgogne-Bois, Rec., p.586; C.E., 13 octobre 1973, A . .... . 
Rhone, D., 1979, p.249, note Amselek et Waline. 
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source of the dispute.
2o 
If the activity at the source of the dispute is of a private nature, 
then the actions of the administration fall within the scope of private disputes and are 
judged on the basis of civil law by the ordinary courtS.21 If, however, the administration 
acts within its competence of public power, applicable are the provisions of administra-
tive law and any dispute must be brought before the administrative COurtS. 22 Thus, as 
Dickson notes, administrative courts judge on disputes "concerned with relationships in 
public law, or which relate to situations or powers which are different from those in-
volving private individuals".23 
In the case of the disputes of interest to this analysis, there is little doubt that it is 
the administrative courts which have the competence to hear the case. It is obvious that 
the state uses public power when passing a national law or issuing an administrative act 
rejecting the application of the foreign establishment.24 Moreover, the interpretation of 
the Treaties and the compatibility of French law with the provisions of EC legislation 
falls within the competence of the administrative judge.2s As Dantonel-Cor pus it, it is 
the task of the administrative judge to ensure that EC nonnative texts are applied in 
France.26 The question is whether the French administrative courts can also hear claims 
for compensation or whether their competence is limited to applications for annulment 
of illegal administrative acts or declarations of illegality of nonnative legislative texts. 
The widely accepted position is that although companies are expected to attack the va-
lidity of the legislative provision grounding the administrative decision in the individual 
case,27 even simple claims for compensation against the legislature or the administrative 
authorities of the state are heard before the administrative courts. A contrary solution 
19 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, Droit administratif(1994, Dalloz, Paris), p.146; also see AE~ 5, 6, 8, 9 
AE6, LlLl, 1989, 779; Athens Three-member Administrative Court of First Instance 15222/90, LlLl, 1991, 
1067. 
20 See P. Georges, op. cit. , p.254; also see G. Mitsopoulos, Civil Procedure A · (1972, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens), p.1 05. 
21 See C.E., 5 fev. 1954, EI Hamidia. Rec., p.77; T.C., 15 janv. 1968, Air-France c. Epoux Barbier, . 
R.D.P., 1968, p.393; T.C., 22 janv. 1921, Bac D' Eloka, Gr. Ar., no 40; C.E., 21 avril 1962, Dame Agnesl, 
0.1962, p.535; also see An 132179, ToE, 1986, 177. 
22 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.112. 
23 See B. Dickson, Introduction to French Law (1994, Pitman Publishing, London), p.30. 
24 See M. Jarvis, The Application ofEC Law by National Courts: The Free Movement of Goods i~998, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.398-399; also see C.E., 23 mars 1984, Alivar, Rec. Lebon, 1984, p.l , 
RTDE, 1984, 341. .
2S See C.E., 29 juin 1990, GISTI, unreported; also see B. Stirn, "Le Conseil d'Etat et Ie drOIt cO.m-
munautaire, 49 (1993) Actualite Juridique: Droit Administratif, pp.244-246, at 244; for the ne.g~tJve ~e­
sponse of the Conseil d'Etat on this matter until 1989, see N. Brown and J. Bell, French AdmlnlStrallve 
Law (1998, Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.284-286. . . d dr 't 
26 See N. Dantonel-Cor, "La mise en jour de la responsabilite de l'Etat fran9ais pour VIOlatIOn u 01 
communautaire" 31 [1995] RTDE, pp.471-507, at 472. 
27 See N. Brown and 1. Bell, op.cit., p.286. 
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would "undermine the separation of administrative and judicial authorities".28 In any 
case, claims for compensation for damages resulting from legislative texts in breach of 
EC law has been considered admissible by administrative courtS.29 Similarly, admissible 
by administrative courts are claims for compensation for wrongful administrative acts.30 
In Greece the determination of the courts with the jurisdiction to judge on such 
claims for compensation against the state was expressly introduced by Law 1406/1983, 
which was based on the general provisions of Arts.94 and 95 of the Constitution of 
1975/86. According to these provisions, which were re-affirmed by Arts. 1, 2 and 71 of 
the Greek Code of Administrative Procedure, administrative disputes (and only admin-
istrative disputes)31 are heard exclusively before the administrative COurtS.32 Claims for 
state liability are disputes falling within the competence of the ordinary administrative 
courts which have jurisdiction in matters of plein contientieux, that is of claims for 
compensation.33 One type of relevant claims are requests for compensation based on the 
"non passing of legislative or administrative provisions for the complete adaptation of 
Greek law with EC legislation [ ... J in the area of free establishment".34 Such claims may 
be heard by the administrative courts during the trial for the annulment of the illegal 
administrative act or the declaration of the illegality of the law.35 
The Italian position on this issue is different. The determination of the courts 
which can adjudicate in the cases of the breaches of EC law examined in this thesis is 
based on the distinction between subjective rights and legitimate interests. Disputes de-
riving from subjective rights are brought before the civil courts and disputes deriving 
from legitimate interests are judged by the administrative COurtS.36 The French and 
28 See P. Georges, Droit public: Concours administratifs (1992, Sirey, Paris), p.349. 
29 See, for example, Cour administrative d'appel de Paris (form. plen.), 1 juillet 1992, Ste Jacques 
Dangeville, AJ, 1992, p.768. 30 See, for example, CE, 28 fev.1992, AJ, 1992, p.210. 
31 Civil disputes may not be added to the jurisdiction of administrative courts, not even by law. See 
AE~ 1/91, Elliv'l, 1991, 1480; OAAn 490/82 NoB, 1982,204; OAAn 488/82, Elliv'l, 1982,29. 32 See An 595/85, Elliv'l, 1985, 300. 
33 See Athens Court of Appeal 1878/88, Elliv'l, 1988, 349; Athens Court of Appeal 13605/88, 
Elli v'l , 1988,361; Athens Tri-member Court of First Instance 860/88, L1u1IK, 1, 122; Athens Court of 
Appeal 7711/87, Elliv'l, 1987,329; Athens Administrative Court of Appeal 171.1/89, ~u1I~, 1, 1362. 
34 See S. Koukouli-Spiliotopoulou, "Issues arising from the effect of Commumty legislatIOn to the pro-
vision of judicial protection" [1992] NoB, pp.825-847, at 845. 
35 See Art.26 of Presidential Decree 341178, <l>EK 71/10.5.1978, as codified in Art.124 (1) .C?de o( Ad-
ministrative Procedure; also see A. Liagas, "General introduction on the competence of.a~irmmstratl~e. 
courts" in A. Liagas, V. Skouris and A. Sofialidis, Delimitation of the Competence ofClvz/ and AdminiS-
trative Courts (1990, Sakkoulas, Thessaloniki), pp.5-25, at 17; l:'tE 4052/1985, L1L1, 1986, 180. . 
36 See G. Manca, A. Corrao and L. Longo, "Italy" in M. Sheridan and 1. Cameron, EC Legal Systems. 
An Introductory Guide (1992, Butterworths, London!DublinlEdinburghIBrussels), p.Italy-23; also s~~~. 
Certoma The Italian Legal System (1985, Butterworths, London), p.251; Casso sez. un., 1 ottobre 1 , 15 
n.5030, Giust. civ., 1982, 1,2916; Cassazione 18 novembre 1977, n.5042, Giust. civ., 1978, 1,19; Casso 
176 
Greek criterion of the nature of the applicable provisions is irrelevant in Ital Th y. us, 
even in administrative disputes the ordinary courts adjudicate over subjective rights.37 
Despite the crucial importance of the distinction between the concepts of legitimate in-
terests and subjective rights for the application of Italian law, they have not been ade-
quately interpreted by the Italian courtS.38 Doctrine suggests that for the establishment of 
a subjective right the existence of a general legitimate interest is inadequate: what is re-
quired, is not only the illegitimacy and inappropriateness of the act or fact, but the ac-
ceptance that "a perfect and entrusted subjective right has been harmed".39 Doctrine also 
accepts that the jurisdiction of ordinary courts in disputes deriving from acts of the state 
is limited to the examination of the effects of the act for the applicant, which may not 
extend to the revocation or modification of the act. 40 
In the case of disputes deriving from refusals of requests for authorisations to 
establish or trade in Italy, the subject matter is not the right to establish or trade but the 
exercise of these rights. The latter gives rise to subjective rights which fall within the 
jurisdiction of ordinary judges.41 Similarly, disputes deriving from non-discretional reg-
istration in professional organisations as a condition for permission to trade in Italy are 
adjudicated by the ordinary courtS.42 However, an action for mere annulment of the ad-
ministrative act turns against its legitimacy. It attacks the legitimate interest to establish 
or trade, which (being a legitimate interest) is a matter for the administrative COurtS.43 
This observation is not too dissimilar to the conclusion reached in the analysis of 
the French and Greek positions. In all three countries only administrative judges may 
judge on the legality of administrative or legislative acts. However, there is one signifi-
cant difference. In France and Greece the applicant company will submit its claim for 
compensation to the administrative judge who also has the competence to award dam-
ages. Italian law, however, has to take into account the persistent case-law of the Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione, which accepts civil liability of the administration only if a le-
novembre 1983, n. 6767, Foro it., 1984, 1,1009; Casso 15 ottobre 1980, n.5456, Foro it., 1981, 1,2530; 
Casso 14 ottobre 1972, n.3060, unreported. 
37 See T. Watkin, The Italian Legal Tradition (1997, AshgatelDartmouth, AldershotiBrookfield 
USA/Singapore/ Sydney), p.151. 
38 See La C. cost., 25 marzo 1980, n.35, Foro it., 1980, I, 889 
39 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.330.. .' . 
40 See M. Severo Giannini and A. Piras, "Giurisdizione amministrativa" in Enciclopedla del dmtto 
(1970, Giuffre, Milano), pp.229-294, at 270. 
41 See, ibid, p.276. 
42 See Cons. St., sez. IV, 11 maggio 1966, n. 370, Cons',St .. , ~966, 92~. -712 at 
43 See Casso civ., 9 giugno 1995, n. 6542, Responsabilita CIVile e prevldenza 60 (1995), pp.71~40' aiso 
711; also see Cass., 4 marzo 1985, n.1808; Tribunale Roma, 20 marzo 1987, Foro am., 1987,3 , 
see N. Brown and 1. Bell, op.cit., p.273. 
177 
gitimate interest has been found to be injured.44 Thus, for the establishment of civil li-
ability, the company will have to prove as a conditio sine qua non45 hann to a legitimate 
interest. As this can only be declared before the administrative courts, there seems to be 
only one legal route for the company: first attack the act before the administrative courts 
and then seek compensation for damages before the ordinary civil COurtS.46 This has led 
Benvenuti to state that, quite simply, the existence of subjective rights signifies the lack 
of a valid administrative act, and the existence of an administrative or legislative act ex-
cludes any ground for recourse before the ordinary courtS.47 Similarly, many authors 
note that a claim for compensation pre-supposes the annulment of the act giving rise to 
the dispute.48 This position reflects the change in the case-law of the Corte di Cassazi-
one, which no longer accepts the evaluation of the legality of an act by the civil court as 
a preliminary issue, or the simple non-application of the act by the civil judge.49 
In the particular case of claims for compensation against the Italian state for its 
failure to comply with its ED obligations, the Corte di Cassazione has held that claims 
based on any legislative or administrative act which leaves even the smallest margin of 
discretion to the state (either in the evaluation of the fulfilment of certain generically 
introduced conditions or in the determination of compliance with national acts) gives 
rise to legitimate interests which are protected, at least in the first place, by the admin-
istrative courts. These legitimate interests give rise to subjective rights, for which com-
pensation may be sought only after the annulment of the relevant legislative or admin-
istrative measure. so Claims based on legislative or administrative measures which leave 
44 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, Manuale di diritto amministrativo (1990, Giuffre, Milano), p.330. 
4S "R b·l·t). See Cass., 5 ottobre 1979, n.5145; also see Cass., 5 ottobre 1979, n.5146; F. Satta, esponsa I I C1 
della pubblica amministrazione" in Enciclopedia del diritto (1988, Giuffre, Milano), pp.1369-1381, 
atl374. 
46 See Cass., sez.un., 22 ottobre 1984, n.5361, Foro it., 1985, 1,2358; Cass., 6 aprile 1983, n.2443, 
Foro it. 1983 I 2498' Casso 1 ottobre 1982, n.5027, Foro it., 1982, 1,2433; Cass., 16 luglio 1985, n. 
4151, Foro it.: 1'986, I: 2206;' also see V. Caianiello, "11 giudice amministrativo ed i nu~vi c~iteri di riparto 
delle giurisdizioni" 74 [1998] Foro amministrativo, pp.1943-1955, at 1946; also see Tnb. dl.Roma, 23 
settembre 1987, Giust. civ., 1988, 785, which states that the prohibition to open a pharma.cy I.S a ~ere. 
interresso legitimo and cannot give rise to claims for compensation until the relevant subjective nght IS 
born through the annulment of the act. . . 
47 See F. Benvenuti, "Giustizia amministrativa", Enciclopedia di diritto (1970, GIUffre, Milano), pp. 
588-612, at 602; however, see contra Corte cost., 8 maggio 1998, n.165, Giur.it., 1998, 1929. 
48 See A. Toscano, "La responsabilita civile della p.a.", 38 (1988) Giustizia civile, pp.l 042-1 045, ~t 
1042-1043; G. Zanobini, Corso di diritto amministrativo (1958, Giuffre, Milano), p.339; also see Tnb. 
Roma, sez. I, 30 giugno 1987, Giust. civ., 1988, 1041. . 
49 See Cass civ 9 giugno 1995 n. 6542 Responsabilita civile e previdenza 60 (1995), pp. 710-712, 
. ., " . ' S 22 ttobre 
which signaled a departure from the then prevailing view reflected m Casso CIV., ez. un., . 0 ., of 
1984 n 5361 Resp CN' prev 1985 625 The latter decision referred to the case where the Illegitimacy 
,. , . . ., , . . . . ee M Cerrato 
the act leads to its non-application by the civil court. For an analYSIS of the ~l~er P?SltlOn, s 2049 ' 
"11 giudice amministrativo e Ie direttive comunitarie" 70 [1~94] Foro ammmlsirallvo, pp.2010- , at 
2026. . 
so See Cass., sez. un., 18 giugno 1981, n.3967, Giust. civ., 1981,2217. 
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absolutely no ground for discretion to the state give rise to subjective rights which are 
directly adjudicated by the civil courtS.51 In any case, violations of EC law constitute the 
source of civil liability of the state and are mainly heard by the administrative COurtS.52 
The latter may take into account judgements of the ECJ declaring that the relevant leg-
islative or administrative practises are in breach ofEC law. 
This brief reference to the problem of the determination of the court with the ju-
risdiction to judge on claims of foreign secondary establishments against the French, 
Greek and Italian state has led to the conclusion that in all three states claims for com-
pensation against the state for breaches of EC law fall mainly within the competence of 
the administrative courts. The situation is quite clear in Greece, where the issue is re-
solved by the express provision of Law 1406/83, as amended by Arts. 1 , 2 and 71 of the 
new Code of Administrative Procedure, which subjects all claims for compensation 
against the state to the administrative courts. This provision is successful in creating a 
situation of legal certainty for foreign companies. In France the position seems to be 
equally clear. Indeed, the French legislator has attempted -and to a certain degree has 
managed- to clarify the French position through the Law of 16-24 August 1790 in com-
bination with a series of judgements by the French courts. It must be accepted, however, 
that the general terms in which this ancient law is expressed in combination with the 
lack of a strict doctrine of precedent in French law poses some uncertainty over the ex-
act distinction between the ordinary and administrative competence in each particular 
case. This has led to the criticism, albeit mild, of the French system for lack of specific 
provisions which would delimit beyond dispute the two competencies. 53 
Unfortunately, the Italian system is even less clear. In fact, the complex and 
fluid distinction between legitimate interests and subjective rights has been severely 
criticised for abolition of all commercial stability and legal certainty, for limitation to 
the access of individuals to compensation and for the "typically Italian discourtesy" of 
its encouragement of subsequent trials between the administrativ~ and the civil courts 
for the final achievement of compensation. 54 Some authors support the view that this 
criterion should be abandoned in favour of "a clearer distinction on the basis of con-
tent", if only as a sign of the Italian willingness to contribute to the harmonisation of 
51 See C.S., 26 aprile 1977, n.1561; sent. 15 ottobre 1975, n.3334; sent. 18 settembre 19?0, n.1572. 
52 See Cons. St., Sez. V, 4 novembre 1991, Foro am., 1994, 11,1257; Sez. IV, 18 genn~l? 1996'i~~~bre 
Giust. civ., 1996, 1191; Sez. 11,19 giugno 1991, n.570, Foro it., 1994, III, 66;.TA~ Sardm~a, 22 d 
1994, n.2204, TAR, 1995, I, 944; TAR Calabria, 19 dicembr~ 1989, n. 502, RlV. del appaltl, 1990, 133. 
53 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.248. 
54 See V. Caianiello, op. cit., pp. 1946 and 1948. 
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administrative laws within the EU.sS Another point of criticism refers to the consequent 
subjective criterion for the classification of acts and disputes,s6 which may only lead to 
further confusion on the choice of the competent courts.S7 A third point of concern refers 
to the introduction of a dual jurisdiction. It is felt that the complex rules on the compe-
tence of the courts to judge on claims for compensation creates difficulty and confusion 
as to the court with the competence to hear each dispute.s8 Moreover, due to the lack of 
a strict doctrine of precedent in civil law jurisdictions, the jUdgements of the adminis-
trative courts seem to be of intermediary rather than final value for the civil judge, who 
may decide to apply or merely consult them for the final formation of a judgement. S9 
When analysed with reference to claims for compensation for state liability for 
breaches of EC law, the Italian position creates two additional points of unease. The 
first point concerns the need of foreign companies to establish the non-compliance of 
the act or law giving rise to state liability before the claim for compensation is heard. 
Since many breaches of EC law never reach the ECl while many Eel judgements rest 
in the declaration of breach of merely one relevant Ee provision, it seems that foreign 
establishments will often have to undergo the additional burden of proving its non-
compliance with the freedom of establishment. This will inevitably take place before the 
national courts under the procedure of preliminary rulings, whose effectiveness is under 
debate,60 as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7. This is even more significant, if the need 
for two separate actions before two different national courts is taken into account. Thus, 
the second point of concern refers to the possible effectiveness of the protection offered 
to companies by a system which refers them to two different national judges, who may 
lack in knowledge and willingness to identify the issue as one of Ee law, or to recog-
nise the necessity to apply EC rather than national legal provisions.61 
ss See L. Bocchi, op. cit., p.290; for reference to doctrine supporting this view see ibid, note 8. 
S6 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op. cit. , p.224. ., . 
S7 See B. Spampinato, "Sull'estensione della giurisdizione amministrativa agh attl del prIvato conces-
sionario",73 [1997] Foro amministrativo, pp.977-998, at 977. . . 
S8 • • •• .., t' I ?" 66 [1990) Foro ammlnlstra-See E. Reggio d'AcI, "Verso una glUstlzla ammmlstrattva s~s anzla e. , 
tivo, pp.2515-2531, at 2526. 
S9 See H. Simon II comportamento amministrativo (1979, Bologna), p.106. . . . . 
60 See M. Chiti, :'1 signori del diritto comunitario: la corte di giustizia e 10 sviluppo del dmtto arnrnlnlS-
trativo europeo", 41 [1991] Rivista trimestriale di diritto pubblico, pp. 798-831, at 821-~22. . f 
61 See Trib. Parma, 23 avrile 1994, Foro it., 1994, I, 2526, which stated that the n~n-I~p:~rnent~~~~i~n 
a directive does not need to be declared by the ECJ, but national courts must ascertam weer a s 
of non-compliance with EC law exists. 
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C2. The choice of the suitable remedy before the national courts 
In the three selected jurisdictions the first forum for the hearing of cases of breaches of 
EC law by the state is the administrative courtS.62 In France and Greece the case is heard 
in a single trial, where the court decides on the annulment of the illegal administrative 
act or the declaration of illegality of the illegal national legislative measure, ands on the 
claim of the company for compensation. In Italy, however, the initial process before the 
administrative courts which annuls the measure in question is followed by a second 
heari~g brought before the civil courts which adjudicate on the claim for compensation. 
Before proceeding with the determination of the suitable remedy for the submission of 
the companies' claim, it must be noted that -as established in Chapter 3- foreign compa-
nies are recognised ipso jure within the three selected countries. Since secondary units 
lack separate legal personality, it is the recognised foreign company which has the right 
to submit a claim for compensation before the national courts. 
In order to achieve a full examination of all aspects of the case, including an 
evaluation of the legality of the measure giving rise to liability and the claim for com-
pensation, the company suffering damages will make use of the French unrestricted ac-
tion (contentieux de pleine jurisdiction) or the similar Greek prosfygi brought on any 
possible ground of law or fact for the assessment of actions in tort against the state 
(contentieux de la responsabilite').63 This action takes into account the whole adminis-
trative or legislative activity, not only under the profile of legitimacy, but also the 
evaluation of fact and merit.64 In other words, the power awarded to the administrative 
judge in this type of action is far more extensive compared to actions for mere annul-
ment: the judge is asked to acknowledge the existence of a right, to declare an illegal 
harm to this right and to rectify this situation.65 Within this last framework the judge 
may even amend the illegal act. 66 The action is open to the beneficiaries of the legal 
right whose damage is claimed, or their legal successors,67 and it is only these persons 
62 Since the aim of this chapter is to evaluate the judicial protection offered to companies i? the three 
selected countries administrative remedies heard internally by administrative organs are outSide the scope 
of this analysis and will not be referred to here. For administrative remedies in France and Italy, see M. 
Protio "La rifonna del contentieux administratif' 72 [1996] Foro amministrativo, pp.2117 -2162;also see 
B. Padteau, Contientieux administratif(1997, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris). 
63 See W. Cairns and R. McKeon, op.cit., ppI42-143; also see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.479; N. 
Soleidakis, Application/or Compensation (1998, Nomiki Vivliothiki, Athens). 
64 See G. Landie and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.674; also see N. Brown and 1. Bell, op.cit., p.277. 
65 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.18l. 
66 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op. cit. , p.224; also see P .. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., ~.465. . . 
67 See Art.24 , par. 1 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341178, <l>EK 71 A'/l0.5.1978 In combmatlon 
with Art.4 of Law 1406/83, <l>EK 182 A'/14.12.1983; as codified by Art.71 CAP. 
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who are legally bound by the court's judgement.68 Last but not least, with this type of 
action, the company may seek both the annulment of the act and compensation for dam-
ages suffered.
69 
This joint action is of particular use to companies which may have suf-
fered damages in the past as a result of breaches of EC law by the Greek and French na-
tional authorities, but they still wish to establish and pursue their activities in these 
countries in the future. In this case, the companies' action before the courts will both 
achieve compensation for damages suffered in the past, as well as ensure the future ob-
servance of their legal rights by the national authorities. 
In Italy, however, such a wide examination of a case is impossible. In the first, 
administrative stage of the action, the company has to seek annulment of the act which 
caused the alleged damage. In order to achieve this, the company must establish /egiti-
matio ad causam, interest to act and iegitimatio ad processum.70 In other words, the 
judge needs to be satisfied that the subject of the remedy falls within the jurisdiction of 
the administrative COurtS,71 the applicant has a personal, direct, actual and concrete in-
terest in attacking the act whose annulment is sought,72 and the company, as a person, 
can participate in a trial before an Italian court.73 Moreover, the company will also have 
to prove the illegitimacy of the act under attack on the basis of one of the restrictively 
introduced grounds of incompetence, excess of power or violation of law.74 If all these 
conditions are fulfilled, the administrative judge annuls the measure and either refers it 
back to the competent authority in case of incompetence, or annuls the measure in 
whole or part in cases of excess of power and violation of law.7s 
The Italian position on the issue of remedies for state liability due to violations 
of EC law is quite restrictive in comparison with the relevant Greek and French provi-
sions. The most obvious constraints for the companies' access to justice refer to the de-
limitation of the circle of persons that may attack an illegitimate act. Although similar 
procedural restrictions are introduced by the French and Greek laws, these refer to the 
68 See Art.57 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341/78, <l>EK 71 A' 110.5.1978, as codified ~y Art. 197(3 ) 
of the new CAP. In contrast, the effect of an ultra vires action apply erga omnes. See W. Calms and R. 
McKeon, op.cit., p.143. 
69 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.181; also see Art.26 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341/78, 
(/>EK71 A'/I0.5.1978; Art.2, par.3 of Law 1649/1986, if>EK 149 A'/3.10.1986; Art.19, par. 1 of Law 
1868/989, if>EK230, A'/I0.1O.89, as codified by Arts.79-80 CAP. 
70 See S. Satta, Diritto processuale civile (1981, CEDAM, Padova), p.132. . 
71 See C. S., sez. IV, 29 aprile 1980, n. 473; C. S., ad. plen., 19.ottobre 1979, n. 24; Cass., 8 magg10 
1978, n. 2208, TAR. Em. Rom., 26 gennaio 1977, n. 28. . 
72 See C. S., sez. V, 28 febbraio 1975, n.233; TAR. Cal., 7 aprile 1975, n. 16; TAR. LazlO, sez. 11,17 
dicembre 1975, n.575. . M'l 
73 See E. Picozza, "Processo anuninistrativo" in Enciclopedia del diritto (1987, GIUffre, I ano), 
Pp.463-519, at 474. 
74 See T. Watkin, op.cit., p.153. 
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procedural ability of the company to be heard by the national courts, rather than to the 
quality of the right allegedly harmed by the act. An even more significant constraint 
concerns the delimitation of the grounds under which the application for annulment can 
be achieved. A consequent constraint refers to the extent of examination afforded by the 
Italian legal system with reference to the act. Although the legitimacy of the act is 
evaluated, there is no possible assessment of its merits. Similarly, there is little flexibil-
ity in the power of the administrative judge to rectify the damage caused, as there is no 
possibility of amending the act. Having said that, the decision of the Italian courts seems 
to be much stronger in legal value, as it is binding not only to the parties of the dispute, 
but erga omnes. This point is of particular significance for the three selected civil law 
jurisdictions, where -at least in theory- there is no obligation to follow precedents of 
other courts, especially those of different competence. 
C3. The evolution of the case before the national courts 
In France and Greece the hearing of the case in the first instance takes place before the 
French Administrative Court of First Instance and the Greek Tri-member Administra-
tive Court of First Instance of the region where the wrongful administrative act was is-
sued or where the head office of the administrative authority which omitted to issue the 
wrongful administrative act is based.76 After the French reform of 1987 judgements of 
the administrative courts of first instance are subj ect to appeal before the Cour admin-
istrative d 'appe/ of the region where the court issuing the judgement in the first instance 
is 10cated.77 The first instance judgement is subject to appeal before the Administrative 
Court of Appeal,78 in the region of which sat the Administrative Court of First Instance 
which decided the case in the first instance. The appeal can be based on any ground of 
law or fact,79 as long as the relevant argument is concrete and precise,80 and has been put 
forward by the appellant. 8 I The court judging on the appeal may quash, in part or in 
7S See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.259. 
76 See Art.7, par.6 in combination with par.5 of Law 702/1977, ifJEK 268, A'/19.9.1 ?77, and Art.2, 
par.l and Art.3, par. 1 of Presidential Decree 341/1978, ifJEK71, A'/I0.5.1978, as codified by Arts.6 and 
7 CAP. 
77 See the Law of31 December 1987, as codified by Art.7(4) CAP; also see C.E., 12juillet 1969, 
L 'Etang, Rec. Lebon, 388; J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.16t: . 
78 See Art.8, par.2 of Law 702/1977, ifJEK 268, A'/19.9.1977; Art.2, par.2 and Art.66, par. 1 of Pres 1-
dential Decree 341/1987, ifJEK71, A'/I0.5.1978, as codified in Art.6(6) CAP. 79 
See Art.95 CAP. 
10 See :EtE 1275/89, AA, 1989, 1285. . 
81 See :EtE 531/89 and :EtE 4664/84, AA, 1990, 786, note Papahatjis; 75190, AA, 1990, 788; also see 
C.E., 27 juin 1919, Vial/at etji/s, Rec. Lebon, 561. 
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whole, or modify the judgement under appea1.82 Moreover, the court of appeal may nul-
lify or modify the administrative act under attack for any reason, irrespective of whether 
it has been put forward by the appellant or not. 83 The company may seek the cassation 
(anairesi or cassation) of the decision of the Court of AppealB4 before the Greek or 
French Council of the State for matters of law only.8s Admissible grounds of cassation 
are excess of power of the court whose judgement is under cassation, wrongful or illegal 
membership of the court, wrongful interpretation or application of law, violation of pro-
cedurallaw, and existence of two conflicting judgements on the same case.86 Cassation 
on the basis of wrongful evaluation of facts,87 error concerning facts,88 wrongful inter-
pretation of the documents submitted as means of proof,89 or violation of a non-binding 
internal administrative document have been unsuccessful before the Greek Council of 
the State.90 The latter may reject the application, or accept it and quash the judgement 
under attack in part or in whole. In Greece the result of a successful cassation is the re-
turn of the case to the court of first instance,91 which is legally bound to follow the deci-
sion of the Council of the State.92 In France, however, the Conseil may either refer the 
case back to the court whose decision it decides to quash, or keep it and decide on its 
substance as a court of first and final instance.93 
The Greek and French provisions on the remedies against the liability of the 
state have proven very similar. The foreign company has the opportunity to present its 
case in two instances, before the court of first instance and the court of appeal. Both 
courts decide fully on the case and may adjudicate issues of both substance and law. 
This system is quite similar to the procedure before the civil courts for private disputes. 
Equally similar is the procedure for cassation, judged before the hierarchically highest 
court which, adjudicates on matters of law only. From this brief reference to the proce-
82 See Art. 174, par. I, K<I>~; Art.75, pars. I and 2 of Presidential Decree 341119~8, CPEK71, 
A'/I0.5.1978, as codified in Art.98 CAP; also see C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op. Cit. , p.239. 
83 See l:tE 633175, unreported; also see P. Georges, op.cit., p.263. ., . 
84 Decisions in the first instance are not subject to cassation even after the end of the prescnptlOn penod 
for the submission of an appeal. See OALtE 654/93, L1L1, 1993, 67; l:tE 1648/93, L1L1, 1993, 714. Also see 
eE, 7 fev. 1947, d'Aillieres, G. Ar., no 68. 
85 See Art.95, par. 1 b of the Constitution; see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.698. For France, see C.E., 9 
juillet 1956, Trassard, p.31 O. 
86 See Art.56 of Presidential Decree 18/89 of 30.12.1988, CPEK 8, A' 19 .1.1989; for France see reasons 
same J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.199. 
87 See l:tE 2283/95, L1L1, 1995,618; l:tE 2625/89, Elli, 1989,374. 
88 
See l:tE 1955/87, NoB, 1987, 716. 
89 See I. Katras, op.cit., p.130, note 10. 
90 See l:tE 113/96, L1L1, 1996, 611. 
91 See OJJ:tE 1470/90, L1L1, 1990, 713; also see l:tE 1338/?3, L1L1, 1993, 714. 92 See l:tE 173/90, L1L1, 1990, 714. , . 
93 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.199; also see P. Georges, op.cit., p.264. 
184 
dure before the administrative courts it seems that foreign companies seeking compen-
sation due to state liability suffer no additional burden in comparison with similar ac-
tions turned against private individuals. 
This conclusion, however, does not take into account two areas where the state 
has maintained its privilege. First, both in Greece and in France the submission of an 
action for appeal or cassation against the state lacks the suspending effect which is in-
troduced for similar remedies adjudicated before the civil COurtS.94 This means that the 
initial judgement can be executed even if an appeal or cassation is submitted. Conse-
quently, companies which have lost their application against the state in the first in-
stance and are suffering damages due to a wrongful administrative or legislative act or 
omission will continue to be bound by the act and, as a result, to suffer additional dam-
ages while the appeal or cassation against the allegedly wrongful initial judgement 
comes to an end. This wouldn't have been the case in claims for damages against pri-
vate individuals.95 It must be noted that cassations submitted by the Greek state do have 
suspending effect. This provision has been strongly criticised as a breach of the princi-
ple of equality amongst plaintiffs.96 
Second, the prescription periods introduced for the submission of the appeal and 
cassation are much shorter in comparison to actions against private individuals heard by 
the civil COurtS.97 In France, the appeal and cassation must be submitted within two 
months from the day that the judgement under attack was issued.98 In contrast, in civil 
law the limitation period begins with its notification to the plaintiff.99 In civil law this 
prescription period may be extended to two years, when the judgement has not been 
served to the applicant. 100 In Greece these prescription periods are even shorter. The 
limitation period for the appeal is only one month starting from the next day after the 
notification of the judgement under attack and ending on the same day of the next 
94 In the case of Greece, see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op. cit., p.672 for appeals and Art.5~ of Presidenti,al 
Decree 18/89 of30.12.1988, fPEK 8, A'19.1.1989; for France see 1. Vincent and S. Gumchard, Procedure 
Civile (1994, Dalloz, Paris), pp.830-831; also see C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.239. 
9S See B. Dickson, op. cit., p.134. 8 
96 See Art.19 of Emergency Law 1715/1973 and Art.54 of Presidential Decree 18/1989 of30.12.198 , 
(/>EK8, A'19.1.1989; also see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.708.. 'dak' 
97 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.262; also see 1. Vincent and S. Guinchard, op.cit., p.824; N. Solei IS, 
op.cit., pp.39 and 131-132. de b 
98 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.239; also see C. Gabole, op. cit. , p.466; C.E., 8 cern re 
1972, Ministre de I'lnterieur, D.A., 1973,27. d 
99 See Art.528 CPC; also see Cour d'Appel, civ., 2, 13 jany.1983, Gaz. Pal., 1983,444, note u 
Rusquec. . . 
100 See Art.528, paLl CPC; also see S. Guinchard, op. cit., p.290. 
185 
month.
lol 
In any case, the appeal must be submitted within one year from the publication 
of the judgement, whereas in a civil trial the relevant prescription period is three 
102 F 11 . . h F h years. 0 oWIng once agaIn t e renc model, the Greek cassation must be submitted 
within 60 days starting from the notification of the judgement to the company or within 
60 days starting from the date of publication of the judgement for the state. 103 In both 
France and Greece the difference in the initiating event of the prescription period is a 
violation of the principle of equality amongst plaintiffs, which -in view of the delays in 
the publication of administrative jUdgements and the consequent longer limitation peri-
ods for the state- proves to be beneficiary to the state. 104 
Without a doubt the company's claim for compensation against the state would 
benefit from a dual-grade procedure and a cassation before the highest administrative 
court. However, it would have to overcome the procedural hurdles set by the Greek and 
French law in favour of the state, namely lack of suspending effect of the judgement 
under attack and shorter limitation periods in comparison with the relevant procedures 
introduced for claims against private persons. 
In Italy the company's case will be heard before the Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale (TAR) in the first instance. lOS Under Art.25 CPC, territorial competence to 
judge the case has the tribunale of the place where the head-office of the relevant Avvo-
catura della Stato is located. 106 As a general rule, the aim of the procedure before the 
TAR is the attack of the legitimacy and expediency of the administrative or legislative 
measure which constitutes the source of the company's damage. 107 The court may annul 
the measure under attack for incompetence, excess of power or violation of law, or up-
hold it. 108 The merits of the case are irrelevant. 109 The judgement of the TAR is subject 
to appeal for matters of law and fact before the Consiglio di Stato within a short pre-
scription period of sixty days from the notification of the decision in the first instance to 
101 See Art.4 of Law 1406/83, ([>EK 182 A'/14.12.1983, which refers to Art.167 of Presidential Decree 
331185, ([>EK 116 A'/31.5; also see l:tE 3504/91, LlLI, 1991,294. 
102 See Art.5, p~r.2 of Law 702/1977, ([>EK 268, A'/19.9.1977 and Art.58, parJ of~r~sidential Decree 
18/1989 of30.12.1988, ([>EK 8, A'/9.1.1989. Also see Art.518, par.2 of the Code of CIvil Procedure. 
103 See Art.53 of Presidential Decree 18/89 of 30.12.1988, ([>EK 8, A' /9 .1.1989. Also see B. Pa-
pachristou, Limitation Periods for and against the State and Public Enterprises (1993, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens), p.227; ~'tE 1084/1984, NoB, 1985,342. , .. 
104 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op. cit. , p.706; also see S. Guincha~d, Code de Procedure CIVile (1997-
1998, Litec, Paris), p.289. 
lOS See Art.6 Reg. Proc. TAR; also see Art.35 Cons. St. and 6 reg. proc. Con. St. 3 
106 Also see Royal Decree n.1611 of30 October 1933; Law n. 260 of25 March 1958; Law n. 103 of 
April 1979, as subsequently amended. 
107 See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.259. 
108 See T. Watkin, op. cit. , p.155. 
109 See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.258. 
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the applicant. 110 Contrary to France and Greece, this period can be extended to the one 
year introduced by the relevant provision of civil procedure I 11 in cases where the notifi-
cation never took place or was undertaken in an illegal manner.112 Similarly to Greece 
and France, however, the appeal before the ConSiglio di Stato does not have suspending 
effect. 113 Under Art.362 CPC the decision of the Council of the State is subject to cassa-
tion before the Corte di Cassazione for jurisdictional grounds only.114 Having succeeded 
to annul or modify the administrative or legislative measure which caused damage to 
the company, and thus having acquired a sUbjective right, the company will bring its 
claim for compensation before the civil court. This will probably be the Tribunale, 
which adjudicates claims of above 750,000 Lire. lls Its decisions are subject to appeal on 
matters of law and fact before the Corte d' Appello which must be submitted within the 
prescription period of thirty days running from the day of the publication of the first in-
stance judgement. 116 The decision on this appeal is subject to cassation before the Corte 
di Cassazione on matters of law only:17 Valid grounds for cassation include errors in 
the jurisdictional process,118 competence errors,119 violation or false application of the 
law;20 invalidity of the sentence or the procedure,12I and omission or insufficient or 
contradictory legal basis. 122 
The Italian procedure for the achievement of compensation for state liability is 
characterised by its complexity,123 which has already been mentioned. From the analysis 
of the evolution of the case before the Italian courts other disadvantages of the Italian 
110 See Art.28, par.2 of Law 1034 of6 December 1971; also see G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., 
p.800. 
III See Art.327 cpc. 
112 See F. Benvenuti, "Processo amministrativo", Enciclopedia del diritto (1987, Giuffre, Milano), 
pp.454-519, at 504. 
1\3 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op. cit. , p.800. 
114 See Art.37 of Royal Decree no. 1443 of 28 October 1940; also see Maisto and Miscali, op. cit., 
p.370. . 
115 See Arts.339 and 343 CPC; Casso Civ., sez. III, 11 ottobre 1978, n. 3542; also L. Certoma, Op.Clt., 
p.188. 
116 See Art.341 CPC; Casso Civ., sez. 111,11 gennaio 1979, n. 220; also see T. Watkin, op.~it., p.105 .. 
117 See Art.lll of the Constitution; Art.59 of Law 353 of26 November 1990; also see Malsto and MlS-
cali, op.cit., p.361; Casso civ., sez. Un., 30 luglio 1953, n.2593. . 
118 See Casso Civ., sez. II, 15 aprile 1987, n. 3725; Casso Civ., sez. I, 8lugho ~986, n. 4455 .. 
119 See Casso Civ., sez. I, 17 gennaio 1980, n. 385; Casso Civ., sez. 1,4 febbralo 1980: n. 776'I~~sieb_ 
Civ., sez. I, 14 aprile 1993, n. 4442; Casso Civ., sez. I, 16luglio 1979, n. 4139; Casso CIV., sez. , 
braio 1979, n.764. . . . C Civ 
120 Casso Civ., sez. II, 25 gennaio 1980, n. 617; Casso Civ., sez. I1~ 8 gennalO 198~, n. 124:v ~:~ I i6 
Sez. 11,16 novembre 1985, n. 5622; Casso Civ., sez. Lav., 18 gennalO 1993, n. 550, Casso CI., ., 
gennaio 1987, n. 713. 
121 See Casso Civ., sez. Lav., 25 giugno 1985, n. 3810. . 1986 1981' 
122 See Casso Civ., sez. Lav., 10 maggio 1986, n. 3113; Casso Civ., sez. 1,22 febbralO , n. , 
Casso Civ., sez. I, 16 gennaio 1991, n. 357; Casso Civ., sez~ 1,18 settembre 1986, n. 5656. 
123 See F. Benvenuti, op.cit., 1987, p.462. 
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position become obvious. First, the company claiming damages from the Italian state 
will have to seek the annulment of the relevant administrative or legislative measure on 
grounds which are much limited compared to the relevant provisions of French and 
Greek law. Indeed, the Italian grounds for the annulment of the act are limited to excess 
of power, incompetence and breach of law. This leaves little ground to annulment on the 
basis of wrongful interpretation of the evidence produced, wrongful ignorance of evi-
dence or other matters of fact. This limitation in the grounds for annulment of the rele-
vant measures acquires particular significance for the evaluation of the protection of-
fered to companies under the Italian provisions, if one takes into account that failure of 
the company to establish a valid reason for the annulment of the act signifies lack of a 
subjective right, which in tum means lack of opportunity to achieve compensation. Sec-
ond, in Italy the cassation in the administrative trial, allowed on matters of law only be-
fore the French and Greek Council of the State, is limited to purely jurisdictional issues. 
This withholds the company's right to a two-grade trial with the opportunity for a cas-
sation on matters of law, which would normally be the case in claims for compensation 
against private individuals in the civil procedure. Third, as is also the case in France and 
Greece, the decisions of the Italian administrative courts lack suspending effect, a fact 
which disadvantages the companies and favours the state. 124 
Having said that, in Italy the time-limits set for the submission of appeals and 
cassations are the same in the administrative and civil process creating no difference 
between actions for compensation against the state and private individuals. 125 Moreover, 
in the Italian administrative stage of the claim for compensation, the presence of the 
company in court to defend its recourse is not necessary. 126 This signifies that the case 
will evolve even if, for any reason, the company does not appear before the administra-
tive judge. In addition to this, the administrative judge has the power and the obligation 
to examine the validity of all grounds for annulment put forward by the applicant com-
pany but based on all possible arguments. This provision introduces a more in-depth 
examination of the merits on which the claim of the company is based. 
From the analysis of the possible evolution of the trial before the national courts 
of the three selected jurisdictions it becomes clear that the company's claim against the 
state is more complicated and difficult compared to claims against private individuals. 
124 See F. Bartolini, 1/ nuovo codice di procedura civile (1995, Editrice la tribuna, Piacenza), pp.536-
537. . . . th ac 
12' See Art.369 CPC, as modified by Art.4 of Law 793 of.18 October 1977. For ~ Criticism on e pr -
tice of introducing shorter time-limits, see Trib. di Roma, 11 febbraio 1993, Foro II., 1993, 2391. 
126 See ibid, 1987, p.460. 
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C4. Miscellaneous procedural issues: enforcement and compliance 
Having followed the procedural aspect of the company's claim for compensation 
against the state in the three selected countries and having established that claims 
against the state in all three jurisdiction tend to be burdened by special provisions intro-
duced in favour of the state, it is time to refer an issue which is especially problematic in 
claims against the national authorities of the selected states. Perhaps, the most important 
point of reference for the assessment of the efficiency of the protection offered to for-
eign companies at the national level refers to national provisions on the execution of the 
relevant judgements. In other words, for the evaluation of the level of access of these 
companies to justice at national level, it is important to establish that the judgement of 
the national court awarding compensation to the company can be efficiently used for the 
final payment of the awarded sum to the foreign public limited company. 
In Italy final judgements of civil and administrative courts may be enforced 
against the state. The procedure of execution or enforcement of civil court judgements is 
regulated by the third Libra of the CPC. As a general remark, it would be fair to state 
that in Italy (as in most civil law countries) the aim of the judicial system is to establish 
the existence of rights rather than to enforce these rights. 127 As a consequence of this 
philosophy, the execution process is initiated at the demand of the plaintiffs, who must 
acquire one of the exclusively introduced executive documents of Art.474 CPC. These 
include final judgements of the civil and administrative courtS. 128 The powers awarded 
to Italian judges in the area of enforcement are wide and include all means under which 
the order of the final judgement on the substance of the case can be realised. Examples 
of such powers include an order to the administration to proceed to the realisation of the 
jUdgement without delay, or an order to the administration to issue a new act without 
delay, or the decision of the court to take action in lieu of the administration. 129 It must 
be noted, as rule, plaintiffs may seek the enforcement of previous judgements only 
when the state has failed to act in compliance with a previous final decision.130 How-
ever, actions for enforcement have been considered admissible even in cases of pseudo-
. b' I \32 acts or wrongful acts. 131 Judgements on compllance are su ~ect to appea . 
127 See T. Watkin, op.cit., p.106. 
128 See E. Picozza, op.cit., p.515. . ., bbf 
129 See G. Paleo logo, "Le juge administratif italien" [1993] Rivista trimestriale dl dmlto pu leo, 
pp.615-628, at 619. 
130 See Cons. St., sez. V, 5 giugno 1985, n. 230; Cons. St.,.ad. plen., 19 marzo 1984, n.6. 
131 See Cons. St., ad. plen., 14 Iuglio 1973, n. 23; Cons. St., ad. plen. 29 gennaio 1980, n. 2. 
132 See E. Picozza, op.cit., p.518. 
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In France the enforcement of final jUdgements133 in the administrative process 
depends very much upon the goodwill of the administration, as there is practically no 
means of forced execution against the state. 134 This is mainly based on the belief that 
there is a need for the state to enjoy certain privileges in order to serve the general good 
more effectively.135 The weakness l36 of the administrative courts to force the national 
authorities to comply with their judgements is addressed via three routes: first, the right 
of the minister concerned to seek the assistance of the Conseil d' Etat on the appropriate 
manner in which a judgement against him may be enforced; second, the possibility of a 
Conseil d'Etat initiative to point out to the administration the implication of final 
judgements; and third, the right of the plaintiff to report difficulties of enforcement to 
the Conseil. 137 Insofar as orders to payment of compensation are concerned, the state has 
the obligation to proceed with payment within four months of the publication of the 
judgement. If the state does not conform with this obligation, the Conseil d' Etat has the 
power to order financial penalties and a fine for each day of non-compliance. 138 It must 
be noted, however, that the admittedly significant control awarded to the Conseil for the 
effectiveness of judgements against the state is clouded by the very cautious use of this 
action so far and the small number of successful actions. 139 Thus, there is little doubt 
that enforcement of final administrative judgements against the French national authori-
ties is a problematic process. This is mainly due to the lack of execution mechanisms, as 
is the case with enforcement against private individuals. The introduction of indirect 
means of coercion of the French state to comply with administrative judgements can be 
of some help to foreign companies seeking the payment of compensation for violations 
of EC law. The usual compliance of the French authorities, albeit delayed, is also a fact 
which must be taken into account for the evaluation of the effects of this provision on 
the access of foreign companies to justice at the national level. 140 However, it would be 
unfair to say that this privilege of the French state does not radically and adversely af-
fect the right of companies to effective judicial protection, even after the violation has 
been declared by the courts and compensation has been ordered. 
133 See C.E., 15 mars 1963, Centre hospitalier regional de Grenoble cI Bosse, Rec. Lebon, p.173; C.E., 
5 fevrier 1969 Port autonome de Bordeaux, D.A .. , 1969, 109. , 
134 See 1. Rivero and 1. Waline, op. cit. , p.194. 
135 See M. Protio, Ope cit., p.2156. _ 
136 See C.E., 13 juillet 1962, Breart de Boisanger, D., 1962, p.664. J I 1963 
137 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op. cit. , p.238; also see Arts.58 and 59 of Decree of 31. u y . 
138 See Act of 16 July 1980 as supplemented by decree of 12 May 1981; also see W. Calms and R. 
McKeon, op. cit. , p.189; C.E., 30 novembre 1923, Couiteas, G.A., 247. JDA 
139. •• ICE 17 . 1985 Mme Menneret, A . ... , See J. Rivero and J. Wahne, Op.Clt., p.197; a so see ,," mal , 
1985, p.454; C.E., 15 ocrobre 1986, Mme Leroux, A.J.D,~., 1986, p.716, 
140 See C. Gabolde, op.cit., p.418, 
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In Greece the provision on compliance has been modI' fied aft th· d . 
er e Intro uctlOn 
of the new Code of Administrative Procedure of July 1999. According to the pre-
existing system in Greece, as in France, there was no specific provision expressly intro-
ducing the obligation of the state to comply with the judgements of the administrative 
courts. In order to achieve compliance of the Greek authorities to the judgements of the 
courts, Greek law introduced three methods of coercion for the state and its servants to 
comply. First, state employees who did not fulfil their duties were punished under 
Art.259 CrC. However, despite the undoubtful application of this provision in the case 
of civil servants who failed or omitted to comply with administrative court jUdgements 
on compensation for state liability, its implementation in practice was hindered by the 
need to prove that the relevant civil servants acted with intent and that their aim was ei-
ther personal illegal gain or the provocation of harm to the state or third persons. Sec-
ond, Art.205 of the Employer's Code introduced disciplinary liability to employees who 
failed to fulfil their duties through wrongful acts or omissions. However, the successful 
action against civil servants who failed to comply with administrative judgements 
would only succeed, if the plaintiff managed the impossible task of ignoring the collec-
tive policy of the particular department and determined attributable liability to a specific 
person. Third, the failure or omission to comply with court judgements gave rise to state 
liability. In practice, however, the Greek authorities tended to use "inertia, stalling and 
silent rejection" as means of non-compliance. 141 Thus, even these three methods were 
not considered capable of persuading the state to comply. 
This position changed, albeit basically in theory, after the 1997 ratification of the 
1966 UN International Agreement on Personal and Political Rights by the Greek Par-
liament. 142 The Agreement, which guarantees the execution of judgements against the 
authorities of the state, led a small number of Greek judges to recognise that forced exe-
cution was possible even against the state. 143 The new Code of Administrative Proce-
dure, in force since July 1999, introduces the first Greek legislative provision on the 
obligation of the state to comply with the judgements of the Greek administrative 
courts. Art.198 CAP regulates that administrative authorities have the obligation to 
comply with the content of judgements on disputes brought before the courts under the 
procedure of prosfygi. In cases of non-compliance, state employees who fail or omit to 
comply are punished under Art.259 of the Penal Code and are personally liable to com-
pensate those injured by their actions or inaction. There is little doubt that Art.198 is a 
141 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cil., p.608. _ 
142 See Art. I of Law 2462/1997 <I>EK A' 25/26.2.1997. 
191 
revolutionary provision whose introduction can be seen as a guarantee for the effective 
protection of natural and legal persons claiming compensation for damages by the 
Greek state. Indeed, a guarantee of compliance by the Greek administrative authorities 
with the judgements of the administrative courts would signify unhindered access to 
justice for foreign companies suffering damages as a result of the Greek failure to com-
ply with EC legislation. The question is, whether this new provision really guarantees 
this compliance. The interpretation of this provision by the Greek courts and its imple-
mentation by the administrative authorities in future cases will demonstrate its value. 
However, even without the benefit of case-law on this new provision, there are three 
points of concern in relation to its possible benefits. First, Art.198 refers to judgements 
under prosfygi only. In the cases examined in this thesis this signifies the state's obliga-
tion to comply with the judgements of the administrative courts concerning the validity 
of administrative acts and their compliance with EC legislation. However, it seems that 
the state's obligation to comply does not cover applications for damages suffered due to 
illegal acts or omissions of the state. It seems therefore that there is little guarantee for 
the final payment of compensation by the Greek state to the foreign companies. Second, 
the result of non-compliance is not liability of the state as such, but personal criminal 
and civil responsibility of the state employee whose action or inaction is considered to 
be in clash with judgements of the administrative courts. The value of these provisions 
were discussed in the analysis of the old position on non-compliance. The criminal li-
ability of the employee requires proof of intent to harm and aim to personal gain, 
whereas the civil liability of the employee requires attribution of liability to an action or 
inaction of a particular natural person employed in one of the departments dealing with 
the file of the injured party. Third, in view of the express abolition of prior provisions 
on issues covered by the new Code,144 it is doubtful whether the disciplinary punishment 
of such employees -introduced in the old system, but ignored in the Code- is still valid. 
On the basis of the analysis of the Code so far, it is fair to say that the provision 
of the new Code on compliance is a timid act of the Greek legislator, which does not 
guarantee the effective protection of foreign companies suffering damages by the non-
compliance of the Greek authorities with EC legislation. However, a final assessment of 
the new Code would be incomplete without reference to the issue of enforcement. In the 
past, in Greece -as in France- there was no mechanism for the enforcement of civil, 
143 See 1212/1999 MovTIpA8 (Amp.), NoB, 1999, pp.986-988. 
144 See Art.285 CAP. 
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criminal or administrative judgements against the state and its authorities. 14s This posi-
tion was strongly criticised as a direct breach of the constitutional principle which intro-
duces unhindered access of all citizens to justice. 146 Art. 199 of the new Code regulates 
that for the enforcement of judgements reached under the procedure of application for 
damages plaintiffs must follow the enforcement procedure of the Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure. In other words, for the enforcement of judgements on compensation, foreign 
companies can seize assets of the Greek state under the procedure followed in the case 
of seizure against private individuals. 147 This constitutes the ultimate weapon for the co-
ercion of the Greek state into compliance with the relevant orders for the payment of 
compensation by administrative courts. However, in view of the novelty of the provi-
sion on seizure against the state, there is uncertainty over the practical application of 
this provision. It is difficult to imagine which assets of the Greek state will be seized 
and, when liquidated, which particular department or organ will be entitled to the excess 
remaining after the subtraction of the sum ordered by the court. Moreover, there is 
scope for an argument that the seizure of assets of the state clashes with the general 
principle of the prevalence of public interest, which in this case is the unhindered func-
tioning of the Greek administrative authorities. Furthermore, there is a problem con-
cerning the legal basis of the company's request for the enforcement of judgements or-
dering compensation: as these are brought before the administrative courts under appli-
cations for damages, rather than under the procedure of prosfygi, the state has no obli-
gation to comply. Since the state is not obliged to comply, it is doubtful that a seizure of 
assets will be theoretically sound and, consequently, practically allowed by the Greek 
judges who have always exercised their right to refrain from applying a procedurally 
valid Greek law if they consider it illegal or unconstitutional. Last but not least, this 
provision can only benefit future claims for damages and is inapplicable to orders for 
compensation already declared by the COurtS. 148 From the analysis of the old and new 
regime on the obligation of the Greek authorities to comply with administrative judge-
ments and on the issue of enforcement it is clear that even the new Code fails to guar-
antee the final payment of foreign companies, even after a final judgement ordering 
compensation has been reached. 
145 See Law 2052/52 of24-28 April 1952; also see Art.909 CCP; OAAn 108171, NoB, 1971,601. 
146 See Art.20, paLl of the Constitution; see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op. cit., pp. 52-53; also see Athens 
SinBle-member Court of First Instance 6990178, ToE, 1979, .649. 
14 See Travaux Preparatoires o/Law 271711999, Art.199. 
148 See Art.278 CAP. 
193 
The issue of enforcement and compliance of the state with court decisions is of 
crucial importance for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the protection offered to 
foreign companies suffering damages as a result of state violations of EC law. In France 
and, seemingly still, in Greece there is little evidence that the companies which manage 
to acquire court orders for compensation will be able to use them and achieve payment 
in practice. The French express provision of non-enforcement against the state and the 
Greek ambiguity in the practical implementation of the new, seemingly permissive, 
provisions on enforcement constitute a significant blow to the effectiveness in the judi-
cial protection of foreign companies in practice. As it limits the right of companies to be 
compensated, this doctrine can be viewed as in direct clash with the principle of the ef-
fective protection of the individual and, consequently, can be deemed illegal under EC 
law. This, however, is only one side of the problem. The final payment of compensation 
may satisfy the right of foreign companies to achieve restoration of damages suffered in 
the past. In both French and Greek law there is little, though, which could prevent future 
damages, as the national authorities may still refuse to comply with legality through the 
final rectification of the administrative or legislative act constituting the source of past 
damages. The constant persecution of authorities or employees for compensation due to 
their failure to comply with prior court's judgements declaring the relevant acts illegal 
is little comfort for companies whose main aim is to finally establish and pursue their 
economic activity within the Member State of their choice. 
D. SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF COMPENSATION 
The analysis of the procedural conditions for the achievement of compensation by for-
eign companies suffering damages due to violations of EC law by the French, Italian 
and Greek authorities has demonstrated that the privileges enjoyed by the state in such 
disputes impede, to a certain extent, the companies' case for compensation. Even 
though the relevant provisions are slightly different in the three selected countries, 
mainly as a result of the Italian civil courts' competence to award compensation against 
the state as opposed to the French and Greek unitary system of administrative justice, 
the content of the relevant procedural provisions were found to be rather similar. Proba-
bly more so are the substantive provisions on the establishment of state liability in the 
three countries which all follow the civil law tradition. 149 In general, the conditions of , 
149 .' 'f C d· '( 1955 S kkoulas Athens) at Arts. 1 04-1 06 See P. Poulitsas et al., InterpretatIOn of the Crvr 0 e , a , , 
ElCJAK, pars.9-1 O. 
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liability in the three selected jurisdictions are wrongful act dam d I l' 
, age an a causa Ink 
between the first two elements. Since the civil law principles of liability are also appli-
cable to state liability, 150 these elements also apply in the cases examined in this thesis. 
Let us examine each one of these elements separately. 
Dl. Wrongful act or omission 
The source of the company's damage must be a wrongful act or omission by the 
authorities of the state. For the purposes of establishing state liability in the three se-
lected countries, an act is defined as a judicial or material activity accomplished under 
the rules of administrative law or an omission of such activity. 151 Activity of the public 
administration giving rise to state liability can be acts, operations or any external ex-
pression of behaviour. 152 Material facts include negligence, error, delay or even failure 
to act within the time-limits introduced by the laws of the state. 153 Omissions are defined 
as violations of the legal obligation of national authorities to issue an act, or the igno-
rance of an act which is beneficiary to the citizen or may prevent future damage to the 
citizen in question. 154 An omission presupposes a "concrete legal obligation" to act. ISS It 
goes without saying that the relevant state act must be a result of willing and conscious 
behaviour. 156 The classification of the relevant act as enforceable under the national pro-
visions of procedure is irrelevant for its characterisation as a possible source of state li-
ability.157 Even emanations of legislative acts which are "irregular and faulty" may give 
rise to state liability on the basis of the damage which they may cause in the future to 
individuals against whom the relevant legislative act may be applied. ls8 This aspect of 
state liability will be examined separately. In Italy the action of the authorities must also 
150 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.232; A. Pizzorusso, Manuale di istruzioni di diritlo pubb/ico 
(1997, Jovene Editore, Napoli), p.537; E. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., p.163. Also see Arts.l04~1O.6.El(JAK for 
Greece; Art.2043 CC for Italy and Art. 1582 CC for France as applied in the case of state liability. 
151 See E. Spiliotopoulos, op. cit. , p.163. 
IS2 I 'd k' . 94 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.330; also see N. So el a IS, Op.Clt., p. . 
153 See W. Cairns and R. McKeon, op.cit., p.139; also see An 10611969, NoB, 1969,676; An 
1616/1981 , EEN, 1981, 861. 
154 See Athens Court of Appeal 133511899, eep., lA, 262; An. 315/1911, eep., Kr, 81; also see Ath-
ens Court of Appeal 2041/1906, eep., IH, 601; Athens Court of Appeal 458/1934, EEN, A, 400. 
155 See the Italian C.C., 83/908, 82/2134. 
156 See G. Cian and A. Trabucchi, Commentario breve al Codice Civile (1988, Cedam, Padova), 
p.2043. 
IS7 See Athens Court of Appeal 446/1901, eep., Ir, 38; 506/1915, eep., KZ, 548; 1203/1910, eep., 
KB,519. 
lSI See G. Zanobini, op.cit., p.339. 
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harm a subjective right of the citizen. Such a sub1ective n'ght may d' fi th . 
J enve rom e eXIs-
tence of a wrongful judicial act, an administrative regulation or a simple behaviour. 1.59 
The act or omission giving rise to state liability must be illegal, in other words it 
must be contra ius, namely contrary to the authority's duty to comply with and apply 
the national laws and regulations. l60 However, the law which the national authorities 
breach in each particular case must be introduced in order to benefit the citizens of the 
country. The breach of acts which are introduced for the exclusive protection of the 
general public interest cannot give rise to state liability.161 As a rule, state liability occurs 
as a result of unlawful acts only. 162 In fact, illegality is widely considered to be a neces-
sary pre-requisite for the establishment of state liability. This is the currently prevailing 
view which, however, is subject to possible change due to the recent development of a 
more liberal doctrine of state liability for legal acts by the EeJ. 163 However, so far there 
is little evidence to demonstrate that national courts are willing to accept state liability 
for legal acts. This is more so in Italy, where the illegality of the act must be declared by 
an administrative court before the subjective right giving rise to a right to compensation 
can be conceived. 164 
In order to establish state, rather than personal, liability the act or omission must 
have taken place within the framework of the provision of public service by the author-
ity which issues or omits to issue the act giving rise to a claim for compensation. If this 
is the case, liable for compensation is the state and not the civil servant who acts or 
omits to act. 165 This is so, because the state authority and its employers are bound by a 
relationship of representation or order which signifies that the state is bound by the ac-
tions or omissions of its employees, as long as these fall within the framework of their 
159 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op. cit. , p.332; also see Trib. Roma, Sez. 1,30 giugno 1987, Giust. eN., 
1988,1041; L. Attolico, "La responsabilita civile della p.a.", 38 [1988] Giust. civ., pp.1042-1045, at 
1042. 
160 See P. Poulitsas et al., op. cit. , par.25; also see F. Piga, "Responsabilita civile degli amministrat.ori 
pubblici: nuovi profili", 64 [1988] Foro amministrativo, pp.747-770.p.748; Trib. Roma, Sez. 1,30 glUgnO 
1987, Giust. eN., 1988. 1041; ~npAe. 10472/1990, Ap~., ME, 1991,93. 
161 See An 20/1929, Bell., M, 277; An 130/1932, Bep., Mf, 413; An 729/1981, NoB, 1982,231; 
Athens Court of Appeal 130/1904, 8£p., ILT, 360; also see E. Spiliotopoulos, op. ~it. ~ p.168. Laws refer-
ring to compensation for state liability are not set for the protection of general pubh.c .mt~res.t;. see N. Ka-
logirou, The Criminal and Civil Liability of Members of the Government and the CIVIl Llabllzty of the 
State in Greece (1993, Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini), p.229. 
162 See K. Kerameus and P. Kozyris, Introduction to Greek Lmy (1993, KluwerISakkoul~, The !'leth-
erlands), p.42; also see R. Chapus, Droit administratif general (1987, Editions Montchrestlen, Pans), 
p.904; also see C.E., 11 mai 1979, Boulanger, 202. 
163 See G. Cian and A. Trabucchi, op.cit., p.1539; also see G. Zanobinbi, op. cit. , pp.337 ~d. 35? .. 
164 See L. Attolico, op.cit., p.l043; G. Zanobini, op.cit., p.339; also see P. Pavlopoulos, C,v,l Lzabzllty 
of the State (1986, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.258.. - t:,. 
165 See An 864/1954, Bell., E1:T, 68; n.natp. 1458/1932, Bell., Mr, 808; Eq>A9 1103/1953, eel1.,::' , 
792; An 352/1953, Bell., E~, 736.; also see G. Braibant, op. cit. , p.267. 
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contract of representation or order. l66 Activity within the framework of their public 
service is defined as the action within the circle of the competence of their functioning, 
which is regulated by legal rules introducing the conditions of legality of their acts. 167 
However, if the civil servant acts or omits to act outside the framework of the activity 
undertaken by the department to which s/he is employed, or if the service provided to 
the citizen is in the name of the natural or legal person undertaking it on behalf of the 
state, the act or omission cannot be attributed to the state. 168 This could occur when the 
civil servant undertakes an action totally foreign to the work of the authority where s/he 
is employed with intent to achieve personal benefit. 169 In any other case, liability must 
be attributed to the state as a general rule. 170 
The source of illegality of the state's activity, or lack of, is the violation of law, 
which constitutes a sufficient element for the establishment of state liability as an ob-
jective factor. This means the citizen will not have to prove the existence of fault of the 
administration in any of the three countries examined here. 171 Thus, the public admini-
stration is at wrong every time that the law is broken. The theoretical justification of the 
prevalence of objective state liability lies with the impossibility in the attribution of 
subjective fault to particular organs in complex procedures of legislative and adminis-
trative decision-making. It is felt, and rightly so, that the introduction of subjective fault 
as an additional element of state liability would make its proof by the individual citizen 
impractical, since it would be humanly impossible for ordinary citizens to pinpoint all 
the particular natural and legal persons involved in the legislative or administrative act 
which is the source of liability and to attribute the exact percentages of such liability to 
166 Art.28 of the Italian Constitution; G. Landi and G. Potenza, op. cit. , p.337; G. Zanobini, op.cit., 
p.340; 1. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.238. P. Poulitsas et al., op. cit. , par.49. 
167 See G. Papahatjis, System of Administrative Law Applicable in Greece (1983, Sakkoulas, Athens), 
p.42. 
168 See Cass., 17 febbraio 1939, Foro it., repert., 1939, 1568; Cass., 11uglio 1941, Foro amm., 1941, II, 
90; Trib. Milano, II giugno 1947, Mon. trib., 1947,237; Cass., 23 giugno 1949, Foro it., repert., 1949, 
1429. 
169 See Cass., 18 gennaio 1985, n.485; Corte dei Conti, Sez. Basilicata, 10 febbraio 1998, Fo,:o ?,:,., 
1998,2579; Corte dei Conti, Sez. riun., 23 settembre 1997, Foro am., 1998, 1238. Even then, ha?lhty c~n 
only be established for positive damage, not mere loss of profits. See K. Kerameus and P. Kozyns, op. cit. , 
p.43. . 
170 See Cass., 17 dicembre 1986, n.7631; 22 ottobre 1984, n.5333.; F. Piga, op.cil., p.759; G. Bralbant, 
op.cil., p.267. - 466/1969 
171 See K. Kennaeus and P. Kozyris, op.cit., p.43; E. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., p.168; ~,~ , 
NoB, 1969,50; M. Jarvis, op.cit., p.400; Trib. admin. de Strasbourg, 5 jui~ ,1?84, ~oclele Trensch- Rec 
Alsacaves [1986] 2 CMLRev. 625; Trib. admin. Dijon, 15 avril 1986, Societe vemcole Berard ~A: 1991 
Lebon, 1986,311, RTDE 1988,112, note Soler-Couteaux; Cour d'Appel Admin. de Nantes, .20 Jum , 
Ree.Lebon, 1991, 742; C.E., 28 fevrier 1992, AJDA, 1992, pp.~ 1 0-~26, at 220; also ose~ A~~I~~~S~~~SI. 
op.cit., p.538; Cass., Sez. un., 20 gennaio 1964, n. 126; see Tnb. dl Roma, Sez. 1,3 g ug 
eiv., 1041. 
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each.
l72 
Although the end result for the applicant is the same in all three countries, 
namely subjective fault of the administration does not have to be proven for the success 
of the claim for compensation, it would not be right to state that fault is not an element 
of liability in France. In the past, the French courts did indeed declare that state liability 
is one of no fault. 173 However, this position was battered by vocal critics who character-
. d't "a disgrace" fi th F h I I t 174 R h h Ise 1 as or e renc ega sys em. at er t an a reaction to the prin-
ciple of no-fault state liability, this was the expression of adverse feelings towards the 
background to the decision of the French courts to introduce the principle in the first 
place, which was the well camouflaged attempt of French judges to avoid the examina-
tion of the preliminary issue of the legality of the act or omission. 175 As a result, the po-
sition of the French courts has recently changed and fault, albeit not SUbjective, is in-
deed an element of state liability. However, fault is required in the objective sense, 
namely as an element which is fulfilled with the existence of a violation of law. 176 For 
violations of EC law in specific, all three jurisdictions examined here now accept that 
the basis of liability is the breach itself.l77 The legal bass of this doctrine is the French 
and Greek recognition of the primacy of EC law, the Italian doctrine on the obligato-
rieta of EU provisions. 178 
Despite the legal basis of the national provisions on wrongful acts or omissions 
as elements of state liability in the three selected countries, the fact still remains that the 
company suffering damages as a result of a state violation of EC law does not have to 
prove a subjective fault by the administration. This means that the wrongfulness of the 
act or omission will be judged on the basis of its non-compliance with EC law and not 
on the basis of alleged negligence or intent by the national authority which issued the 
act or undertook the omission. It is widely accepted that the lack of a subjective element 
of fault is a guarantee of unhindered access of the company to justice. 179 Indeed, the in-
172 See G. Zanobinbi, op.cit., p.342. 
173 See C.E., Ass., 28 mars 1984, Societe Alivar, A.J., 1984, 396. 
174 See B. Genevois, "Responsabilite de la puissance publique, 40 [1984] AJDA, pp.396-398, at 399. 
175 See C.E., Ass., 28 fevrier 1992, Societe Arizona Tabaco Products, A.J., 1992, 210, concl. Laboque; 
also see M. Jarvis, op.cit., p.400. 
176 See Cour d' Appel Admin. de Nancy, 9 juillet 1991, Minislre de I' economie, des finances el du 
bugel v Societe Lefebvre, Rec. Lebon, 741; C.E., 20 janvier 1988, Aubin, Rec. Lebon, 1988,20; JCP, . 
1989, II, 21169, note Modeme, AJDA, 1988,418, note Pretot; Cour de Cassation, ch. comm., 21 f~vner 
1995, Dal/oz, 1995, IR 100; C.E., 28 fevrier 1992, [1993] 1 CML.Rev. 252; N. Dantonel-Cor, op.cll., 
p.493. 
177 See D. Simon, "Droit communautaire et responsabiIite de la puissance publique", 49 [~993] AC~­
alile Juridique Droit Administratif, pp.235-243, at p.237; also see G. Alpa, "Nuove figure dl respo~~.-p 
biIita civile di derivazione comunitaria", 63 [1998] ResponsabililG civile e previdenza, pp.5-28, at , . 
D~~toglou, 1994, op. cit. , p.69. '. . 
B See ibid, pp.41 and 69; C. St., Sez. IV, 18 gennaio ~996, n. 54, G,ust. CN., 1996, 1191. 
179 See D. Simon, op. cit., p.241. 
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troduction of the mere demonstration of the existence of an EU violation as a poof of 
wrongfulness could not have been more liberal and beneficial a provision for the com-
pany. In any case, any concept of fault going beyond illegality would clash with the EU 
doctrine of Brasserie and would therefore be an unacceptable limitation to the access of 
foreign companies to justice at the national level. 180 
D2. Damage and Causation 
The other two elements of state liability are damage suffered by the foreign company as 
a result of the state's violation of EC law and a causal link between wrongful act and 
damage. Since the regulation of these elements of liability are regulated by the relevant 
doctrines of civil law, they will be analysed briefly. Damage is defined as any loss suf-
fered by the citizen in his corporal or incorporeal goods, or as any reduction in the legal 
interests of the citizen. 181 According to a well established civil law principle, applicable 
in the vast majority of civil law countries, damage is compensated only if it is certain, 
direct and subject to financial evaluation. 182 The damage is certain, if it is existent and 
actual. Having said that, future damage may be compensated for, as long as it can be 
currently evaluated and its realisation is certain, or at least quite probable. 183 As a gen-
eral rule, the damage must be quantifiable. However, even where this is not the case, 
some damages will be awarded. 184 Damages can be awarded for financial loss, moral 
loss and loss of chance, that is loss of the opportunity to gain.185 In the last case, the 
chance to gain must be established with sufficient certainty.186 This would be the case in 
180 See M. Jarvis, op.cit., p.404. 
181 See E. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., p.l65; also see F. Piga, op.cit., p.753; C.C., Civ., 13 fevrier 1923, 
D.P., 1923, 1,52. 
182 See G. Braibant, op.cit., p.293; also see 1. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.234; L. Certoma, op.cit., 
pp.366-367; N. Soleidakis, op.cit., p.107. 
183 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.363; also see G. Braibant, op.cit., p.293; A. Iatrou, An Outline of the Greek 
Civil Law (1986, Tsapepas, Athens), p.l06; N. Kalogirou, op.cit., 229; Athens Court of Appeal 
543211979 , NoB, 1979, 1638. . 
184 See C.E., 27 janvier 1988, Giraud; also see N. Brown and 1. Bell, op.cit., p.201; L. Certoma, op.CIf., 
p.367. 
185 See C.E., 27 may 1987, Aubin, Rec. Lebon, 1988,20; JCP, 1989, II, 2116~, note Moder:ne, AJDA, 
1988,418, note Pretot; C.E., Ass. plen., 6 mars 1959, Secreta ire d' Etat a ['agriculture cI Ste Fros . 
Freres Rec Leb 157' C E Ass 28 fevrier 1992, AJDA, 210; also see N. Brown and J. Bell, op.ell·
d
, . 
, . ., , .. , ., . . 348' Corte e1 p.210; also see E. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., pp.l65-166; G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cll., p. 80' 1946 
Conti Sez Basilicata 10 febbraio 1998, Foro amm., 1998,2579; An 515/1980, NoB, 19, . 
186 S' ee C· C CI'V 2'e 20J'uillet 1993 D. 1993 526 note Chartier. It must be taken into account, how-
.., ., , "" . b 1875 Gazz Pal 
ever, that by nature an opportunity is never totally certain. See C.C., Cnm., 9 octo re , . ., 
1976, 1.4. 
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the loss of the chance to enter into a contractual agreement, or to acquire funding which 
would have added to the property of a person. 187 
Moreover, in order to succeed in its claim for compensation, the company must 
prove that the relevant damage is direct. In other words, the company must prove that 
the damage is an immediate and direct consequence of the wrongful act or omission. 188 
This occurs when, under normal circumstances, the wrongful act or omission would 
lead to the damages suffered. 189 Thus, the company seeking compensation will have to 
concentrate on two elements for the proof of causality between wrongful act and dam-
age, namely the criteria of normality and proximity. The company will have to prove 
that the damage is the normal consequence of the wrongful act or omission, and that it 
was close to the act in time, space and situation which caused it harm. 19O Thus, it is the 
theory of the causa adequata which is applicable in this case. 191 
In the case of foreign companies suffering damages as a result of the state's 
violation of EC law, the company will seek compensation for losses suffered until the 
hearing of the trial and amounting to expenses occurred for the procedure necessary for 
the acquisition of state permission to establish or trade. However, the main claim of the 
company would be compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain through trade 
within the state in question, or trade in a specific area of commercial activity within the 
state extending both before and after the hearing and until the annulment or modifica-
tion of the wrongful act. This would amount to the profit which is the normally expected 
to accrue in the ordinary course of things or by reference to specific circumstances 
where preparatory measures have been taken. 192 The positive damage incurred is obvi-
ously certain and quantifiable. As far as the manque de chance is concerned, it may be 
future loss but the company will have little difficulty in proving that its establishment in 
the state and trade in the particular commercial activity of its choice would produce gain 
187 See C.E., 19 avril 1985, Comm. de VitroUes, RDP, 1985, 1701; C.C., Crim., 3 novembre 1983, JCP, 
1985, II, 20360; for other types of loss of chance, see C.E., 3 novembre 1971, DUe Cannac, 6~0; C.E., 17 
mars 1972, DUe Jarrige, 222; C.E., 22 janvier 1986, DUe Grellier, AJ, 1986, 694; C.E., 6 fevner 1974, 
Gomez, AJ, 456. 
188 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.363; also see L. Certoma, op.cit., p.367. . . . 
189 See E. Spiliotopoulos, op. cit., p.166; See F. Galgano, Dirittto Civile e Commerciale: Le Ob"gaz~om 
e I Contratti (1990, CEDAM, Padova), p.30 1; C.C., Crim., 10 mai 1984, D., 1985,256, note Penneau, 
An 316/1983, NoB, 1983, 1571; An 913/1988, EA.!\Vll, 1989, 1331; Athens Court of Appeal 
13613/1988, NoB, 1989, 1299. . 
190 See G. Braibant, op.cit., p.293; Cass., 20 dicembre 1986, n. 7801, Mass. Foro it., 1986,480; 
L\npA9 10472/1990, ApJ.1, ME, 1991,93; An 462/1957, NoB, 1957, Ill; An 64/1955, NoB, 1955, 
495. 96 
191 • • G G b d P Bihr Code Civil (1995- , See A. Iatrou, op.cit., p.l07; F. Plga, op.CIl., p.753; . ou eaux an. , 
Dalloz, Paris), p.931. . 
192 See A. Iatrou, op. cit., p.l 06; Cass., 24 febbraio 1987, n. 1937, Arch. circolaz., 1987, p.4 71; C.C., 
Civ., Ire, 18 octobre 1978, Gaz. Pal., 1979, 1, 118, note Damien. 
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which they now missed due to the state's refusal or omission to all tho bl' hm 
ow IS esta IS ent 
or trade. Means of proof in this direction could be the production of annual profit of 
companies dealing in similar areas of trade, or reference to contracts which would have 
been entered to if the company were allowed to establish within the host state. The main 
problem with this loss of opportunity to gain, however, lies with the evaluation of the 
damages suffered. Although this damage is very difficult to quantify, the company 
should expect some level of compensation from the courts. Furthermore, the company 
will have to establish the direct causal link between act and damage as introduced by the 
prevailing doctrine on civil and administrative liability in the three selected countries 
, 
the causa adequata. In practice, this would be quite easy, as without the state's prohibi-
tion to establish or trade the company would have been allowed to make profit anyway. 
This brief reference to the issue of damage and causation demonstrates that the relevant 
national provisions allow a fair opportunity for the company to achieve compensation 
for all possible types of loss. 
D3. Restitution 
In the case of foreign companies suffering damages from acts of the national authorities 
which are contrary to EU provisions on the freedom of establishment, in natura restitu-
tion is not possible. In fact, it is accepted that restitution in natura could not be re-
quested by the state due to the principle of the separation of powers, which prevents the 
intervention of the judicial function to the executive function. 193 This argument is not 
without legal basis. In natura restitution would involve an order by the competent judge 
to the authorities to abolish a precise act. The theoretical and practical problems of such 
an interference by the judiciary to the executive have already been analysed. In any 
case, in natura restitution would signify reversal to the situation before the occurrence 
of the damage, that is abolition of the administrative or legislative act in question. How-
ever, this fonn of restitution could not be considered full, as it would still not rectify the 
company's loss of the opportunity to gain. 194 Since the judge may order in natura resti-
tution only when this type of compensation is not contrary to the interests of the appli-
cant,195 this type of restitution could not possibly be ordered in the case of foreign com-
panies suffering damages as a result of breaches of EC law by national authorities. In-
193 . I"t 245 See P. Poulitsas et 01., op.cit., par.70; also see J. RIvero and 1. Wa me, Op.CI., p.. . 
194 . . . d A T b h' 't p 2043' R Chapus Op.Clt., See P. Pouhtsas et 01., Op.Clt., par.70; G. Clan an . fa uee 1, Op.CI.,. . '.' 0 1 ' 
p.855; P. Dagtoglou, General Administrtaive Law (1992"Sakkoulas, AthenslKomotlm), p.8 . 
195 See e. Spiliotopoulos, op.cit., p.17l; A. Iatrou, op.cit., p.l08; L. Certoma, op.cit., p.368. 
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deed, in order to achieve full restitution, the judge in the case will have to order a lump 
sum for the expenses incurred and the loss of Opportunity until the date of the trial, as 
well as a daily rate for compensation for future damages until the administration abol-
ishes the wrongful act or proceeds with the act so far omitted. l96 For the evaluation of 
the compensation awarded the judge will base the judgement on the particular circum-
stances of the case and the detailed liquidation of losses submitted by the applicant. 197 A 
daily interest may also be awarded running from the date that the damage occurred until 
the date of payment of compensation. 198 
The Greek, French and Italian provisions on restitution for damages resulting 
from state liability are a replica of the relevant provisions for compensation in private 
disputes, to which they refer anyway. The compensation awarded to foreign companies 
equals the amount of money by which the company's fortune has decreased due to the 
wrongful act or omission of the administration. 199 This principle, also known as Differ-
enztheorie, prevails in all cases of compensation in the three selected jurisdictions and, 
as non-discriminatory, is in full compliance with the criteria of restitution introduced by 
the EU doctrine on state liability.2°O 
D4. Compensation for legislative acts 
The analysis of the substantive conditions for the establishment of state liability in 
France, Italy and Greece has demonstrated that the elements of state liability for 
breaches of EC law in the three selected countries do not restrict the companies' free-
dom of establishment via limitations to their access to justice. However, although refer-
ence was made to both administrative and legislative acts as sources of possible dam-
ages for which compensation is sought, the issue of the recognition of state liability 
from legislative acts has not been explored. The acknowledgement of state liability for 
legislative acts is a doctrine recently introduced and developed by the Eel after Bras-
196 See F. Galgano, op.cit., p.307; A. Iatrou, op.cit., p.140; Cass., 16 gennaio 1987, n. 333, Mass. Foro 1 
it., 1987; Corte dei Conti, Sez. I centrale, 6 agosto 1997, Foro amm., 1998, 1243; Athens Court of Appea 
523/1960, L1,K., 1960,581. . 
197 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op. cit. , p.246; F. Galgano, op.cit., p.307; E. Spiliotopoulos, op.CIl., 
p.171. . . 
198 Arts. 1153 and 1154 of the French Code Civil; Arts.293-294 and 346 of the Greek CIVil Code; 
Arts.1223, 1226 and 1227 of the Italian Civil Code. . 
199 See C E Ass 28 ~.r.vrl·er 1992 AJDA 1992 210' Cass., 3 ottobre 1987, n.7389, Mass. Foro ll.~ 
.., ., u:; "" • • . 171' L Attohco 1987; G. Braibant, op.cit., p.294; R. Chapus, op.cit., p.876; E. Splhotopoulos, op.cll., p. ,. , 
op.cit., p.l 044. .., .' .'1 
200 See E Scoditti "Profili di responsabilita civile per mancata attuazione dl dlrettlva comumtd~lpa: It . 
. , . . . 511 t 509' Iso see Pretura I IS Ola, caso Francovich in Cassazlone", 119 [1996] Foro lfallano,pp.503- , a , a 
20 ottobre 1992, G iusi. civ., 1993, 1, 301. 
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serie and its subsequent jUdgements. This EU doctrine will be analysed in chapter 7. 
Since EC law introduces an obligation of the state to make good damages suffered as a 
result of a legislative act or omission of the state, the evaluation of the level of protec-
tion offered to foreign companies at the national level would be incomplete without ref-
erence to the issue of legislative state liability. 
Such liability is not unknown to the three jurisdictions analysed in this thesis.20I 
State liability is accepted for any illegal action or omission of the national authorities. 
The legislature is a national authority whose duty is to ensure that legislative texts 
passed by it are in compliance with the Constitution and, insofar as EU citizens are con-
cerned, the regulations of the EU. 202 Thus, legislative acts in clash with EC law are ille-
gal and may lead to compensation for damages under the general provisions on state 
liability.203 Despite the acceptance of this position in the legal theory of all three selected 
jurisdictions, state liability for legislative acts is not accepted unconditionally. In all 
three countries legislative acts, albeit illegal, set for the protection of the general inter-
ests of the citizens of the state, general economic interest or social order may not give 
rise to legislative state liability, as any subsequent damage would not be abnormal and 
specia1.204 Moreover, legislative state liability can only derive from a positive legislative 
action rather than an omission of the legislator to regulate a specific situation.20s Last but 
not least, despite the support of the principle of legislative state liability by most Greek 
authors, the Greek Areios Pagos (the highest civil court) refuses to recognise liability 
for legislative acts.206 Thus, in Greece state liability for legislative actions is not ac-
cepted and compensation for a relevant case has never been awarded. 
Even in France and Italy, however, national law introduces two important re-
strictions. First, there is a limitation concerning the means with which this liability may 
occur. Contrary to one of the main general doctrines of civil and administrative law, an 
action is required whereas an omission is not sufficient. In principle, there is little to 
201 See P. Poulitsas et aI., op. cit. , par.58; I. Kyriakopoulos, Greek Administrative Law (1954, Sakkou-
las, Athens), p.491; J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.253; M. Cerrato, op.cit., p.2018. 
202 See M. Jarvis, op.cit., p.402; R. Chapus, op.cit., p.955. 
203 See Cour admin. d' appel de Paris, 1 juillet 1992, AJDA, 1992, 768, note Pretot; 12 novembre 1992, 
Rec. Lebon, 1992, 790; A. Adinolfi, op. cit., p.1341 . 
204 See P. Poulitsas et al., op.cit., par.58; also see D. Simon, op.cit., p.242; J. Rivero and 1. Waline, . 
op.cit. p.254; C.E., 14 janvier 1938, La Fleurette, Leb., 1938,25; C.E., 22 octobre 1943, Ste. des ,f;~~/~­
semenls Lacaussade, Leb., 1943, 231; C.E., 21 juin 1944, Caucheteux et Desmond, Leb., 1944, 2 , . ., 
5 janvier 1963, Bovero, Leb., 1963, 53; C.E., 18 decembre 1981, Ministre de la Cultu~e et ,de la Commu-
niction, Leb., 1981,478; C.E., 23 decembre 1988, Martin, Leb., 1988,470; Cour admm. d appel de 
Lyon, 16 fevrier 1989, Bente, JCP, 1990, II, 21521. 
20S See Cour admin. d' appel de Paris, 1 juillet 1992, AJDA, 1992, 765, note X. Pretot. n 
206 See P. Dagtoglou, 1992, op.cit., p.826; also see An 115/1935, 0eJ.1l~ MB', 1935,333; A 
3711957, EEN, 1957,483; An 665175, To~, 1976,495. 
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justify this limitation to the rights of companies seeking compensation for legislative 
state liability. However, in practice the omission of the state to legislate on a particular 
issue would signify the existence of a lacuna in the relevant national legislation. For 
companies wishing to benefit from the freedom of establishment, this would be filled by 
reference to the relevant principles of EC law. This would not restrict their freedom to 
establish and trade within the territory of the host state. If the latter refuses to apply the 
relevant EC law provisions, then liability of the state would occur from a precise ad-
ministrative act expressing the state's intention. In this case, the company is owed com-
pensation on the basis of this illegal administrative act, rather than on the basis of the 
omission of the legislator to issue an act in compliance with EC law. Apart from the 
lack of practical value of this limitation, the theoretical background of its introduction 
seems to be the principle of the separation of powers. Although judicial control of an 
existing law is accepted to be not only a right but also a duty of the judicial function of a 
modern state, a court order forcing the legislature to take a particular legislative step or, 
even worse, an attempt by the judiciary to create a legislative regime through a court 
judgement would be an obvious and vulgar interference of the judiciary to the function 
of the legislative authorities of the state. Thus, the limitation of state liability to damages 
caused exclusively by legislative actions is justified by reference to the principle of the 
separation of powers. 
A second restriction introduced in the area of legislative state liability refers to 
the nature of damages suffered by the applicant. These have to be abnormal and special, 
a result of a legislative act which was set for the protection of a particular circle of peo-
ple, rather than the general interest. Admittedly, the French Conseil d' Etat, whose case-
law also has an indirect effect to its Italian and Greek counterparts, seems to be quite 
liberal in its interpretation of this provision.207 In any case, the effect of the legislative 
action to a specific circle of persons is an obvious expression of the German 
Schutznormtheorie, according to which the state is only liable when the interests of a 
closed circle of persons are injured by its action.208 This doctrine also prevails in EC law 
• 209 • 
as demonstrated by the ECl's judgements in Schoppenstedt and Brasserze. There IS 
little doubt that this condition limits the access of individuals to justice at the national 
level. In fact, the introduction of additional conditions for the establishment of legisla-
207 See R. Chapus, op.cit., p.957. d ( d ) 
208 See E. Grabitz, "Liability for Legislative Acts" in H. Schermers, T. Heukels, and P. Mea e s , 
Non-Contractual Liability of the EC (1988, Martinus Nijhoff, London), pp.l-ll, at 6. d 48/93 
209 See case 5171 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; also seFe 46 an Ltd 
. ifS fi ~ ort ex parte actortame Brasserie Du Pecheur Sa v Germany, Regma v Secretary 0 tate or 1 ransp , 
and Others [1996] ECR 1-1029. 
204 
tive state liability has been strongly criticised for its reluctance to "de-sanctify" the leg-
islative function of the state.2lO It must be accepted, however, that the protection re-
quired from Member States is merely one equivalent to the level of protection made 
available under Ee legislation. Thus, the restrictive provisions for the establishment of 
state liability is a general problem applicable to the protection of companies at both na-
tional and EU level. The evaluation of this problem is better placed in chapter 7 where 
the details of relevant recent case-law of the Eel will be presented. For the purposes of 
this chapter, it suffices to state that the national provisions on legislative state liability in 
France and Italy are in compliance with EU standards, but are still restrictive for the ac-
cess of the foreign companies to justice. In contrast to this, the Greek position on this 
issue is in clash with Ee law and is another blow to the effective protection of foreign 
companies seeking damages due to violations of Ee law by the Greek authorities. 
The analysis of the substantive conditions for the establishment of state liability 
in the three selected countries has revealed that protection to foreign companies is of-
fered by reference to the provisions applicable in the case of claims for compensation 
against private persons. In fact, the substantive prerequisites of state liability seem to be 
very liberal for the companies, which need not even prove the existence of fault in their 
claim. Thus, for the successful claim for compensation due to state liability, foreign 
companies need to establish a minimum set of conditions, whose content is unusually 
favourable for the applicants.211 These conditions are very similar to those introduced by 
the EU doctrine of state liability. This is due to the recognition of EC law as a source of 
national administrative law, a doctrine which encourages the highest administrative na-
tional courts to create a state liability doctrine based on ECl case-Iaw.212 In fact, Zano-
bini argues that the development of a doctrine even considering the possibility of state 
liability due to legal acts demonstrates how state liability has departed from ordinary, 
. b 213 
civil liability for damages and how extended the legislator seems to want It to e. 
E. EVALUATION OF PROTECTION AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
The analysis of the national provisions on the procedural and substantive conditions for 
the establishment of state liability in France, Italy and Greece has led to a number of 
210 See D. Simon, op.cit., pp.242-243. 
211 See A. Iatrou, op.cit., p.138. 9 fe . 1988 Asso-
212 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cil., p.39; also see G. Alpa, op.cit., p.27; C.E., 1 vner I ' 
. . I' . d . I d 11 emolal Cales-Mauzac el au res, clalion des proporietaires riverams el p QlSanClers u cmg ~ e r -
AJDA, 1988, 418. 
213 See G. Zanobini, op. cit., p.34 7. 
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valuable findings. Despite the existence of three types of courts in the selected jurisdic-
tions and the consequent creation of an administrative law of tort, state liability borrows 
most of its provisions from the general doctrines of civil torts. The elements of state li-
ability are those applicable to any tort and include a wrongful administrative or legisla-
tive act, damage to the applicant company and a causal link between the two. The re-
quirements for the characterisation of an act as wrongful is flexible in favour of the ap-
plicant. Indeed, the inclusion of omissions in the concept of wrongful acts for the estab-
lishment of state liability can only be seen as a advantageous extension of the possible 
sources of state liability and, consequently, an amplification of the field of application 
of the liability of the state. More importantly, the only condition for the classification of 
an act or omission as wrongful is its objective illegality. The sUbjective element of fault 
is not a prerequisite of liability. In fact, in Greece and Italy fault is not required at all, 
whereas in France the precondition of illegality as the exclusive means of demonstrating 
the existence of fault leads to its practical exclusion from the deliberation of the com-
petent judges. This is reflected in recent judgements of the French courts who "inten-
tionally" avoid all reference to fault. 214 The unusual exclusion of subjective fault is of 
paramount assistance to companies. Had the situation been different, they would have 
had to meet the impossible task of tracing negligence/intent to specific employees of the 
national authority and attributing percentages of it to members of the circle of adminis-
trative or legislative officials who dealt with the particular file. 
The regulation of damage as an element of state liability is equally auspicious to 
the applicant company. Replicating the most accommodating of provisions in this area 
of civil law, the legislator allows compensation for state liability even for future dam-
ages whose certainty (an essential characteristic) is debatable. Along the same generous 
lines is the provision on the nature of damages which may be compensated for. These 
include positive damage, moral damage and loss of the opportunity to make profit. It is 
the last type of damages which is of particular interest to companies suffering harm due 
to breaches of Ee law in the field of the freedom of establishment. The inclusion of 
perle de chance allows the company to seek restitution for the major part of its damages 
which will derive most probably from the loss of the opportunity to establish in the host 
. ·t fr aking state or to trade in a particular field of commerce therefore preventIng 1 om m 
. . fy th pany will profit. Even when the damages in question are difficult to quantI e com 
receive some compensation. Moreover, in order to submit a successful claim, the com-
pany will have to prove that the harm occurred is a direct consequence of the act or 
214 See N. Dantonel-Cor, op. cit. , p.502. 
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omission of the state. This is another provision borrowed by the civil law of torts, which 
favours the theory of causa adequata in all three selected jurisdictions. The pennissive 
substantive con~itions for the establishment of state liability are complemented by an 
similarly accommodating doctrine of full compensation equal to the amount of money 
by which the company's fortune decreased due to the act of the national authorities. 
The evaluation of the substantive elements of state liability in France, Greece 
and Italy draw an ideal picture of tolerance and permissiveness in the relevant provi-
sions whose aim clearly is to allow foreign companies to achieve compensation for 
damages suffered as a result of a wrongful act or omission of the host state. This con-
clusion seems to be confirmed by reference to the doctrine of state liability due to 
wrongful legislative acts, which is recognised in France and Italy. Provided that the ad-
ditional conditions of existence of a positive legislative act, affecting only a closed cir-
cle of people are met, the company may claim compensation for damages suffered as a 
result of a national legislative text, whose provisions breach EC law. These conditions, 
albeit identical to those introduced by the EU doctrine of legislative state liability, in 
combination with the reluctance of some judges to apply the relative new concepts of 
legislative state liability, render compensation due to this source somewhat uncertain.2I.s 
It is therefore more effective for the company to seek permission to establish or to trade 
in the host state, so that a precise administrative act, albeit prohibitive, is issued. This 
act will assist the company with the establishment of a sounder legal basis for compen-
sation, as well as with the provision of information on the concrete competent adminis-
trative organ and the detailed reasoning for the rejection of the company's request. This 
would be the only option available to the company in Greece, where legislative state 
liability is not accepted. In France and Italy, however, even though it is advisable for the 
company to try to establish state liability due to administrative acts or omissions, the 
recognition of legislative state liability presents an additional legal basis for the claim 
for damages which can be of particular use in the, admittedly rare, cases where permis-
sion by the authorities is not conceivable or extremely expensive and time-consuming. 
Thus, in principle, the three selected jurisdictions award a high level of protec-
tion to companies at the national level. From the point of view of the substantive provi-
sions this is mainly due to the harmonisation in the national case-law of EU Member 
216 H States resulting from their reception of relevant ECJ and CFI precedents. owever, 
. .. h . d h the procedural conditions 
thIS pIcture of effectIveness becomes somew at talnte w en 
21S See N. Dantonel-Cor, op.cit., p.499. 
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of compensation for state liability are examined. The first sign of probl 
ems appears well 
before the application for damages is lodged in the resolution of the p 1" . 
re lmlnary Issue of 
the choice of competent court. The existence of three types of courts in the selected 
countries forces foreign companies to determine the court with the jurisdiction to rule 
on its application for damages against the state very early on in the process. Leaving 
aside the increased difficulty involved for companies whose state of origin does not 
follow a system of separate administrative court structure, the determination of the 
competent court seems a difficult task, mainly due to the complexity and fluidity of the 
criteria introduced for this purpose. Greece is the only country of the three examined in 
this thesis which has adequately resolved this problem through the express subjection of 
claims for compensation against the state to the competence of its administrative courts. 
In contrast, France seems to suffer from the fact that the rules determining the right 
court derive from case-law and are therefore based on previous courts' judgements on 
specific cases. This method of introduction of legal provisions is problematic in a civil 
law country where the value of precedent is only limited to the parties in each dispute. 
However, the French uncertainty and complexity is only minimal when compared to the 
Italian position. The latter is based on the doctrine of subjective rights and legitimate 
interests which has been criticised for its complexity and distorting intricacy.217 
These characteristics are carried onto the procedure of the trial, where the com-
pany needs to refer its case first to the Italian administrative courts for the annulment of 
the wrongful act or declaration of illegality of the omission of the authorities and then to 
the Italian civil courts which have the exclusive competence to adjudicate on the issue 
of compensation. This position creates delays in the dispensation of justice. Since a final 
decision by the administrative judge could take up to twenty years, there is little doubt 
that these long delays "threaten the efficiency of justice" and force individuals to tum to 
other routes of restitution outside the rules of law.21s Another consequence of the Italian 
position is the imposition of a double-risk for foreign companies which are forced to 
face the common reluctance of national judges to identify their case as one tackling is-
sues of EC law and to refer to the ECl for a preliminary ruling twice.219 A third conse-
quence of the two-trial Italian system is the constraint in the circle of persons with the 
216 See E. G. de Enterria, "Perspectivas de las justicias administrativas nacionales en el ambito de la 
Uni6n Europea" [1999] Rivista trimestiale di diritto pubblico, pp.I-14, at 10. ..' "66 
. ., stratlva 217 See E. R. D' Aci, "Notazione minime, rna non troppo, sullo stato della gJUstlcla ~mlm , 
[1990] Foro amministrativo, pp.2508-2514, at 2510 and 2511; also see G. Alp~, Op.~'t., p.1306. 
21S See G. Paleologo, on.cit., p.623. It should be noted that the article was wn~en .. ~ 1993 .. Tnol'stramYtl'va 
r R Ch' "Glustlcla amml , knowledge, there is no recent calculation on this issue. Also see . . leppa, 2504 
efficienza e pubblica amrninistrazione", 72 [1996] Foro amministratlvo, pp.2500-2515, at . 
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locus standi to seek compensation, in the grounds on which such I' b 
c alms may e suc-
cessful, and in the powers of the adjudicating judges. These are limited to the persons, 
merits and powers introduced for actions for annulment of acts or omissions of national 
authorities are not as extensive as the ones provided for in France and Greece where the 
claims for compensation can be based on all possible factual and legal grounds of ille-
gality which may lead not only to the annulment but also to the modification of the 
measure in question. It can be argued that this Italian handicap is counteracted by the 
increased protection offered by a double system of appeals and cassations. True as this 
argument may be, the resources and time constraints involved in such a long process 
render the detailed examination of the case before the Italian courts an exercise not 
worth pursuing for most companies.220 Even if the time and money for the completion of 
this process, which may also entail preliminary rulings to the ECJ, were available, the 
comparison with the French and Greek models would be favourable to them as the 
merit, locus standi and court power limitations still impede access to justice in Italy. 
Another problem of the protection offered to foreign companies at the national 
level refers to the state privileges in the case of compensations for state liability. These 
involve shorter prescription periods for the submission of appeals or cassations against 
judgements of the courts of first instance, which are introduced in a discriminatory 
manner in favour of the state. The introduction of shorter time-limits for the appeal of 
companies against court decisions is a significant impediment to the access of the com-
panies to justice. However, a crucial finding of this chapter refers to the lack of mecha-
nisms for the enforced execution of court judgements in France and Greece. This signi-
fies the lack of practical value of court judgements against the state, whose authorities 
only execute court judgements if they so wish. The problem is one based on the consti-
tutional principle of the separation of powers and ·extends in all judgements against the 
state irrespective of the identity or nationality of the applicant. However, it can only be 
seen as a terrible blow in the fight of foreign companies to achieve restitution for dam-
ages suffered as a result of wrongful acts or omissions by the host state. In fact, it can be 
stated that both the shorter prescription periods and the Greek and French problem of 
execution against the state are national provisions which, albeit non-discriminatory on 
the basis of the companies' nationality, impede the efficiency of the protection of EU 
I 221 nationals at the national level considerably and, thus, are contrary to EC aw. 
219 See M. Chiti, op.cit., p.824. . ., l'ta I . ci io 
220 For the need to put efficiency before legality, see F .. Ledda, "Dal pnnclplo de lega I a prm p 
d'infallibilita dell' amministrazione", 73 [1997] Foro.amministrativo, pp.3303-3327, at 3307. 
221 See N. Dantonel-Cor, op.cit., p.496. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Protection of Foreign Secondary Units 
at ED Level 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The second hypothesis of this thesis is that the judicial protection offered to foreign 
companies suffering damages as a result of direct or indirect violations of EC law by the 
Greek, French and Italian national authorities is inadequate and ineffective. One aspect 
of this hypothesis, namely the inefficiency of judicial protection at the national level, 
was addressed in Chapter 6. The second aspect of judicial protection, protection at the 
ED level, will be the topic of this last chapter. The main aim of Chapter 7 is to delve 
into the legal routes under which protection for foreign companies may be sought at the 
ED level. For the identification of these routes it must be noted that the remedies under 
which actions may be brought before the ECJ and the CFI are restrictively introduced 
by the Treaties. Thus, foreign companies seeking judicial protection at the ED level may 
only seek restitution for damages under one of the procedures introduced by them. 
In examining the legal routes open to foreign companies at the EU level, namely 
involving direct or indirect contribution of the ECJ or the CFI, it is necessary to clarify 
that the action of the foreign company will inevitably refer to the alleged failure of a 
Member State to fulfil its EU obligations. Thus, the remedy which readily springs to 
mind is the initiation of infringement proceedings against the Member State under 
Arts.226 and 227 EC. However, a closer look at the text of these Articles excludes their 
use by private individuals on the basis of an express and clear lack of locus standi. 
Thus, the only possible role for foreign companies in such proceedings is limited to the 
mere notification to the Commission or another Member State that a violation of EC 
law is taking place, in the hope that these, as parties with locus standi in such proceed-
ings, will initiate an action. Yet, the true role that an individual may play in such in-
fringement proceedings is notoriously insignifi~ant, a realisation which is interpreted as 
210 
the main factor of the decline of relevant complaints to the Comml·s· 1 E ·f 
slon. ven 1 some-
ho~ the company manages to persuade the Commission or another M b S 
em er tate to 
pursue the case, the end result of the procedure will be an ECJ declaration that the rele-
vant national law is in breach of EC law without, however, reference to any damages 
caused.3 The only value of such a declaration for the company lies with its possible use 
as an indication of illegality in actions for damages before national courts in proceed-
ings offering judicial protection at the national level. Another possible route for the 
company's judicial protection could be the annulment of the allegedly wrongful national 
legislative or administrative act that constitutes the source of damage. Even this action, 
however, would be brought before the national courts, since judicial review at the EU 
level under Art.230 is admissible against Community acts only. A third possible means 
of judicial protection at the EU level can be sought through preliminary rulings pro-
ceedings under Art.234. This provision allows the company to bring an action for dam-
ages against the state before the national courts and, in order to pre-empt the problems 
inherent to judicial protection at the national level, persuade the national judge to seek 
clarifications on EC law issues of the case from the ECJ. 
The procedure of preliminary rulings as a means of bringing the state liability 
doctrine to the ECJ will be analysed in this chapter. It must be noted that state liability 
may constitute the legal basis of cases against Member States before the national courts 
without necessarily reference to the ECJ. In this case, the analysis of Chapter 6 on pro-
tection at the national level will apply. Since this chapter discusses judicial protection at 
the EU level, it will focus on state liability in conjunction with preliminary rulings (the 
Francovich scenario) as a means of involving the ECJ, and protection at EU level, in the 
process. An in-depth examination of an innovative, some might even say, futuristic le-
gal route which may soon become available to foreign companies on the basis of a pos-
sible interpretation of Art.288(2) and the concurrent liability scenario will also be un-
dertaken. Finally, the judicial protection of companies at EU level will be evaluated. 
The assessment on the efficiency of judicial protection will influence the final deduction 
on the reasons for the existence of breaches of EC law within the three states after more 
than forty years of European integration. 
1 See M. Horspool, EU Law (1998, Butterworths, LondonlEdinburghlDublin), p.188. 
2 See P. Craig and G. de BUrca, op.cit., p.394.. d M '11 London) 
3 See N. Brown and T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the EC (1994, Sweet an ax\',e, ' 
p.l19. 
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B. PRELIMINARY REFERENCES AND THE STATE LIABILITY SCENARIO 
The main doctrine currently offered to individuals natural and legal ~ h 
' persons, lor t e 
restitution of damages suffered as a result of actions or omissions by Member States is 
state liability. For their judicial protection at the EU level, foreign companies may util-
ise the preliminary rulings process in order to involve the ECl to judicial actions for 
damages initiated and heard before the competent national courts. State liability was 
formulated by the landmark Francovich case,4 which has been described as one of the 
most obvious examples of "classic judicial activism".' 
The foreign company suffering damages as a result of breaches of EC law by 
Member States may submit an action for damages before the competent national courts, 
determined in Chapter 6, against the Member State whose action or omission caused the 
damage. In order to assess whether compensation is due, the national judge will need to 
establish whether the legislative6 or administrative' action or inaction of the Member 
State was wrongful. This can only be determined via the examination of a preliminary 
issue, namely whether the relevant action or omission is in compliance with EC legisla-
tion. This is a matter of EC law. In order to ensure that the decision of the court on this 
preliminary issue is based on a correct and full application of EC law, without the hin-
drance of the common natural prejudices for the state described in Chapter 6, the appli-
cant foreign company has the right to argue that the national judge needs clarifications 
on the issue from Eel judges. The company may thus persuade the national judge to 
request a preliminary ruling by the ECl. The clarification and interpretation of the legal 
points provided by the Eel in their preliminary ruling will be used by the national 
judges as the legal basis of their judgement, which may award compensation for dam-
ages suffered due to wrongful acts or omissions of the Member State. 
It is worth noting that following the EU doctrine of state liability, to which every 
4 See Joined cases 6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and another v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357. For a detail.ed 
listing of the relevant literature, see R. Caranta, "Judicial protection against Member States: A new IUS 
commune takes shape" [1995] Common Market Law Review, Vo1.32, pp.703-726, at 709, n~te 2~. AIS~ 
see Opinion of Advocate General Leger in case C-5/94 Regina v Ministry of Agriculture, FIsherIes a.n h 
Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-2553, con.82, who notes that "the Francovlc 
judgment fills a lacuna in the protection afforded to individuals". / B / . 
It must be noted that state liability was introduced in the 1960s; see case 6/60 Humb et v e glum 
[1960] ECR 1125. . I 1 tiona/ 
S See D. O'Keeffe, "Judicial protection of the individual by the ECl" [1996] Fordham n erna 
Law Journal, pp.901-915, at 913. h B desre 
6 See joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and 01 ;;~/~4 ;;;nkavi~ 
pub/ik Deutschland [1996] ECR 1-4845; also see joined cases ~-283/?4, C-29~~~:/~~ ~~/omone Haim v 
Internationaal ECR 1-5063; Opinion of Advocate General Mlscho III case 
Kassenzahnarzliche Vereiningun Nordheim, 19 May 1999, unreported. 
7 See case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories [1998] ECR 1-1531. 
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national court must comply unifonnly,8 foreign companies may also seek compensation 
for damages deriving from the wrongful application of EC legislative texts which are 
not nonnally invokable before the national courts. This Occurs in cases "where by rea-
son of the insufficiently precise and unconditional nature of the provisions of a direc-
tive, he [the individual] cannot rely on it directly before its national courts".9 Thus, for-
eign companies now have the opportunity to demand restitution on the basis of meas-
ures of "imperfect" direct effect, namely measures which do, not comply with the tradi-
tional conditions of direct effects. Moreover, following Francovich foreign companies 
may successfully seek compensation even in circumstances of horizontal direct effects 
, 
namely in disputes amongst private commercial units.IO Furthermore, after the subse-
quent Brasserie judgement compensation may also be achieved for damages suffered by 
foreign companies as a result of actions or omissions undertaken by all possible types of 
national authorities falling in all three functions of the state, namely the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary. 11 Also, foreign companies are now allowed to seek restitu-
tion for damages deriving from national measures implementing EU Directives even 
before the time-limit of the relevant Directive has expired. 12 On the basis of this, it 
would be fair to say that the development of the state liability doctrine and the subjec-
tion of new areas to EC law under the Treaty of Amsterdam has led to the expansion of 
the field of application of the right of foreign companies to seek compensation. 13 
The procedural conditions for the submission of the action for restitution are 
regulated by the relevant national procedural provisions. As these have been presented 
and evaluated in Chapter 6, there is no need for further analysis here. The substantive 
conditions for the establishment of state liability include the following three conditions: 
a. the infringed rule of EC law must be introduced in order to confer rights to 
individuals; 
8 See A. Campesan and A. Oal Ferro, "La responsabilita dello stato per la viol~io~~ degli obb.li~hi a~ 
esso incombenti in forza del diritto comunitario aIle luce della sentenza Francovlch [1993] R,v,sla dl 
diritto europeo, pp. 313-332, at 313; also see case 166173 Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorfv Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstellefiir Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] ECR 33, con.2. . . 
9 See Opinion of Advocate General Leger in case C-5/94 Regina v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-2553, con.76. . 
10 See J. Steiner, 'From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of Community 
law', European Law Review, Vol.18, 1993, pp.3-22, at 21. S t fi 
11 See Joined cases 46 and 48/93 Brasserie Du Pecheur Sa v Germany, Regina v Secretary of la e or 
Transport, ex parte F actortame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR I~ 1 ~2~. CMLR 1057. 
12 See case C-129/96 Inter-Environement Wallonie ASBL v RegIOn Wallonne [19.98] 1 " 1999 E _ 
13 See A. Kaczorowska, "A new right available to individua.ls un?~r co~;.u~~ty IL~:te!tion ;fte;;:e 
pean Public Law, pp.79-90, at 90; also see A. Biondi, "The fleXIble cItIzen: In,,~VI ua ~bution de la Cour 
Treaty of Amsterdam" [1999] European Public Law, pp.245-267; R. Kovar, a con L w EUI Col-
. . ,,' A ademy of European a, • de justice a l'edification de l'ordre juridique commu,nautalTe In c 
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b. the breach must be sufficiently serious; and 
c. there must be a direct causal link between the breach d th d 
an e amage sus-
tained. 14 
In Brasserie the Court clarified that a breach is sufficiently serious when the Member 
State has manifestly and gravely violated the limits of its discretion. In Lomas and Dil-
lenkofer the EC] explained, by reference to Art.288(2), that this criterion applied to 
cases where the state makes a choice of economic policy, whereas in all other cases any 
breach of EC law is sufficient for the fulfilment of this second Francovich condition. IS 
The procedure introduced by Francovich and developed by the EC] and the CFI 
in their numerous post-Francovich judgements is of undeniable value to foreign com-
panies. The presentation of complaints against Member States before the EC] had been 
preserved for the Commission and other Member States, which have been (and still are) 
the only ones able to bring a national government before the EC] in infringement pro-
ceedings against it. However, in combining state liability and preliminary rulings, the 
Francovich scenario can be seen as a means of opening the back door to foreign com-
panies wishing to approach, albeit indirectly through their national judges, the ECJ with 
complaints against Member States. Not only that, but the factual circumstances giving 
rise to state liability and, consequently, to the right of foreign companies to seek restitu-
tion is greatly expanded. Moreover, following the state liability procedure companies 
acquire a uniquely significant, active role in the relevant proceedings. For the first time 
in EC law the company may initiate an action against Member States before the national 
courts, support its claim in an active manner, request reference of the case to the ECJ, 
where necessary, and argue for the correct and full application of the preliminary ruling 
in the particular case. On this basis, the initiative of Ee] judges to introduce and de-
velop this type of doctrine can only be considered a revolutionary attempt by the ECJ 
judges to achieve effective judicial protection for the citizens of the Union. 16 
However, the value of state liability does not end there. The doctrine may finally 
lected Courses 0/ the Academy 0/ European Law, J 993, EC Law (1995, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague), pp.15-122, at 109-122. 
14 For a brief analysis of these conditions with specific reference to British law, see A. Geddes, Protec-
tion o/Individual Rights under EC Law (l995, Butterworths, London), pp.124-126. 
IS .., ,/, • I F' h' d r: d ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ire-See case 5/94 Regma v MInistry OJ Agrzcu ture, IS erzes an rOO, 
land) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-2553; Joined cases 178, 179, 188 and 190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and Others v 
Germany [1996] 3 CMLR 469. ., .' as 
16 See for example V.D. Simon and A. Barav "La responsabilite de l'admmlstratlon natlOnale e~ c 
, . ' h'C 165-174·alsoseeF.Fmes, de violation du droit communautalre" [1987] Revue du Marc e ommun, pp. '. . II d' 
.. . t' ?" [1997] 33 Revue trrmestrze e L 
"Quelle obligation de reparer pour la VIOlatIOn du drOit communau alre. f h C rt' 
droit euroneen pp 69-101 Amull notes that Francovich represents a natural development 0 t e teO cUt l'ns 
r ".' ., d h d ty f national courts to pro -
already well established case-law on pnmacy, direct effects an t e u 0 . 3-15 at 10. 
dividual rights. See A. Amull, "Judging the new Europe" [1994] European Law Review, pp. , 
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create an expectation that infringements of EC law will not merely be noticed, but will 
probably result in financial punishment for the perpetrators, amounting to claims for 
compensation for damages suffered as a direct result of their action or omission. In 
other words, the state liability doctrine now acts as deterrent by applying pressure on 
Member States to implement EC law, and especially Directives, correctly and on time.17 
Furthermore, as Snyder puts it, the state liability principle "is likely to be an element, 
implicit if not explicit, in bargaining processes between the Commission and Member 
States, especially concerning the implementation of Community law". 18 
Without underestimating the significant role of the Francovich scenario for the 
effective judicial protection of foreign companies at the EU level, it must be accepted 
that the enthusiasm currently surrounding Francovich reflects and is partly due to the 
presently favourable evaluation of remedies initiated before national courts. In fact, the 
preliminary rulings procedure is often viewed as "the only way to make sure that these 
remedies are properly applied and developed further without losing their peculiar char-
acteristic, which is to be common to all Member States":9 Oliver notes that for its sur-
vival as a system of law, EC law depends on effective remedies and procedures for its 
enforcement before national courts.20 The advantage of such procedures lies in the in-
troduction of the possibility of enforcing EC law before national courts and in proceed-
ings following the national rules of civil procedure.21 Their value is reflected in the 
enormous and continuous success - both qualitative quantitative - of the preliminary 
rulings procedure. Indeed, from a quantitative point of view, it suffices to observe that 
half of the ECl's judgements arise from preliminary rulings references.22 From a quali-
tative point of view, it suffices to note the importance and the number of doctrines of 
EC law introduced by the ECl on the basis of preliminary references, such as suprem-
acy, direct effect, guarantee of fundamental rights, state and EU liability.23 The success 
of the preliminary rulings procedure is also due to its favourable treatment from ECJ 
judges, who from the outset have not generally been pedantic as to the formalities of the 
17 See C. Plaza Martin, "Furthering the effectiveness of EC Directives and the judicial protection of in-
dividual rights thereunder" [1994] International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.27-54, at 34. 
18 See F. Snyder, "The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques" [1993] 56 The Modern Law Review, pp.19-54. 
19 See R. Caranta, op. cit., p.718. . R . , 
20 See P. Oliver, "Enforcing Community rights in the English courts" [1987] 50 Modern Law evl~, 
pp.881-907, at 906. 
21 See E. G. de Enterria, op.cit., p.5. . ?" [1996) Euro-
22 See M. O'Neill, "Article 177 and limits to the right to refer: an end to the confusIOn. 
pean Public Law, pp.375-391, at 375. . . . "'11 uro eo 
23 See R. JouIet, "L 'article 177 du traite CEE et Ie renvoi prejudiciel" [1991] R,v,sla dl dm 0 e 'P ' 
pp.591-616, at 592-593. 
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reference and the questions asked.24 Another element of Success refiers t th 1" 
o e app lcatlOn 
of national rules of procedure, a fact which aid national courts and tn'bun 1 t 
as 0 promote 
an internal harmony and consistency within the legal system of each Member State be-
tween the enforcement of EC law on the one hand and national law on the other.25 Even 
when the introduction of new national authorities is deemed necessary, these authorities 
reflect the governmental and administrative traditions of each Member State, thus con-
tributing to the acceptance of the Union and its law.26 
However, proceedings initiated before national courts are not without disadvan-
tages.27 Several authors have expressed their concern at the disparities in remedies and 
procedures to be followed by applicants wishing to enforce their EU rights before their 
national courtS.28 Advocate General Capotorti held that at the present time, given the 
differences in legal rules between one Member State and another "inequality in treat-
ment exists",29 whereas the ECl has often expressed concern as to the difference in the 
treatment of EU citizens amongst the fifteen different legal orders within the EU.30 It is 
widely accepted that the main strength of such remedies also constitutes their major 
weakness, namely their reliance on national rules of procedure for their availability and 
effectiveness. Where EC law does not prescribe common provisions,3) such rules differ 
amongst Member States, thus leading to lack of uniformity, inequality and unfairness in 
the protection of the individual during the relevant proceedings before the national 
courtS.32 Having said that, it must be accepted that these admittedly large discrepancies 
are now limited to a degree by the fact that the ECl has increasingly impinged on na-
tionallegal remedies by introducing general principles of EC law, such as proportional-
24 See G. Tesauro, "The effectiveness of judicial protection and co-operation between the Court of Jus-
tice and the national courts" [1993] Yearbook of European Law, pp.I-17, at 13. 
25 See D. F. Waelboeck, "Treaty violations and liability of Member States: the effect of the Francovich 
case-law" in T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Action for Damages in Community Law (1997, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague/LondonlBoston), pp.311-337, at 336. 
26 See J. Bridge, "Procedural aspects of the enforcement of EC law through the legal systems of Mem-
ber States" [1984] European Law Review, pp. 28-42, at 31. . . 
27 See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, "Are national remedies the only way forward? Wldenmg the scope 
of Article 215(2) of the Treaty of Rome" in J. Lonbay and A. Biondi (eds.), Remedies for Breach of EC 
Law (1997, John Wiley and Sons), pp.85-101, at 88. 
28 See P. Oliver, op.cit., p. 894; also see D. Anderson, References to the European Court (1995, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London), p.25. 
29 See case 130179 Express Dairy Foods Limited v Intervention Board for Agricultural Pro~uce (pre)-
. '. . f' Q 'B h Division CommerCial Court hmmary rulIng requested by the High Court 0 Justice, ueen s enc , 
[1980] ECR 1887, at 1910. ' . h I' h 1,/ k 
30 B d t Itfi" landwlrts caft IC e mar -For example, see case 54/81 Firma Wilhelm Fromme v un esans a ur 
tordnung [1982] ECR 1449, con.4. . t en 
3) "The grey area where Community law seems to stop and national law takes over, contmu~ 0 ~ -
erate intriguing problems". See S. Prechal, "Community law in national courts: the lessons om an 
Schijndel" (1998] Common Market Law Review, pp.681-706, at 681. 
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ity, which contribute to the restructuring of national procedural systems with a view to 
forming a common European standard that focuses on effective judicial protection.33 
Bearing this last point in mind, let us examine some specific discrepancies in 
such proceedings before national courts within different Member States. Amongst those 
reported to date are inequalities in the locus standi and time-limit requirements for ac-
tions against the state before the national courts. Indeed, time-limits vary between 
Member States "from a matter of a few weeks to a mater of several years in relation to 
the same type of case. ,,34 Other areas of discrepancy include national rules on the burden 
of proof,35 inequalities in the legal aid36 and its effectiveness, in the maximum sum 
awarded, and in the calculation of interest under the various national legal orders.37 
Further inequality arise from the fact that the application of national legal rules extends 
to all ancillary questions relating to actions for the enforcement of EC law.38 Moreover, 
the maintenance of national rules in the areas of causation and damages creates further 
uncertainty not only from the EC law perspective and the consequent disparities in the 
national legal orders of the Member States, but also from the national law perspective, 
as these rules may be challenged under the effectiveness principle.39 In pointing out 
these inequalities and discrepancies, it must be noted that they are an expected and nor-
mal phenomenon in a legal system attempting to rely upon fifteen different jurisdic-
tions. In particular, supreme courts, which work on the basis of long settled legal tradi-
tions and principles, need time to adjust to the new methods of procedure and doctrines 
of substance.4o This is demonstrated by the marked difference in the frequency of refer-
32 See J. Bridge, op.cit., p.32; also see K. Lanaerts, "Some thoughts about the interaction between 
judges and politicians in the EC" [1992] Yearbook of European Law, p.17, at 6. 
33 See F. Snyder, op.cit., p.46. 
34 See P. Oliver, op.cit., p.894. . . 
35 See case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfuntionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk ArbeJdsglver-
jorening acting ore beholf of Dan/oss [1989] ECR 3199, cons.13 and 14. 
36 See M. Brealy and M. Hoskins, Remedies in EC Law (1994, Longman, London), p.152. . .. 
37 Ibid, p.32; also see C. Harding, "The choice of court problem in cases of non-contrac!~al habillty 
under EEC law" [1979] Common Market Law Review, pp.389-406, at 391; T.e. Hartley, Concurrent 
liability in EEC law: a critical review of the cases" [1977] European Law Review, pp.249-265., at 265, 
note 37, notes that "since the question would be governed by national law, the diffic~l~ .could not be 
solved by means of reference under Article 177 EEC". T. Hartley in "Non-contractual}la~llI~:. Whe;et~~ 
sue" [1975-76] European Law Review, p.399, notes that under such procedures the JUrisdictIOn o. 1 
. I h . t f a remedy before the nattOna European Court depends on a matter of natlonal aw: t e ~XIS ence 0 
courts". 
38 See case 26174 Societe Roquette Freres v Commission [1976] ECR 677. CR 1. 
39 See case 208/90 Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Allorney General [1/9
h
91
A
] Eh on' 
h UI H h· Area Hea I ut on/ also see case 271191 Helen Marshall v Southampton and SOUl -"esl amps Ire 
[1993] ECR 1-4367, [1993] 3 CMLR 293. 0 d d Article 
40 See M. Dauses, "Practical considerations regarding the preliminary rulings proce ure u;76er 
177 of the EEC Treaty" [1986-1987] 10 Fordham International Law Journal, pp.538-577, at . 
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ences between the original six states and the newcomers, irrespective of their size.''' 
The diversity in the application of the preliminary references process and, con-
sequently, of the Francovich scenario within different Member States can only affect 
the judicial protection offered to foreign companies at the EU level in a negative man-
ner. The lack of certainty in the way under which this action is used by each national 
court and the realisation that the same factual circumstances may lead to different judi-
cial orders depending on court and nationality can only harm the trust of foreign com-
panies to EC law for the resolution of their claim against Member States. However, the 
Francovich scenario applied in the specific case of foreign companies examined in this 
thesis presents further problems which refer to the practical, rather than psychological, 
reception of this scenario by foreign companies. First, the submission of a request for a 
preliminary reference to the national judge may not necessarily lead to the reference of 
the case to the ECl. Second, resorting to a preliminary reference before the Eel will 
have a detrimental effect on the length of the proceedings. Third, in view of the recent 
change in the attitude of ECl judges towards preliminary rulings may prevent the acqui-
sition of a ruling even if one is ordered by the national jUdge. Fourth, even if a reference 
is indeed ordered, the decision of the national judge may still be uninfluenced by the 
interpretation of EC law provided by the ECl in its preliminary ruling. Fifth, even in the 
doubtful case where the Francovich scenario is followed to the letter, the problems in 
the national proceedings identified in Chapter 6 still remain. 
One of the main disadvantages of preliminary references, and consequently of 
Francovich, is that they cannot serve their purpose without co-operation from national 
jUdges. Indeed, the action of the foreign company against the Member State could not 
possibly acquire its desired EU dimension without the willingness of the national judge 
to order reference of the matter to the ECl.42 This co-operation is not always provided 
by national judges.43 This is partly due to the common reluctance of national judges to 
accept that their ECl counterparts have the ability and power to provide guidance in the 
41 See D. Anderson, op.cit., p.26. In order to prove this claim, the author mentions between ~~9 and 
1993 the newcomers made a total of 145 references out of the total of 832, a percentage of only 1 o. 
42 On that aspect and problem of the procedure introduced by Article 177, see ibid, p.391 and note
h
8 
. d h' ~ . I t'on to the appeal before t e with reference to the Dietz case where the applIcant expresse IS lear m re a I . . . h' h 
. . h h t " d xically the mequalltles W Ie Bundes'inanzhol' Also see J. Bndge op.CIl., p.40 w 0 notes t a para 0 . . I' 
'./, 'J. , . I f C 'ty law requIrIng re lance have been revealed by the case law are in a sense the duect resu t 0 ommum I 
. . " On that matter a so see 
upon the laws of the Member States in the absence of any harmomsmg me~sures .' . fior Fiscal Affairs 
comments by Advocate General Reischl in case 68179 }lans Just v Damsh Ministry 
[1980] ECR 531. 
43 See R. Caranta, op. cit., p.721. 
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legal thought which will be used for the final judgement 44 partly d t th . 
, ue 0 e Ignorance of 
EC law4s by the national judges or the lawyers of the case 46 and partl d . 
, y ue to national 
scrutiny procedures of requests for preliminary references to the ECl, undertaken by the 
supreme courts of Member States. German courts are "reluctant, if not afraid to refer" as 
the German Constitutional Court scrutinises references quite closely in order to assess 
their necessity and legality.47 It must be accepted, however, that the main reason for this 
reluctance of national judges to refer is the result of a "clear wish to control all transfers 
of competencies to the EU", a reluctance reflected in the 1997 declaration of the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel that the Treaty of Amsterdam was not compatible with the 
French Constitution.48 
With specific reference to the judicial protection of foreign companies seeking 
restitution for damages suffered as a result of breaches of EC law in the three selected 
countries, it must be noted that the French, Italian and Greek judges have indeed shown 
signs of reluctance to refer to the ECl. In fact, although the reception of the provisions 
on preliminary rulings by the French administrative courts are considered satisfactory49 
and France is the Member State with the second highest number of referrals to the 
ECl,sO the frequent use of the acte claire doctrine as a justification for lack of reference 
from the judge creates more than a few doubts as to the true willingness of French ad-
ministrative judges to resort to the ECl for the clarification of EC legal issues.sl These 
doubts can only be strengthened by the common realisation that France is one of the 
Member States in which EC law "had the greatest difficulties to be fully integrated and 
44 See R.M. Chevalier, D. Maidani and A. Calogeropoulos, Practical Guide to Article 177 of the Treaty 
of Rome (1981, Service for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg), p.17. 
4S See R. Voss, op. cit., p.l124. 
46 See A. Bakopoulos, "The effect of EC law to the attitude of the judge" in I. Koukiadis, The Effect of 
Community Law to Greek Private Law (1995, Sakkoulas, Athens), pp.91-1 00, at 93. 
47 See ibid, p.1120. . . 
48 See S. Boyron, "The French Constitution and the Treaty of Amsterdam: A lesson In European inte-
gration" [1999] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp.169-191, at 169. . 
49 See O. Audeoud, D. Berlin and P. Manin, "The application of Community law in France: revIew of 
French court decisions from 1974 to 1981" [1982] CMLR, pp.289-309, at 290. It must be noted that from 
1987 onwards the number of preliminary rulings from French lower courts stabilised to thirty annuall~ as 
opposed to only eighteen per year before 1986; see ECJ, Annual Report 1991 (1993, Office des Publica-
tions Officielles des CE, Luxembourg), p.136.. . h C t 
so France has 594 references after Germany's 1113; see Table 17 in Statistical InformatIOn on t ~ 0~r5 
01" Justice (19981 http·//europa.eu.int.Ofthosereferences57werereferredby the Cour de C
I 
~~at\On, . 
'J '/I' 8' S ( ( InJormatlOn from the Conseil D' Etat and 522 from other courts or tribunals. See Table 1 In ta IS Ica 
on the Court of Justice (1998), http://europa.eu.int. C T 
SI See R. Errera, "French courts and Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome" in. H. Scher;;rs'bl' I~~:~-
mans, A. Kellermann and J. Steward Watson (eds.), Article 177 EEC: Experiences an ro ems , 
T.M.C. Asser Institute, the Hague), pp.78-108, at 90. 
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recognised as supreme to national law". S2 In Italy the situat" . . . Ion IS not too dIssImIlar to 
France. Despite the optimism concerning the adoption of pr 1" c. e Imlnary relerences as a 
means of effective judicial protection inspired by their use in F. . h Ital' ranCOVIC, Ian pre-
liminary references are not as numerous as one might have expected. 53 In fact, although 
Italy has the third highest number of references within the EU the nu b f c. 
, m er 0 relerences 
by the administrative courts which is of particular interest to this thesis is extremely 
low.54 Until the beginning of the 1990s the Consiglio dello Stato had referred no cases to 
the ECJ ,55 whereas the Corte Costituzionale has yet to make use of what it describes as 
its faculty (note: not duty) to refer.56 This Italian reluctance to refer is reflected in the 
writings of Italian authors, who insist that preliminary rulings are a means of co-
operation and mutual respect between the national and European judges who, however, 
are "organs of two separate competencies".57 
The situation tends to be even worse in Greece, where the total number of pre-
liminary references is a very low 53.58 In the past, the Areios Pagos avoided to refer to 
the ECJ on the flimsy excuse that its Secretariat did not know which reference form to 
fill in.59 In fact until the end of 1985 not a single preliminary ruling had been requested 
by any Greek COurt,60 a period of time which was not considered "excessive" by some 
52 See J. Pl{)tner, "Report on France" in A-M Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. Weiler, The European 
Court and the National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1998, Hart Publishing, Oxford), pp.41-75, 
at 41; also see S. Millns, "The Treaty of Amsterdam and constitutional revision in France" [1999] Euro-
pean Public Law, pp.61-77, at 77, where national sovereignty is described as "at once both jealousy 
guarded and yet half-heartedly conceded". 
53 See A. Saggio, "Italian experience in the application of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty" in H. 
Schermers, C. Timmermans, A. Kellermann and J. Steward Watson (eds.), Article 177 EEC: Experiences 
and Problems (1987, T.M.C. Asser Institute, the Hague), pp.109-113, at 111. 
54 See Table 17 in Statistical Information on the Court of Justice (1998), http://europa.eu.int. Of those 
references 63 were referred by the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 490 by other courts or tribunals and 
only 28 from the Consiglio di Stato. See Table 18 in Statistical Information on the Court of Justice 
(1998), http://europa.eu.int. 
55 See M. Chiti, op. cit., p.824. 
56 See M. Cartabia, "The Italian Constitutional Court and the relationship between the Italian legal. sys-
tem and the EU" in A-M Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and 1. Weiler, The European Court and the NatIOnal 
Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1998, Hart Publishing, Oxford), pp.133-146, at 141; also see F. 
Ru~geri Laderchi, "Report on Italy" in ibid, pp.147-170, at 167. 
S See G.B. Goletti, "L' art.177, tr. CE e la sua applicabilita" [1997] Foro amministrativo, pp.2615-
2623,at2617. . 
58 See Table 17 in Statistical Information on the Court of Justice (1998), http://europa.eu.mt. Of thos.e 
references 2 were from the Areios Pagos, 7 from the Council of the State and 44 from other c~urts or tri-
bunals. See Table 18 in Statistical Information on the Court of Justice (1998), http://europa.eu.mt. 
59 See H Xanthaki on cit pp 145-153 For a general comment on the failure of national courts to refer, 
. 'r' .,., . . f h H f Lords on case 
see R. Caranta, op.cit., p.721, who refers to the example of the ~eclS1on 0 t e ouse ~70 188 
Kirklees Metronolitan Borough Council v Wickles Building Supplies Ltd [1992] 2 WLR , . 
60 r . I . G " [1987] Legal Is-See E.V. Konstantinidis, "Five years of application of CommunIty aw m reece 
sues of European Integration, pp.l 0 1-124, at 116. 
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Greek authors.61 Another clash with EC law concerns the case-Ia f th A . P 
woe rews agos 
which refuses to examine whether there are issues of EC law in the cases brought before 
it, unless the plaintiffs specify the particular EC provisions relating to the case.62 Insofar 
as Greek administrative courts are concerned,63 there is one specific point of consider-
able concern. Under Art.15(5) of Act 1470/1984 a chamber of the Council of the State 
wishing to refer a matter to the ECJ must first refer the case to the Plenary of th urt e co . 
This position imposes an additional hurdle to foreign companies seeking a preliminary 
ruling. It does not suffice for the company to persuade the Councillors of the State 
hearing the case that a preliminary ruling of the ECJ is necessary. The plenary of the 
court must also be convinced in proceedings to which the company itself plays no role 
whatsoever. The severity of this hurdle, which is in obvious breach of the spirit of the 
preliminary rulings process introduced by the Treaty,64 is better appreciated when the 
nature of the Council as a court of last instance is taken into account. 
From this brief presentation of the reception of EC provisions on preliminary 
rulings by the French, Italian and Greek judges it becomes obvious that the first hurdle 
in the successful outcome of a foreign company's request for a preliminary ruling lies in 
the persuasion of the reluctant national judges to order the reference. This issue is of 
particular importance in evaluating the effectiveness of the Francovich scenario, espe-
cially if one takes into account the fact that in deciding whether or not to refer, national 
courts "should bear in mind that the decision is theirs and theirs alone".6s Even in cases 
where reference to the ECJ is obligatory, namely when the national court concerned is 
one of last instance, the awareness that reference is compulsory and the decision to fulfil 
the obligation to refer is left to the knowledge and discretion of national judges. A 
glimpse of hope for the foreign companies seeking restitution may derive from the re-
cent Brasserie judgement, which expanded the source of state liability to all functions of 
the state, even the judiciary. On this basis, the foreign company which suffered damage 
as a result of the refusal of a French, Italian or Greek judge to comply with the obliga-
61 See A. Calogeropoulos, "The Greek courts and the preliminary references procedure according to 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty: Some remarks" in H. Schermers, C. Timmermans, A. Kellerma~n and J. 
Steward Watson (eds.), Article 177 EEC: Experiences and Problems (1987, T.M.C. Asser Institute, the 
Hague), pp.122-127, at 127. 
62 See An 816/1990 and 1148/1989, EU~vll, 1990,31,317; An 963/1988, E~V11, 30, 1988, 1341~~ 
An 1465/1987, EE~, 1987, 47, 1079; An 1069/1983, ~, 1983, 15, 419; also see S. Koukou 
Spiliotopoulou, op.cit., pp.831-832. I E Ad 
63 For examples of relevant Greek cases, see K. Vasilaki-Bouyouka, D. Anagnostopou ou,. aman-
tidou and A. Sgouridou Community Law in Greek Jurisprudence (1994, Sakkoulas, Athens). . . 
64' '1 f h St t " [1986] Nomlko Vlma, See A. Calogeropoulos, "Commentary on case 1258/85 COuncl 0 tea e 
pp.475-479, at 475. . . 375-391, at 
6S See A. Arnull, "References to the European Court" [1990] European Law RevIew, pp. 
387. 
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tion to refer the matter to the Ee] may attempt to seek compensatt' c. d fi 
on lor amages rom 
the relevant state. Although this may theoretically be achieved,66 it is doubtful that any 
such claim may be successful in practice.67 It is difficult to imagine that a French, Greek 
or Italian judge (or any other judge) will award compensation for damages to a foreign 
company on the basis of the failure of a colleague to refer to the Ee]. The roots of the 
constitutional principles of the separation of powers and of the independent judiciary are 
too strong to allow the recognition of such liability, which has not even been established 
in Ee law anyway. It is therefore almost certain that, at least for the time being, foreign 
companies being refused reference of their case to the Ee] even from the courts of last 
resort have little else to do but accept the decision of the national court. 
The second problem in the use of the state liability scenario for the achievement 
of compensation refers to the length of time required for a final decision when prelimi-
nary rulings from the Ee] are sought. It has often been argued that a direct action before 
the Ee] would be less lengthy and significantly cheaper for the applicant.68 In the mid-
1990s Voss supported the view that the main problem for referral to the Ee] in the 
Member States is that the then average of 18 months required for the completion of the 
procedure is "simply too long".69 Similarly, Dauses expressed the view that the proce-
dure of preliminary rulings often represents "an unnecessary prolongation of the pro-
ceedings or an additional element of uncertainty" for most applicants in most Member 
States.70 Since the time when such views were being put forward, things have deterio-
rated considerably. In his Report on the future of the Ee] published on 28th May 1999, 
the President of the Ee] tied the delay in the preliminary rulings with the problem of 
inefficiency of justice at the EU level. 71 The same Report revealed that the average du-
ration of proceedings for references for preliminary rulings was 17.4 months in 1990, 
18.2 months in 1991, 18.8 months in 1992,20.4 months in 1993, 18 months in 1994, 
20.5 months in 1995, 20.8 months in 1996, 21.4 months in 1997 and 21.4 months in 
1998.72 This signifies that a foreign company submitting a request to the national com-
petent judge for a referral for a preliminary ruling from the Ee] must be prepared to 
66 See Advocate General Warner in case 9/75 Meyer-Buckhardt v Commission [1975] ECR 1171: 
67 See J. Steiner, "The limits of state liability for breach of EC law" [1998] European Public Law, 
pp.69-109, at 91-92. 
68 See C. Harding, op.cit., p.391. . C rt f Jus 
69 See R. Voss, "The national perception of the Court of First Instance and the European ou 0 -
tice" [1993] Common Market Law Review, pp. 1119-1134, at 1119. 
70 See M. Dauses, op.cit., p.576. 'd if the ECJ 
71 See European Court of Justice, "The Future", Repor.t of 28'h May J 998 of the Pres, ent 0 , 
h~:/europa.eu. intlcjlen/pres/persp.htm, p.5. 
2 See ibid, p.29. 
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wait at least two more years for the final decision of the national court If thO fi . 
. IS Igure IS 
combined with the extremely long delays in the proceedings of national administrative 
courts especially in Italy (discussed in Chapter 6), it is evident that the time parameter 
can only deter the foreign company from seeking justice at EU level. This can only dent 
the efficiency of judicial protection at ED level. 
The third problem faced by foreign companies seeking restitution via the Fran-
covich scenario concerns a recent change in the attitude of the ECl towards the proce-
dure of preliminary rulings. One of the advantages of Francovich and the preliminary 
rulings procedure had been their accessibility to companies resulting from the lack of 
admissibility requirements.73 Indeed, from very early on the ECl encouraged national 
courts to refer preliminary requests to it by stating clearly that it would only refuse re-
ferral if it was the result of a manifest error by the referring national COurt. 74 This clear 
position became somewhat fuzzier after Foglia,7S where the ECl held that only genuine 
disputes may be referred to it without, however, specifying the criteria for the charac-
terisation of a dispute as non-genuine. 76 This uncertainty in the nature of referrals that 
would be considered genuine, and consequently admissible, by the ECl became rather 
more serious when the Court began to reject requests for preliminary rulings on that ba-
sis.77 In Leclerc-Siplec the ECl finally determined the difference between fictitious liti-
gation as a means of abuse of the preliminary rulings process and genuine questions 
which, however, did not help the resolution of the case brought before the national 
courts and were therefore hypothetical. 78 Despite the initial warm welcome to this 
judgement,79 it soon became clear that the ECl has acquired a rather more restrictive at-
titude to the accessibility of preliminary rulings. O'Keeffe interprets Leclerc-Siplec and 
the subsequent case-law as "part of an effort to erect a series of tests for admissibility, 
without however developing a general system of admissibility". 80 This new idea of 
qualified access to references is reflected in the new guidelines for admissibility of pre-
73 See Advocate General Mancini in case 14/86 Pretore di Salo v Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545, 
at 2557. 
74 See case 13/68 Salgoilv Italian Ministry/or Foreign Trade [1968] ECR453. 
7S See cases 104179 Foglia v Novello [1980] ECR 745 and C-244/80 [1981] ECR 3045. 
76 See M. O'Neill, op.cit., p.382. C 
77 See C-83/91 Wienand Meilicke v ADV/ORGA F.A. Meyer AG [1992] ECR 1-4871; also see cases .-
343/90 Lorenco Dias v Director da Alfadenga do Porto [19?2] ECR 1-4673; C-320-322/90. Tele~~~s~i 
cabruzzo SpA v Circostel Ministero delle Poste e Telecommunicazioni and Ministero della Difesa ~'I 
ECR 1-393; C-157/92 Pr~tore di Genova v Ranchero [1993] ECR 1-1085; C-386/92 Monin Automo I es v 
France [1993] ECR 1-2049. . . , publicite SA 
78 See C-412/93 Societe d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TFI publlclte SA and M6 
[1995] ECR 1-179, cons.13-16. 
79 See M. O'Neill, op. cit. , p.389. 
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Courts. 8\ The effect of this new attitude to the effective judicial protection of foreign 
companies is quite significant. When assessed in combination WI'th th I 
e proven re uc-
tance of some French, Greek and Italian judges to refer, this new EC] policy can only be 
evaluated as an additional discouragement for national judges to refer to the Court. 
From the point of view of foreign companies, the uncertainty in the final outcome of the 
request for preliminary rulings makes the long delay involved in the process a burden 
even more difficult to bear. 
Even if all these three hurdles are overcome by foreign companies seeking com-
pensation for damages caused by breaches EC law from the French, Italian and Greek 
national authorities, a fourth obstacle may block their way to effective judicial protec-
tion at the EU level. This refers to the very real possibility of the misconstruction of the 
preliminary ruling by the national court which may lead to its incorrect application in 
the national hearing.82 In view of the well documented reluctance of national judges to 
even refer to the EC], this theoretical possibility becomes a source of mistrust to the 
process. This damages its efficiency to a great extent. This inherent weakness of the 
preliminary rulings procedure, which affects the efficiency of the Francovich scenario, 
seems to be exacerbated by the already noted lack of tested mechanism for the coercion 
of national judges to implement the ruling of the EC] correctly and in full. 
The fifth problem of the Francovich scenario is that the use of national proce-
dural rules for the achievement of compensation at the EU level does not relieve the ap-
plicant foreign company from the disadvantages of national procedures determined in 
Chapter 6. This observation has been endorsed by the EC] in a strikingly express man-
ner.83 In fact, many authors argue that the problems of inequality deriving from a system 
of enforcement based on procedural autonomy is one of the worst weaknesses of EC 
law in general. 84 Such inequalities have been evaluated in Chapter 6 as detrimental for 
the effectiveness of judicial protection offered to foreign companies at the national 
level. This assessment can only be carried on to the evaluation of judicial protection at 
80 See D. O'Keeffe, "Is the spirit of Article 177 under attack? Preliminary references and admissibility" 
[1998] European Law Review, pp.509-535, at 520. . d 
8\ ti b N t' I Courts" m Procee -See European Court of Justice "Note for Guidance on Re erences y a IOna th 
, C . . 34/96 9 ings of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European ommumtles, no , 
December 1996, [1997] European Law Review, p.55. . h E 82 . . I h II nge facmg t e uro-See F. Mancini and D. Keeling, "From CILFITto ERT: The constltutlOna cae 
pean Court" (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law, pp.1-13, at 2. .' ford 
83 See P. Craig and G. de Burca, The Evolution of EC Law (1999, Oxford Umverslty Press, Ox ), 
p.294. . . h 84 . . d t' I tort laws after FranCOVIC See W. van Gerven, "Bridging the unbridgeable: Commumty an na IOna 
and Brasserie" [1996] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 507. 
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the EU level when the Francovich scenario is used. 
On the basis of the evaluation of the Francovich scenan'o l't' I h th 
' IS C ear t at e 
Francovich route, albeit a revolutionary for some8S and admittedly a useful remedy for 
the judicial protection of foreign companies at the ED level, cannot be considered an 
adequately effective solution to the problem faced by foreign companies seeking to suc-
ceed in their claims for damages resulting from French, Italian or Greek breaches of Ee 
law. It is therefore fair to state that the judicial protection currently offered to such com-
panies at the EU level is inadequate. The question is, whether foreign companies suf-
fering from the current lack of effective judicial protection at the national and EO lev-
els, have any hope in achieving compensation for their damages in the future. 
c. AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION BASED ON CONCURRENT LIABILITY 
The inequality in the treatment of ED companies within different Member States, and its 
consequent damage in the effectiveness of indirect remedies, is "the direct result of 
Community law requiring reliance upon the national laws of the Member States in the 
absence of any harmonising measures". 86 One way of counteracting this damaging effect 
is the harmonisation of national procedural rules, whose absence is currently under-
mining the "authority, integrity and uniformity of Ee law, as well as obstructing the re-
alisation of Community objectives".87 In fact, it is precisely this urgent need to achieve 
harmonisation in the national procedural rules that has led the EeJ to use the prelimi-
nary rulings process as an instrument which enables the Court to rule de facto on the 
compatibility of domestic law with EC law.88 It must be accepted, however, that con-
crete measures of such harmonisation were never put forward by the ED. In any case, 
the EeJ has realistically little to offer in this direction.89 Moreover, leaving the lack of 
EU initiative at this point aside, even if harmonisation in the national procedural rules is 
somehow achieved (leading to the compensation of the individual for damages caused 
by actions of the Member States)/o as far as the Francovich scenario is concerned, the 
8S Barav notes that Francovich was not a moment of eccentricity in the case-law of the Court, but a 
•• '&':" d' . I t fon See A Barav normal - almost expected - consequence of the prmclple of efi.ectlve JU ICla pro ec I. . , 
"State liability in damages for breach of Community law in the national courts" in T. Heukels and A. 
McDonnell, op.cit., pp.363-408, at 406-407.· F' I 
86 D . h M' . tryfior ,sea See the comments of Advocate General Reischlin case 68179 Hans Just v ams in'S 
Affairs [1980] ECR 50 I, at 531. 
87 See ibid, pAl. 
88 See F. Mancini and D. Keeling, op.cit., pp.8 and 12. 
89 See J. Bridge, op.cit., pAO. . . .' . f hr as ects 
90 See W van Gerven op.cit. pp.690-691 who notes that this harmomsatlOn compnse~? t ere d p t' 
. " . d b EC I the provIsion 0 a equa e 
namely the definition of the exact scope of the nghts conferre yaw, 
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problem of reliance upon national judges to refer the case still remains. 
Since the disadvantages of the Francovich scenario derive from the inherent 
problems of preliminary rulings as indirect actions, the logical way forward for foreign 
companies would be to seek compensation at the ED level through actions brought di-
rectly before the ECl. In fact, in view of the analysis of the inadequacies in the judicial 
protection currently offered both at the national level and through the Francovich sce-
nario, avoiding altogether the use of national judges and national procedural rules as an 
even intermediary means of achieving justice may be the foreign companies' optimum 
criterion for the selection of an effective method of judicial protection. Such a direct 
remedy may derive either from the introduction of a new EC procedural provision, or 
through an innovative interpretation of an already existing remedy. After the 1996 In-
tergovernmental Conference, it has become apparent that Member States will not intro-
duce new remedial provisions. Consequently, the hope of foreign companies to have 
effective judicial protection at the ED level lies with ECl judges who, on the basis of 
the principle of the effective judicial protection of the individual91 and through the use 
of the binding value of precedent,92 may introduce a new interpretation of existing 
remedies. One of the few current remedies lending itself to such a novel interpretation 
for the purposes of achieving restitution for damages for foreign companies refers to 
Art.288(2). Although the text of this provision refers to a legal action available to EU 
natural and legal persons for the achievement of compensation for damages caused by 
the ED, its institutions and members of staff acting during the performance of their du-
ties, the provision has also been successfully invoked in cases of concurrent liability 
between ED institutions and the Member States. 
Pre-Francovich Art.288(2) had been interpreted to establish concurrent liability 
between the ED and Member States in cases where a Member State had applied a 
wrongful act issued by ED, in cases of unlawful decisions taken jointly by a Member 
93 C State and the ED, and in cases of infringement of EC law by Member States. oncur-
rent liability deriving from wrongful application of EC law by Member States usually 
arises when, on the basis of an illegal Regulation, the national authority either fails to 
pay the individual monies owed under EC law (a subsidy), or demands payment of 
" . ' d . f ffi ctive legal remedies for sanctions guaranteemg the enforcement of these nghts and the -mtro uctlon 0 e e 
securing these rights. Also see F. Snyder, op.cit., pp.45-47. 3 Sakk I s 
91 • d' . I P .' EC Law (199 , ou a , See P. Pavlopoulos, Guarantees of the Right to Ju ICla rotectlOn In 
Athens), p.58. ,,' 'b'li . recedent and 
92 For the legal value of the Court's precedents, see A. Amull, Owmg up to falh 1 ty. P 
the Court of Justice" [1993] Common Market Law Review~ pp.247-26. 
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monies not legally due (a tax or levy). According to the relevant ECJ case-law, if the 
claim simply relates to the act of the national authorities restitution fior dam d 
' ages cause 
must be sought under national law before the national courts 94 If howe th I' 
" ver, e calm 
stems from EU legislative activity, the matter should be brought directly before the 
European Courts, where compensation can be obtained under Art.288(2).9S Direct action 
before the European Courts is admissible only if an EU institution instructed the na-
tional authorities to proceed in a particular manner,96 if there is no conceivable effective 
remedy under nationallaw/7 or if the substance of the claim is that the EU "has com-
mitted a tortuous wrong to the applicant".98 The best known case of an unlawful deci-
sion taken jointly by a Member State and the EU is Kampffmayer,99 where the Commis-
sion approved a German safeguard measure which was then held to be unlawful by the 
Eel This is one of the clearest forms of concurrent liability, which, however, rarely oc-
curs in practice. Even in this case actions exclusively against Member States are heard 
by the national courts, whereas actions involving EU institutions are heard before the 
European CourtS.100 Concurrent liability in the case of breaches of EC law by Member 
States is a theoretical possibility examined, amongst others, by Wils and Kanellopou-
IOS.101 Such concurrent liability could occur when the Commission assists the Member 
State to apply EC law rules. However, the ECJ has consistently stated that expressions 
of opinion or recommendations, which are non-binding, cannot adequately establish li-
ability of the Community. Thus, in this case, the Member State must be held wholly li-
able for the damages caused to individuals as a result of its actions or omissions. 102 Such 
concurrent liability may also occur if the Commission can be held liable for inadequate 
93 See W. Wils, "Concurrent Liability of the Community and a Member State" [1992] European Law 
Review, pp.191-206, at 194-198. 
94 See P. Kanellopoulos, Concurrent liability between the EC and the Member State during the appli-
cation oJEC law (1990, Sakkoulas, Athens), p.138. 
9S The EU only incurs liability for normative acts if a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of 
law for the protection of the individuals has occurred. See case 5171 ZuckerJabrik Schoppenstedt v Coun-
cil [1971] ECR 975; also see W. Wils, op.cit., p.195; S. Weatherhill and P. Beaumo~t, EC Law: the Es-
sential Guide to the Legal Workings oj the European Community (1993, Pengum Books, London), 
pp.270-271; C. Harding, 1979, op.cit., p.395. For a detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECJ and the 
different types of cases falling in this category, see T. Hartley, 1977, op.cit., pp.261-263. 
96 See case 175/84 Krohn and Co Import-Export GmbH and Co v Commission [1986] ECR 753, (1987] 
I CMLR 745. 
97 See case 281/82 Unifrex v Commission and Council [1984] ECR 1969. . . 
98 , d 1.1 • I (1998 Oxford UnIversity Press, See P. Craig and G. de Burca EU Law: Text, Cases an materia s, .' 
, . . d h d th D' t case the direct action to Oxford) pp 543-544' also see ibid note 74 where It IS state t at un er e Ie z ~ 
,., , . . . I artially to blame lor 
the European Courts is inadmissible when the natIOnal authontIes themse ves were p 
the loss caused to the individual. 
99 See cases 5, 7 and 13-24/66 Kampffmayer v Commission [1967] ECR 245. 
100 See W. Wits, op. cit. , p.198; also see C. Harding, 197.9, op.cit., p.396. 
101 See W. Wils, op.cit., p.195; also see P. Kanellopcmlos, op.cit., p.86. 
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supervision of the Member State which breaches EC law and causes damages to the 
company. The ECl has never stated that inadequate supervision of Member States may 
not establish liability of the Commission. In Lutticke the ECl was given the opportunity 
to examine this possibility, but dismissed the case by declaring that -although in princi-
ple such an action was possible- in these specific circumstances the Commission had 
fulfilled its supervisory task.I03 Thus, the opportunity for companies to attempt to estab-
lish that in specific cases of breaches of EC law the Commission has failed to supervise 
the Member States adequately and, consequently, has contributed to the damages caused 
to companies is still open. The question is, whether foreign companies suffering dam-
ages as a result of breaches of EC law by Member States could, in the future, use this 
action (which has been accepted by the ECl in principle) as a means of achieving com-
pensation on the basis of concurrent liability between the Commission and the Member 
State. As this argument has not yet been evaluated by the ECl, it is interesting to assess 
whether its use by foreign companies could, in the future, prove beneficial in their 
struggle to achieve effective judicial protection at the EU level. 
Cl. The legal basis of the proposed remedy 
For the establishment of concurrent liability in the case of damages caused to foreign 
companies due to violations of EC law in the field of company establishment, the liabil-
ity of both the Member State and the EU must be proven. The legal basis of the Member 
State's liability in the concurrent liability scenario can be borrowed from the well es-
tablished state liability doctrine of Francovich. Thus, the Member State's liability lies 
with Art. I 0, which introduces the obligation of Member States to ensure that EC law is 
implemented within the their territory. Before the introduction of the state liability doc-
trine, the role of Art. I 0 as an autonomous legal basis for actions brought before the 
European courts had been underestimated. This was mainly due to the rarity in which 
this provision had been used by lawyers in their case before the European courts and by 
judges in their decisions. It must be accepted, however, that this rarity of autonomous 
use of Art. I 0 is not a consequence of its insignificance, but a result of the nature of the 
provision introduced by it as a general principle of EC law, also referred to in other 
102 ..' ., [1975] ECR 1531' 12179 Wagner v See cases 99174 Grands Moulms des AntIlles v CommISSIOn ' 
Commission [1979] ECR 3657; 217/81 Interagra v Commission [1982] ECR 2233. 
103 See case 4/69 Alfons Liitlicke v Commission [1971] ECR 325. 
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Treaty articles
lO4 
and specified through more precise provisions. lOS Recent case-law 
, 
however, has demonstrated that Art. 10 has a clear legal dimensl'on 106 I C 
. n lact, even 
authors viewing with past scepticism the possibility of attributing enforceability in this 
legal provision now accept the fact that through the state liability scenario the Eel has 
managed to "fashion" an enforceable provision out of Art. I O. 107 
The determination of the authorities bound by the obligation introduced by 
Art. I 0 is significant for foreign companies, as they may seek restitution from all 
authorities covered by this provision. Such authorities include the Member State's ex-
ecutive, legislative, judicial, regional, local, State enterprises and private bodies to 
which state powers have been delegated. 108 The question is, which is the content of the 
Member States' obligation introduced by Art. I O. In other words, which are the obliga-
tions which, when violated, may invoke the liability of the Member State in the concur-
rent liability remedy? Art. I 0 is viewed as a provision of dual nature. On the one hand, it 
imposes the positive duty for Member States to take all necessary actions in order to 
fulfil their EU obligations and to facilitate the achievement of EU objectives. On the 
other hand, Art. I 0 imposes the obligation of Member States to refrain from activities 
which could imperil the attainment of Treaty objectives. 109 
The obligation introduced by Art. I 0 has been interpreted to include the full 
compliance of Member States with all EC measures. This embraces decisions of the EU 
to which the Member State has disagreed, as long as no legal action for judicial review 
has been launched. 110 The obligation also includes the individual and collective dutylll 
of Member States to contribute positively towards the unhindered functioning of EU 
institutions. 112 It covers the additional task for loyalty and genuine co-operation between 
Member States and EU institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of the tasks 
104 See J. Temple Lang, "Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: the emergence of constitutional principles in the 
case-law of the Court of Justice" [1986-1987] Forham International Law Journal, pp.503-537, at 503-
504. 
lOS See cases 78/70 Deutsche Gramophone GhmH v Metro-SB Grofimarkte G.mbH [19?1] ECR 487; 
2173 Geddo vEnte Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865; 192/84 Commission v HelleniC Republic [1985] ECR 
3967. . . 
106 • • h C 'ty (Art'cle 5 EC) and the oblIgatIOns See K. Mortelmans, "The prmclple of loyalty to t e ommUnl I. _ 8 at 
of Community institutions" [1998] Maastricht Journal of European and ComparatIVe Law, pp.67 8 , 
67. 
107 See K. Lanaerts 1992, op. cit., p.4. . 90 C Mar 
108 See J. Temple Lang, "Community constitutional law: Article 5 EEC Treaty" [19 ] ommon -
ket Law Review, pp.645-681, at 645. . Th L if the EC 
109 See C. De Keersmaeker and T. Pauwels, "Article 5" in H. Smlt and P. Herzog, e aw 0 
(1998, Matthew Bender, The Netherlands), pp. 1/89-1/106.1, at 1189. 
ItO See case 130/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 2849. 
Itl See case 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255. 
112 See case 85/85 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 1149. 
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awarded to the latter by EC law.
113 
However, the most detailed delimitation of the duties 
introduced by Art. I 0 has been produced by Temple Lang who distinguishes fifteen dif-
ferent obligations."4 There is the duty to give full effect to EC law l'nclud' . d 
, 109 JU ge-
ments of the European COurtS,IIS the duty to implement ED objectives when the objec-
tive and the required action are sufficiently clear,116 and to adopt any supplementary 
measures for the achievement of ED obj ectives on behalf of the ED. 117 There is the duty 
not to interfere with the operation of EC law rules, which includes the avoidance of 
measures that conflict with EC provisions and the avoidance of measures that may inter-
fere with future decisions of the ED, 118 as well as the duty not to interfere with the inter-
nal functioning of ED institutions,119 and not to enable, encourage or facilitate breaches 
of EC law. 120 Then there is the duty to clarify the national position under EC law when 
there is a possibility of uncertainty or conflict,121 the duty to consider a specific measure 
legally binding if it is a concrete example of a general duty imposed under Art. I 0,122 the 
duty to comply with the general principles of law,123 duties specific in the field of exter-
nal relations,124 and the duty to consult the Commission when planning to adopt national 
measures of interest to the ED.l2s Moreover, there is the duty not to legislate on issues 
dealt with by EC law,126 the reciprocal duty amongst Member States and between Mem-
ber States and ED institutions to co-operate,127 and the duty to enforce EC law. The lat-
ter obligation is intended to supplement the duty of Member States to observe EC leg-
islation and includes the obligation of Member States, including the national courts, to 
eliminate all illegal consequences resulting from breaches of ED obligations. 128 Such 
elimination obviously includes the reparation of any damage caused by violations of EC 
law. The breach of this obligation constitutes the legal basis for the liability of the 
Member State in the concurrent liability scenario. This liability occurs even if the 
113 See C. De Keersmaeker and T. Pauwels, op.cit., p.1I92. 
114 See J. Temple Lang, 1986-1987, op.cit., pp.506-536. 
115 See Joined cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Procurateur de la Republic v Waterkeyn [1982] ECR 4337. 
116 See case 71176 Thieffry v Conseil de /' Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris [1977] ~CR 765. 
117 See Joined cases 47 and 48/83 Re Pluimveeslachterij Midden-Nedera BV and Plulm [1984] ECR 
1721. 
118 See case 231183 Cullet v Centre Leclerc Toulouse [1985] ECR 305. 
119 See case 208/80 Lord Bruce ofDonington v Aspden [1981] ECR 2205. 
120 See case 13177 NVGB-INNO-BMv ATAB [1977] ECR2115. 
121 See case 50176 Amsterdam Bulb v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1977] ECR 137. 
122 See case 141178 France v UK [1979] ECR 2923. 
123 See case 237/82 J. Kaas and Others v The Netherlands and Others [1984] ECR 483. 
124 See case 61177R Commission v Ireland [1977] ECR 937. 
125 See case 141178 France v UK [1979] ECR 2923. ECR 69 
126 See case 40/69 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v Firma Paul G. Bollman [1970] . 
127 See case 52/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89. 
128 See case 6/60 Jean Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 1125. 
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breach of Ee law has not been declared by the EeJ in infringement proceedings brought 
against the Member State. 129 
Even though the liability of the state has been the subject of thorough research, 
the liability of the EU has not been equally explored. This is probably due to the past 
cautious limitation of the EeJ's interpretation of Art.288(2) to the absolute necessary.lJO 
Indeed, the 1960s were a decade of shyness, during which the ECJ (possibly ill at ease 
with the ambiguous text of ex Art.215) did its best to avoid referring to its text in the 
hope that a detailed interpretation would not be requested. The 1970s was a decade of 
progress in the interpretation of EU liability. It was during this decade that most of the 
relevant principles (such as LiUticke, Schoppenstedt and Kampffmeyer)lJl were intro-
duced, albeit in a manner which imposed limits and additional conditions for the suc-
cessful request of compensation from the individual. The 1980s were an uneventful 
decade, during which the ECJ applied the already introduced principles of liability in 
the cases brought before it. Thus, the restrictions remained, but the rough edges of the 
existing doctrines were smoothed and finer points were addressed. It was only during 
the 1990s that, through the introduction of the Francovich scenario and the development 
of state liability, the Ee] finally turned to the interpretation of EU liability. The details 
of this interpretation will be used for the determination of the conditions for the estab-
lishment of the concurrent liability remedy. 
A starting point for the establishment of EU liability in the concurrent liability 
remedyl32 could be found in Art.211 which introduces the obligation of the Commission 
to ensure that Ee law is applied by the Member States. 133 This obligation includes the 
duty to gather information and the duty to proceed against offenders. 134 The Commis-
sion's duty to collect information includes the authority specifically granted to the 
129 See W. van Gerven 1994, op. cit., p.15. 
130 See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, A Legal and Political Interpretation of Article 2 J 5(2) of the 
Treaty of Rome: The Individual Fights Back (2000, Ashgate, Aldershot), pp.62-63. . 
13I See cases 4/69 Alfons Lutticke GmbH v Commission [1971] ECR 325; case 5171 Aktlen-
Zuckerfabrik Schtippenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; and Joined cases 56-60174 Kurt Kampffmeyer 
Muhlenvereinigung KG and Others v Commission and Council [1976] ECR 711. 
132 Under Art.282 the Commission represents the Community in legal proceedings. . . 
133 •• d I fth mon market the Commission 
"In order to ensure the proper functIonmg and eve opment 0 e com , 
shall: 
. k b th . stitutions pursuant thereto 
- ensure that the provisions of thiS Treaty and the measures ta en y e m 
are applied; .. ., h' T eaty if it expressly so 
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt With m t IS r , 
provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;. k b the Council and 
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shapmg of measures ta en y 
by the European Parliament in the ma~er provided fo~ in this tr~aty; . f the rules laid down by 
- exercise the powers conferred on It by the CouncIl for the ImplementatIOn 0 
the latter". 
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Commission by Treaty provisions or by secondary legislative provisions, as well as the 
general task of collecting infonnation that may assist the achievement of 't I 
1 S goa seven 
when relevant authorisation has not been obtained.13S The Commission's duty to proceed 
against offenders encompasses not only redress, but also prevention. Thus, if the Com-
mission acquires infonnation according to which a Member State is likely to introduce a 
piece of legislation which violates EC law, it will fulfil its task as guardian of the Treaty 
in a more efficient manner by infonning the Member State of the imminent problem be-
fore the new law is passed rather than waiting for the law to be passed and then initiat-
ing the administrative stage of Art.226. The preventative aspect of the Commission's 
duty is reflected in the view, recently shared both by the Commission and the ECl, that 
the Commission's task includes its duty to take action when other EU institutions have 
failed to do SO.136 Once a violation has occurred, the Commission should proceed to re-
dress under the procedures available by EC law.137 
Since the Commission is entrusted with the task of ensuring that Member States 
implement EC law within their boundaries, the existence of a breach of EC law from 
any national authority is a de facto proof of the Commission's failure to fulfil this task. 
The question is whether this failure may lead to the establishment of liability. Steiner 
and Vander W oude argue that the Commission has complete discretion as to the time 
and manner in which its task may be fulfilled. \38 Ebke notes the "duty" of the Commis-
sion to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures pursuant to it are car-
ried out, \39 whereas Bleckmann refers to the "obligation" of the Commission to bring a 
case against Member States which breach EC law. 140 Smit and Herzog are of the opinion 
that this is a matter that can only be decided on a case to case basis: when EC law pre-
scribes a mandatory enforcement procedure, the Commission must follow it, whereas 
when the procedure is cast in tenns of pennission, the Commission must retain reason-
134 See H. Smit and P. Herzog, The Law of the EC (1998, Matthew Bender, UK), pp.5.170-5.198.2., at 
5.176. 
135 See joined cases 188-190/80 France, Italy and the UK v Commission [1982] ECR 2545. . . 
136 See case 804179 Commission v UK [1981] ECR 1045; also see case 124/80 0ff!.cie~ van Justille v J. 
van Dam & Zonen [1981] ECR 1447; joined cases 47 & 48/83 Re Pluimveeslachterlj Mldden-Nedera BV 
and Pluim [1984] ECR 1721. d' 
137 • ••• f h . d' . I t e of infringement procee mgs The Commission's duty to proceed to the InitiatIOn 0 t e JU ICla sag 
is under dispute. See P. Craig and G. de Burca, 1998, op.cit., p.539. 0 see 
138 See J. Steiner and L. Woods, Textbook on EC Law (1998, Blackstone Press, :~ndon), p.28; als d A 
M. H. van der Woude "Liability for administrative acts under Article 215(2) EC In T. Heuk~ls anI Th' 
, .' L (1997 KI wer Law IntematlOna, e McDonnell, (eds), The Action for Damages In Commumty aw ,U 
Hay,uelLondoni Boston), pp.l09-128, at 127. . . . I t the sun 
I 9 See W. Ebke, "Enforcement techniques within the European Commumtles: flymg c ose 0 
. .r . d C Vol 50 pp 685-725 at 692. WIth waxen wings" [1985] The Journal OJ A Ir Law an . ommerce, . ,. .: .. [1988] Recht 
140 See A. Beckmann, "Zur Verbindlichkeit von RechtsauskUnften der EG-Kommlsslon 
der Internazionalen WirtschaJt, pp.963-967, at 904. 
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able leeway in its decision to proceed or not. 141 In fact within the fram k f' 
, ewor 0 Its task 
as guardian of the Treaty, the ECJ may charge the Commission wl'th .. h 
supervIsmg t e 
manner in which its judgement is observed. 142 It must therefore be accepted that the dis-
cretion awarded to the Commission in each particular case is determined by the specific 
provisions of EC law, introduced by legislative provisions or through the case-law of 
the European Courts, which constitute the source of the Commission's task to act in 
each specific case. It must also be accepted, however, that in the absence of specific 
provisions the Commission has an obligation rather than a discretion to act. 143 This is 
based on the use of the term "shall" in the text of Art.211, which introduces the general 
framework of the Commission's obligations. This view is also reflected in the expres-
sion "right and duty" used by the ECJ to describe the nature of the Commission's obli-
gation to pursue its mission as guardian of the Treaties, to monitor the application of EC 
law, and to monitor and enforce compliance with EC provisions. l44 It is also reflected in 
the view of the ECJ that the procedure for establishing an infringement imposes upon 
the Commission an obligation unlimited in time. 145 Thus, the Commission must be held 
liable for its failure to act,146 unless otherwise provided. 
Foreign companies seeking restitution within the concurrent liability framework 
may base their claims on the combination of Arts. 1 0 and 211.147 Art.211 cannot consti-
tute a source of Commission liability in all cases of breaches of EC law by Member 
States. 148 Such a claim would be unrealistic and unfair to the Commission, as it would 
totally disregard the huge number of actions or omissions undertaken by all types of na-
tional authorities within all Member States. It is unreasonable to expect the Commission 
to be fully aware of all such actions at any given time. However, the combination of 
Arts.211 and 231 could indicate that, when the Commission is notified of a specific 
violation yet fails or omits to act within two months, it bears liability for damages en-
141 See H. Smit and P. Herzog, 1998, op.cit., p.5-184. 
142 See case 42/82R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841. 
143 See case C-351/88 Laboratori Bruneau Sri v Unita Sanitaria Locale RM/24 von Monterotondo 
(Rom), transcript, 11 July 1991. 
144 See cases C-351/88 Laboratori Bruneau v Unita Sanitaria Locale RM/24 von Monterotondo (Rom~ 
EC) Fourth Chamber, Transcript, 11 July 1991; C-248/89 Cargill BVv Commission [199~] 1 ECR 298~i 
C-30l/87 France v Commission [1990] 1 ECR 307; Joined cases 326/86 and 66/88 Bemto Franc~~o 1 
and others v Commission [1989] ECR 2087; 141/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 943 and [19 ] 
CMLR234. _ 
145 See case 324/82 Commission v Belgium [1984] ECR 1861. 
146 See case 289/83 GARM and others v Commission [1984] ECR 4295, [1986] 3 CMLR 15. C) t' th 
147 . . d Art 232 before the E lor e Although the Member States may attempt to bnng an action un er. . Id be 
. . , I b h M ber State such actIOn wou failure of the Commission to act agamst the breach of EC aw y teem , 
inadmissible before the Court on the basis of lack of locus standi. 
233 
suing.
149 
Does this signify that a foreign company notifying the Comm" f b ISSlon 0 a reach 
of EC law need only wait two months before it launches an action ~or d . 
amages agamst 
the violating Member State and the Commission for its failure to initiate infringement 
proceedings? According to the prevailing view "the action before the Court under Arti-
cle 169 constitutes one of the Commission's institutional prerogatives and is associated 
with its general task under Article 155".ISO Moreover, the Treaties clearly award the 
Commission some discretion in its decision to refer Member States before the ECl. lSI 
Thus, it is debatable whether the Commission's liability may be based on the mere 
omission of the Commission to initiate infringement procedures, especially when the 
indirectness of the causal link between the company's loss and the Commission's omis-
. . k . t IS2 I b d h slOn IS ta en In 0 account. t must e accepte , owever, that the Commission may be 
held liable when the company can prove that the Commission failed or omitted to act in 
cases where it had the obligation to do so, or where policy had no effect on its deci-
sion. IS) This could be the case when the Commission failed or omitted to initiate even 
the first, informal, administrative phase of the infringement proceedings within a rea-
sonable time, even though it was informed by the company that a breach of EC law was 
causing it damages. This would also be the case when the Commission wrongfully ig-
nored the information presented to it by the company. The view that the Commission, 
under such circumstances, has the duty to refer the Member State to the ECJ Is4 and that 
it is liable for damages, should it fail to do so, has been recognised by the ECJ. In gen-
eral, it must be accepted that Commission liability may be easier to establish in cases of 
148 See cases 151188 Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 1255; 183/84 Sohnlein Rheingoldv Hauptzollamt 
Wiesbaden [1985] ECR 3351; 133/79 Sucrimex and another v Commission [1980] ECR 1299; 12179 
Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH Agrarhandel v Commission [1979] ECR 3657. 
149 See case C-201l86 Spie-Batignolles v Commission [1990] ECR 1-197. 
ISO See case 137/88 Schneemann and others v Commission [1990] 1 ECR 369; also see cases 355/87 
Commission v Council [1991] 1 CMLR 586 and [1989] ECR 1517; 205/84 Commission v Germany 
[1987] 1 CMLR 69. It goes without saying that the Commission also has the right and duty to act under 
Article 171. See case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527, [1972] CMLR 699. 
lSI See cases 137/92P Commission v BASF AG and others [1994] ECR 1-2555; 23175 Rey Soda v C~sa 
Conguag/io Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279; 337/82 St. Nikolaus Brennerei und Likorfabrik, Gustav Kmep} 
Melde GmbH, Rheinberg v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, [1985] 3 CMLR 83. 
IS2 See 132/77 Societe pour I' exportation des sucres, S.A. v Commission [1978] ECR 1061, [197~] 1 
CMLR 309' 12/79 Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH Agrarhandel KG v Commission [1979] ECR 3657, C-
102/86 Spie~Batignolles v Commission [1990] 1 ECR 197; 151188 Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 1255. 
IS) See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, "Restitution for EU companies under Article 215(2)EC and Inte-
gration Theory" [1999a] 6 European Financial Services Law,pp.58-66, at 59; also see~. Ste.fanou and H. 
Xanthaki, "The Principle of the Effective Protection of Individual in EC Law and the DialectiC of Euro-
pean Integration Theory" [1999b] 50 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, pp.213-233, at 220. 
IS4 17 [1991] 1 CMLR 586' also see cases See case 355/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 15 , . ' H tzol/aml 
337/82 St. Nikolaus Brennerei und Likorfabrik, Gustav KniepfMel.de.GmbH, Rhem[t;~~]vEC~u~41; case 
Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, [1985] 3 CMLR 83; case 42/8fR CommiSSIOn v France 4 C mmission v 
79172 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 667, [1973] C~LR 773. However, see cases 205/8 0 
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total lack of any national attempt to implement EC legislation whereas . f 
' In cases 0 mal 
implementation the Commission could rely on its discretion to bring l'nfri 
ngement pro-
ceedings to a greater extent. 
With specific reference to most violations of EC law referred to in this thesis and 
presented in Chapter 5, it is worth noting that the complaint of companies would be that 
the Commission failed to act against a continuing breach of EC law by a Member State, 
even after an EC] declaration on the illegality of the practice of national authorities has 
been issued. Indeed, in most breaches addressed in Chapter 5 the EC] has declared that 
the legislative or administrative action or omission of France, Greece, or Italy is in 
breach of EC law. Consequently, in these specific cases the companies will be blaming 
the Commission for its failure to bring before the EC] the failure of the respective 
Member State to comply with a prior EC] judgement under Art.228. In these particular 
circumstances the use of the concurrent liability scenario by the companies will proba-
bly bear fruit, as the liability of the Community would not be too difficult to prove. Al-
though reliance on Art.226 could necessitate a tum in the mentality of the ECJ judges, 
reliance on the failure of the Commission to act under Art.228 can be based on ECJ 
case-law. The Court has expressly held that when a Member State disobeys its decision, 
the Commission is obliged to initiate infringement proceedings. ISS 
C2. Admissibility requirements 
The theoretical possibility for the recognition of liability to the Commission for its fail-
ure to act towards the prevention or abolition of breaches of EC law by Member States 
is a very interesting prospect for foreign companies whose route to restitution is blocked 
by the inefficiency of judicial protection at the national level and by the profound disad-
vantages of the state liability scenario. A direct remedy heard before the European 
Courts would relieve foreign companies from the procedural hindrances introduced by 
national law and the preliminary rulings process, thus opening the way for a more ef-
fective route to effective judicial protection at the EU level. However, the efficiency of 
the new remedy has to assessed on the basis of its admissibility requirements and the 
substantive conditions it sets for the establishment of concurrent liability. 
In theory, the possibility of such an action before the European Courts has not 
Germany [1986] ECR 3755, [1987] 1 CMLR 69; 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, [1987] 
1 CMLR 150. . 
I.SS See joined cases 24 & 97/80R Commission v France [1980] ECR 1319. 
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been excluded by the ECJ. Both in Kampffmayer and Liitticke l56 the ECl accepted that 
such an action would be admissible in principle. As for the circle of persons with the 
locus standi to use this remedy, the text of Art.288 does not refer to the issue, at least 
not expressly. Some indication on the will of the Treaty signatories can be found in 
Art.43 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice. This Article regulates the 
interruption of the period of limitation for the initiation of proceedings on an action for 
damages under Art.288(2), in the event of the submission of an application to the rele-
vant EU institution by the aggrieved party. It can be argued, and quite persuasively so, 
that if the aggrieved party has the power to interrupt the prescription period for the pro-
ceedings with such an application, surely it is the aggrieved party that has the power to 
initiate the proceedings for compensation in the first place. For the characterisation of a 
party as aggrieved for this stage of the procedure, alleged damage is adequate. 157 This 
position was confirmed by the ECJ, which in CMC held that any person alleging to have 
suffered damage due to actions or omissions of institutions falling within the scope of 
Art.288(2) may initiate proceedings before the ECJ in order to prove the elements of 
liability.ls8 Although the power of natural persons to submit claims for compensation 
was accepted by the ECJ from the very beginning, the power of legal persons was ques-
tioned by the Commission in two notable cases. In Kerisnel and GAARM59 the Com-
mission argued for the inadmissibility of the action on the basis of lack of locus standi 
by the companies, since it was individual producers that were empowered to submit 
claims and not legal persons representing a collective right to compensation. In both 
cases the ECl held for admissibility on the grounds that the companies claimed restitu-
tion for damages suffered by them as individual legal persons rather than by the total of 
the producers participating in them. In Union national des Cooperatives Agricoles de 
Cereales l60 the ECJ found that admissible are even actions initiated by legal persons to 
156 See Joined case 5, 7 and 13-24/66 Kampffmayer v Commission [1967] ECR 245, con. 67; also see 
4/69 Alfons Lutticke GmbH v Commission [1971] ECR 325. I d 
157 See E.-W. Fuss, "La responsabilite des Communautes europeennes pour Ie comportement ilIega e 
leurs organes" [1981] Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen, pp.I-33, at 5. . 6 257 
158 See case 118/83 CMC and others v Commission [1985] ECR 2325. Also s~e Jomed C~es?5 i 987' 
265 and 267/80 5 and 51/81 and 282/82 Birra Wuhrer SpA and Others v Council and CommISSIOn [ 1 , 
ECR 789. . . 
159 See case 144/83 Societe d'initiatives et de cooperation agricole Kerisnel and others v Co~m.,ss,odne 
., A . I pour I' orgamsallOn [1984] ECR 2589' also see case 289/83 Groupement des AssOCzatlOns grlCO es, . . d th-
, I ' de la Region Maloume an 0 la production et de la commercialisation des pommes de terre et egumes 
ers v Commission [1984] ECR 4295. . ,.' oles de 
160 See Joined Cases 95 to 98174, 15 and 100175 Union National des Cooperatives Agrlc 
Cereales and Others v Commission and Council [1975] ECR 1615. 
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which the right to seek restitution has been legally161 transferred by th . d 
e aggrIeve party. 
Having established the right of foreign companies to subml't cIa' C • Ims lor restItu-
tion under Art.288(2), it is necessary to determine the court before which such an action 
is to be submitted. In the past this issue was resolved on the basis of Art.235 which 
awarded exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes relating to compensation for damages 
against EU institutions to the ECJ. However, since 1988 claims initiated by natural or 
legal persons are submitted to the CFI, which judges in the first instance subject to ap-
peal before the ECJ. 162 Appeals are limited to points of law and based on lack of com-
petence, breach of procedure adversely affecting the interests of the appellant, or an in-
fringement of EC law by the CFI. 163 Appeals must contain the pleas in the law and legal 
arguments relied on164 and must specify the alleged flaws in the first instance judgement 
and the legal arguments in support of the application. 165 The mere reproduction of the 
pleas and legal arguments word for word is not acceptable. l66 The introduction of the 
two-tier judicial system has increased the efficiency of judicial protection at the EU 
level,167 as it has "undoubtedly afforded greater protection to individuals" and has al-
lowed the ECJ to "devote itself more fully to its essential task in ensuring the uniform 
interpretation of EC law under conditions which preserve the quality and efficiency of 
the judicial system".168 The introduction of the right of companies to appeal against the 
CFI judgement eliminates another past problem in the effectiveness of the concurrent 
liability scenario, the lack of trial in the second grade. However, in comparison with the 
state liability scenario, even the current position seems disadvantageous. In the concur-
rent liability scenario companies may ohly appeal before the ECJ on pure matters of 
law. With state liability the judgement. in the first instance is subject to an appeal on 
matters of both law and fact and a cassation on matters of law. 
161 See case 250178 DEKA GetreideprodukteGmbH & Co. KG, i.L. (formerly Firma Conti/ex Getreide-
produkte GmbH & Co. KG) v EEC [1983] ECR 421. 
162 See Article 3, Council Decision of24.1 0.1988 establishing a Court of First Instance ~fthe .European 
Communities (88/591 ECSC, EEC, EUROA TOM) as corrected by the corrige?~um published III OJ No. 
L241 of 17 August 1989) OJ 1989, No. C21511, as amended by Council DeCISIon 93/350/ ECSC, EEC, 
EUROATOM of8 June 1993 OJ 1993, No. L144/21 J. . . 
163 See par. 1 , Art.51 of the EC Statute on the Court of Justice. Also see case C-218/97 Counczl v Leite 
Mateus [1997] ECR 1-6945, con.20. 
164 See Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 
165 See case C-401/96 P Somaco SARL v Commission [1998] ECR 1-2587. . C-
166 See case C-244/92 P Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Sodal Committee [1993] ~~R I-20~~j ~~ 1-
73/95 P Viho v Commission [1996] ECR 1-5457; case C-59/96 P Kolman v CommissIOn [19 
4809. . fi th oses 
167 See European Court of First Instance, "Contribution of the Court of FIrst Instance. o~ e ~~f the 
of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference", Report of the Court of Justice on Certam spec s 
Treaty of the European Union, 15/95, May 1995, p.20. . . . Iication 
168 See European Court of Justice, "Report of the Court of Justice on cert~m aspe~ts of ~~;ea~p 
of the Treaty on EU" (May 1995, Luxembourg, http://www.cec.luleuroparV Igc/en/ cJJep. ) 
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This analysis leads to the question whether a company's claim for damages 
against the Member State and the EU can be judged in a single case before the ECl,169 or 
whether the ECl is prohibited from doing so because "the Community legal order and 
national legal orders are separate from one another".170 Until the development of the 
state liability scenario the general consensus was that a joint action was inconceiv-
able,l71 as it involved two separate legal orders, national law for the Member State's li-
ability and EC law for the liability of the EU. After Francovich, however, and the intro-
duction of an EU doctrine of state liability l72 the submission of two actions, one against 
a Member State before its national courts and under its national rules of law, and one 
against the EU under EC law, for the same legal issue deriving from the same factual 
background would be a waste of time and resources. Furthermore, in cases of concur-
rent liability the acts of the EU and the Member State interlock in such a way that the 
liability of both parties can be established only if the complaints against both, as well as 
the provisions of both legal orders, are taken into account. 173 This, in combination with 
the obvious danger for the acquisition of double compensation during two separate tri-
als, indicates that the concurrent liability between the EU and the Member States not 
only may, but also must, be assessed in one trial before the European Courts. 
Another issue of procedural nature with reference to the proposed remedy con-
cerns its characterisation as a remedy of last resort. In Kampffmeyer the ECl declared 
that for the admissibility of the restitution action brought before it all national remedies 
must be exhausted. 174 In Haegeman l75 an action for damages was declared inadmissible 
on the basis that its subject (a national authority's application ofEC law) rendered com-
petent the national courts, whereas the ECl reached the same conclusion in Societe 
Grand Moulin on the claim for damages caused to the applicant company by the refusal 
of French authorities to reimburse it after the Commission's failure to reimburse France 
169 Any trial against the EU or its institutions held before any other court would be "inconceivable". ~ee 
M. Herdegen, "Zur Haftung fUr fehlerhafte Verordnungen im Recht der Europfiischen Wirtschaftsgemem-
schaft" [1984] Neue ZeitschriftfiJr Verwaltungsrecht, p.347. 
170 See M.L. Jones, op.cit., p.4. " . uk 1 d A 
171 See P. Oliver "Joint liability of the Community and the member states In T. He ~ s ani Th' 
'. .' L (1997 Kluwer Law Intematlona, e McDonnell (eds), The ActIOn for Damages In Commumty.ow , 
Ha~ue/LondonIBoston), pp.285-309, at 308. 
1 2 See W. Wils, op. cit. , p.l92; also see R. Caranta, op.cit., p.713.. V 1 370 
173 See J. G. Huglo, "Cour de justice, responsabilite extracontractuelle", Junsclaseur Europe, o. , 
pars. 82-90. . . ] ECR ')45 
174 See Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24/66 Firma E. Kampffme~er. v Com"'.,sslOn [1967 b the r'ribunal 
175 See case 181173 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State (prelImmary rulIng. ~e~ueste~~nr \{oulins des 
de premiere instance de Bruxelles) [1974] ECR 449; also see cases 99174 Societe des g I 
Antilles v Commission [1975] ECR 1531. 
238 
for the payment of refunds to exporters of cereals under CommunI'ty pro" 176 Th' VISIons. IS 
line of judgements by the ECl established the view that claims for compensation must 
be considered inadmissible, when the national courts may offer effective protection un-
der the national rules of law. l77 The last resort doctrine, which can be viewed as a re-
flection of the past trend towards judicial protection at the national level,178 disregards 
both the inequality and inefficiency of judicial protection at the nationallevel 179 and the 
recent U-turn in its doctrine of the ECl. This is evident in Brasserie and Dillenkofer 
where the ECl held that the admissibility of a claim for damages must not rely on the 
previous exhaustive use of national methods of recourse. 180 Similarly, in Lomas Advo-
cate General Leger argued that the action for damages before the European Courts ex-
ists in parallel, not in exclusion of, actions for damages before national courts. The same 
Advocate General pointed out, however, that a claim for damages would be inadmissi-
ble if the individual concerned could obtain full compensation. 181 The interpretation of 
the recent case-law of the ECl on the issue of the last resort doctrine leads to the con-
clusion that the application of the effective judicial protection principle does not allow 
the arbitrary imposition of such a restrictive additional condition of admissibility in the 
remedy of Art.288(2). It is clear from the text of the Article that the legislator envisaged 
no limitations in the access of individuals to this remedy. In fact, Heukels and McDon-
nell argue that, in recognition of the significance awarded to this remedy by the Treaty 
signatories, the ECl tends to be quite lenient on issues of admissibility and chooses to 
reject claims mostly on material grounds. 182 It is also clear from the relevant extensive 
case-law of the ECl that the remedy of Article 288(2) is of an independent nature. It is 
therefore not surprising that the ECl no longer doubts the power of companies to chal-
lenge the legality of EC acts through actions for damages, even if they do not fulfil the 
conditions for the admissibility of a direct claim for judicial review under Arts.230 and 
176 See cases 99/74 Societe des grands Moulins des Antilles v Commission [1975] ECR 1531. 
177 See C. Harding, op. cit. , p.395. . . . d G 
178 See F. Fines, "La recours en responsabilite extracontractuelle" [19~3] La Semame JUrld,que, E ~?': 
pp.288-291, at 288; also see A. Durdan, "Restitution or damages: natIOnal court or European cou . 
[1975-76] European Law Review, pp.431-443, at 433.. ." 1981 
179 See A. Barav, "La repetition de l'indu dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des CE [ ] 
Cahiers de droit europeen, pp.507-538, at 523.. I 
180 See Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93 Brasserie Du Pecheur SA v Germany; C-221189 Re~i~a ~ ~cre ag 
o/Slatefor Transporl, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR 1-1029; also see Jo;ne ases 
178 179 188 189 and 190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and others v Germany [1996] 2 CMLR 39 . (/ 
18'1 ' , . h' d F d ex parle Hedley Lomas re-See case 5/94 Regina v Ministry of Agriculture, FIS erzes an 00, 
land) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-2553. '.' rs ective" in T. 
182 See T. Heukels and A. McDonnell, "The action for damages m. a communt~ l~u~eer PLaw Intema-
Heukels and A. McDonnell, The Action for Damages in Commumty Law (199 , 
tional, The HaguelLondonIBos-ton, pp.I-9, at 8. 
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183 
It can therefore be stated that the admissibility of such claims is not affected by 
the choice of companies to ignore national procedures leading to compensation. 184 
Under Art.43 of the Protocol of the Statute of the EeJ the company must submit 
its action for restitution of damages to the European Courts within a period of five 
years.
18S 
According to the text of this provision this period begins with the OCcurrence of 
the event which gave rise to liability. In the past this phrase was interpreted to involve 
the occurrence of the harmful event, the actual emergence of damage, or the time when 
the plaintiff could reasonably apprehend the damage and became aware of the identity 
of the responsible EU institution. 186 In the second Meroni case the ECJ held that the 
limitation period cannot begin to run unless there has been certain and finally quantifi-
able damage, thus using the existence of damage, rather than the occurrence of the dam-
aging event, as the decisive factor in the commencement of the limitation period. 187 If, 
however, the applicant was not aware of the damage at the time of the manifestation of 
the damaging effects, the commencement of the limitation period is postponed.188 This 
solution, which seems to comply with the relevant general principles of law common to 
the laws of the Member States, is quite favourable for the company which, however, 
must prove its lack of knowledge at the crucial time. 189 This favourable position leads to 
considerable flexibility in the determination of the limitation period. When the damage 
results from a legislative measure, the limitation period does not run from the time of 
the enactment, but begins on the day when the injury actually occurs. This leads to the 
theoretical possibility of actions for damages being admissibly submitted before the 
European Courts even decades after their enactment. If one combines this with the use 
183 See P. Mead "The relationship between an action for damages and an action for annulment: the re-
turn of Plaumann:' in H. Schermers, T. Heukels and P. Mead (eds), The non-contractual liability of the 
EC (1988, Martinus Nijhoff, London), pp.l 05-119, at 116. 
184 See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, 2000, op.cit., p.80. 
18S "Proceedings against the Community in matters arising from the non-contractual liability sh.all be 
barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto. The peno~ of 
limitation shall be interrupted if proceedings are instituted before the Court or if prior to s~ch proceedmgs 
an application is made by the aggrieved party to the relevant institution of th~ Comm~mty .. In the l~tter 
even the proceedings must be instituted within the period of two months prOVided for m ArtIcle 173, the 
h . t "s Art 43 of the Protocol provisions of the second paragraph of Art.175 shall apply were appropna e. ee . 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, amended by Council Decision 94/993 (OJ 1994 L37.9/l). 
186 See T. Heukels, "The prescription of an action for damages under Article 215(2) .EEC" .~n H. 
Schermers, T. Heukels and P. Mead, The non-contractual lIability of the EC (1988, Martmus NIJhoff, 
London), pp.83-103, at 85. .' d s 9 and 
187 See joined cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni v High Authority ~1962] ECR 411; also s~~ JOI~e26~~~ 5 and 
25/64 FERAMv High Authority [1965] ECR 311; also see lomed Cas~s ~56, 257, 2 an 9' cas~ 44176 
51/81 and 282/82 Birra WiJhrer SpA and Others v Council and CommiSSIOn [1987] ECR 78 , 
Milch- Felt- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 393. Ad v 
188 See case 145/83 Stanley George Adams v ComT1}iss'ion (No 1); case 53/84 Stanley George ams 
Commission (No 2) [1985] ECR 3651. 
189 See T. Heukels, 1998, op.cit., p.90. 
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of Article 288(2) as an indirect means of judicial review the flex'bl l' " . 
, I e ImItatIOn penod 
may legitimately result to a circumvention of the time-limit requirements of Art.230. 190 
Applications for compensation include the subject matter of the dispute and a 
brief statement on the grounds on which the application is based 191 ThI'S t t 
. s a ement must 
be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant and the judge to respond to re-
spond adequately to the case. 192 The company must state in a coherent, brief and intelli-
gible manner the basic legal and factual particulars of the case. This condition of admis-
sibility aims to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice. 193 In order 
to satisfy these requirements, an action for damages must state the evidence from which 
the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution can be identified, the rea-
sons for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between the conduct 
and the damage it claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage. 194 
The presentation of the admissibility requirements for the proposed remedy lead 
to the conclusion that the action for damages based on concurrent liability provides am-
ple access to justice with the minimum procedural requirements. Foreign companies 
seeking compensation for damages are expressly empowered to submit such claims 
within a period of five years generously running from the materialisation of all substan-
tive elements for the establishment of the liability, including the actual materialisation 
of a quantifiable damage and the claimant's knowledge of the damaging effects. This 
broad interpretation of the relevant prOVision of the Eel's Protocol of Statute results in 
the almost indefinite extension of the limitation period for the submission of the claim 
for damages, since the company's knowledge may significantly post-date the damaging 
event and the existence of quantifiable damage may occur long after the damaging event 
actually took place. Moreover, the individual now has recourse to appeal before the 
Eel, since in the first instance concurrent liability cases are heard by the eFI. It is also 
worth noting that the recent case-law of the Eel has abolished the most restrictive ad-
• 195 • 
missibility condition for claims under Art.288(2), the last resort doctrIne whose mam 
190 See P. Mathijsen, A Guide to EU Law (1995, Sweet and Maxwell, London), p.105; also see case 
11172 Giordano v Commission [1973] ECR 417. 
191 See the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable to the CFI b~ 
virtue of the first paragraph of Article 46 of that Statute, and Article 44( I )( c) of the Rules of Procedure 0 
the Court of First Instance. . . . . 11-125 
192 See case T-113/96 Edouard Dubois el Fils SA v Council andCommlsslOn [1998] ECR . 
193 See case T-85/92 De Hoe v Commission [1993] ECR II-523, con.20. T 
194 C ., [1996] ECR Il-961; case -See cases T-387/94 Asia Molor France and Others v ommlSSlOn . b'I 
679 T 38/96 Guerin Automo 1 es v 195/95 Guerin Automobiles v Commission [1997] ECR 11- ; case -
Commission [1997] ECR 11-1223. . . 175/84 Krohn 
195 See case 281/82 Unifrex v Commission and Council [1984] ECR 1969; alsCo see ~a~e [1987] ECR 
. C '1 and ommlSSlOn 
v Commission [1986] ECR 753; case 81/86 De Boer RUlzen v ouncl. 46175 IRC v Commission 
3677. See contra case 96171 Haegemann v Commission [1972] ECR 1015, case 
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legal basis has been the increase in the workload of the ECJ and th 'b'l' 
e POSSI I Ity of dou-
ble compensation for the applicants. l96 Following Francovich the' 't' f th Imposl Ion 0 e last 
resort requirement concerning the prior exhaustion of national rem d' ld b I e les wou e ack-
ing legality, 197 and would introduce double standards used unjustifiably198 by the Euro-
pean Courts in their judgements on liability of the ED and Member States. l99 The recent 
post-Francovich case-law has also silenced all criticism against the impossibility of rec-
ognising the admissibility of a claim for damages brought before the European Courts 
against two different authorities liable under two different systems of law. The Euro-
pean Courts now have exclusive jurisdiction to hear concurrent liability claims, which 
they are fully equipped to consider on the basis of the doctrine of liability in EC law. 
C3. Substantive requirements 
The determination of the substantive conditions for the establishment of liability in the 
concurrent liability remedy is significantly facilitated by the express, and now well-
established, ECJ position that the grant of damages by a national court for breach of EC 
law by a Member State should be subject to the same conditions as the grant for dam-
ages by the ECJ for infringement of that same EC provision by an ED institution.200 The 
similarity in the conditions for liability with reference to both the ED and Member 
States increases the efficiency of the concurrent liability remedy, since the applicant 
company will need to establish the same conditions for both parties. Since the concur-
rent liability remedy in the form introduced in this thesis has not been brought before 
the ECJ so far, the conditions for the establishment of concurrent liability have not been 
determined authentically yet. However, the combination of the state liability case-law 
and the ECJ's precedents on the conditions for liability under Art.288(2) may elucidate 
the matter to great detail. More precisely, the conditions for the establishment of the li-
ability of the Member State which breaches EC law do not merit separate analysis here, 
[1976] ECR 65; also see M.L. Jones, "The non-contractual liability of the EEC and the availability of an 
alternative remedy in the national courts" [1981] Legal Issues of European Integration, pp.I-42, at 10. 
196 See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (1994, Clarendon Press, Oxford), 
p.501. . 
197 See A.W.H. Meij, "Article 215(2) and local remedies" in, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell, The A~~;~ 
for Damages in Community Law (1997, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/LondonIBoston), pp. 
284, at 284. 198 .. . d d f on for annulment: the re-See P. Mead "The relatIOnship between an actIOn for amages an an ac 1 • (1997 
' . D . C mumty Law , tum of Plaumann" in T. Heukels and A. McDonnell, The ActIOn for am ages In om 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague/LondonIBoston), pp.243-258, at 257. 
199 See R. Caranta, op. cit. , pp.724-725. . . . h d Olh-
200 • • ' C C 6/90 nd C-9/90 FrancovlC an See OpmIOn of Advocate General Mlscho on Jomed ases - a 
ers v Italian Republic [1991] 1-5370-5402, con.7l. 
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as they have been presented in the first part of this chapter In short th d' . C 
. , e con lhons lor 
the establishment of EU liability amount to a wrongful act, damage to the company and 
a causal link between the two. 20 I 
The first condition of concurrent liability refers to a wrongful act or omission by 
a national authority and the Commission. There is no doubt that the Commission may 
be held liable under Art.288(2) due to its role in the organisational structure of the 
EU.202 In any case, the ECJ has expressly held that in Art.288 the tenn "institutions" is 
not confined to the institutions mentioned in Art.7(l), but extends to all ED bodies es-
tablished by the Treaty and authorised to act in the name of the EU. 203 As for the nature 
of the act of the Commission, this may be actions or omissions,204 such as the failure to 
adopt satisfactory procedures or the failure to supervise properly the work of an inferior 
body,20S or non-performance of obligations.206 The Commission or its organs do not nec-
essary have to be aware of the illegality of its action.207 The question is whether this po-
sition signifies that fault is not an element sine qua non for the liability of the Commis-
sion in the concurrent liability scenario. A number of authors argue that this liability 
may be based on factors other than fault, such as risk/08 or even to the recognition of 
objective no-fault liability.209 Goffin feels that the difference in the wording of 
Art.288(2), in comparison with the relevant Art.40 ECSC which expressly refers to 
fault, is a clear indication that fault is no longer a priority for the establishment of EU 
liability.2lO An equal, if not larger, number of authors continue to support the view that 
EU liability can only be based on fault. 211 In support of the same doctrine, Du Ban refers 
to the general principles of law common to the laws of the Member States which alleg-
201 See E.W. Fuss, op.cit., p. 9. All elements must be present for the establishment of liability; see case 
26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei v Commission [1982] ECR 3057. 
202 See E. Grabitz, "Das Amtshaftungsrecht der Gemeinschaft" [1991] Europaisches Verwaltungsrecht, 
pp.167-196, at 174; also see A.D. Papagiannidis and A.I. Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.549. 
203 See case C-370/89 SGEEM and Etzroy v EIB [1992] ECR 1-6211. 
204 See F. Fines, Etudes de la Responsabilite Extracontractuelle de la Communaute Europeenne (1990, 
LGDJ, Paris), p.369. 
20S See cases 32 and 33/58 SNUPATv High Authority [1959] ECR 127. 
206 See, for example, joined cases 9 and 12/60 Vloeberghs SA v High Authority [1961] ECR 197. 
207 See E. Grabitz, 1988,op.cit.,p.176. M k t 
208 See Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, "The non-contractual liability of the EEC" [1975] Commo.n . . ar :f 
Law Review, pp.493-512, at 501; also see G. Lysen, "Three questions on the non-contractual lIabilIty 
the EEC" [1985] Legal Issues of European Integration, pp.86-120, at 109. . 1988 
209 See A.D. Papagiannidis and A. I. Christogiannopoulos, op.cit., p.550-551; also see E. Grabltz, , 
op.cit., p.lO. 11 P 's) 
210 d C t' (1969 Les Nouve es, an , See L. Goffin, La responsabilite non contractuelle es ommunau es , 
p.156. I CEE" At;-
211 See P Cahier "Les elements constitutifs de la responsabilite extracontractuelle .d~ a , tr l_ 
. , "L" responsablhte extracon ac ianges Reuter (1981), pp.127-152, at 145; also see T .. Debart, action en . U· ity Lyon III 
tuelle devant la Court de Justice des Communautes europeennes", Doctoral theSIS, mvers , 
1984, p.353. 
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edly demand the presence of fault for the establishment of liabl'll'ty 212 B l' C 
. ou OIS relers to 
the same principles, but interprets them as allowing liability without C It 1 b lau ,name y 0 -
jective liability.213 The case-law of the ECl is equally undecided. In many cases the ECl 
expressly held that the illegality of an act is not sufficient for the establishment of EU 
liability and that the existence of fault must also been proven.214 However, since the 
1970s (with a notable reappearance of the term in Berti in 1982) the Court has ceased to 
mention fault as an element of extra-contractualliability.2Is The view that the ECl has 
moved from the notion of fault to the concept of illegality was confinned in Brasserie 
, 
where the Court made it clear that there was no need for any finding of fault once there 
has been a finding of a serious breach of EC law.216 Thus, the notion of fault is an ob-
jective one, which amounts to the material fact of the violation of an EU obligation and 
lies with the wrongful circumstances surrounding its application or the way in which the 
act has been taken. This conclusion is identical to the one reached in the analysis of 
fault in the state liability scenario of Chapter 6. It is interesting to note that equally 
similar is the cautiously positive position on liability due to unlawful legislative acts217 
which, however, is not of significance to this thesis, as the action of the Commission in 
the concurrent liability scenario is not of a legislative nature. The analysis of the first 
condition of EU liability leads to the conclusion that its interpretation is very similar to 
the interpretation of the wrongful act as an element of state liability at the national level. 
Consequently, foreign companies seeking restitution at the EU level are not disadvan-
taged by the introduction of the requirement of the existence of a wrongful act or omis-
sion. In fact, under the concurrent liability scenario the foreign company need only 
212 See B. du Ban, "Les principes generaux et la responsabilite non-contractuelle de la Communaute" 
[1977] Cahiers de droit europeen, pp.397-434. . . 
213 See J.Boulois, Droit institutionnel des Communautes europeenes (1993, Montchrestlen, Pans), 
p.399. 
214 See Kampffmeyer case, op.cit., note 16; alse see 16/67 Labeyrie v Commission [1968] ECR 293; 
joined cases 19,20,25 and 30/69 Richez-Parise v Commission [1970] ECR 325. . 
215 See case 131181 Mario Berti v Commission [1982] ECR 3493; see F. Fines, 1990, op.clt., p.375. 
216 See case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany; 46 and 48/93 Brasserie Du Pecheur 
Sa v Germany, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte F actortam~ Ltd and Others [1996] 
ECR 1-1029 [1996] 1 CMLR 889' also see P. Graig and G. de Burca, 1998, op.clt., pp.526-527. . 
" .' d Article 
217 For the definition of legislative acts, see A. Amull, "Liability for le~lslatlve act~ u~ er (1997 
215(2) EC" in T. Heukels and A. McDonnell, The Actions for Damages In Community da-; -484/93 
T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague), pp.129-151, at 135; also see Joi~e~ case~ T~~1/9\~5] ECR 11-
Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Another. v CommiSSIOn (Live Igs) [d 'd'l 
2941; case C-298/89 Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR 1-3605; case C-63/8~ ~;~ura~~~s C~~u~i; 
Council and Commission [1991] ECR 1-1799; D. Curtin, "The non-contractual ha I Ik o. e p 46-55 at 
legislature for illegal directives: effective judicial protection?" [1992] European L~ . ev;ew, p <:-46 ~d 
4; case 5171 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Sch6ppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; case Jome cases
te 
Factor-
A • S t ,# Statefior Transport, ex par 48/93 Brasserie Du Pecheur Sa v Germany; Regma v ecre ary OJ te British Tele-
tame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR 1-1029; case C-392/93 Regina v H.M. Tr~asU1I'i;;/~~rDi/lenkofer and 
communications Pic [1996] 2 CMLR 217; Joined cases C-178, 179, 188, 18 an 
others v Commission [1996] 3 CMLR 469. 
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prove the wrongfulness of the Member State's breach of EC law and of the Commis-
sion's omission or failure to act. 
The foreign companies seeking restitution on the basis of concurrent liability 
must also prove that the damage suffered is reparable, specific and quantifiable, and 
that its repercussions are actual and impossible to reverse in a manner other than the 
reparation sought be the European CourtS.218 Reparable is any specific, real and certain 
damage.
219 
Specific is the damage which affects the company's interests and assets in a 
special and individual way.220 The reality of the damage is proof of its existence and as 
such constitutes a very significant part in the establishment of EU liability. The certainty 
of the damage refers to loss, which is either actual or certain to occur in the future. The 
broad interpretation of the term "certain" seems to be in compliance with the general 
principles of law common to the laws of the Member States, which in their majority ac-
cept the possibility of reparation for future but sufficiently certain damages. 221 However, 
in FERAM and Nolcf22 the Court explained that purely potential or hypothetical damage 
cannot constitute the basis of EU liability under Art.284(2). The damage must also be 
proven/23 and quantifiable, namely expressed or capable of being expressed in a specific 
sum of money. 224 Moreover, where the loss has been passed on to third parties, no dam-
age will be recoverable.225 In fact, the applicants have the obligation to prove that they 
could not have possibly limited the effects of the damaging event.226 From this brief 
presentation its is clear that companies seeking restitution of damages caused by the 
Member State's breach of EC law and the Commission's failure to prevent or abolish 
this breach may seek compensation both for the actual damages suffered in its attempt 
to establish within the Member State and for the loss of income resulting from the pro-
hibition or the limitation of the company's activities within the Member State.227 How-
218 See E. Grabitz, 1991, op.cit., p.180; also see F. Fines, 1990, op.cit., p.4l0; A. :alot, J.M. d~ la 
Torre, M. Uria and J. Aguilo, "La responsabilidad extracontractual y razon de estado [1989] Revlsta 
general de derecho, pp.6835-6874, at 6857. 
219 See case 26174 Roquette Freres y Commission [1976] ECR 677. 
220 See Joined cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni y High Authority [1962] ECR 411. 
221 See F. Fines, 1990, op. cit. , p.4Il. I I see 
222 See case 4173 Nold, Kohlen-und BaustoflgroJ3handlung y Commission [1974] ECR 49 ; a so 
case 29/59 FERAM y High Authority [1959] ECR 517. 
223 See case T-64/89 Automec y Commission [1990] ECR 11-367. M" . h 
224 4 1956]' ECR 151' also see case 10/55 lrosSevlC See case 1155 Kergall y Common Assembly [195 - , 
v High Authority [1954-1956] ECR 333. 27/60 & 1161 Aleroni v 
225 See E. Grabitz, 1991, op.cit., p.182;joined cases 14, 16, 17,20,24,.26 & . hA thori [1967] 
High Authority [1961] ECR 161; also see joined cases 9 and 58/65 San MIchele v Hlg u ty 
ECR 1. .] ECR II 2305 
226 See case T -480 and 483/93 Antillean Rice Mills (Jnd others y Commi~si~n [199~2] ECR ;-306 i; also 
227 See Joined cases C-I04/89 and 37/90 Mulder y Council and CommISSIOn [19 
see J. Steiner and L. Woods, op.cit., p.507. 
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ever, reparation for moral damage amounting to loss of reputation due to the Member 
State's refusal to allow the company's activity within its boundan'es d t b 
oes no seem to e 
reparable under EC law. This would be the only difference in the restitution achieved 
following the concurrent liability scenario at the EU level and the c t' 
ompensa IOn 
achieved by the company if protection at the national level were to be chosen. It must be 
accepted, however, that even before the national courts moral damage is not highly 
compensated. 
The last element of concurrent liability is the directness of the damage, in other 
words the causal link between the wrongful act and the damage.228 Grabitz expresses the 
view that the European Courts apply the Adaquantztheorie of causation, according to 
which causal link between action and damage exists if the action was not only necessary 
but also adequate and sufficient for the occurrence of the damage.229 Thus, albeit neces-
sary as an element sine qua non/30 it would be insufficient for the company to prove 
that the damage would not have occurred without the wrongful action.231 In fact, fol-
lowing the case-law of the ECl, the company need only show that the Commission 
failed to act, thereby failing to exercise adequate control over the Member States.232 
Moreover, the company must show that the chain of causation was not broken by itself 
or the Member State. This would not be too difficult, as despite the position of the Eel 
that the chain is broken by actions undertaken by an independent and autonomous 
authority of a Member State,233 it must be accepted that following Kampffmeyer, Vloe-
berghs and Liitticke the Commission is still liable for the damages caused to the appli-
cants due to its failure to exercise its supervisory duty. Moreover, the company will 
have to prove that the chain of causation was not broken by its negligence or contribu-
tory negligence234 which is judged on the basis of the action expected by an average, 
vigilant, prudent and reasonable person.235 The EU doctrine on causation is very similar 
to the theories applied by the French, Italian and Greek courts in proceedings heard be-
fore them. 
228 See joined cases 64 & 113/76, 167 & 239178,27,28 & 45179 P. Dumortier Freres SA and others v 
Council [1982] ECR 1733. . d I 
229 See E. Grabitz, 1991, op.cit., p.183; also see joined cases 29,31,36,39-47,50 & 51163 Usmes e a 
Provence v High Authority [1965] ECR 911. 
230 See case T-478/93 Wafer Zoo Sri v Commission [1995] CMLR 750. AId h tJ 
231 See D. Chalmers, European Union Law "(1998, AshgatelDartmouth, ers 0 
Brookfield/Singapore/Sydney), p.595. 
232 See joined cases 9 and 12/60 Vloeberghs SA v High Authority [1961] ECR 197. 
233 See case 132177 Societe pour l'Exportation des Sucres S.A. v Commission [1978] ECR 1061 Ad 
234 See case 145/83 Stanley George Adams v Commission (No 1); case 53/84 Stanley George oms v 
Commission (No 2) [1985] ECR 3651. 
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If all elements of liability are proven the company will rece' . 
, lve compensation. In 
the absence of a set EU doctrine, the extent of the compensation awarded will be calcu-
lated on the basis of the general principles of law common to the laws of the Member 
States.
236 
The doctrine prevailing in most civil law jurisdictions, as seen in Chapter 6, 
requires from the judge to award a sum equal to the damage suffered, nothing more, 
nothing less.
237 
In other words, the Court must award "full compensation for the loss 
actually sustained".238 This includes interese39 set to 8% calculated from the date of the 
judgement.24o In fact, the company can claim two types of interests, legal interest im-
posed on the amount awarded as compensation by the Court and therefore running from 
the day of the delivery of the judgement, and compensatory interest imposed on the 
damage actually suffered and hence running from the time that the damage was actually 
suffered.241 It is also worth mentioning that the European Courts will most likely appor-
tion damages between the Commission and the Member State.242 Since the EC doctrine 
of full compensation is a guarantee of effective judicial protection for the company and 
since the national doctrines on compensation are being applied, it must be accepted that 
the company choosing to seek restitution under the concurrent liability scenario would 
benefit, rather than suffer, from its choice.243 
The analysis of the substantive conditions for the establishment of liability in the 
concurrent liability scenario has demonstrated the great degree of similarity in the rele-
vant provisions of French, Italian and Greek law, the state liability scenario and the con-
current liability remedy. This similarity may be due to the reference to the general prin-
ciple of law common to the laws of the Member States in the text of Art.288(2), which 
guide the ECl and the CFI in their attempt to create an EU doctrine of state and EU li-
235 See T-336/94 Efisol SA v Commission [1997] 3 CMLR 298; also see case 62/83 Eximo Molkereier-
zeugnisse Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg v Commission [1984] ECR 2295. . ., " 
236 See P. Craig, "One more unto breach: the Community, the state and damages hablhty [1997] Legal 
Quarterly Review, pp.67-94, at 77. . . 
237 See L Dubois "La responsabilite de I'etat legislateur pour les dommages causes aux parttcuhers par 
" . '1' d I Cute" [1996] Re-la violation du droit communautaire et son inCIdence sur la responsabl Ite e a ommuna 
vue fran~aise de droit administratif, pp.583-60 1, at 594. . .. ,,' 
238 See A.G. Toth "The concepts of damage and causality as elements of non-contractual hab,.hty N~ 
H. Schermers, T. H~ukels and P. Mead (eds), Non-contractual Liability of the EC (1988, Martmus 1-
jhoff, London), pp.23-38, at 28. dAM Donnell 
239 See A van Casteren "Art 215(2) and the question of interest" in T. Heukels an '. C 1 Th 
. . . (" 1997 KI r Law IntematlOna, e (eds), The Action for Damages In Commumty Law ,uwe 
Ha~uelLondonIBoston), pp.199-216, at 215. 
20 See 58175 Sergy v Commission [1976] ECR 1139. . ., . law" [1994] 
241 See B. Fitzpatrick and E. Szyszczak, "Remedies and effectIve protectIOn III CommunIty 
Modern Law Review, pp.435-441, at 437. . . m [1990] I-ECR 
242 See case 308/87 Alfredo Grifoni v European Atomic Energy Commumty (Eurato ~ 
1203. [1984] ECR 1891 
243 See case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Another v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen . 
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ability. Although the introduction of an ED doctrine of liability h d d th 
as ren ere ese gen-
eral principles of law useful only as interpretative tool for the dete . t' f h 
nnma Ion 0 t e con-
ditions for restitution under Art.288(2),244 thus ridding this provision from one of the 
most restricting doctrines surrounding its application, it is precisely this reference which 
determined the theoretical background for the development of the EU doctrine of liabil-
ity and rendered the concurrent liability scenario possible in practice.245 
To summarise the substantive conditions for the establishment of concurrent li-
ability, it suffices to note that the company need only prove the illegality of the act or 
omission undertaken by any type of national authority (executive, legislative or judicial) 
and the Commission, the extent and nature of damages suffered and the existence of a 
direct causal link between the first two elements. Thus, the company must prove that the 
Member State wrongfully breached EC law and that the Commission failed to fulfil its 
supervisory duty, even when its discretion is taken into account. The company must 
determine the actual, certain, concrete, assessable, direct or consequential loss suffered. 
This will most likely be equal to the amount of money that the company would have 
gained, had it been allowed to exercise its right to free establishment under EC law. In-
terest and other claims will also be taken into account. Moreover, the company will 
have to prove that the Member State's action or omission and the Commission's omis-
sion were the sole determining factors jointly leading to the occurrence of the damages 
sought. By its very nature, concurrent liability is established by two joint actions or 
omissions which lead directly to the effect of damage. Adequate proof of these three 
factors will lead to full restitution, which will be commensurate to the damage sus-
tained. An interest of 8% will also be awarded. The criteria for the division of liability 
in the concurrent liability scenario is one of the areas where there actually is a lacuna in 
the law of the ED.246 However, it would be very unlikely that the Commission would 
bear a higher percentage than the Member State which actually violated EC law. Pay-
ment of the successful applicant in the concurrent liability scenario is the joint responsi-
bility of the Commission and the national authority. It must be accepted, however, that 
within the framework of the principle of effective judicial protection the Commission 
could be ordered to pay the full amount and then bring proceedings under Art.226 in 
order to recover the contribution of the Member St~te. 
244 See J. Schwarze, Europaisches Verwaltungsrecht (1988, Nomos, Baden-Baden), vo~.I, p.63. t " 
245 . E tract law and Its componen s See J. Basedow, "The renascence of UnIform la~: uropean con 
[1998] Legal Studies, pp.121-145, at 135. .. I La and Taxa-
246 See H. Schermers and D. Waelbroek, Judicial Protection in the EC (1992, K uwer w 
tion Publishers, Deventer), p.356. 
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D. EVALUATION OF THE PROTECTION OF COMPANIES AT EU LEVEL 
The lack of effective judicial protection for foreign companies se k' . 
e mg compensation 
for damages resulting from French, Italian and Greek breaches of EC law before the na-
tional courts forces foreign companies to turn to protection at the EU level. In view of 
the limited role of natural and legal persons in infringement proceedings against Mem-
ber States and the restricted field of application of the provisions for judicial review be-
fore the European Courts, the main remedy currently available to companies at the EU 
level is the Francovich scenario, which combines the doctrine of state liability with the 
procedure of preliminary rulings. This extends the power to turn against Member States 
for their failure to comply with EC law to companies suffering damages as a result of 
these breaches. These companies are now empowered to participate actively to the pro-
ceedings before the national courts. Another considerable advantage of the Francovich 
scenario is the expansion of its field of application to, amongst others, cases of hori-
zontal and indirect effects. Moreover, all this is available before the familiar national 
courts under the known national procedural rules. 
The question is, whether this is advantageous for companies. On the basis of the 
findings of Chapter 6, this cannot be the case. The familiarity of national proceedings, 
which is doubtful with respect to foreign companies, cannot possibly be considered 
more important than the confusion in the determination of the national competent courts 
in France and Italy, the Italian long delays until a final decision is reached and the 
French and Greek lack of mechanisms of enforced execution of the national courts' de-
cisions. And all of the above comes as a supplement to the inherent problems of indirect 
remedies. These include the uncertainty as to the outcome of the company's application 
for damages caused by the unavoidable discrepancies in the national procedural rules 
applicable in the fifteen different jurisdictions of the EU, the reluctance of French, 
Greek and Italian judges to refer cases to the ECl, the additional long delays in the final 
judgement on the application for damages by an average of 21.4 months until the ECl 
reaches its preliminary ruling, the recent restrictive attitude of the ECl concerning the 
admissibility of referrals, and the possibility of going through all of the above only to 
find that the national judge either misapplies or ignores the preliminary ruling of the 
ECl. These significant, and very real, disadvantages of the state liability remedy render 
. . . t the EU level as inade-the Judicial protection currently offered to foreIgn companIes a 
. 1 Th th tection offered to for-quate as the protection offered at the natlonal leve . us, e pro 
eign companies at the EU level is inadequate and ineffective. 
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The question is if this is a dead end for such companies, or whether EC law may 
still leave ground to hope for companies seeking compensation fo d 
r amages caused by 
breaches of EC law by Member States. An innovative some would s futuri·· I 
' ay shc, so u-
tion to the current inability of foreign companies to achieve compensation at the EU 
level can develop through future ECl case-law by reference to the concurrent liability 
scenario. Following the existing doctrine of concurrent liability introduced by Lutticke, 
foreign companies may argue that liable for their damages are both the Member State 
for its breach of EC law and the Commission for its failure to fulfil its supervisory duty 
adequately. Although the ECl has, in principle, accepted this doctrine, its application to 
Art.288 has not be attempted. It is proposed here, however, that the Lutticke principle 
could aid companies in their search for an effective vehicle of judicial protection. If this 
proposal is followed by the ECl, companies would be able to by-pass their national 
courts and the inherent problems of proceedings before them and initiate a direct action 
for damages against the Member State and the Commission before the CFI and the ECl. 
This is the main advantage of the proposed remedy. It is suggested that foreign 
companies seeking compensation for damages caused by French, Italian and Greek 
breaches of EC law may be able to establish a claim both against the relevant Member 
State for its failure to comply with its EU obligations and against the Commission for its 
failure to fulfil its supervisory task and ensure that EC law is implemented within EU 
Member States. This remedy would be a result of a novel interpretation of Art.288(2) 
and would be based on the obligations introduced for Member States under Art. I 0 and 
for the Commission by Art. 2 I I. It is widely accepted that Art. I 0 introduces the obliga-
tion of Member States to take all necessary measures for their full compliance with EC 
law, as well as to refrain from any action which could hinder this compliance. The use 
of this provision as a legal basis for the establishment of liability for the state which 
breaches EC law has been successfully used in the state liability scenario. Such liability 
is recognised under the flexible minimal substantive conditions of a wrongful act or 
omission, damage to the applicant and a causal link between the two. However, the es-
tablishment of the Commission's liability is not currently recognised equally widely. In 
fact, it is only after the change in the description used by the ECl for the Commission'S 
obligation to "a right and a duty" since the mid-1980s that the recognition of such li-
ability could become possible. Even is this accepted, the mere existence of a breach of 
EC law may not establish the liability of the Community (represented by the Commis-
. . . .. . Th 1· t mpany would need to prove 
slOn) In the concurrent hablhty scenario. e app lcan co . 
'.-. d h t ·t fi ·led or omitted to act that the Commission was fully aware of the vlolatlOn an tal al 
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towards its prevention or abolition as a result of negligence rather th I 
an as a resu t of a 
policy decision. This position is emphasised by use of the tenn "shall'" th d " 
In e escnpbon 
of the Commission's role in the initiation of the administrative stage of the infringement 
proceedings against Member States which fail to fulfil their EU obligations. It must also 
be accepted that in cases of failure of Member States to comply with prior ECJ judge-
ments, as is the case with all breaches presented in Chapter 5, the failure of the Com-
mission to refer the matter to the ECJ would be sufficient basis for the establishment of 
Community liability, since in the procedure of Art.228 the Commission has an obliga-
tion (rather than a discretion) to act. 
The evaluation of the efficiency in the protection which would be offered to 
companies, should the concurrent liability doctrine be followed by the ECJ, can only be 
successfully achieved if the procedural and substantive conditions for its establishment 
are assessed. The substantive conditions for the establishment of liability in both the na-
tional courts' proceedings of Chapter 6 and the state liability procedure presented in this 
chapter were characterised by a flexibility and liberality which opened an unhindered 
route to justice for companies. This assessment also applies to the substantive condi-
tions for the establishment of concurrent liability, since the ECJ has repeatedly stated 
that the conditions for liability are the same in EC law irrespective of the carrier of this 
liability. Consequently, an objectively illegal action or omission, damages to the appli-
cant (including the future loss of the opportunity to make profit) and a causal link be-
tween the first two elements suffice for the establishment of the liability of both the 
Member State and the Commission in all EU doctrines for restitution irrespective of the 
remedy used as a vehicle for its request. It follows that the favourable conclusions on 
the effectiveness of state liability based on its substantive elements can be carried on to 
the evaluation of the concurrent liability remedy. 
The final negative assessment of both protection at the national level and state 
liability was due to the restrictive procedural rules regulating the national and the state 
liability remedies. The question is, whether similar procedural rules block the way to the 
access of the company to justice in the concurrent liability remedy too. Since the text of 
Art.288(2) has been interpreted by the ECJ to introduce locus standi for companies, the 
latter cannot be prevented from submitting a claim. for compensation under this provi-
sion. This claim must be submitted within a period of five years generously starting 
. . 1 th mpan)' was in knowl-from the time when the Injury actually occurred, as ong as e co 
. 'b'l' tr' t' s in the remedy of edge of its occurrence. The practical lack of admlssl 1 Ity res IC IOn 
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concurrent liability is an encouraging sign in the evaluation of th f'C: . 
e e lectlveness of the 
concurrent liability remedy for the judicial protection of companies. 
The main procedural problem is, whether the EeJ, as the court with the exclu-
sive competence to judge on actions involving EU institutions has the t 
, compe ence to 
judge on a claim against both the Commission and a Member State. Even in its pre-
Francovich case-law the possibility of considering such an action admissible had not 
been excluded by the ECJ, which proceeded to judge on a large number of concurrent 
liability cases. The only difference between these cases and the present time is that 
nowadays a claim for damages against the Commission and the Member State would be 
submitted to the CFI which judges in the first instance subject to appeal on matters of 
law before the ECJ. In fact, this two-tier system increases the effectiveness of the judi-
cial protection offered to foreign companies, as it introduces two grades of trial as a 
guarantee of a fuller and error-free examination of the case before the final decision is 
reached. Having said that, the EU two-tier court system is still behindhand the national 
systems of justice where an appeal on both law and fact, as well as a cassation on mat-
ters of law is available to the company. Even so, it would be unfair to let this point un-
dermine the opportunities presented by the concurrent liability remedy. These derive 
from its directness, consequent lack of inherent problems presented by national pro-
ceedings and the state liability remedy, and the recent introduction of two grades of 
trial. However, it is precisely this directness which suffered considerably from a past 
doctrine of the ECJ that viewed the remedy of Art.288(2) as one of last resort. This 
doctrine demanded from the company to suffer all the problems of the national remedies 
examined in Chapter 6 before it could even launch an application for damages before 
the EeJ. Thankfully, this doctrine has now been eradicated by the judgements of the 
EeJ in Brasserie and Dillenkofer, where it was held that the rights of individuals to seek 
redress at the national and the EU level were parallel, rather than exclusive. This posi-
tion offers extreme value to the concurrent liability remedy, which seems to be the only 
route for companies to effective judicial protection. 
This observation, however, disregards the fact that the concurrent liability rem-
edy has never been tried in practice, at least not in the format suggested in this chapter. 
. . t' £ damages due to viola-Therefore, to conclude that the company seekIng r~stItu IOn or 
tions of EC law by Member States can find effective judicial protection at the EU level 
. f hit edy as proposed here 
would be based on the hypothetIcal acceptance 0 t e re evan rem 
. tly offered to for-by the CFI and ECJ judges. It must be clear that the protectIOn curren 
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eign companies at the EU level is based solely on the state liabl'l't d . 
1 Y reme y, which has 
proven inadequate and ineffective in practice. 
The effective protection of the individual is not only a lawful right for the natu-
ral and legal persons, citizens of the EU,247 but also a general principle248 of EC law 
"which underlines the constitutional traditions common to Member States and has been 
enshrined in Art. 6 and 13 ECHR".249 The principle was traditionally interpreted to en-
tail the obligation of all national authorities to refrain from passing and/or applying any 
domestic law which could prevent the effective judicial protection of individuals.250 Af-
ter Factortame I and Francovich251 the principle is defined as the positive obligation of 
national authorities to create the legal and administrative environment that would allow 
the assertion of EU rights before the national courtS.252 So far the principle has been ap-
plied on national authorities. However, as a recognised general principle of EC law, 
which forms part of the law of the Union,253 it is binding not only to national but also to 
EU authorities. Thus, it is the duty of both national and EU authorities to ensure that 
individuals have the realistic opportunity to achieve compensation for damages caused 
by the failure of Member States to comply with their EU obligations. 254 From the analy-
sis of the judicial protection offered to companies seeking restitution for damages 
caused by French, Italian and Greek breaches of the freedom of establishment it is clear 
that both the national authorities and the EU have failed to realise the general principle 
of effective judicial protection on this point. This observation emphasises the need for 
European judges to look into the possibility of accepting the remedy offered by 
247 See A. Barav, op.cit., p.509; also see the Opinion of Advocate General Leger in case C-5/94 The 
Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR 1-
2553, cons.67. 
248 "It appears that the guarantee of effective judicial protection is a general ~rincipl.e o.f Community 
law". See W. van Gerven, "Non-contractual liability of Member States, Commumty Institutions and Indi-
viduals for Breaches of Community Law with a view to a common law for Europe" [1994] Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp.6-40, at 11. 
249 See Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, par.14; also see cases 222/84 John,ston v 
Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651, par.18; Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven ill case 
C-128/92 H.J. Banks v British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR 1-1209, at 1-1253. 
250 See case 33176 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland [1976] ECR 1997, cons. 5; also. s~e 
cases 45176 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2053, const. 12-17; 106177 Ammlnls-
Irazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, cons. 22; 199/82 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR. 3595; 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable o/RUe [1986] 
ECR 1651 cons. 17-20. 
251 See case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State ex parte Factorlame [1990] ECR 1-2433; also see 
A P Tash "Remedies for European Community Law claims in Member States courts: toward a European 
. . , h that ·'the Fac-
Standard" [1993] Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, pp.377-401, at 394 w 0 notes d' th t 
C II ·tied the new reme les a tortame case goes far further than Von Colson because the ourt actua y speci I 
the national courts must provide". C h' d drol'/ 
252 ..' • I" [1992] a lers e See P. Oliver, "Le drOlt communautalre et les VOles de recours natlOna es 
europeen, pp.348-374, at 348 and 353; also see R. Caranta, op. cit. , p.710. 
253 See J. Steiner, Enforcing EC Law (1995, Blackstone Press, London), p.l O. 
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Art.288(2) and the concurrent liability scenario in a positive and sympathetic manner. 
Moreover, it leads to the conclusion that the failure of France, Italy, Greece and EU in-
stitutions to offer effective protection constitutes another breach of EC law, which must 
be added in the list produced in Chapter 5. 
This brings us to an issue also raised in Chapter 5. The chapter concluded that 
breaches of EC law affect a large number of diverse areas of commercial activity, which 
tend to be common within the three selected Member States. These two factors render 
the identification of breaches ofEC law rather simple. Moreover, the decisiveness of the 
EU to enforce EC law was demonstrated by the detection and condemnation of all cases 
of violations chosen for presentation in Chapter 5. In view of this, it was quite difficult 
to justify the large number of breaches of EC law -some persistent- still occurring in 
France, Italy and Greece after more than forty years of European integration. The find-
ings of Chapters 6 and 7 confirm the doubts posed in Chapter 5 on the effectiveness of 
the restitution process at the national and ED levels. In fact, the combination of the van-
ity in pursuing the matter further for companies with the knowledge of Member States 
that the remedies available do not work in practice diminishes their fear of compensa-
tion orders and leads to the conclusion that these remedies are not as strong a deterrent 
as was initially expected. 
254 See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, 1997, op.cit., p.87. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions 
This thesis examined the legislative and administrative conditions for the secondary es-
tablishment of foreign public companies limited by shares in France, Italy and Greece. 
Its main aim was to assess whether the companies' freedom of establishment introduced 
by EC law is observed within the three selected countries. The thesis revolved around 
two main hypotheses. First, it was suggested that even after more than forty years of 
European integration the companies' freedom of establishment is not fully respected, at 
least in France, Greece and Italy. Second, one of the main reasons for the continuing 
breach of the freedom of establishment lies in the current lack of effective judicial pro-
tection for foreign companies at the national and ED levels. 
Chapter 2 examined EC law on the secondary establishment of foreign ED com-
panies in other ED Member States. Establishment includes the recognition of foreign 
companies as legal entities. EC law recognises foreign companies ipso jure. The deter-
mination of the companies' lex fori is rather complicated due to the parallel prevalence 
of two clashing legal theories of private international law in the legal systems of EU 
Member States. Thus, EC law accepts the recognition of foreign companies under either 
the lex of incorporation or of the real social seat Establishment is defined as the actual 
pursuit of economic activity through a fixed establishment. The permanent physical lo-
cation of the company in a Member State distinguishes between establishment and pro-
vision of services, which is defined as the exercise of activities on a temporary basis in a 
manner primarily addressed to the market of a state other than the receiving one. The 
nature of the freedom of establishment is described as a fundamental ED right existing 
irrespective of special secondary legislation. Secondary establishment, namely the ex-
pansion of a company's activities in other Member States through the creation of 
branches, agencies, offices or subsidiary companie~, is the only possible legal form of 
establishment in France, Italy and Greece. Ratione personae the freedom of establish-
ment covers all legal entities which are profit~aiming, are recognised within the EU, 
have an effective and continuous link with the economy of the host state, and comply 
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with the EU rules of origin or the special anti-dumping regul t' R' . 
a Ions. atlone lOCI the 
freedom applies to companies originating from the fifteen Memb St t d . . 
er a es an temtones 
with a special relationship with these states. Ratione materiae the Co d . l' tree om IS app lcable 
to all forms of financial and commercial independent activities (including maritime 
transport) and their corollary activities, irrespective of whether they have been ex-
pressly subjected to the freedom of establishment under secondary EC legislation. Na-
tional administrative or legal measures applied in a discriminatory manner restricting or 
prohibiting such activities for foreign companies breach their freedom of establishment. 
Chapter 2 provided the legal background for the comparative analysis of French, 
Italian and Greek laws with EC law on the various aspects of national requirements for 
the secondary establishment of foreign companies presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Chapter 3 referred to the first aspect of establishment, recognition. It analysed French, 
Greek and Italian laws on the recognition of foreign legal entities and evaluated their 
compliance with EC law as presented in Chapter 2. With reference to public companies 
limited by shares originating from other EU Member States, French, Greek and Italian 
law follow the liberal theory of recognition. Thus, in full compliance with EC law, such 
companies are recognised ipso jure, as long as they have legal personality according to 
the law of the lex fori, that is the law which regulates their formation, functioning, inter-
nal structure, external relationships and dissolution. This is determined by the com-
pany's true social seat, which is defined as the location where the main management, 
administration and financial activity of the company takes place. Since the company's 
seat as the determining criterion of its lex fori is also introduced by ArtsA3-48 EC, 
Greek, French and Italian laws on the recognition of foreign EU companies are in ab-
solute compliance with EC law. Discrepancies were observed between the national pro-
visions of the three selected countries and the 1968 Brussels Convention. These refer to 
companies which have been incorporated abroad but have their true seats in Greece, 
France and Italy. Their non-recognition is in breach of ArtA of the Convention which 
introduces the obligation of the signatory parties to recognise these companies subject to 
national mandatory provisions. Moreover, the right of companies which have failed to 
follow the conditions for their legal formation set by the law of their lex fori to appear 
before the French, Greek and Italian national courts violates the Brussels Convention 
. . . H .' of the recognition of the WhICh does not recognIse such companIes. owever, In VIew 
. . f EC I and the lack of ratifica-European ConventIon of Human Rights as a source 0 aw 
tion of the Brussels Convention, these discrepancies are not breaches of EC law. 
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Chapter 4 presented another aspect of national prerequisites for the secondary 
establishment of foreign ED public companies namely the ~orm I' . 
, l~ a reqUlrements for theIr 
establishment in France, Italy and Greece. In compliance with Directive 89/666 the 
formation of branches and agencies (secondary units with no separ t I al al' a e eg person Ity 
from the main primary unit) requires a relatively simple procedure mainly consisting of 
the registration of details both of the main company unit and the secondary establish-
ment to the company registry. Insofar as subsidiaries are concerned, the three selected 
countries introduce a very complex procedure. However, all three states follow the doc-
trine of the true social seat whose application on subsidiaries results in the characterisa-
tion of such companies as domestic. Thus, this procedure, albeit complex, is imple-
mented in a non-discriminatory manner and does not inhibit the companies' freedom of 
establishment. It must be noted however, that in view of the common provisions for the 
establishment of foreign ED and non-ED companies, the three countries' compliance 
with EC law is more a reflection of their open policy towards foreign companies, rather 
than a demonstration of their effort to comply with EC law. 
The third aspect of national prerequisites for the secondary establishment of for-
eign companies analysed in the thesis referred to the substantive conditions for such an 
establishment, that is to restrictive national regulations on the nature of the activities 
allowed to foreign companies which, having been recognised as legal entities, were al-
lowed to establish secondary commercial units in France, Italy and Greece. Specific ar-
eas of commercial activity were selected as case-studies and analysed in comparison 
with EC law in Chapter 5. The criteria for this selection were the common existence of 
breaches of EC law in the three selected countries, the existence of ECJ judgements de-
claring the relevant national laws as breaches of EC law and the continuing violation of 
EC law even after the judgement of the ECJ. The case-studies used in Chapter 5 proved 
beyond doubt that national laws and administrative practices do restrict, and conse-
quently violate, the companies' freedom of establishment in the three selected countries. 
Such violations affect a large nwnber of diverse areas of commercial activity, including 
trade in crude oil, commercial agents, education, tourism and shipping. In fact, the 
. . '1 of com-breaches discovered in the three selected Member States occur In simi ar areas 
mercial activity. This seems to be mainly due to ~he common protectionist interests 
shared by these countries, whose governments seem to be eager to protect the same ar-
h 0 • I nomy The persis-eas of trade, deemed of particular importance for t elr natlOna eco . 
., . 01 ~ domestic companies in tence of the three Member States to maintain some pnvl eges lor 
. . d' . of the Commis-particular areas of commercial activity is evident. SO IS the eClSlveness 
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sion and the ECJ to fulfil their role as enforcers of EC law d d b 
,emonstrate y the detec-
tion and condemnation of all cases of violations chosen for pre tat' 'th. 
sen IOn 10 IS chapter. 
This has forced Member States to abolish most direct breaches d t . . 
an 0 resort to 10dIrect 
and disguised discriminatory practices which by definition are t '1 d 
' no easI y etectable. 
The examination of such disguised breaches also demonstrated the effect of breaches of 
other freedoms, such as capital or services, to the establishment and functioning of for-
eign companies. The restrictive effect of such breaches on the right of establishment, 
which also affects adversely the access of such companies to justice at national level, 
seems to be ignored by the EU. However, the large number of violations detected by the 
Commission and declared by the ECJ shows that the problem of infringements in the 
area of establishment is well known to the EU. So is the persistence of certain breaches, 
such as those used as case-studies here, which continue years after a relevant condemn-
ing ECJ judgement. This phenomenon poses doubts on the effectiveness of the en-
forcement process at EU level and, consequently, the level of protection offered to 
companies at national and EU level. 
Having proven the first hypothesis in Chapter 5, Chapters 6 and 7 set out to 
prove the second hypothesis, namely that the continuing breaches of EC law in the field 
of company establishment are mainly due to the lack of judicial protection for compa-
nies suffering damages as a result of these The analysis of the relevant national provi-
sions led to two main conclusions. First, the doctrine on the substantive conditions for 
the establishment of state liability in these three Member States has been influenced to a 
great extent by the EU doctrine on state liability. Thus, a liberal legal regime allowing 
for the establishment of state liability under minimum substantive conditions has been 
formed in all three selected countries by reference to the recent case-law of the ECJ and 
the CFI. Second, the procedural conditions for the establishment of state liability intro-
duce considerable impediments in the access of individuals to justice in the case of state 
liability. The Italian system of distinction between legitimate interests and subjective 
rights leads to confusion as to the competent court for the application of the company 
for compensation. More importantly, the need for annulment of the wrongful act before 
the application for compensation is launched in a separate trial creates massive delays in 
the final award of justice and involves significant expenses for the company. The 
French lack of execution mechanisms against the state and the Greek ambiguity in the 
enforcement of administrative judgements leads to the decrease in the practical value of 
even final judgements of administrative courts .. The privileges still enjoyed by the state 
. .' t of the three selected 
validates the conclusion of Chapter 5 that the protectIOnlst na ure 
258 
legal systems is geared towards the maintenance of some degr fib 
ee 0 contro y the state. 
Moreover, they prove one element of the second hypothesis I h . 
, name y t e madequate 
means of protection of foreign companies at the national level. 
For the final proof of the second hypothesis, Chapter 7 examined the judicial 
protection of foreign companies seeking restitution for damages suffered as a result of 
breaches of EC law by the French, Italian and Greek authorities at the EU level. The 
role of the individual, natural and legal person, in direct proceedings before the Euro-
pean Courts is insignificant. At the ED level the only remedy which can result to a judi-
cial order for a Member State to pay damages to such companies is a combination of the 
state liability doctrine with a request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ. This remedy, 
also known as the Francovich scenario, offers foreign companies the opportunity to by-
pass some of the hurdles of national proceedings analysed in Chapter 6 by requesting 
reference of the case to the ECJ. The substantive conditions for the establishment of 
state liability under this scenario are minimal and, consequently, quite favourable to the 
applicant company. However, the procedural aspect of this scenario blocks the access of 
companies to effective judicial protection. The Francovich scenario is based on the pro-
ceedings for preliminary references, which requires reference of the issue from the na-
tionaljudge to the ECJ. The analysis of this mechanism showed that French, Greek and 
Italian judges are reluctant to co-operate with ECJ judges and refer to the ECl Moreo-
ver, since Francovich requires proceedings to be undertaken before the national courts 
under the national rules of procedure, the procedural problems of national procedures 
presented in Chapter 6 render judicial protection at the ED level equally ineffective with 
protection at the national level. The lack of effective protection for foreign companies 
by Member States and ED institutions constitutes a violation of the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection, which must be added to the list of breaches produced in Chapter 
5. Moreover, it justifies the occurrence of so many breaches of EC law after four dec-
ades of European integration and, thus, proves the second hypothesis of the thesis. 
The situation described in the thesis on the observance of the freedom of estab-
lishment of foreign companies and the protection offered to foreign companies whose 
right is circumvented is quite grim. For the evaluation of these conclusions, however, it 
is necessary to bear in mind that the countries selec~ed for presentation in this thesis are 
amongst the worst observers ofEC law. Moreover, the national laws chosen for analysis 
in the thesis are the most obvious examples of persistent violations of EC law in the 
field of company establishment, have been declared as breaches of EC law by the ECl 
often in more than one occasions and are still in the list of priorities of the Commission 
259 
for further action. Furthennore, companies seeking restitution under the circumstances 
examined in this thesis may draw some hope for protection from a possible future inter-
pretation of Art.288(2) and the concurrent liability remedy. Indeed, foreign companies 
may attempt to argue that the damages suffered is a result of concurrent liability be-
tween the Member State which failed to comply with its EU obligations and the Com-
munity due to the Commission's failure to fulfil its supervisory obligations. The legal 
basis of this remedy could be traced in the combination of Arts. 1 0 and 211. The main 
advantage of such a remedy, if accepted by the future case-law of the ECJ and the CFI 
, 
is that it would combine the liberal substantive conditions for the establishment of li-
ability introduced in the national and state liability remedies with uniquely favourable 
procedural requirements. The latter would include the practical lack of locus standi and 
time-limit conditions and must be assessed in combination with the abolition of the past 
doctrine of last resort by recent post-Francovich jUdgements. It must be noted, however, 
that the concurrent liability remedy has not been tried in practice and is therefore still 
only a theoretical possibility of protection. 
It would seem therefore that in order to put an end to violations in the field of 
company establishment, the EU must finally award a more significant role to foreign 
companies which must be allowed to take matters in their own hands and pursue the 
condemnation of violating Member States within the framework of the EU justice sys-
tem. One route for achieving this could be via the concurrent liability scenario. What 
remains to be seen is whether the ECJ is prepared to suffer another wave of objections 
to its activism in order to make the concurrent liability scenario part ofEC law. 
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Appendix 
New Numbering of Treaty Articles 
(Numbering according to Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam) 
(*) New Article introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(**) New Title introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(***) Title restructured by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
[Source: Treaty of Amsterdam] 
A. Treaty on European Union 
Previous numbering New numbering 
Title I Title I 
Article A Article 1 
Article B Article 2 
Article C Article 3 
Article D Article 4 
Article E Article 5 
Article F Article 6 
Article F.l * Article 7 
Title II Title II 
Article G Article 8 
Title III Title III 
Article H Article 9 
Title IV Title IV 
Article I Article 10 
Title V *** Title V 
Article J.l Article 11 
Article J.2 Article 12 
Article J.3 Article 13 
Article J.4 Article 14 
Article J.5 Article 15 
Article J.6 Article 16 
Article J.7 Article 17 
Article J.8 Article 18 
Article 1.9 Article 19 
Article 1.10 Article 20 
Article 1.11 Article 21 
Article J .12 Article 22 
Article 1.13 Article 23 
Article 1.14 Article 24 
Article J .15 Article 25 
Article J .16 Article 26 
Article J. 1 7 Article 27 
Article J .18 Article 28 
Title VI·*· Title VI 
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Article K.I Article 29 
Article K.2 Article 30 
Article K.3 Article 31 
Article K.4 Article 32 
Article K.5 Article 33 
Article K.6 Article 34 
Article K.7 Article 35 
Article K.8 Article 36 
Article K.9 Article 37 
Article K.I 0 Article 38 
Article K.II Article 39 
Article K.12 Article 40 
Article K.13 Article 41 
Article K.14 Article 42 
Title VIa ** Title Vll 
Article K.15 * Article 43 
Article K.I6 * Article 44 
Article K.17 * Article 45 
Title Vll Title VIll 
Article L Article 46 
Article M Article 47 
Article N Article 48 
Article 0 Article 49 
Article P Article 50 
Article Q Article 51 
Article R Article 52 
Article S Article 53 
B. Treaty establishing the European Community 
Previous numbering New numbering 
Part One Part One 
Article 1 Article 1 
Article 2 Article 2 
Article 3 Article 3 
Article 3a Article 4 
Article 3b Article 5 
Article 3c * Article 6 
Article 4 Article 7 
Article 4a Article 8 
Article 4b Article 9 
Article 5 Article 10 
Article 5a * Article II 
Article 6 Article 12 
Article 6a * Article 13 
Article 7 (repealed) 
Article 7a Article 14 
Article 7b (repealed) 
Article 7c Article 15 
Article 7d * Article 16 
Part Two Part Two 
Article 8 Article 17 
Article 8a Article 18 
Article 8b Article 19 
Article 8e Article 20 
Article 8d Article 21 
Article 8e Article 22 
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Part Three Part Three 
Title I Title I 
Article 9 Article 23 
Article 10 Article 24 
Article 11 (repealed) 
Chapter J Chapter J 
Section J (deleted) 
Article 12 Article 25 
Article 13 (repealed) 
Article 14 (repealed) 
Article 15 (repealed) 
Article 16 (repealed 
Article 17 (repealed) 
Section 2 (deleted) 
Article 18 (repealed) 
Article 19 (repealed) 
Article 20 (repealed) 
Article 21 (repealed) 
Article 22 (repealed) 
Article 23 (repealed) 
Article 24 (repealed) 
Article 25 (repealed) 
Article 26 (repealed) 
Article 27 (repealed) 
Article 28 Article 26 
Article 29 Article 27 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 30 Article 28 
Article 31 (repealed) 
Article 32 (repealed) 
Article 33 (repealed) 
Article 34 Article 29 
Article 35 (repealed) 
Article 36 Article 30 
Article 37 Article 31 
Title II Title II 
Article 38 Article 32 
Article 39 Article 33 
Article 40 Article 34 
Article 41 Article 35 
Article 42 Article 36 
Article 43 Article 37 
Article 44 (repealed) 
Article 45 (repealed) 
Article 46 Article 38 
Article 47 (repealed) 
Title III Title III 
Chapter J Chapter J 
Article 48 Article 39 
Article 49 Article 40 
Article 50 Article 41 
Article 51 Article 42 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 52 Article 43 
Article 53 (repealed) 
Article 54 Article 44 
Article 55 Article 45 
Article 56 Article 46 
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Article 57 Article 47 
Article 58 Article 48 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 
Article 59 Article 49 
Article 60 Article 50 
Article 61 Article 51 
Article 62 (repealed) 
Article 63 Article 52 
Article 64 Article 53 
Article 65 Article 54 
Article 66 Article 55 
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 
Article 67 (repealed) 
Article 68 (repealed) 
Article 69 (repealed) 
Article 70 (repealed) 
Article 71 (repealed) 
Article 72 (repealed) 
Article 73 (repealed) 
Article 73a (repealed) 
Article 73b Article 56 
Article 73c Article 57 
Article 73d Article 58 
Article 73e (repealed) 
Article 73f Article 59 
Article 73g Article 60 
Article 73h (repealed) 
Title IlIa * Title IV 
Article 73 i * Article 61 
Article 73j * Article 62 
Article 73k * Article 63 
Article 731 * Article 64 
Article 73m * Article 65 
Article 73n * Article 66 
Article 730 * Article 67 
Article 73p * Article 68 
Article 73q * Article 69 
Title IV Tille V 
Article 74 Article 70 
Article 75 Article 71 
Article 76 Article 72 
Article 77 Article 73 
Article 78 Article 74 
Article 79 Article 75 
Article 80 Article 76 
Article 81 Article 77 
Article 82 Article 78 
Article 83 Article 79 
Article 84 Article 80 
Title V Title VI 
Chapter 1 Chapter 1 
Section 1 Section 1 
Article 85 Article 81 
Article 86 Article 82 
Article 87 Article 83 
Article 88 Article 84 
Article 89 Article 85 
Article 90 Article 86 
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Section 2 (deleted) 
Article 91 (repealed) 
Section 3 Section 2 
Article 92 Article 87 
Article 93 Article 88 
Article 94 Article 89 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 95 Article 90 
Article 96 Article 91 
Article 97 (repealed) 
Article 98 Article 92 
Article 99 Article 93 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 
Article 100 Article 94 
Article 100a Article 95 
Article 100b (repealed) 
Article 100c (repealed) 
Article 100d (repealed) 
Article 101 Article 96 
Article 102 Article 97 
Title VI Title Vll 
Chapter I Chapter 1 
Article 102a Article 98 
Article 103 Article 99 
Article 103a Article 100 
Article 104 Article 101 
Article 104a Article 102 
Article 104b Article 103 
Article 104c Article 104 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 105 Article 105 
Article 105a Article 106 
Article 106 Article 107 
Article 107 Article 108 
Article 108 Article 109 
Article 108a Article 110 
Article 109 Article 111 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 
Article 109a Article 112 
Article 109b Article 113 
Article 109c Article 114 
Article 109d Article 115 
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 
Article 10ge Article 116 
Article I 09f Article 117 
Article 109g Article 118 
Article 109h Article I 19 
Article 109i Article 120 
Article 109j Article 121 
Article 109k Article 122 
Article 1091 Article 123 
Article 109m Article 124 
Title VIa (**) Title VIll 
Article 109n * Article 125 
Article 1090 * Article 126 
Article 109p * Article 127 
Article 109q * Article 128 
Article 109r * Article 129 
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Article 109s * Article 130 
Title VII Title IX 
Article 110 Article 131 
Article 111 (repealed) 
Article 112 Article 132 
Article 113 Article 133 
Article 114 (repealed) 
Article 115 Article 134 
Title VIla *. Title X 
Article 116 • Article 135 
Title VIII Title Xl 
Chapter I •• * Chapter J 
Article 117 Article 136 
Article 118 Article 137 
Article 118a Article 138 
Article 118b Article 139 
Article 118c Article 140 
Article 119 Article 141 
Article 119a Article 142 
Article 120 Article 143 
Article 121 Article 144 
Article 122 Article 145 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 123 Article 146 
Article 124 Article 147 
Article 125 Article 148 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 
Article 126 Article 149 
Article 127 Article 150 
Title IX Title Xll 
Article 128 Article 151 
Title X Title XIll 
Article 129 Article 152 
Title Xl Title XIV 
Article 129a Article 153 
Title XII Title XV 
Article 129b Article 154 
Article 129c Article 155 
Article 129d Article 156 
Title XIII Title XVI 
Article 130 Article 157 
Title XIV TitleXVll 
Article 130a Article 158 
Article 130b Article 159 
Article 130c Article 160 
Article 130d Article 161 
Article 130e Article 162 
Title XV Title XVIII 
Article 130f Article 163 
Article 130g Article 164 
Article 130h Article 165 
Article 130i Article 166 
Article 130j Article 167 
Article 130k Article 168 
Article 1301 Article 169 
Article 130m Article 170 
Article 130n Article 171 
Article 1300 Article 172 
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Article 130p Article 173 
Article 130q (repealed) 
Title XVI Title XIX 
Article 130r Article 174 
Article 130s Article 175 
Article 130t Article 176 
Title XVII Title AX 
Article 130u Article 177 
Article 130v Article 178 
Article 130w Article 179 
Article 130x Article 180 
Article 130y Article 181 
Part Four Part Four 
Article 131 Article 182 
Article 132 Article 183 
Article 133 Article 184 
Article 134 Article 185 
Article 135 Article 186 
Article 136 Article 187 
Article 136a Article 188 
Part Five Part Five 
Title I Title I 
Chapter I Chapter 1 
Section I Section 1 
Article 137 Article 189 
Article 138 Article 190 
Article 138a Article 191 
Article 138b Article 192 
Article 138c Article 193 
Article 138d Article 194 
Article 138e Article 195 
Article 139 Article 196 
Article 140 Article 197 
Article 141 Article 198 
Article 142 Article 199 
Article 143 Article 200 
Article 144 Article 201 
Section 2 Section 2 
Article 145 Article 202 
Article 146 Article 203 
Article 147 Article 204 
Article 148 Article 205 
Article 149 (repealed) 
Article 150 Article 206 
Article 151 Article 207 
Article 152 Article 208 
Article 153 Article 209 
Article 154 Article 210 
Section 3 Section 3 
Article 155 Article 211 
Article 156 Article 212 
Article 157 Article 213 
Article 158 Article 214 
Article 159 Article 215 
Article 160 Article 216 
Article 161 Article 217 
Article 162 Article 218 
Article 163 Article 219 
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Section 4 Section 4 
Article 164 Article 220 
Article 165 Article 221 
Article 166 Article 222 
Article 167 Article 223 
Article 168 Article 224 
Article 168 a Article 225 
Article 169 Article 226 
Article 170 Article 227 
Article 171 Article 228 
Article 172 Article 229 
Article 173 Article 230 
Article 174 Article 231 
Article 175 Article 232 
Article 176 Article 233 
Article 177 Article 234 
Article 178 Article 235 
Article 179 Article 236 
Article 180 Article 237 
Article 181 Article 238 
Article 182 Article 239 
Article 183 Article 240 
Article 184 Article 241 
Article 185 Article 242 
Article 186 Article 243 
Article 187 Article 244 
Article 188 Article 245 
Section 5 Section 5 
Article 188a Article 246 
Article 188b Article 247 
Article 188c Article 248 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 
Article 189 Article 249 
Article 189a Article 250 
Article 189b Article 251 
Article 189c Article 252 
Article 190 Article 253 
Article 191 Article 254 
Article 191 a * Article 255 
Article 192 Article 256 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 
Article 193 Article 257 
Article 194 Article 258 
Article 195 Article 259 
Article 196 Article 260 
Article 197 Article 261 
Article 198 Article 262 
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 
Article 198a Article 263 
Article 198b Article 264 
Article 198c Article 265 
Chapter 5 Chapter 5 
Article 198d Article 266 
Article 198e Article 267 
Title II Title II 
Article 199 Article 268 
Article 200 (repealed) 
Article 201 Article 269 
268 
Article 201 a Article 270 
Article 202 Article 271 
Article 203 Article 272 
Article 204 Article 273 
Article 205 Article 274 
Article 205a Article 275 
Article 206 Article 276 
Article 206a (repealed) 
Article 207 Article 277 
Article 208 Article 278 
Article 209 Article 279 
Article 209a Article 280 
Part Six Part Six 
Article 210 Article 281 
Article 211 Article 282 
Article 212 * Article 283 
Article 213 Article 284 
Article 213a * Article 285 
Article 213b * Article 286 
Article 214 Article 287 
Article 215 Article 288 
Article 216 Article 289 
Article 217 Article 290 
Article 218 * Article 291 
Article 219 Article 292 
Article 220 Article 293 
Article 221 Article 294 
Article 222 Article 295 
Article 223 Article 296 
Article 224 Article 297 
Article 225 Article 298 
Article 226 (repealed) 
Article 227 Article 299 
Article 228 Article 300 
Article 228a Article 301 
Article 229 Article 302 
Article 230 Article 303 
Article 231 Article 304 
Article 232 Article 305 
Article 233 Article 306 
Article 234 Article 307 
Article 235 Article 308 
Article 236 * Article 309 
Article 237 (repealed) 
Article 238 Article 310 
Article 239 Article 311 
Article 240 Article 312 
Article 241 (repealed) 
Article 242 (repealed) 
Article 243 (repealed) 
Article 244 (repealed) 
Article 245 (repealed) 
Article 246 (repealed) 
Final Provisions Final Provisions 
Article 247 Article 313 
Article 248 Article 314 
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List of cases - National Courts 
A.FRANCE 
Supreme Courts 
Cassation civil, 13 fevrier 1923, DP, 1923, 1, 52 
Civ. 25 July 1933,DP, 1936, 1, 121 
Civ. 7 July 1947, D., 1948, Somm., 9; JCP 1947, II, 3871, note J. L 
Civ. 30 March 1971, Rev. crit. dr. inter. prive, 1971,451, note Lagarde, JCP, 
1972.2.17101 and 17140, note Oppetit, J. Clunet, 1972, 834, note Loussouarn 
Civ. 1, 17 October 1972, Bull. civ. I, no 204; Rev. cr. dr. inter. prive, 1973, 520, note 
Batiffol; Rev. societes 1974, 127, note Bismuth 
Civ., 10 March 1976, Rev.crit.dr.pr., 1976,658 
Civ., Ire, 18 October 1978, Gaz. Pal., 1979, 1, 118, note Damien. 
Civ.1, 25 June 1991, Extraco Anstalt, Rev. crit., 1991,667,3 esp., note Khairallah, D 
1992 Som. 163, obs. Audit 
Civ., 2e, 20 July 1993, D., 1993, 526, note Chartier 
Cassation Comm. 20 October 1953, D., 1954, Somm., 13; JCP 1954, II, 7898, note 
Freyria 
Com. 16 December 1958, Bull. civ., III, no 438 
Com. 12 December 1972, Bull. casso 1972, 4, p.307 
Com., 21 December 1987, J.C.P., 198, II, 21113, note Montanier 
Com., 9 April 1991, RJDA, 7/91, 613 
Com., 9 March 1993, RJDA, 7/93, 617 
Com., 21 February 1995, Dalloz, 1995, IR 100 
Cassation Crim., 9 October 1875, Gazz. Pal., 1976, 1.4 
Crim. 4 August 1906, J. Clunet, 1907, 151 
Crim., 3 November 1983, JCP, 1985, II, 20360 
Crim., 10 May 1984, D., 1985, 256, note Penneau 
Crim 12 November 1990, Extraco Anstalt, Rev. 9rit. , 1991,667.2 
Casso req. 22 December 1986, S. 1987,1.84 . 
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Conseil d'Etat, 6 February 1903, Gr. Ar., no 12, concI. Romieu R 94 
, ec., p. 
C.E., 4 March 1910, Therond, Gr. Ar., no 24 
C.E., 31 July 1912, Ste des granits prophyroi"des des Vosges Gr A 29 
, . r., no 
C.E., 27 June 1919, ViaUat etfils, Rec. Lebon, 561 
C.E., 30 November 1923, Couiteas, G.A., 247 
C.E., 14 January 1938, La Fleurette, Leb., 1938,25 
C.E., 22 October 1943, Ste. des Etablissements Lacaussade, Leb., 1943,231 
C.E., 21 June 1944, Caucheteux et Desmond, Leb., 1944, 222 
CE, 7 February 1947, d'Aillieres, G. Ar., no 68 
C.E., 23 January 1953, Audoin, J.C.P., 1954, II, no 7916, note Vedel 
CoE., 5 February 1954, EI Hamidia, J. C.P., 1954, ii, NO 8136 
C.Eo, 20 April 1956, Epoux Bertin, Gr. Ar., no 91, concI. Long, note Waline, R.D.P., 
1956, po869 
C.E., 9 July 1956, Trassard, p.31 O. 
CoE., 19 October 1956, Soc.Le Beton, Gr. Ar., no 92, concl. Long, D., 1956, p.81 
C.Eo, 12 April 1957, Mimouni, Do, 1957, pA13, concI. Talcot, note PoL.J. 
C.E., Ass. plen., 6 March 1959, Secretaire d' Etat a I 'agriculture c/ Ste Fros Freres, 
Rec. Leb., 157 
CoE., 22 February 1960, D., 1960, 671, note Blancher 
C.E., 21 April 1962, Dame Agnesi, D. 1962, p.535 
C.E., 13 July 1962, Breart de Boisanger, D., 1962, p.664 
C.E., 5 January 1963, Bovero, Lebo, 1963, 53 
CoE., 15 March 1963, Centre hospitalier regional de Grenoble c/ Bosse, Rec. Lebon, 
po173 
C.E., 28 June 1963, Narcy, RoD.P., 1963, p.1188 
C.E., 13 July 1967, AUegretto,A.J., 1967, p.538 
C.E.,5 February 1969, Port autonome de Bordeaux, D.A .. , 1969, 109 
C.E., 3 November 1971, DUe Cannac, 650 
CoEo, 17 March 1972, DUe Jarrige, 222 
C.E., 13 October 1973, AoD.A.S.E.A. du Rhone, D., 1979, p.249, note Amselek et 
Waline 
C.E., 6 February 1974, Gomez, AJ, 456 
C.Eo, 22 November 1974, Federation des industries du sport, fC.P., 1975, L NO 2724 
C.E., 11 May 1979, Boulanger, 202 
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C.E., 18 December 1981, Ministre de la Culture et de la Comm . t' L b 
umc lOn, e., 1981, 478 
C.E., 23 March 1984, Alivar, Rec. Lebon, 1984, p.127, RTDE, 1984,341 
C.E., 19 April 1985, Comm. de VitroUes, RDP, 1985, 1701 
C.E., 17 May 1985, Mme Menneret, A.J.D.A., 1985, p.454 
C.E., 22 January 1986, DUe GreUier, AJ, 1986, 694 
C.E., 15 October 1986, Mme Leroux, A.J. D.A., 1986, p.716 
C.E., 27 May 1987, Legol! 
C.E., 20 January 1988, Aubin, Rec. Lebon, 1988,20; JCP, 1989, II, 21169, note 
Moderne, AJDA, 1988,418, note Pretot 
C.E., 23 December 1988, Martin, Leb., 1988, 470 
C.E., 29 June 1990, GISTI, unreported 
C.E., Ass., 28 February 1992, Societe Arizona Tabaco Products, A.J, 1992, 210, cone I. 
Laboque; [1993] 1 CMLRev. 252 
C.E., 19 February 1988, Association des proporietaires rivera ins et plaisanciers du 
cingle de Tremolat-Cales-Mauzac et autres, AJDA, 1988, 418 
Tribunal des Conflits, 8 February 1873, Blanco, Gr. Ar., 15 
T.C., 29 February 1908, Feutry, Gr. Ar., no 20 
T.C.,13 April 1908, de Fonscolombe, Rec., p.448 
T.C., 22 January 1921, Ste Commercile de l'Ouest africain, Gr. Ar., no 40 
T.C., 22 January 1921, Bac D' Eloka, Gr. Ar., no 40 
T.C., 26 May 1954, Moritz, J.C.P., 1954, II, no 8334, note Vedel 
T.C., 23 November 1959, JCP 1960.II.11430, note Aymond 
T.C., 10 July 1965, Ste Bourgogne-Bois, Rec., p.586 
T.C., 15 January 1968, Air-France c. Epoux Barbier, R.D.P., 1968, p.393 
Lower Courts 
Rennes Court d' Appel, 8 July 1981, Rev. crit. DIP, 1982 
Cour d'Appel, civ., 2, 13 January 1983, Gaz. Pal., 1983,444, note du Rusquec 
TGISeine, 1 February 1967, JCP, 1967, II, 15163,.noteFabre 
Tribunal Aix 23 October 1979, Bull. Aix 1979,4, p.31 
T. Colmar, 23 June 1950, D., 1951, 62, note R. Savatier 
T. civ. Metz, 22 February 1950, D., 1950, Somm., 46 
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T. civ. Mulhouse, 2 May 1950, Rev. cr. dr. inter. prive 1951, 157, note Niboyet 
T. Paris, 20 March 1944, D., 1945,24, note Basdevant 
T. Paris, 26 March 1966, D., 1966, Somm. 103; rev. crit. dr. inter. prive, 1968, 58, note 
Loussouam; Gaz. Pal., 1966, 1, 400 
T. Paris, 17 May 1967, D., 1968,313; JCP, 1968, II, 15427, note Oppetit 
T. Paris 17 October 1980, JCP, 80, ed. G, IV, 374 
Cour admin. d' appel de Lyon, 16 February 1989, Bente, JCP, 1990, II, 21521 
Cour admin. d'appel de Nancy, 9 July 1991, Ministre de l' economie, des finances et du 
buget v Societe Lefebvre, Rec. Lebon, 741 
Cour admin. d'appel de Nantes, 20 June 1991, Rec.Lebon, 1991, 742 
Cour administrative d'appel de Paris (form. plen.), 1 July 1992, Ste Jacques Dangeville, 
AJ, 1992, p.768 
Cour admin. d' appel de Paris, 12 November 1992, Rec. Lebon, 1992,790 
Trib. admin. Dijon, 15 April 1986, Societe venicole Berard SA, Rec. Lebon, 1986, 311, 
RTDE 1988, 112, note Soler-Couteaux 
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B.GREECE 
Supreme Courts 
Plenary Meeting of the Council of the State 722/54 
l:tE 3395/71, unreported 
l:tE 633175, unreported 
l:tE 1218/78, ToE, 1978, 367 
l:tE 4677/83, unreported 
1:tE 108411984, NoB, 1985, 342 
LtE 1955/87, NoB, 1987,716. 
l:tE 2625/89, EMLf, 1989, 374. 
l:tE 1275/89, Ltd, 1989, 1285 
l:tE 531189 and l:tE 4664/84, LlLl, 1990, 786, note Papahatj is 
LtE 75/90, LlLl, 1990, 788 
LtE 173/90, LlLl, 1990, 714 
OAl:tE 1470/90,LlLl, 1990,713 
LtE 3504/91, LlLl, 1991,294 
OALtE 654/93, LlLl, 1993, 67 
LtE 1338/93, LlLl, 1993, 714 
LtE 1648/93, LlLl, 1993, 714 
LtE 2283/95, LlLl, 1995,618 
LtE 113/96, LlLl, 1996, 611 
Supreme Court 64/1905, unreported 
An 17111907, unreported 
An 315/1911, ec!1., IIT,81 
An 20/1929, ec!1., M, 277 
All 130/1932, ecJ1-., Mr, 413 
An 2111934, unreported 
All 115/1935, e€Jlt~ MB', 1935, 333 
An 352/1953, ec!1., 8~, 736 
An 439/1954, unreported 
An 86411954, ec!1., 8l:T, 68 
All 64/1955, NoB, 1955,495 
All 3711957, EEN, 1957,483 
An 462/1957, NoB, 1957, III 
All 358/1966, unreported 
An 406/67, unreported 
An 106/1969, NoB, 1969,676 
An 466/1969, NoB, 1969, 50 
OAATI 108/71, NoB, 1971,601 
An 665/75, To~, 1976, 495 
All 61611976, unreported 
An 1070/76, unreported 
An 46111978, unreported 
An 132/79, ToE, 1986, 177 
An 515/1980, NoB, 1980, 1946 
All 72911981, NoB, 1982, 231 
An 1616/1981, EEN, 1981,861 
OAATI 490/82 NoB, 1982, 204 
OAATI 488/82, Elliv'7, 1982, 29 
An 316/1983, NoB, 1983, 1571 
An 595/85, Elliv'7, 1985, 300 
An 1627/1986, unreported 
An 418/78, NoB, 1978, 192 
An 913/1988, EA.~vl1, 1989, 1331 
An 59/1989, unreported 
AEA 1191, Elliv'7, 1991, 1480 
Lower Courts 
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Athens Court of Appeal 100211892, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 1137/1898, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 133511899, eej1.., lA, 262 
Athens Court of Appeal 446/1901, eej1.., If, 38 
Athens Court of Appeal 130/1904, eelL, I~T, 360 
Athens Court of Appeal 2041/1906, eej1.., IH, 601 
Athens Court of Appeal 1203/1910, eej1.., KB, 519 
Athens Court of Appeal 1416/1911, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 511/1912, unreported 
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Athens Court of Appeal 506/1915, Bcp., KZ, 548 
Athens Court of Appeal 458/1934, EEN, A, 400 
Athens Court of Appeal 262/1935, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 1103/1953, Bcp., 2Ll, 792 
Athens Court of Appeal 523/1960, ~tK., 1960,581 
Athens Court of Appeal 5432/1979, NoB, 1979, 1638 
Athens Court of Appeal 11711982, unreported 
Athens Court of AppeaI7261/86, Elliv,?, 1986, 156 
Athens Court of Appeal 2135/1987, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 7711/87, Elliv,?, 1987,329 
Athens Court of Appeal 4163/87, Elliv,?, 1987,942 
Athens Court of Appeal 17511988, unreported 
Athens Court of Appeal 1878/88, Elliv,?, 1988, 349 
Athens Court of Appeal 13605/88, Elliv,?, 1988,361 
Athens Court of Appeal 1361311988, NoB, 1989, 1299 
Corfu Court of Appeal 7511981, unreported 
Patras Court of Appeal 78911896, unreported 
Pireus Court of Appeal 65/1988, unreported 
Pireus Court of Appeal 163311989, unreported 
Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 1937/1974, unreported 
Athens Single-member Court of First Instance 6990/78, TOL, 1979, 649 
Athens Tri-member Court of First Instance 860/88, Llu1l1(, 1, 122 
Athens Court of First Instance, NoB, 1999, pp.986-988 
Patras Court of First Instance 145811932, Bcp., Mf, 808 
Pireus Court of First Instance 115211969, unreported 
Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 190311979, unreported 
Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 2400/1983, unreported 
Pireus Multi-member Court of First Instance 494/1987, unreported 
Sparta Single member Court of First Instance 74/1981, unreported 
Thessaloniki Court of First Instance 4911165, unreported 
Thessaloniki Court of First Instance 4868/60, unreported 
Athens Administrative Court of Appeal 1711(89, LlzLlzK, 1, 1362 
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Athens Administrative Court of First Instance 1047211990, APIl., ME, 1991,93 
Athens Three-member Administrative Court of First Instance 15222/90, AA, 1991, 1067 
--
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C. ITALY 
Supreme Courts 
Corte costituzionaie, 25 marzo 1980, n.35, Foro it., 1980, I, 889 
C.C., 908/1983, unreported 
C.C. 2134/1982, unreported 
C.C., 8 maggio 1998, n.165, Giur. it., 1998, 1929 
Corte dei Conti, Sez. I centrale, 6 agosto 1997, Foro amm., 1998, 1243 
Corte dei Conti, Sez. riun., 23 settembre 1997, Foro am., 1998, 1238 
Corte dei Conti, Sez. Basilicata, 10 febbraio 1998, Foro am., 1998, 2579 
Consiglio dello Stato, sez. IV, 11 maggio 1966, n. 370, Cons. St., 1966, 928 
C.S., 26 aprile 1977, n.1561, unreported 
C.S., 15 ottobre 1975, n.3334, unreported 
C.S., sent. 18 settembre 1970, n.1572, unreported 
C. S., sez. V, 28 febbraio 1975, n.233, unreported 
C. S., ad. plen., 19 ottobre 1979, n. 24, unreported 
C. S., ad. plen. 29 gennaio 1980, n. 2, unreported 
C. S., sez. IV, 29 aprile 1980, n. 473, unreported 
C. S., ad. plen., 19 marzo 1984, n.6, unreported 
C. S., sez. V, 5 giugno 1985, n. 230, unreported 
C.S., Sez. II, 19 giugno 1991, n.570, Foro it., 1994, III, 66 
C.S., Sez. V, 4 novembre 1991, Foro am., 1994, 11,1257 
C.S., Sez. IV, 18 gennaio 1996, n.54, Giust. civ., 1996, 1191 
Cassazione, 17 febbraio 1939, Foro it., repert., 1939, 1568 
Cass., 1 luglio 1941, Foro amm., 1941, II, 90 
Cass., 23 giugno 1949, Foro it., repert., 1949, 1429 
Cass., civ., sez. Un., 30 luglio 1953, n.2593, unreported 
Cass., 26 ottobre 1955, No 3491, Foro it., 1956, I, 335 
Cassazione, 26 ottobre 1955, No 3491, Foro it., 1956, I, 335 
Cassazione, sez. un., 15 novembre 1960, No 3041, Giust. civ., 1961, 650 
Cass., Sez. un., 20 gennaio 1964, n. 126, unrepo.rted 
Cassazione, sez. I, 30 novembre 1967, No 2854, Giust. civ. Mass., 1967, 148 
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Cassazione, 26 maggio 1969, Foro it., 1969, I, 2538 
Cass., 19 novembre 1971, no 3319, unreported 
Casso 14 ottobre 1972, n.3060, unreported 
Cassazione, sez. III, 10 dicembre 1974, 1806, unreported 
Cassazione, 18 novembre 1977, n.5042, Giust. civ., 1978, I, 19 
Cass., 8 maggio 1978, n. 2208, TAR. Em. Rom., 26 gennaio 1977, n. 28 
Casso Civ., sez. III, 11 ottobre 1978, n. 3542, unreported 
Cassazione, 20 ottobre 1978, no 4750, RFI, 1978, voce Societa, c.2502, n.348 
Casso Civ., sez. III, 11 gennaio 1979, n. 220, unreported 
Casso Civ., sez. II, 5 febbraio 1979, n.764, unreported 
Casso Civ., sez. I, 161uglio 1979, n. 4139, unreported 
Cass.,50ttobre 1979, n.5145, unreported 
Cass., 5 ottobre 1979, n.5146, unreported 
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